TROOP LIST
1. Hq & Hq Co, 3d Inf Div
2. 7th Infantry
3. 15th Infantry
4. 30th Infantry
5. 3d Inf Div Arty
9th FA Bn
10th FA Bn
39th FA Bn
41st FA Bn
141st FA Bn
II/62d FA Bn (Fr)
802d FA Bn
773d (4.5) FA Bn
6. 254th Inf Regt (-)
7. 3d Bn, 112th Inf Regt
8. 441st AAA A W Bn
9. 2d Plat, Btry A, 353d (S/L) Bn'
10. 10th Engr Bn (C)
3d Bn, 40th Engr Regt.
11. 256th Engr (C) Bn
12. 3d Rcn Troop
13. 3d Med Bn
14. 3d Signal Co
15. 756th Tank Bn
16. 601st TD Bn
17. 99th Cml Mortar Bn
168th Cml Co (SG)
21st Cml Co
18. 5 DB (Fr)
19. Air Support
Although many units of the 3d Division seized the' opportunities offered them to rest and rehabilitate in and near Strasbourg, at no time was the Division off the front lines or out of contact with the enemy.
Following elimination of the Kehl bridgehead (with the weird "Battle of the Apartments," and the end, by German surrender, of the publicized Mutzig "Ostfort"), nightly contacts in the form of vicious exchanges of fire across the Rhine punctuated the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments' otherwise almost monotonous vigil along the banks of the river.
The 3d Infantry Division was on the defensive for the second time in the war, but despite the lack of face-to-face contact it was an uneasy period. Through no direct connection with our activities, stalemate had overcome the Division as a whole. A crossing in strength of the Rhine River was not then feasible nor contemplated; consequently a good deal of wonderment was in store as to the immediate future.
To the north, other units of the Seventh Army were pushing into southern Germany. To the south, First French Army, with the U. S. 36th Infantry Division attached, found, with a growing realization that it still had on its hands an embarrassing German bulge west of the Rhine, and that temporarily it was unable to do anything about it. As the Germans, to preserve Colmar, pushed back some French units and elements of the 36th Division around Selestat, the fact emerged that here was no mere line on the situation map to be wiped out at leisure, but a stubbornly fighting pocket of enemy who were becoming fortified more strongly daily, and that a full-scale coordinated army-sized attack was going to be required to eliminate them.
At first it was called "the bridgehead around Colmar," but as it persisted, a name was given it which stuck: "Colmar Pocket." The 3d Infantry Division was to learn that it was a pocket bulging with fortifications and sudden death; and an area whose elimination was to develop into our second greatest fight of the entire war-some said the greatest-in the same degree of ferocity as the attack to break the Anzio "iron ring." Yet, even following the elimination of the Colmar Pocket, comparatively few persons on the outside knew Colmar-if they knew of it at all-as anything more than the name of an upper Alsatian city whose liberation came only after a lengthy period of waiting.
Following receipt of the Seventh Army order that 3d Infantry Division would relieve 36th Infantry Division, 30th Infantry was designated as the vanguard, and commenced moving south on the afternoon of December 13, to be attached to the 36th.
The complete force was dubbed "Task Force McGarr" ----also named because Col. Lionel C. McGarr (then acting Assistant Division Commander) was ordered to lead it into the Colmar Pocket action. Lt. Col. Richard H. Neddersen commanded the 30th Infantry. Initially the force was composed of the complete 30th Infantry; 41st Field Artillery Battalion; Company C of the 10th Engineers; Battery D, 441st Antiaircraft Battalion; a section of tanks from Company B, 753d Tank Battalion; and a platoon of tanks and a section of tank destroyers.
The 30th Infantry, of all the 3d Division units, had had the least rest. During its 15-day stay in Strasbourg the 1st Battalion had been attached to the 2 DB (LeClerc's famed 2d Armored) for the five-day engage ment near Kogenheim for which twenty-three officers and men had been awarded the Croix de Guerre. Company E, in addition, had been assigned the mission of neutralizing the Mutzig fort, which it accomplished successfully.
The regiment's attack, following its commitment in the Colmar Pocket, got off between 0700 and 0800, December 15, the three battalions attacking simultaneously from assembly areas in the vicinity of Aubure and Freland. The 2d and 3d Battalions moved through the mountainous forest of Sigolsheim into firing positions near Ursprung. The first opposition was encountered by Company 1, which received intense enemy machine-gun fire at 1300 from a force emplaced on Hill 651, an irregular mountainous mass that dominated the then critically important Toggenbach-Alspach area. After a 25-minute firefight, Company I destroyed three machine guns, and killed several enemy riflemen.
The two assault battalions moved across the twin hillmasses flanking Toggenbach. At 1417 approximately fifty Germans, manning concrete and earthwork emplacements of World War I type on Hill 672, opened fire on Company E with machine guns, machine pistols, and rifles. Company E accepted the challenge. In a swift flanking movement it overwhelmed this segment of the German outpost line of resistance and swept southwest along the rugged wooded ridge toward Hill 621. The movement of the battalion along the ridge line which pointed like an arrow at Kaysersberg directly to the south was harassed by continuing smallarms and automatic fire, but the advance was uninterrupted.
The 3d Battalion meanwhile advanced on Toggenbach, a cluster of houses between Aubure and Kaysersberg. A roadblock, manned by a determined German force, was reported 1300 meters north of the village, and a combat patrol was dispatched to demolish it. Sgt. William A. Nagowski was instrumental in clearing this roadblock. Another 3d Battalion patrol sliced the highway south of Toggenbach at 1500 after a brisk fire fight.
While Company G was pounded by heavy howitzer fire along the high ground north of Hill 666, Company E organized night positions to the east of the Toggenbach road and plans were completed for the final assault on the village. One platoon of Company K guided on the ridge line for the attack, but encountered a large force of determined enemy on the hillside due west of the village. Fighting in dim light in deep weeds at almost hand-to-hand range, the platoon took eighteen prisoners and killed or wounded the remainder of the German force.
Company G moved through a tempest of howitzer fire to establish night positions, at the north base of Hill 666. Companies E and G were deluged by heavy artillery concentrations during the night, in one of which 2d Battalion CO Lt. Col. Frederick R. Armstrong was killed while personally assisting his most advanced assault unit-Company G---in its forward drive. Maj. James L. Osgard succeeded him.
At 2200 Company M headquarters repulsed a 10 man enemy patrol, wounding six of the attackers.
As engineers cleared the Toggenbach-Kaysersberg road of mines, tanks thrust their way through Toggenbach. At 1835, patrols of Company B established contact with Company I inside the village. Tanks and engineers with bridging materials moved up to await patrol reports on suitable crossing sites over the Weiss River. The report came back at 2250 that the stream could be crossed without difficulty near the Kaysersberg road, although the stream was swift and elsewhere the banks steep.
Two separate reconnaissance patrols, one from Company 1, the other from the 1st Battalion I & R Platoon., thrust into Kaysersberg, heart of the enemy defensive position, engaged an antitank strongpoint and drew withering fire from the buildings.
In the first day's action Toggenbach had. been captured, the Toggenbach-Alspach road cleared, a vital bridge site over the Weiss seized, and the first five houses in Kaysersberg taken. In addition 2d Battalion had taken Hill 672, establishing a line of departure to attack Hills 666 and 621.
On December 16 the Task Force was strengthened by the addition of Companies C of: 756th Tank Battalion, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 3d Medical Battalion, all normal attachments to the 30th.
The three battalions of the 30th were now ready to join in the -assault on Kaysersberg, located on the rim of the Rhine plain where the Weiss River flows through a narrow channel between rugged, forested mountain masses, which flank the town to the north and south. East is the flatland of the Rhine; west the valley winds upward through the hills toward the La Bonhomme pass, one of the main corridors through the Vosges.
The 1st Battalion drew the assignment of crossing the Weiss and ascending the steep slopes of Hill 512, south of the town. The 2d Battalion was to thrust its way down the precipitous, oblong mountain mass to the north of Kaysersberg, consisting of Hills 616 and 612. The 3d Battalion had the assignment of driving into Kaysersberg itself, to clear the town.
There were confused clashes between patrols and isolated enemy groups as the 30th Infantry moved silently forward to join the battle in the early morning hours of December 16.
By 0630 Company B had moved through the factory area of Kaysersberg and found no enemy. The battalion attack on Hill 512 commenced. The main force was preceded by a screen of scouts, especially coached by Maj. Mackenzie E. Porter to be on the alert to report all evidences of enemy activity. Aim of the battalion commander was to gain his objective by stealth, avoiding all fighting until the troops were established on the crest of the hill.
Using circuitous routes, the 1st Battalion reached the trail net on Hill 512, which constituted the point agreed upon with French Goums. By 0930 the entire hill was cleared with no contact other than overrunning a five man enemy observation -post. The enemy began pound ing the hill with mortar fire. The 1st Battalion sent out patrols to guard its positions and repel all counter attacks.
Meanwhile Company I had thrust aggressively into Kaysersberg from the southeast, followed by Company K and supporting armor. The hard, bloody work of house-clearing began. Withering small-arms fire whipped up and back the narrow streets as our troop'. advanced. Company 1 changed commanders twice during the battle for the town.
By 1300, footholds had been gained in the heart of the town, at heavy cost. The 3d Battalion CP set up in Kaysersberg, and the work of clearing snipers con tinued. Suddenly, the enemy launched an all-out coun terattack to regain his principal stronghold. Tank opened fire on 3d Battalion troops in the town, while at the same time Companies I and L were hit from th( east by a force of 300 Germans. Heavy artillery, mortar, tank, and machine-gun fire poured in on the troops in the town.
The counterattack continued for two hours, during which numerous separate acts of heroism stood out. The attack was repulsed, but the powerful German force, still determined to regain Kaysersberg, established and entrenched itself around the city, gathering its strength for new counterblows.
Meanwhile, 2d Battalion had commenced its attack on the hill mass north of Kaysersberg and east of the Toggenbach-Kaysersberg road. At 1300, Company E's 1st platoon moved to the nose of the long hill which ended at Kaysersberg while Companies F and G continued their slow advance along the wooded slopes of Hill 666 against heavy opposition.
The enemy held the oval hill mass with a determined force of crack troops, abundantly supplied with all types of weapons, and greatly aided by the concrete and earthwork strongpoints originally built by the French in the early part of the war.
The way was prepared by Cannon Company fire on Ammerschwihr and systematic pounding of the hostile hill positions with mortar rounds and machine-gun fire. The battalion then moved toward the crest. By midafternoon Company G was halted by fire from three concrete machine-gun emplacements, which were difficult to locate due to the dense vegetation in which they were sited. At approximately the same time Company F found its attack interrupted by intense fire from six defiladed enemy machine guns.
The 2d Battalion decided to postpone its attack and made preparations for a full-scale assault the following day. The engineers began to clear roads to the hill positions so that three tanks, assigned to the battalion from the 756th, could be brought into action. While diversionary fire was laid on the West Side of the Hill Company E was to attack from the east. Clearing of these two hills was considered the key to the position and the central objective of Task Force McGarr.
The 1st Battalion, which had seized its objective swiftly and without strong opposition, rained artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire from Hill 512 on the Germans fleeing from Kaysersberg. A decision was made to strike southward from the hill crest, setting up a roadblock at Bridge 267, commanding an important east-west highway leading from Ammerschwihr. First Lt. Charles P. Murray, Jr., CO of Company C, led the two platoons which performed this mission and in accomplishing it performed an outstanding deed of gallantry and intrepidity to the successful accomplishment of the mission.
Unwilling to risk his men in the attack, Murray went forward with an SCR 536 to a suitable vantage point. Here he attempted to place artillery on the withdrawing enemy, but found his radio out of commission. Returning to his platoon he borrowed an M-1 with grenade-launcher attachment, returned to his exposed position, and opened fire on the enemy. The German force of 200 replied with intense fire, but Lieutenant Murray stayed at his post until all of his ten grenades, had been thrown. He withdrew to secure a BAR and returned to his hazardous position to engage the enemy in a half-hour attack. Fighting alone, he compelled the Germans to withdraw leaving three 120mm mortars, then directed mortar fire on the withdrawing enemy with devastating effect; he led his men forward in an assault from foxhole to foxhole although wounded in eight places by an exploding grenade. He personally killed twenty and captured eleven of the enemy, for which he later received the Nation's highest award-the Congressional Medal of Honor.
On December 17, fighting in the Kaysersberg salient reached a climax. The 2d Battalion continued its difficult drive to seize the hill masses north of the city, and 1st Battalion weathered a furious German counterattack which was delivered with great power and determination. The 3d Battalion drove deeper into Kaysersberg under accelerated enemy artillery and mortar fire. Company I directed tank-destroyer fire on a medieval tower north of Kaysersberg which the enemy was employing as an observation post. Companies K and L advanced to the south and southwest of town and toward the base of Hill 512. Tank and bazooka fire was received from the northwest edge of the city, but the battalion directed artillery on the tanks, destroying one.
The fighting still continued unabated at noon. Heavy fighting also occurred at the Weiss River bridge. The enemy jabbed at 3d Battalion's positions with smallscale tank-infantry attacks. Attack and counterattack continued throughout the day with unflagging violence. By midnight the enemy was definitely losing his hold.
The 2d Battalion jumped off on its all-out attack at 0645, December 17. Three tanks from the 756th Tank Battalion supported Company F in its attack on Hill 621 as Companies E and G drove on Hill 666, making such rapid progress that the section from Battery D, 441st AAA ("anti-anything, anytime") Battalion, which had fired sixty-three rounds of 37mm high-explosive shells and 2660 rounds of cal. .50 ammunition, was obliged to lift fire. Company E scaled the precipitous slope, losing eight men killed and seventeen wounded, but reaching the summit and killing, wounding, or capturing all Germans there. Simultaneously Company G made its frontal assault on the hill through a screen of enemy howitzer, mortar, machinegun, and Panzerfaust fire.
Hills 666 and 621 were cleared by 1130, with at least fifty Germans killed and a hundred wounded, plus thirty prisoners. Twenty machine guns were destroyed, and three mortars captured, as well as a vast quantity of small arms and ammunition.
Companies E and G regrouped and drove southeast toward Company F on Hill 621, encountering strong ,enemy opposition. In the fierce fight to make this linkup, troops of the battalion destroyed five more machine guns. They also killed thirty and captured forty-five more Germans in the all-afternoon fight, and themselves took heavy casualties. Contact was made with Company F at 1545 by Company G. The companies -immediately began to organize night defensive positions. Despite incessant German infiltration and savage patrol combat in the forests, the battalion succeeded in maintaining its grip on the high ground.
The 1st Battalion's daylong fight had commenced with a German counterattack, delivered by an entire regiment, driving from three directions at once. The enemy swarmed toward Hill 512 from Ammerschwihr and Kaysersberg, hitting Company B's line at 0811.
The battalion had not had time to consolidate its hill-positions and tie in closely with the remainder of the Task Force. There was but one mountain trail to the summit of Hill 512. No armor had been able to get to the summit and the battalion requirements of ammunition, food, and water had to be hand-carried up the trail, necessitating a four-hour trip each time.
At 0825 approximately a hundred enemy advanced from the southeast to drive a wedge between Companies B and C on the high ground designated Objective "X." By 0840 the three prongs of the enemy counterattack had overrun the eastern nose of the battalion position.
The Battalion CO, Major Porter, placed artillery fire on the enemy's rear to prevent reinforcement of the counterattack and pounded the Germans with a mortar concentration. The enemy, however, continued to gain ground, overrunning the eastern end of Company C's position.
Major Porter consolidated his forces and ordered the battalion to hold the high ridge line at all costs. The nose of the hill had been temporarily lost, but the crucial ridge line and the road net junction were firmly in our hands. The reinforced platoon at Bridge 267, finding itself isolated by the sudden counterattack, now fought its way back through hostile lines, finally reaching the ridge to join the defense.
The battalion engaged the Germans from its high ground position in a fire fight that lasted all day and all night. The enemy forces were composed of German officer candidates, who had been promised that once they regained Kayserberg and the surrounding hills they would be returned to Germany to complete their courses. Fresh, fanatical, and more intelligent than the average Landser, these men fought with skill and determination. By the end of the day an estimated fifty had been killed and twice that number wounded.
The German recapture of Bridge 267 was disastrous -for the enemy. Mortar and artillery fire placed on the bridge and roadblock was so intense that the enemy retreated leaving behind twenty-five dead.
On December 18 Task Force McGarr was further strengthened by the addition of Company B, 99th Chemical Battalion, but the battalion's tank and tankdestroyer support from the French CC4 and 753d Tank Battalion was withdrawn.
At daybreak 1st Battalion was still weathering furious counterattacks. It was noticed by Major Porter that the enemy chose the same avenues of assault; accordingly, he regrouped his forces so that they could effectively control with enfilading small-arms and machine gun fire and mortars, the draws and pathways along which the enemy so persistently advanced.
The supply problem grew more acute. The battalion rear echelon was mobilized, almost, entirely, to carry ammunition. Supplies were thus assured for the rest of the day.
Patrols were sent from the beleaguered hill position. First Sgt. Nicholas F. Kiwatisky of Company B reflected the temper of several valorous actions by leading his small patrol deep into enemy territory, killing a machine gunner and assistant with M-1 fire at 200-yard range, and moving straight into the core of the German position to silence a second machine gun and kill seven enemy soldiers single-handedly.
By 1300 the battalion had repulsed three counterattacks; from the east, from Ammerschwihr, and from the southeast, each of them consisting of from 200 to 300 men supported by tank and self-propelled-gun fires. Three more counterattacks were hurled against the battalion during the afternoon and all were repelled. By 1845, after bringing the combined weight of all fires on the enemy, the counterattacks ceased. At 2055 a check revealed that 1st Battalion had not lost an inch of ground during the day's counterattacks.
During the morning of the 18th, the 2d Battalion expelled the Germans from their last remaining positions around Hill 621, then continued its drive to the southwest to link up with the Task Force positions in Kaysersberg. Company F remained behind to eliminate a small German pocket.
The 3d Battalion received counterattacks during the day but pressed forward, tightening its control over Kaysersberg and establishing patrol contact with the French CCV at approximately 1300. Company L, having cleared its sector of Kaysersberg, was ordered to move up the hill south of town to join 1st Battalion and reinforce its west flank. Preparations were made for the final attack to eliminate the enemy from his remaining positions on and around Hill 512.
The primary task of December 19 was to smash the German positions in the 1st Battalion sector. Tremendous preliminary fires deluged the enemy line. At 0815 1st Battalion, with Companies B and C in the assault, fell on the German force. By 0920 the enemy was driven in confusion from the nose of the hill which he had fought so desperately to retain. Dazed by the furious fire, the Germans put up little more than token resistance. Then, at 1115, Company C reported the establishment of contact with the French in Ammerschwihr and set up and manned a roadblock at Bridge 267.
Company F eliminated the pocket in its zone after a fierce fire fight, destroying eight machine guns and three mortars and taking eleven prisoners, then continued over Hill 21 and entered Kayserberg at 1100.
At 1845 two battalions of enemy were sighted approaching Task Force positions from the west. Company C set up a roadblock on the Alspach-Kaysersberg road to thwart this move and brought a section of Flakwagons up for its defense.
At daybreak on December 20, the 441st Flakwagons fired 4,900 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition and 170 rounds of 37mm HE ammunition, saturating the woods where the Germans were preparing their counterattack. The 30th Infantry, with the aid of this fire, shattered this counterattack before it got under way.
At 1030 another and final enemy blow was reported in preparation, this time from the south in the vicinity of Bridge 267. Again the Task Force deluged the assembly areas of the Germans with artillery, mortar, and cannon fire.
Results of the entire mission, now completed, were striking. A 5,000-meter German penetration between the 3d French DIA (Division Infanterie Algerienne) and the 36th U. S. Infantry Division had been sealed off and smashed, opening a vital supply artery from St. Die' to the Rhine Valley for the passage of troops and materiel. A preliminary battle to the major offensive that was to obliterate the Colmar Pocket had been waged and won.
The accomplishment of this task involved the most exacting type of mountain warfare in icy weather. Scaling steep slopes, their passage barred by a tangled undergrowth and a maze of forest, subjected to harrowing fire from German casemates of timber, earthwork, and concrete, the men of Task Force McGarr had fought with determination and quiet heroism.
Prisoner interrogation revealed that nine battalions of German infantry, two of engineers, a specialized support battalion and a minimum of four artillery battalions had been shattered.
The victory was accomplished at a cost to the Task Force of fifty-eight killed, eighteen missing, and 190 wounded. In comparison, known enemy losses were 298 killed, 327 prisoners, and an estimated 1185 wounded. In addition the enemy lost four tanks, twelve mortars, two Flakwagons, forty machine guns, and a large number of artillery pieces.
The 41st Field Artillery Battalion fired 7226 rounds Of 105mm howitzer ammuntion in seventy-four concentrations arid ten TOTs (time on target, a system whereby the fire of all guns of a given number of artillery units is brought to bear simultaneously). Cannon Company fired 5864 rounds of 105 and 75mm ammunition, and a total of ninety-nine rounds of 4.2 mortar ammunition were expended by Company B, 99th Chemical Battalion.
(Beginning December 16, the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies of Field Marshal von Rundstedt lashed out in a counteroffensive in Belgium and Luxembourg which stunned the entire Allied camp. Known later as "Battle of the Bulge," German elements achieved a maximum penetration of approximately fifty-five miles before the tide of battle turned and Third and Ninth Armies to either flank of the attacked United States First Army began slashing at the sides of the Bulge. Colmar Pocket, in the big picture, was an irritating little red greasepencilled twist on the lower end of the situation map, only a minor battle-unless one was there.)
On December 17 the 3d Infantry Division began moving south for the continuance of the relief of 36th Infantry Division. The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, was first relieved, to commence its move to the vicinity of Riquewihr, where it closed in on the following day. The 3d and 1st Battalions followed it on December 19. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Infantry, were completely relieved on defensive positions in Strasbourg by other elements of the 36th Division, and command of the former 36th sector passed to Brigadier General Robert N. Young (commanding the Division in the absence of General O'Daniel, on temporary duty in the United States) at 1430, December 21.
Two days later, December 23, the 15th Infantry launched an attack against the two towns of Bennwihr and Sigolsheim, as the first step in securing a more stable line of defense. Defense was the keynote at this time. Seventh Army had received a sizable German counterattack against its barely-won positions in southern Germany and was forced to withdraw to a more tenable line in lower Alsace. It was known that the Germans had announced their intentions of retaking Strasbourg, if possible, as a "Christmas present" for der Fuhrer and a pincers between the forces opposing Seventh Army forces and those opposing French First Army, of which the 3d Infantry Division was now a part, was considered a definite possibility. Our first step, therefore, was to secure Bennwihr and Sigolsheim, the last two towns of any size between that part of our line and the key city of Colmar, and to drive the Germans from all high ground north of a line Sigolsheim--Kayersberg.
Sigolsheim and Bennwihr are located at the extreme western edge of the Alsace Plain and just east of the last high slopes of the Vosges. Advance reconnaissance indicated that Sigolsheim in particular was strongly occupied by the enemy, and later events proved this to be entirely true.
Besides drawing the assignment to take the two towns, 15th Infantry also had the mission of clearing Hill 351, a high mass that lies between them.
The 15th's drive was directed east from positions in the vicinity of Kientzheim, which was held by the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Keith L. Ware, was to capture Sigolsheim; the 3d Battalion, under Maj. John O'Connell, to attack Bennwihr, and the 2d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Eugene A. Salet, was to block and support the attack of the other battalions from positions on the northern slope of Hill 351.
At H-hour, 0730, Companies A and C attacked. Particularly stiff resistance was encountered just before reaching the town when a convent just north of it was found to be an enemy stronghold, with enemy manning machine guns, mortars, and small arms. After a stiff two-hour fight Company A succeeded in pressing through and past this opposition to reach the edge of town at noon.
The entrance of Company A into the town of Sigolsheim was only a forerunner to a terrific fight that lasted five days. The small village was a shambles, having been reduced by our bombers and artillery, and by tank and tank-destroyer fire provided by the 601st and 756th attachments to 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, under command of Lt. Colonel Ware.
The 3d Battalion, meanwhile, had marched south from Mittelwihr in the morning and attacked Bennwihr from the north and west. Companies I and K under command of Capts. Warren M. Stuart and Robert W. Hahn, respectively, moved into the town at 0800, and it seemed as if resistance would be light until Company K suddenly came under terrific fire from a school near the center of the village.
Accepting the challenge, Company K stormed the school. The enemy was entrenched in the rubble of houses and cellars, and resisted bitterly. Finally Company K drove the enemy from the school and established the buildings as a temporary PW cage. The conquest, however, was short-lived. A desperate enemy counterattack was launched that afternoon and the Germans retook the school and some sixty prisoners who were being held in it. Enemy armor figured strongly in this attack and a Mark IV tank was reported to have withstood several bazooka and rifle-grenade shots which apparently struck it squarely. As darkness came the 3d Battalion withdrew slightly to prepare for another attack the following morning.
In Sigolsheim, too, there was a bitter fight. Several armored vehicles of the 756th Tank Battalion, under command of Lt. Col. Glenn F. Rogers, bogged down in the muddy terrain, thus reducing the striking power of out force.
Complete penetration into the village had not been accomplished and the battalion was still attempting to gain a good toehold in Sigolsheim when the enemy counterattacked from the center of town with infantry and armor late that night, and from the direction of Hill 351 to the north, with mortar and artillery fire. The position became untenable and 1st Battalion relinquished its slender hold on Sigolsheim and, under orders, withdrew to Kientzheim and Riquewihr for the night.
It was now apparent that before any position in Sigolsheim could be held the enemy must be driven completely from Hill 351, or else the same thing would happen again.
During darkness Companies K and L, the latter commanded by 1st Lt. Earl B. Hobbs, struck Bennwihr again in an early morning thrust, this time from the east. Each company destroyed an enemy tank shortly after the attack got underway and this seemed to help demoralize the enemy, who always had placed a good deal of faith in his supporting armor. Moving in, the 3d Battalion again commenced the grinding, dangerous, physically exhausting work of eliminating the enemy from the basements and house-fragments of Bennwihr. By 1225 a major portion of the town had been cleared.
Intent on eliminating the harassing interference from Hill 351 ' 1st Battalion attacked up the northwestern slope of the hill on the morning of December 24, from the direction of Riquewihr. Company B, commanded by 1st Lt. George W. Mohr, encountered a heavy fire fight en route, coming under machine-gun and smallarms fire from well dug-in and concealed positions. This pocket was eliminated and the company proceeded, Company A, under Capt. Elmo F. Tefanelli, reached the top of the hill twice, but was badly disorganized on the barren slopes by heavy flanking fire and concentrations of mortar and artillery, and was forced to withdraw. Company C, commanded by Capt. Samuel H. Roberts, took up the fight and, with Company B, succeeded in reaching the northeast slope of the hill at noon.
At this point Lt. Col. Keith L. Ware, 1st Battalion commander, reviewed the situation and decided that a vigorous display of personal leadership was necessary to invigorate the troops with an offensive spirit that had been dampened by the extremely heavy losses that had been sustained, the icy-cold weather, and the continuous fighting.
After a two-hour personal reconnaissance, he led a handful of men and a tank in a daring assault on the enemy positions on top of the hill, which was crowned with six enemy machine guns.
In describing Colonel Ware's action, Capt. Merlin C. Stoker, S-3 of the 1st Battalion and himself a member of the group that went with the Colonel, said: "It is my opinion that Colonel Ware's display of icy courage was an act, not only of heroism, but of necessity. It was essential that the deadlock in the Sigolsheim sector be broken and that the discouraged troops be given a new injection of the offensive spirit."
Capt. Vernon L. Rankin, commanding Company D, who directed mortar fire on the hill during the assault, said that Colonel Ware personally killed five Germans and captured about twenty others. Tank fire which the Colonel directed, accounted for four of the six machine guns that comprised the hard core of the German hill position.
At the end of the assault, twenty German dead were counted, thirty captured, and about 150 crack SS troops, were put to flight.
Colonel Ware was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for this feat.
The 2d Battalion coordinated its fires with the attack of the 1st in the final clearing of all-important Hill 351. The 3d Battalion, having cleared all but a few houses on the south edge of Bennwihr, proposed to turn southeast out or' the city but again struck a stronghold at a road junction on the edge -of town. A platoon of Company K, which had been deployed in the vicinity of the junction, was attacked from two directions-from, the southern edge of Hill 351 and from the basements of houses that lined the roads at the intersection. As the Germans closed in from Hill 351 the others, apparently in a prearranged plan, jumped yelling from the basement windows. The remainder of Company K, with a tank destroyer, took up the fight, but the enemy also brought in reinforcements and forced the company back. Captain Stuart then reorganized his men, launched them into a fierce counterattack, and by 1600 the company had killed a great number of Germans and retaken control of the road junction.
This terrific fight over a mere road junction was typical of the entire fight over the small area. Bennwihr and Hill 351 were still the scenes of great violence as night came on-the eve of the birth of the Prince of Peace.
The roast turkey, creamed potatoes, and other supplementary items which the Division Quartermaster had received for the Yule dinner were not to be consumed on Christmas Day by the 15th Infantry. On the contrary, the day was' to be only another fierce episode which saw the Germans resisting with a fanaticism generated partly by the exaggerated version of the RundIstedt drive to the north given them by their superiors. Statements from prisoners indicated that the enemy morale, especially that of the younger and more fanatical soldiers, had been greatly raised by such statements as, -"The U. S. First Army has been completely destroyed," and which led them to believe that help from northern Germany would soon be on the way.
West of Echternach the Germans had been engaged at two points near the frontier. The columns of the enemy had been halted some thirty miles from Namur, Lie'ge, and Sedan Gap.
On the north flank the enemy had failed to take his objectives. The shoulder of the salient above Stavelot was beaten back some six miles. In Belgium, the advance was not halted but was being well canalized. Elements of the 1st SS Division were cut off with the loss of fifteen tanks, 200 prisoners taken. The two regimental combat teams of the U. S. 106th Infantry Division that had been cut off during the initial phases of the counteroffensive had made contact and were still fighting. They were being supplied from the air.
The 84th Infantry Division had just been committed south of Maffe. The 2d Armored and 75th Infantry Divisions were assembled just to the north. Some 7,000 Allied air sorties were flown December 24. Ten thousand tons of bombs were dropped. One hundred and sixteen enemy aircraft were destroyed. Enemy movements were limited to darkness. One spectacular raid blew up a hundred vehicles loaded with gasoline.
Goebbels told the Germans that is was the worst Christmas of the war. He also told them not to worry, that the Fuhrer was filled with plans and visions for the future.
On the main street of Bennwihr' a small figure was implanted in the ground in front of a ruined church. It was a reproduction of Christ crucified. The head was missing.
Although Company K held the road junction at the dawn of Christmas Day, enemy snipers and machine gunners in the houses near the junction wrought death and injury to a number of our men in that area. At 1700, flame throwers were brought into use and several houses were fired. In a little more than an hour, over fifty Germans had surrendered and the other occupants were either casualties or had retreated to a safer place to spend the rest of the holiday.
Hill 351, Bennwihr, the little road junction outside Bennwihr, and a large number of prisoners constituted the holiday gift that Brig. Gen. Robert N. Young, acting division commander, received from the 15th Infantry.
Sigolsheim remained as the only uncaptured objective of the regiment's offensive, and it was attacked from the east on December 26-27.
The 1st Battalion, after clearing out some of the diehards on Hill 351, tied in with 2d Battalion on the left. Company G moved to the road east of the town and joined with Companies K and L, which had been driven back after attacking the east side of the village Christmas night.
The coordinated attack began at 0930, December 26 with Company K advancing along the north road into town from the east, Company L moving along the center road and Company G taking the south road. Air-support missions were also being flown.
The enemy put up a suicidal defense as he fell back from house to house in the streets of Sigolsheim. It was not unusual to see a German standing completely exposed in the center of the street, firing a bazooka or sometimes only a rifle, at our tanks as the armor relentlessly mowed him down or the doughboys took pot shots at him.
The fighting continued unabated all day throughout the night and into the next day. Company K was the first unit to report its zone "all clear," and when the company finished mopping up the northern part of the town at 1450, it swung north toward the convent, which like Hill 351, had been a thorn in the side of the regiment's operations ever -since the attack began.
Company L found opposition stiffest in the center of town but continually kept pounding at strongpoints behind rubble, stone fences and pillboxes until the enemy finally began disintegrating and retreating from the city in small groups.
During Company I's bitter fight to clear the enemy from the houses they held in the fire-swept streets of Sigolsheim, 1st Lt. Ell Whiteley particularly distinguished himself and earned the Medal of Honor. In the midst of the savage street fighting, he was hit and badly wounded in the arm and shoulder. Despite this, he attacked alone a house on the street, fire from which was delaying the advance of the company. He killed its two defenders. Hurling smoke and fragmentation grenades, he charged a second house, killed two and captured eleven enemy. He continued to lead his platoon down the battle-crazy street, eliminating house after house. Finally he reached a building held by fanatical Nazis.
Although suffering from painful wounds which had rendered his left arm useless, he advanced on this strongly defended house and, after blasting out a wall with bazooka fire, charged through a hail of bullets. Wedging his sub-machine gun under his uninjured arm, he rushed into the house through the hole torn by his rockets, killed five of the enemy and forced the remaining twelve to surrender. As he emerged- to continue his fearless attack, he was hit again and critically wounded. In agony and with one eye pierced by a shell fragment, he shouted for his men to follow him to the next house. He was determined to stay in the fighting and did remain at the head of his platoon until forcibly evacuated . . ."
Company G met the same fanatical resistance in the south part of the city but cleared its section shortly before Company L.
Late that night the town was completely cleared of Germans and the 15th Infantry had captured another hundred prisoners. The regimental I and R platoon, under 1st Lt. Robert Wann, was attached to 3d Battalion for the battle, and distinguished itself in combat.
the convent fell to Company K early the following morning after an all-night siege. The monastery gave up fifty more prisoners, in addition to about 150 civilians hiding in the basement.
While the remainder of the regiment was concentrating on the Sigolsheim attack Company E, commanded by Capt. Charles Adams, cleared the enemy from the area north of the Weiss River, which was the right boundary of the regiment. This mission in itself resulted in many fire fights in which the enemy used mortars, machine guns, and Flakwagons. More than twenty Germans were killed in one of these engagements.
In this area, however, the enemy proved himself particularly obstinate. His infiltration back into the area along the Weiss became a nightly process, and it was necessary to work the vicinity over again and again, since the Weiss was easily forded.
A nasty surprise awaited our troops on Hill 216. Previously reported clear of enemy, the enemy soon proved in occupation of the crest (which was east of the road leading south from Bennwihr). in sizable strength and determined to hold.
Throughout 15th Infantry's occupation of the Bennwihr-Sigolsheim area, and 30th Infantry's subsequent control of the sector, Hill 216 with its sizable determined forces of enemy defenders, was a salient into our lines. The western side was cleared only after a series of small attacks by 15th and 30th Infantry, but the enemy remained in control of the east side up until the full-scale Division attack which commenced January 22, when the 254th Infantry drove him from- it. The crest was no-man's land.
In addition to capturing Bennwihr and Sigolsheim, the 15th Infantry had annihilated the Zeiher Battle Group and the SS Battle Group Braun, taking nearly 500 prisoners during the last ten days of December.
Following clearance of the 15th Infantry sector to the Fecht River on the east, the Division began regrouping, and received as an attachment the 254th Infantry of the 63d Infantry Division to assist in defending the Division front, which had been broadened by the removal of the 3d Algerian Division, the unit that occupied our right flank during the SigolsheimBennwihr offensive. Purpose of attaching the 254th was to add to the Division's strength and to give the regiment combat seasoning.
On New Year's day the Division sector in the Vosges Mountains covered a frontage of approximately fifteen miles between Chatenois (west of Selestat) and Orbey, which is just south of La Poutroie.
The 15th Infantry held the longest front, its line running from Chatenois, through Bennwihr, to a point west of Alspach. The 7th Infantry's line began at Alspach and terminated at Orbey.
There were numerous adjustments to the Division boundary during the first three weeks of January, chief of which was the extension of the Division front about six miles west into high Vosges.
These were the days of the "great scare." Even though the enemy had by now been definitely stopped in the Ardennes and the Bulge was being slowly whittled away; although the Seventh Army had temporarily halted with considerable loss the renewed offensive toward the south -the enemy still held the initiative in most areas of the front. A decision to move administrative elements out of Strasbourg, pending the necessity of withdrawing tactical troops to the Vosges, precipitated a panic in the Alsatian Capital. A large-number of loyal Frenchmen were fleeing the city in terror of their lives should the Germans return. United States and French flags disappeared from the windows, to be replaced in some instances with the swastika. Two men from the Strasbourg staff of the Stars and Stripes and three members of the 3d Division's Front Line staff formed the only U. S. administrative establishment remaining in the city. (The CP and some troops of 42d Infantry Division, in tactical control of the area, remained in Strasbourg throughout this period.) The two newspaper groups worked together in producing a Stars and Stripes with a special, boxed daily column in French for the benefit of the panic-stricken population. It and the daily presence of six Americans did much to dispel many of the Alsatians' fears. The Front Line likewise continued to make its regular weekly appearance.)
Division Order of Battle personnel had some difficulty in piecing together some of the rag, tag and bobtail that opposed the Division on its long front. Upon moving into the sector, we inherited from the 36th Division the following Battle Groups (each of about battalion size):
Ayrer, Bermann, Backe, Braun, SS
Dietrichs, Eberle, Fischer, Fuhrguth, Geiser, Herbrechtsmeier'
Hock, Huth, Krebs, Landeberger, Lang,
Probst, Reimers, Remmes, Schaefer, Scheck, Schweitzer,
Wallner, Wasser, Zeiher, and Winter.
As the Division took its own prisoners, however, these elements shook down and sorted themselves generally into members of regular divisions, principal of which were the 198th Infantry Division, 708th Yolksgrenadier Division, 16th and 189th Infantry Divisions Toward the end of December two battalions of the 40th Panzer Grenadier Replacement Training Battalion made their appearance. Also known to be on the bridgehead, and against some of whom the 3d Infantry Division later fought were: 269th VG Division, 159th VG Division and 338th Infantry Division.
The 254th Infantry, attached to the 3d, was assigned a defensive sector during the adjustments and the 290th Engineer Combat Battalion, a unit with no previous battle experience, was attached for use as infantry. A French parachute battalion was also attached.
Winter weather was present with all its mountain fury with the coming of January and many frostbite cases were added to the trenchfoot casualties brought by cool, rainy- days during the previous three months.
Generally speaking, the situation in the first three weeks was characterized by defensive actions and patrolling on both sides, with the east slopes of Hill 216 occupying the most import-ant role.
It was a snowy and cold New Year's Eve and the 10th Engineer Battalion was busy all night keeping roads passable. Company A, commanded by Capt. Albert H. Cook, spread cinders and sand on the road from Kaysersberg; Company B, under Capt. Daniel A. Raymond, de-iced and drained the RiquewihrKientzheim road while Company C, commanded by 1st Lt. Robert L. Bangert, continued the never-ending task of erecting triple-concertina wire around and in front of our positions.
Late that might Company E of the 30th Infantry, commanded by 1st Lt. Douglas W. Chambers, engaged a strong enemy patrol in a small arms fight in the woods north of the Weiss River and another German patrol overran the outposts of Company F, commanded by 1st Lt. Richard N. Hagelin. These outposts, located south of Hill 216, were reestablished before daylight, however.
At about midnight of January 2, Companies E and F of the 15th Infantry attacked south along the eastern slopes of Hill 216, intent-on clearing the hill and the area south to the Weiss River. The 30th Infantry assisted the attack by sending out three strong combat patrols with artillery support.
Company E of the 15th met heavy resistance at a road curve northeast of the hill and suffered heavy casualties when the enemy set up a searing defense with machine guns, Panzerfaust, small arms, mortars, and hand grenades. The attack, originally scheduled as a strong raid supported by tanks, quickly turned into a bloody full-scale pitched engagement. Two of the supporting tanks were almost immediately destroyed by either Panzerfaust or antitank fire as they crossed the rise of the crest, and the company commander, Capt. Charles E. Adams, went forward to supervise his men personally. While he was moving forward he stepped into a hole in which there was an enemy soldier, - who immediately shot and killed him. The company was disorganized and forced to fall back.
Company F, commanded by Capt. Hugh H. Bruner, proceeded well down the forward slopes of the hill but was hit by a strong enemy counterattack early in the morning. A heavy fire fight ensued but Company F held its ground. A short time later, the Germans launched another counterattack supported by tanks and Captain Bruner's men fell back to the road leading to Bennwihr. The two companies took sixteen prisoners in the attack. The enemy's reluctance to abandon any of the terrain under his control was proving costly to both forces and the pocket of resistance on Hill 216 developed into a bloody battlefield.
Enemy patrols, clad in white garments as camouflage in the snow, were little less aggressive than our own, and continuous clashes between them took place during the next several days. Our own troops, without camouflage clothing, improvised by using mattress covers.
On January 4 the Division sector was extended on the right to include Le Rudlin and abandoned on the left to exclude Zellenberg and Ostheim. The 15th Infantry, which had occupied the extreme left of the Division front, moved to the extreme right, putting our troops deeper into the heights of the Vosges.
A strong German counterattack against the 1st French Motorized Infantry Division, on the Division's left flank, was launched January 7 and resulted in the extension of the 3d Division's zone farther north, and the 254th Infantry was regrouped to take over the newly acquired sector in the vicinity of Ribeauville.
Assisted by diversionary fire by the 7th Infantry's field artillery, chemical, tank, tank-destroyer, and antiaircraft attachments, the 30th Infantry staged two attacks on January 8, the purpose being to divert the enemy's attention from the fact that an Allied division was being replaced in another sector of the perimeter surrounding the enemy Colmar bridgehead.
Company A, commanded by 1st Lt. Willard C. Johnson, moved through Company C at 1430, under cover of smoke from 4.2 chemical mortars and 81mm mortars, and reached the crest of Hill 216 after overcoming resistance from dug-in infantry using small arms and machine guns. After killing and capturing a number of Germans, Company A was relieved in its new positions by Company C, commanded by 1st Lt. Charles P. Murray, Jr.
Simultaneously Company 1, under 1st Lt. Darwyn E. Walker, attacked south from Ammerschwihr toward Hill 616, which lies just west of Katzenthal. Company C of the 756th Tank Battalion, commanded by Capt. John W. Heard, was in close support of the attackers.
After a difficult 45-minute climb through the heavy snow, the company came under enemy fire from German positions halfway up the hill and about eighty-five yards to the front. A Flakwagon on a hill 500 yards southwest of Hill 616 poured extremely accurate fire on Lieutenant Walker's men and they were forced back to cover in a clump of trees. A second attack ended in the same manner and the company swung around the hill out of range of the Flakwagon and attacked for the third time.
It was here that S/Sgt. Russell E. Dunham, acting platoon sergeant of the 3d platoon and commonly known to his buddies as "The Arsenal," performed the actions that earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor.
Dunham carried a dozen hand grenades that hung from his suspenders, from the buttonholes in his clothes and from his belt. And he had eleven full magazines of carbine ammunition, four in pouches, seven more in his pockets.
The enemy machine guns had a clear, snow-covered field of fire from solidly-built emplacements covered with logs hidden by recent heavy snows. Two-man foxholes protected the machine-gun position from all sides.
Dunham's platoon moved forward, with the sergeant far out in front, crawling from small bush to tree stump into the very face of the German fire. A machine gun on the left of his platoon front received first attention and Dunham edged his way toward it until he reached a point about ten yards away. Jumping to his feet, he charged the position, throwing hand grenades, firing his carbine from the hip and yelling as he went. A second machine gun on the right fired a full clip at him and Dunham fell, a 10-inch gash ripped across his back.
The doughty sergeant rolled fifteen feet down the hill, arose, and charged again as his mattress-cover uniform turned red with blood. An enemy egg grenade fell at his feet, was quickly kicked aside and exploded in the snow several yards away. Dunham continued to fire, killed the machine gunner and his assistant, and yanked a third German from the emplacement when his carbine was empty.
Refusing evacuation by the medics, Dunham led the advance on the second machine gun some seventyfive yards up the hill. Again he was the lone figure out in front, leaving a crimson trail in the snow as he crept toward the blazing gun. Rifle fire and rifle grenades raked his path. Dunham got within throwing range and tossed a grenade that bounced off a tree a little to the right of the machine gun emplacement. His next heave was a bull's eye which killed the entire gun crew.
Two Germans raised their heads from a nearby foxhole to take a bead on Dunham. The sergeant promptly killed one and wounded the other, winging a third who tried to escape.
The mattress cover was rosy as Sergeant Dunham briefed his platoon for the attack on a third machine gun hidden about a hundred yards up on the side of the hill. Again he was the platoon's "advance element" as he sneaked to the kill.
This time he was favored with a deserving stroke of luck when a German fired point blank at him and missed after Dunham had just tossed a grenade that neutralized the gun. The poor-shooting rifleman fell dead from a Dunham bullet. Another shouted "Kamcrad" and gave up.
Dunham continued his maniacal attack on enemy foxholes, killed one more German, shot five others as they attempted to flee, and took another prisoner.
Dunham's total was: three enemy machine guns destroyed, nine dead Germans, seven wounded, and two prisoners. He had fired 175 rounds of ammunition and tossed eleven of his twelve hand grenades.
Praise was later heaped upon Dunham by Lieutenant Walker, his company commander, by 2d Lt. James M. Beck, Company I platoon leader, and by 2d Lt. Glenn A. Black who had been Dunham's first sergeant on the day of the attack, prior to receiving a battlefield promotion.
The next few days featured the normal firefights that come with vigorous patrolling and in addition some of the bitterest give-and-take small engagements the Division ever had encountered. Frequent efforts were made by the enemy to infiltrate our positions to obtain information concerning the shifts that were being made in the front lines of the 3d Division. The nights were moonless and bitterly cold; the days chilly and misty and both forces were using houses scattered throughout the area in "no-man's land" as outposts. The Division Operations Report rarely failed to record an account of an attack on one or more of them, either by our patrols or by the enemy.
Preceded by an artillery and mortar barrage, a strong enemy patrol staged a midnight raid January 9 on a platoon CP near La Baroche and took one officer and seven men, retiring under cover of artillery fire.
A patrol leader of Company L, 7th Infantry, S/Sgt. Herman F. Nevers, reported the same night that he had been seized and taken to a house in the La Baroche vicinity and effected an escape while he was being questioned, when he drew. a small non-functioning pistol which he had concealed in one of his boots. He held the surprised Germans at bay and backed out of the building into the darkness.
A 254th Infantry outpost was also attacked that night by a patrol of superior force and had to withdraw from its position until the next morning.
An enemy propaganda truck, interspersing subversive words with popular American "hillbilly" music, turned its loud speakers toward the 7th Infantry sector while the men were sweating "chow" on the night of January 10. Our artillery answered with well-placed fire that silenced the music.
Our artillery also stopped a sizable attack by an infiltrating group that reached a point west of Ammerschwihr on January 15. A similar attack on an outpost near Ostheim. was staged the next morning and the Germans took thirteen prisoners. This latter attack, however, was overshadowed by a highly successful raid conducted the same morning by the 3d Battalion of the 7th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Lloyd B. Ramsey.
Company L, commanded by Capt. Phillip T. Perry, crossed its line of departure at 0630 and immediately encountered heavy enemy mortar and small-arms fire near La Baroche, and a concentration of eight German machine guns north of this point held up the company's advance.
A house which contained about thirty enemy was blown up when one of Captain Perry's men placed a satchel charge in it. Three enemy machine guns also were silenced before the raiders withdrew.'
Companies I and K, under Capts. Edward J. Brink and Francis J. Kret, respectively, attacked south at a point east of Company L's effort. Company I headed toward the little village of Braderhau, neutralized a machine gun, and captured a few prisoners en route. A heavy firefight ensued when a strong enemy force was encountered just north of Braderhau. Four more German machine guns were destroyed in this battle.
Company K also silenced four enemy machine guns, killed a large number of Germans, and forced the foe to desert his positions in the area.
The regimental Battle Patrol assisted the 3d Battalion's raid with a diversionary attack on Hill 806, near La Rochette. This raid, which was started and ended before daylight, brought several casualties to the Patrol when it came under heavy artillery fire. The Patrol closed with the Germans, however, and inflicted severe losses on them before withdrawing just prior to dawn.
The raiding companies all withdrew early in the morning. All had accomplished their mission of locating enemy strongholds and measuring their strength.
The tacit understanding which had existed among officers and men of the Division that the defensive was not our style, well though the 3d had performed that role (Cf. Anzio-February) when assigned to it, was sometimes expressed by a shrug, a grimace, and the unanswerable question, "How long before . . . ?" To an outsider these cryptic signs would have meant nothing. To veterans indoctrinated in the 3d Infantry Division this restlessness when confronted with stalemate spoke volumes, but translated might be stated very simply. "How long before we start another attack? How long before they shove us in to knock out this damn pocket?"
By the same token, the restlessness could not be interpreted as eagerness. Such an assumption would have been foolish. The cold, bone-chilling winds; the quality and spirit of the German defenders as evidenced during the grim fights for Kaysersberg, Sigolsheim and Bennwihr, and the day-and-night bitterly-fought patrol clashes; the trenchfoot and the frostbite; all precluded any tendency toward individual desire to tangle again full-scale with the enemy. But the restlessness persisted. "We'll have to be at it soon." The feeling pervaded every platoon and squad.
"As long as there's a war and as long as there's a 3d Division, the 3d Division will be in that war." Variations on this same theme were repeated many times by nearly every wearer of the blue-and-white patch. The knowledge was omnipresent. The thought was conveyed in various shades of tone-cynically, bitterly, disgustedly . . . or, confidently, resignedly, cockily . . . or in any combination. But in nearly every case there was a matter-of-fact acceptance of the fact that soon -we would return to the offensive. Coupled with this was the feeling of surety, born of success in battle, that the 3d would accomplish successfully any task given it. And that is the feeling that wins battles.
Withdrawal from the lines in preparation for an offensive began with the 7th Infantry during the night of January 17-18. The 3d Battalion, 254th Infantry, moved from Ribeauville to the vicinity of Kaysersberg and during the hours of darkness relieved the 1st Battalion, 7th, on positions, to become attached to the 7th Infantry. This relief was completed by 0200, and 1st Battalion, 7th, moved into Alspach. The 290th Combat Engineer Battalion moved from St. Croix to the vicinity of Hachimette and relieved 2d Battalion and Antitank Company, 7th Infantry, likewise' coming under the command of 7th Infantry. By 0450 this relief was complete and the 2d Battalion, with AT Company, assembled in La Poutroie. The battalion moved to Kaysersberg by motor during the morning.
The 28th Infantry Division, after participating in the initial stages of the Ardennes counteroffensive and suffering great losses, had been relieved from attachment to Twenty-first Army Group and sent south to join Sixth Army Group, which in turn assigned the division to assist, in a minor role, in the attack against the north flank of the Colmar Pocket. As the 3d shifted and regrouped in preparation for withdrawing the bulk of its striking force to the east, in the general vicinity of Guemar, elements of the 28th slipped into position on the right of the 254th Infantry, which held down the 3d's right flank.
There was no time to lose in preparing for the coming operation. On the same day that relief of the 3d was completed by the 28th, January 20, French I Corps launched its drive against the south side of the Pocket from long-held positions immediately to the north of Mulhouse. We had learned at Anzio of the invaluable need for coordination between the Cassino and beachhead forces, and if the German defenders of the Colmar Pocket were to be kept from shifting their strength from one dangerous sector to another, repelling individual attacks in sequence, our attack must get away on time. The date was already set-January 22.
Individual units had begun conducting as much training as was practical under the circumstances, upon their separate relief’s from the line. All armor and all combat vehicles were painted white. Mattress covers, sheets, pillowcases, everything available in the way of white cloth-was set upon and redesigned into "spook suits" for camouflage in the snow. The infantry regiments also undertook limited training programs in small-unit problems, speed marches, weapons training, field firing, night problems, river crossing technique, and use of the German Panzerfaust.
The 10th Engineer Battalion assembled bridging materials for the operation.