The narrow zone which we faced was characterized by a front line which followed for the greater part, a river-the Fecht. This stream splits the town of Ostheim and forms the southeast boundary of Guemar. The primary move, therefore, was a crossing of its flooded, icy waters. Although the Division's "target" was not announced to any but important commanders until the latest possible date in the interests of security, regimental and smaller-unit intelligence officers had long concentrated on gathering information relative to the width, depth, steepness of banks, and conditions and swiftness of water, of all streams which lay along a possible future zone of advance. The Fecht had been thoroughly "cased" in preparation for the unnamed eventuality, as had the Weiss. Information was also sought from left-flank French elements as to the same conditions prevailing with respect to the Ill River. Possible marshy areas had also come under the same critical scrutiny: "Is it frozen? How deep is the water? Is it possible to go around it without going too far out of the way? "

In addition to the all-important terrain study, of course, there was the never-ending quest for enemy dispositions and order of battle. The best information available prior to the attack placed the 748th VG Regiment of the 708th VG Division, and a battalion of the 760th VG Regiment, from the same division, to our front. An additional battalion of the 760th and elements of the 728th VG Regiment, same division, were suspected but lacked definite confirmation.

The enemy's counteroffensive possibilities were well summed up in the January 17 Division G-2 Report: "While the new Russian offensive in Poland may seem to be a long way from our front-line infantry platoon positions, it is bound to have an immediate and profound effect on the enemy capabilities in the Alsace pocket.

"This effect stems directly from the priorities onreinforcements (both men and materiel) which will have to be reshuffled among the various fronts. Heretofore top priority has gone to the Belgium front, with the Upper Rhine not far behind. Now, however, Poland is bound to absorb everything the Germans can throw into it, at least until the Russian drives are well stopped. The result should be a decline in enemy ability to send important reinforcements, especially for offensive purposes, into the Colmar Bridgehead. Under pressure, the enemy will always be able to find scratch units to try to keep us from reaching important objectives, but fresh divisions are a luxury he can hardly afford in a sector like this when he needs them for fire-fighting purposes in other parts of his household . . ."

Substantially, that was the picture of the enemy's offensive capabilities. His defensive capabilities, however, were to prove an entirely different story. For, in telling the story of the Colmar Pocket, it must be emphasized that terrain and weather were the equal of the worst any unit ever contended with anywhere. From Guemar to Neuf-Brisach there was hardly a depression in the ground worthy of the name, with the exception of a few stream beds (the Fecht, the 111, the Colmar, and Rhone-Rhine Canals), the basements of houses in the captured towns and old- Maginot Line emplacements-from all of which the enemy had to be driven-and finally a few bomb and shell holes, the impressions of which were much less deep than could normally be expected, due to the frozen solidity of the ground.

The mercury in thermometers constantly stood at minus 10 degrees C. (14' F) which was about the highest point reached during the day. In the late afternoon, early morning, and during each night the temperature dropped lower and stayed there. This may not seem extremely cold weather to inhabitants of the northern and eastern parts of the ' United States, but it must be remembered that men were fighting, attempting to sleep, fording streams-and dying--in constant exposure to these temperatures. To experience a few seconds' exposure of nose and ears to the icy gusts of wind which constantly swept down from the high Vosges was almost unbearable.

Over-all plan of the Division attack was as follows: To attack on D-day, H-hour, force crossings of the Fecht and Ill Rivers in the Guemar-Ostheim area; to pivot to the south, force crossings over the Colmar Canal in the Wickerschwihr area, block to the southwest in the area southwest of Houssen, and isolate Colmar on the east. (It was known that the capture of Colmar was assured once it became isolated from the main road feeding it with supplies and reinforcements via the two bridges over the Rhine near Neuf-Brisach.)

Upon completion of this action, the Division was to group the bulk of its infantry in the Holtzwihr-Riedwihr area, and the bulk of its attached Armored Combat Command in the Horbourg-Bischwihr-Andolsheim area, prepared to:

One: Capture Colmar and block the Fecht Valley immediately west of Turckheim, or

Two: Assist 5 DB (5th French Armored Division) in the capture of Neuf-Brisach.

Separate missions of the regiments were:

30th Infantry (Attached: Company C, 756 Tank Battalion; Company C, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company B, 99th Chemical Battalion; Reconnaissance Company, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion; 3d Reconnaissance Troop and Division Battle Patrol; 3d platoon, Company D, 756th Tank Battalion; three sections, 441st AAA AW Battalion (SP) To force a crossing of the Fecht River in its zone, advance with all possible speed to clear the east-west road in its zone through Colmar Forest (Foret Communale de Colmar), and seize objectives indicated on the III River.

To force a crossing of the III River at the earliest possible moment and continue the advance to seize objectives indicated (along a line running east from the III River south of Maison Rouge bridge).

To extend south to another phase line, blocking to the east.

On Division order, to be prepared to regroup in the Horbourg-Bennwihr area prepared to execute Maneuver 1 and capture Colmar from the east, or to pass to Division reserve.

In addition, 30th Infantry was to protect its own left throughout the advance south along the east side of the III; to protect the Division left; to maintain contact with 1 DMI and 5 DB on the left flank, and to reinforce its supporting engineers with one rifle company from the regiment's reserve battalion for the purpose of carrying an infantry footbridge from the Fecht River to the Ill.

7th Infantry (Attached: Company A, 756th Tank Battalion; Company A, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company C, 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion (-one platoon); Company D, 756th Tank Battalion (-two platoons); and three sections of the 441st AAA):

To force a crossing of the Fecht in its zone; advance with all possible speed to seize objectives in a line to the west of 30th Infantry's first phase line across the 111.

To clear the east-west road in its zone through the Colmar Forest and the road running east from Ostheim in its zone.

To extend its line further south, seizing and holding the objectives taken within the boundary defined.

To push strong combat patrols to the southwest in the direction of Ingersheim and to the south in the direction of Colmar.

On Division order to assemble on last line gained, and to be prepared:

To attack toward Neuf-Brisach and objectives in that vicinity.

To execute Maneuver 1 and capture Colmar, or

To execute Maneuver 2, isolate Colmar on the south, capture Wintzenheim and Turckheim, and block to the southwest as indicated.

254th Infantry (Attached: one platoon, Company B, 756th; one platoon, Company B 601st; one platoon, Company A, 99th Chemical; two sections, 441st AAA Battalion) :

Attack through 28th Infantry Division north of Hill 216 at daylight of D + 1, isolate and capture Hill 216, seize Line A-B (extension of 30th and 7th first phase line, to the west), in zone, and seize and hold bridge over the Fecht River immediately west of its junction with the Weiss River.

Push strong combat patrols to the south on Ingersheim.

On Division order following the forcing of the Fecht River, assemble 2d Battalion in the Beblenheim area under regimental control.

On Division order, undergo relief of positions on line A-B in zone, by elements of 28th Infantry Division.

On Division order following relief of positions on line A-B, relieve elements of 7th Infantry on line C-D (second phase line) between the Fecht and Ill rivers, prevent enemy movement northeast of this line, and patrol vigorously to the south on Colmar and to the southwest in Ingersheim.

Protect Division right. Maintain contact with 28th Infantry Division on right.

Coordinate directly with commanding officer of regiment on right in reference to passage and assistance.

5th Infantry was assigned the mission of crossing the Fecht immediately behind 30th Infantry to assemble in Division reserve, or

On Division order from present assembly area or the .Colmar Forest, be prepared to assume the mission of either the 7th or 30th Infantry Regiments.

The remainder of the order pertaining to 15th Infantry specified several alternatives, duplicating those found in orders for the 7th and 30th, providing the 15th took over for either of them.

French II Corps Artillery was to support the 3d Infantry Division attack by reinforcing direct-support fires, and by supplementing interdiction, counterbattery, and harassing fires of the Division Artillery.

In addition a powerful air program was to be conducted in support of the Division attack in conjunction with an over-all air program in the entire First French Army zone.

CC4 of the French 5th Armored Division (5 DB) was attached to 3d Infantry Division for the attack.

Attacking on our left at daylight of D-plus-1 was 1st Division Motorise Infanterie.

The attack was scheduled to begin three hours after darkness on January 22, the first anniversary of the landing of the Division below Nettuno. During the morning of January 22 units began moving to the forward assembly areas, and footbridges and heavy bridging material were moved to proposed crossing sites at Guemar and Ostheim during the night. Company A, 10th Engineers, under the command of 1st Lt. Robert K. Fleet, hid a preconstructed 84-foot span in a cemetery north of Guemar.

The 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments, commanded by Lt. Col. John A. Heintges and Col. Lionel C. McGarr, respectively, began their crossing of the Fecht River by stealth at Guemar at 2100, on a front measuring less than 1000 yards in width. It was a repetition of the Meurthe stunt, and it worked. In the 7th zone two platoons crossed just prior to H-Hour and seized bridgeheads. Artillery fell -on both bridges of the 7th, and enemy heavy mortar fire fell on 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, but enemy infantry resistance was negligible.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Lloyd B. Ramsey, after crossing the river swung southeast and encountered enemy small-arms and machine-gun fire in the Bois Communale de Guemar. After overcoming this resistance the battalion, with Company I on the right and Company L on the left, moved swiftly across the east-west road which runs along the northern edge of the Foret Communale de Colmar.

Clearing the woods as they advanced, Colonel Ramsey's men continued past Ostheim and to a small wooded area, Brunnwald, where they beat off an enemy counterattack consisting of tanks and infantry which came from the east. Our artillery and mortar fire played an important part in stopping the German counterthrust while elements of Lt. Col. Glenn F. Rogers' 756th Tank Battalion supported the battalion all along the route of advance. Company A, under Capt. Orlando A. Richardson, Jr., and elements of Company D, commanded by Capt. Robert F. Kramer, were attached to the 7th Infantry throughout.

Maj. Kenneth W. Wallace's 1st Battalion turned directly south after crossing the river and suffered some casualties as the troops moved through a wooded area filled with wire obstacles and mines. The battalion entered Ostheim from the north at 0400 and engaged the Germans in a heavy small-arms and machine-gun battle that lasted for five hours.

The enemy continued to resist fiercely in the southern part of the town, where every window was a potential sniper's nest. By 1730, however, the last vestige of resistance had ended and the battalion was in full possession of the city.

The 2d Battalion, which had followed in the wake of the assault battalions, moved rapidly south to the Bois dit de Rothleible after engaging in a hot fire fight en route.

The 30th Infantry crossed the Fecht with the 1st Battalion, under the command of Lt. Col. Mackenzie E. Porter, on the left and 3d Battalion, commanded by Maj. Robert B. Pridgen, on the right.

Meeting little opposition, 1st Battalion continued through the Foret Communale de Colmar to the east and had elements across the III River by daybreak. By 0900 the entire battalion had crossed the III and moved south along the east bank of the stream, heading for the Maison Rouge bridge, at the southeast corner of the forest.

The 3d Battalion, 30th, cut southeast through the forest, and encountered a schu-minefield and two enemy strongpoints during its advance. A brisk fire fight was staged at Niederwald, a crossroad settlement in the Foret Communale, but the doughboys soon eliminated this obstacle.

Closing' in on the Maison Rouge bridge, Major Pridgen's battalion had it, intact, by 1155.

That little wooden bridge figured greatly in the 30th Infantry's plans, and around it revolved one of the most fateful moments of the regiment or Division in the entire war.

Foreseeing the possibility of capturing the bridge, Division engineers had ordered reinforcing treadway to be delivered as soon as possible to the bridge site once it was captured in order to get armor across in the minimum possible time. Traffic along the roads to the rear was heavy. The engineers, having already allocated most of the available treadway to other bridge projects, sent forward all the remaining treadway to the Maison Rouge site. When they had a chance to look the bridge over and measure it, the amount was just fifteen feet short.

Traffic over the roads to the rear was heavy. The time required to obtain an extra fifteen feet might be prohibitive. After a certain number of tactical vehicles of the 30th had passed over the bridge, it was closed to traffic and the treadway was laid on either side. A 15-foot gap remained in the center.

The order had been given: "Get armor across the III with all possible speed." The engineer officer in charge was dubious, but did not want to delay the armor. One tank started across, The bridge shook a bit, but that was nothing unusual. The driver stopped. Engineers, watching tensely, decided the bridge was stable. They waved the tank on'. The full weight of the tank passed on to the nonreinforced section of the bridge. There was a rending crash and the bridge collapsed to the level of the river, the tank staying just above water. The crew clambered out. A few minutes passed. A truck, bearing an amount of treadway sufficient to have bridged, the gap arrived on the scene.

While the 7th and 30th Infantry regiments were attacking their objectives, the 254th Infantry assaulted Hill 216 at daylight. This long-time salient in our lines proved as difficult as, ever, with one important difference. It was no longer the sole point of attack, but only one of many. By noon the 254th had routed the Germans from well dug-in positions on the eastern slopes, which were protected by schu-mines and boobytraps, plus the fire of machine guns, small arms, and Panzerfaust. This clearing of the enemy from the far side of Hill 216 eliminated a strongpoint that jeopardized the flank of our attacking units and deprived the Germans of an extraordinary observation post.

Following the capture of Hill 216, 254th Infantry continued its mission of clearing the area south to the Weiss River, and of capturing a bridge across the Fecht River, in conjunction with joining the 7th Infantry in that area, once the enemy had been cleared from the lower Fecht stream bank near its juncture with the Weiss.

Heavy fighting here carried into the following day. The 1st Battalion, leading the attack, became stalled and the 3d Battalion was committed around its right flank. Troops of the 254th were forced virtually to ferret the Germans out of their dug-in positions in a yardby-yard advance that was bitterly contested all the way.

The Germans had nearly recovered from the initial shock of the surprise attack. The enemy was marshalling every tank and automatic weapon at his command to stem the tide of our advance. The battle of armor and infantry that was waged in and around the wooded areas in the vicinity of Houssen, Riedwihr, Holtzwihr, and Wickerschwihr will be remembered as one of the most bitterly fought engagements, and without doubt one of the most important, that the 3d Division ever encountered.

During the afternoon of the 23rd, 30th Infantry forward elements reached the outskirts of Riedwihr and Holtzwihr and held the clump of woods known as Bois de Riedwihr.

Companies I and K had moved into the northern edge of Holtzwihr. Position of the 1st and 3d Battalions at this time was like a finger sticking deep into enemy territory. Opposition had been so light up to this point that the 30th had lanced ahead and was completely exposed on the left flank, resistance against the French having prevented them from advancing rapidly, and ahead of 7th Infantry on the right, which was also encountering very tenacious resistance.

At 1650 the first blow struck. Companies I and K of the 30th under 1st Lts. Darwyn E. Walker and Ross H. Calvert, respectively, without armor, advanced into Holtzwihr. Ten enemy tanks and TDs accompanied by at least a hundred foot troops, moved into and beyond Holtzwihr from the southeast. The tanks broke up into groups of two's and three's and sliced the 30th's positions into several pockets. Tank machine-gun fire whipped along the snow-covered ground in murderous grazing fire and the tanks and tank destroyers fired as they came.

The 3d Battalion had just completed a rapid move and, even had the men had time to dig in they would have been completely frustrated. The ground was frozen solid. It would have taken TNT charges to blow holes in it. And-it was perfectly flat. There was not a vestige of cover as 3d Battalion, struck from three sides and without even one tank or tank destroyer to shoot at the oncoming assortment of power, vainly tried to repel the counterattack. Also important was the fact that artillery FOs with the 30th had not yet established radio communication.

The result was a foregone conclusion. 3d Battalion, badly disorganized, was forced to make its way back-back toward the 111 and the protection afforded by its banks.

At 1720, as the 1st Battalion was about to reach Riedwlhr, the blow fell on it as it had on the 3d. The enemy hit with all he had. Men sought in vain for cover. Bands of grazing machine-gun fire criss-crossed in vicious, cracking streams. As in the case of 3d Battalion, 1st Battalion had nowhere to go but to the rear-if possible-nothing with which to combat the thick-sided enemy tanks and the lagdpanzer tank destroyers, and above all no holes from which to fight.

During the withdrawals, handfuls of brave men in each company braved almost certain death or capture to stick it out on the hopeless positions. Despite open flanks on the right and left, small, bitter and last-ditch actions were fought by isolated groups, such as those led by 1st Lts. Darwyn E. Walker and Ross H. Calvert, who were last seen on that day entering a patch of woods from which two enemy tanks shortly thereafter emerged. In the Orchbach stream bed, east of the III by several hundred yards, a group of 30th Infantry men was still in position the next day when a counterattack was launched and the ground was regained!

At the Maison Rouge bridge site, -bystanders gazed ruefully at a Sherman tank sitting in the center of the III River, icy waves lapping at the base of its turret.

The 2d Battalion, 30th, under Maj. James L. Osgard, had crossed the III at the southeast corner of the Colmar Forest, but had hardly had time to get reorganized before it, too, was counterattacked by enemy tanks and infantry and was forced back across the river, where it set up temporary positions in the Colmar woods. Approximately 350 men, most of whom were captured, were lost by the 30th in this counterattack. However, during the withdrawal machine-gun sections from H and D Companies and small groups of infantrymen, chiefly from Companies A, B, C and E held on the east side of the III and covered the remainder of the battalion.

As night drew on the enemy was completely in possession of the east bank of the 111, with this important exception, Lt. Colonel MacKenzie Porter and Capt. William F. Stucky organized a group and stuck it out on the east side, north of Maison Rouge. It was the 3d Infantry Division's sole bridgehead during that dark night of January 23-24.

The 30th Infantry was in a bad way. A hurry-up call went out for pyramidal tents, stoves, blankets, clothes, and- hot coffee and food. Regimental supply personnel scoured their stocks and brought these items forward. Division G-4 also got an urgent call: "Send us dry clothes, rifles, and machine guns." A good proportion of the entire regiment was nearly frozen from its terrible exposure to the 111 River and the icy blasts of wind which greeted the men as they clambered from the water.

Straggler posts were set up along all possible routes to the rear, to direct the men back into the line. Although terribly chilled, the offensive spirit was still present in many of them. When collected by the officers they moved up into defensive positions west of the III supported by their massed armor and covered by their riflemen and machine guns east of the river. The attitude of some of the men was expressed by several who were wringing out their wet clothes, their weapons at their sides: "Yes, sir, we can hold! No goddamn kraut is going to kick the hell out of us and get by with it! We'll be here in the morning."

The tenure of 7th Infantry troops in Ostheim was even threatened for a time when the enemy organized for a strong counterattack from Houssen but our artillery massed heavy concentrations on the enemy force and broke up the attack at its inception.

The 15th Infantry was also very busy during the night of January 23-24. The attack must be pushed at all costs. It was obvious that 30th Infantry would need some time in which to reorganize. The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, was chosen to cross the III first, to seize a bridgehead around Maison Rouge to enable the engineers to get the all-important bridge in. Enemy tanks had ranged to within as close as a quarter-mile, firing direct fire on the bridge site.

The 3d Battalion jumped off at 0300, with Company I on the left and Company K on the right. The attack made good progress east of the III until Company I was counterattacked by four tanks and large numbers of enemy infantry. Again, still lacking armor pending a suitable bridge across the III, Company I was forced back in much the same manner as had been 30th Infantry the previous day. Three tanks supporting the 15th Infantry from the west bank of the river were neutralized in a few minutes. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, moving up to the line of departure by 1000, was about to attack in conjunction with 3d Battalion when the counterattack hit the latter.

The 1st Battalion was temporarily held up, but by noon was ready to deliver its attack. The advance rapidly moved through 3d Battalion at Maison Rouge bridge, to the woods northeast of Riedwihr. Here, however, enemy tanks and infantry were encountered and forced 1st Battalion-without armor as had been its predecessors-to withdraw from the -woods. At anyrate we now held a bridgehead, and the engineers went forward with all possible speed, completing the bridge. It was more than obvious that the attack east of the III would get nowhere if supporting armor was not in close support of our infantry troops.

The enemy taunted us with a special propaganda leaflet sent over by enemy artillery, claiming that over one hundred members of Company 1, 30th Infantry, including 1st Lt. Darwyn E. Walker-whom the leaflet named-had been captured on May 23. (In Walker's case, at least, it was true. Both he and 1st Lt. Ross H. Calvert, Company K commander, were later liberated by United States troops in Germany. Walker was liberated by his own Division.)

After completing the clearance of Ostheim, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry, commanded by Maj. Kenneth W. Wallace, had attacked shortly after midnight of January 24 toward Chateau de Schoppenwihr. A strong counterattack consisting of enemy infantry and six tanks came at daybreak. Three of the tanks were destroyed, but the fighting continued all day. It was not until 1830 that night that the Germans were finally driven from their positions in the Chateau area and in the woods between the railroad tracks and west to the Fecht River. Company C, 99th Chemical Battalion, laid down a heavy smoke screen while the fight was at its height, thus enabling Company A, 7th, to rejoin its battalion by crossing the open under cover of smoke at Bois dit de Rothleible. The additional strength was both timely and necessary.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, had a fierce fight in the Brunnwald woods, where the enemy had infiltrated while the struggle for the Chateau was in progress. The infiltration was followed by reinforcements after dark and when the 3d raided the positions at about midnight the enemy was prepared to resist with great strength. Mortars, machine guns and small arms provided stiff opposition to the raiders.

Company L, commanded by 1st Lt. Orville L. Dilley, moved around the tip of the woods and ran, into German machine guns and Flakwagons. Company A, 756th Tank Battalion, under Capt. Orlando A. Richardson, Jr., and Company A of the 601st TD Battalion, with Capt. Francis X. Lambert commanding, were supporting the 7th in the attack and our armor fought the enemy tanks and tank destroyers to a standstill.

Concealed German bazookamen, mechanized and horse-drawn antitank guns, Mark IV and Mark V tanks, were strewn throughout the area. Our casualties also were high and included six or seven pieces of armor.

At the end of the first forty-eight hours an important identification among enemy units had been made. As suspected, we were opposed by the two battalions of the 760 VG regiment, as well as elements of 748th, 225th, 308th, and 728th VG regiments. An additional unit, the 602nd Mobile Battalion, was almost wiped out during the period. The new identification, however, was that of the enemy 67th Reconnaissance Battalion from the 2d Mountain Division, previously identified in Norway. This was combined with the recognition of another element of the same division, the 137th Mountain Regiment, in the I French Corps zone. It provided an indication that the enemy was not going to let the Colmar Pocket be eliminated without a determined effort to prevent it. The 2d Mountain Division actually was earmarked for the pocket to replace the 269th Infantry Division, which previously had been sneaked out and sent to the Russian front. The enemy vainly hoped the switch could be completed before any Allied offensive could be started against the pocket.

Also known to be opposing our advance were: Battle Group Diemer and 235th Engineer Battalion. Suspected were elements of the 40th PG (Panzer Grenadier) Replacement Battalion in the 254th Infantry zone, and a possible addition of elements' of the 137th Mountain Regiment opposing the 7th Infantry.

By 2010 of the night of January 24, the 254th Infantry's 3d Battalion, which had been committed around the right flank of 1st Battalion in the regiment's attack south toward the Weiss River from Hill 216, reached the, Weiss. The regiment thus held the river line east to its juncture with the Fecht, although north of that point, along the Fecht stream line the area was not completely clear of enemy.

Company K, 7th Infantry, commanded by Capt. Francis J. Kret, was still in close contact with the enemy in the woods when the 7th struck south in an all-out attack, with three battalions abreast, at daybreak January 25. Company 1, under 1st Lt. William D. Anthone, was left to contain the enemy in the forest while the bulk of the regiment made the attack, which began after a heavy artillery and mortar concentration had been placed on Houssen and the surrounding area.

Meanwhile, across the 111, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 15th Infantry, took up the fight at 0300 the morning of January 25. They encountered enemy small-arms, machine-gun, 20mm, tank, and mortar fire about 300 yards northwest of Riedwihr. Two tanks and a tank destroyer with the 2d Battalion (a bridge strong enough for armor had finally. been put in several hundred yards north of Maison Rouge) became stuck, and the battalion withdrew about 700 yards. The men were not in the confusion that our elements had been the previous two days, however, when there was no supporting armor whatsoever. The battalion was quickly reorganized. Maj. John O'Connell's 3d Battalion, with Companies K and L in the assault, encountered enemy in the vicinity of a road )unction northeast of Riedwihr. Company K was disorganized and forced to withdraw. Company L succeeded in driving the enemy from some buildings there, and by noon the 3d Battalion was awaiting relief by elements of the French CC4, preparatory to attacking Riedwihr.

The very relentlessness of the Division attacks slowly wore the Germans down and the towns of Riedwlhr, Rosenkranz, and Houssen fell during the torrid fighting of January 25-26.

The 7th Infantry inflicted terrific losses on the enemy when the Germans launched a strong counterattack during the afternoon of January 25. The 1st Battalion, beating back the onslaught, turned the counterattack into an enemy rout and drove along the east-west road into Rosenkranz while 3d Battalion was holding firm against strong enemy armor and infantry pressure.

During the night of January 25 near Rosenkranz, Pfc. Jose F. Valdez gave his life in sacrifice. He was on outpost duty with five other soldiers, when the enemy counterattacked with overwhelming strength. From his position near some woods about five hundred yards beyond his lines, he observed a hostile tank about 75 yards away and raked it with automatic-rifle fire until it withdrew. Soon afterwards, he saw three enemy stealthily approaching through the woods. At thirty yards' distance he engaged in a fire fight with them until he had killed all three. The enemy quickly launched an attack with two full companies of infantrymen, blasting the patrol with murderous concentrations of automatic and rifle fire and beginning an encircling movement which forced the patrol leader to order a withdrawal. Private Valdez volunteered to cover the maneuver, and as the patrol, one by one, plunged through the enemy fire toward their own lines, Private Valdez fired burst after burst into the swarming enemy. The citation of his Medal of Honor award reads in part:

" . . . He was struck by a bullet which entered his stomach, and, passing through his body, emerged from the back. Overcoming agonizing pain, he regained control of himself and resumed his firing position, delivering a protective screen of bullets until all others of the patrol were safe. By field telephone, he called for artillery and mortar fire on the Germans and corrected the range until he had shells falling within fifty yards of his position. For fifteen minutes he refused to be dislodged by more than two hundred of the enemy, then seeing that the barrage had broken the counterattack, he dragged himself back to his own lines. He later died as a result of his wounds . . ."

Final mopping-up of Houssen was done the same day by the 2d and 3d Battalions.

Colonel Heintges' regiment took 166 prisoners, including three officers, and killed and wounded a great number of Germans during the 24-hour period beginning at noon, January 25. The 67th Reconnaissance Battalion of the German 2d Mountain Division, being fed into the line as it moved down from Norway, was caught by several stray artillery TOT's fired into Houssen prior to the attack, and was completely disorganized. Although this battalion contained 700 men, it was no opposition for the 7th's attack.

The 1st Battalion of the 15th, commanded by Maj. Kenneth B. Potter, with the 2d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Eugene F. Salet, on its flank, advanced into the woods west of Riedwihr during the afternoon of the 25th and actually fought until its ammunition ran out after they had penetrated some 600 yards into the forest against tree-to-tree resistance. Major Potter stopped the advance of his battalion until ammunition could be brought up and the attack was resumed at 0200 in the morning.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, moving from positions northwest of Riedwihr, also expended all its ammunition late that night and after being resupplied continued the advance and reached its objective on the south edge of the woods at 0930 the next morning.

The 3d Battalion fought its way to the outer edge of Riedwihr at about midnight and within an hour had cleared the Germans out of the city and had patrols out toward Wickerschwihr to the south.

While the 7th and 15th attacked their objectives, the 254th had been relieved by the 28th Division's 112th Infantry by 0700 of January 25 on the Division right. After coordinating with 7th Infantry in cleaning out the Fecht River bed, the 254th was committed on the Division left, to attack Jebsheim. The end of its first day's fighting found the regiment temporarily, stopped by bitter resistance, and temporary defensive preparations were made along an intermittent stream that ran just west of, Jebsheim. An old mill on the stream was a landmark of the area.

The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 15th were holding a line along the south edges of Le Schmalholtz and Brunnwald woods on the afternoon of the 26th, and occupied the Bois de Riedwihr on the north. Enemy infantry, reinforced by armor, struck the 1st Battalion positions on the west side of the woods. An enemy 88mm gun caught one of our tank destroyers flush in the middle, and a swarm of German armor overran the positions of Company B, thus threatening the Division's control of the -forest which dominated the German stronghold of Holtzwihr, to the south.

It was here that 1st Lt. Audie L. Murphy stopped an attack practically singlehandedly.

Lt. Col. Keith L. Ware, 15th Infantry Executive Officer, said later: "Control (of the Bois de Riedwihr) had been wrested from the enemy at a heavy cost in blood. Its possession was of cardinal importance.

"Accordingly, on the afternoon of January 26 the enemy launched a determined counterattack, hurling two companies and six heavy tanks at Company B's position in an effort to retake the woods at any cost."

1st Lt. Walter W. Weispfenning, a Field Artillery forward observer, said "The woods were sparse and there was practically no underbrush. I could see everything that happened. The kraut tanks rumbled past Murphy's position, passing within fifty yards of him and firing at him as they went by. They did not want to close in for the kill because they wanted to give our tank destroyer, which was burning but not in flames, as wide a berth as possible.

"While we tried to hold off the tanks with directed artillery fire and bazooka rockets, the German infantry line, consisting of two full-strength companies of 125 men each, surged across the open meadow in a wide arc. They fired at Murphy with machine pistols and rifles as they advanced.

Then I saw Lieutenant Murphy do the bravest thing that I had ever seen a man do in combat. With the Germans only a hundred yards away and still moving up on him, he climbed into the slowly burning tank destroyer and began firing the 50-caliber machine gun at the krauts. He was completely exposed and silhouetted against the background of bare trees and snow, with a fire under him that threatened to blow the destroyer to bits if it reached the gasoline and ammunition. Eighty-eight millimeter shells, machine-gun, machine pistol and rifle fire crashed all about him.

"Standing on top of the tank destroyer, Murphy raked the approaching enemy force with machine-gun fire. Twelve Germans, stealing up a ditch to flank him from his right, were killed in the gully at 50-yard range by concentrated fire from his machine gun. Twice the tank destroyer he was standing on was hit by artillery fire and the Lieutenant was enveloped in clouds of smoke and spurts of flame. His clothing was torn and riddled by flying shell fragments and bits of rock. Bullets ricocheted off the tank destroyer as the enemy concentrated the full fury of his fire on this one-man strongpoint."

Sgt. Elmer C. Brawley added: "The enemy tanks, meanwhile, returned because Lieutenant Murphy had held up the supporting infantry and they were apparently loath to advance further without infantry support. These tanks added their murderous fire to that of the kraut artillery and small-arms fire that showered the Lieutenant's position without stopping.

"The German infantrymen got within ten yards of the Lieutenant, who killed them in the draws, in the meadows, in the woods-wherever he saw them. Though wounded and covered with soot and dirt that must have obscured his vision at times, he held the enemy at bay, killing and wounding at least thirty-five during the next hour.

"Lieutenant Murphy, worn out and bleeding profusely, then limped forward through a continuing hall of fire and brought the company forward. Refusing to be evacuated, he led us in a strong attack against the enemy, dislodging the Germans from the whole area. When the fight was over, he allowed his wound to be treated on the field."

Pfc. Anthony V. Abramski, a member of Company B, added that the company was ordered to withdraw to prepared positions inside the woods when an enemy artillery concentration that preceded the attack began:

"Lieutenant Murphy remained at his command post under a tree so that he could direct artillery fire on the advancing tanks," Abramski said. "Together with a tank destroyer, which was across the main road through the 'woods and about ten yards to his right rear, he held that rear-guard position under raking fire from the German tanks.

"From my position in the woods, I saw a direct hit on our tank destroyer from a lagdpanther carrying an 88mm gun. The crew piled out as fast as they could and withdrew toward the company position in the forest. And that is when Lieutenant Murphy took over," concluded Abramski. For his action, Lieutenant Murphy later was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Simultaneously with the smash against 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, the enemy, attacking north from Holtzwihr, struck at- 2d Battalion positions on the south rim of the forest. Our artillery, however, laid some excellent concentrations on the advancing Germans and marked the area with smoke for friendly fighterbombers that strafed the enemy forces and attacked their assembly areas in Holtzwihr. The attack came as though, planned by a,, scenario writer. All day the skies had been cloudy. A few minutes before the German counterattack began, the area over the woods became clear enough for our fighter-bombers to strike, causing many casualties and proving instrumental in forcing a complete German withdrawal. Then the clouds closed in once more.

During the struggle a number of enemy entered the woods from the east and got behind 2d Battalion positions. A hurriedly gathered task force of doughboys, with a Flakwagon in support, was organized, and the enemy was put to flight after a stiff engagement.

The 254th Infantry jumped off at 1630 in resumption of its attack toward Jebsheim; 1st Battalion was on the right, 2d Battalion on the left. The 1st Battalion encountered strong enemy resistance from a pillbox 500 yards north of Jebsheim, which was seven feet high and manned by twelve men. Following its reduction the advance continued. The 2d Battalion entered Jebsheim at 2355, following a 15-minute artillery barrage, and 1st Battalion followed. Stiff houseto-house fighting lasted through the night and into the morning.

The 3d Battalion, 254th Infantry, attacked at 1750, January 26, with the mission of advancing southeast and clearing the Bois de Jebsheim from the south. Prepared enemy positions were encountered along a stream line and the advance was slow, likewise continuing throughout the night into the next day.

The 7th Infantry's 1st and 2d Battalions made local attacks during the afternoon of the 26th to improve their positions preparatory to relief. The 3d Battalion, following artillery preparation, attacked south from Brunnwald woods at 1300, with the Battle Patrol attacking east of Houssen. This got away at 1300 with the purpose of clearing some enemy who were well-intrenched between a dike and the III River on the left flank. Company I was particularly successful in its mission, although it was a very bloody small attack. During the night 28th Division's 109th Infantry elements relieved 7th Infantry, which went into Division reserve after having attacked continuously since the night of January 22.

The morning of January 27th saw a reorganized, vengeful 30th Infantry in the fight once again. The 2d Battalion left its assembly area at 0445 in an attack toward the Colmar Canal which was coordinated with French units on its flank. The 1st Battalion moved out, crossing its line of departure and clearing across the road leading southwest from Riedwihr to an area in the vicinity of west of Wickerschwihr by 0510. The 3d Battalion blocked east of the III River. By 0845 Company E reported the east side of Holtzwihr clear. Company F, after losing a tank to enemy bazooka fire, withdrew to its line of departure to reorganize, and attacked again, to report the remainder of Holtzwihr clear by 0950. The 1st Battalion cleaned out Wickerschwihr by noon.

The Division Commander later praised the 30th Infantry for its rapid reorganization and resumption of the offensive. In his own words: "It took a fighting regiment to make the gains you made on January 22-23, but it took a great regiment to come back after the reverses you suffered and kick hell out of the kraut at Holtzwihr and Wickerschwihr."

By noon of the 27th all but the southern tip of Jebsheim was reported clear by the 254th Infantry. Elements of 5 DB moved in to take charge* of the southern part of the town, and strong German elements infiltrated back in. The task of clearing them out the French then handed back to the 254th because of their lack of infantry. Fierce fighting continued in that small tip for two more days and it was nearly midnight of January 29th before the 254th Infantry could finally and authoritatively report Jebsheim free of Germans. The regiment, new to combat prior to joining the 3d in the Colmar Pocket, acquitted itself with distinction, first in clearing troublesome Hill 216 and then mopping up in Jebsheim, taking a total of nearly 1,000 prisoners in three days. (The importance of Jebsheim was that it was one of a string of fortified towns on- the enemy's main north-south communication artery.)

It now remained for the 15th and 30th Infantry regiments to clear out a few scattered German elements north of the Colmar Canal and the next large phase of the operation was ready to be initiated. During that two-day period, thorough preparations were made to slam across the canal in force, and to move far and fast. This time there was to be no repetition of the grinding battle of attrition which had characterized the fighting so far.

Patrols to the Canal reported that it was about fifty feet wide and five feet deep, its steep banks being some twelve feet high and about eight feet wide at the top, and fifteen at the bottom. The water was slow-moving, but not frozen.

At 2100, January 28, the 3d Infantry Division passed from control of 11 French Corps to control of XXI American Corps, which was commanded by Maj Gen. F. W. Milburn.

Reconnaissance along the north bank of the Colmar Canal was continuous during the hours of darkness January 28-29. Huge trucks hauling engineer bridging equipment clogged the roads behind the forward areas.

The entire French 5 DB was attached to the 3d Division as of 1635, January 29.

That evening, with the coming of darkness, 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments stole to the- edges of the Colmar Canal with engineer rubber boats, and waited.

Heavy concentrations of preparatory fire of all weapons broke loose just preceding the crossing. During a 24-hour period beginning at 1800, the artillery battalions fired 16,438 rounds of ammunition, most of which was fired at the beginning of the attack, while the 441st AAA Battalion, under command of Lt. Col. Thomas H. Leary, fired 22,300 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition during the first three hours of the attack. The antiaircraft gunners sent a continuous hail of shells into enemy positions across the canal and into the towns of Bischwihr, Fortschwihr, and Muntzenheim.

Operation "Krautbuster" was initiated at 2100. Behind the furious screen of preparatory shells, leading elements of the 7th Infantry moved down the steep banks of the canal and paddled across. Enemy resistance was surprisingly light. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 7th were completely across by 2205; the 15th Infantry had its bridging supplies held up by heavy traffic, but began crossing at 2145 with the 2d and 3d Battalions in the lead. By midnight the 7th and 15th were completely across.

Company B, 7th Infantry, engaged some enemy in a fire fight while the remainder of 1st Battalion moved into Bischwihr at 2245. The 3d Battalion on the right, also attacking Bischwihr, encountered some resistance in the town but reported the town clear at 2400.

No less speedy was the 15th Infantry's rapid attack upon Muntzenheim. The 2d and 3d Battalions reorganized after the canal crossing, with 1st Battalion crossing behind them. The 2d and 3d then attacked Muntzenheim from the west with 3d Battalion on the left. Company K was reported on its objective by 0110 and the first elements of the 2d Battalion were reported in the town at 0130.

After Muntzenheim was cleared, the 3d Battalion remained in the town and the 2d Battalion attacked Fortschwihr from the northeast in conjunction with 1st Battalion (less certain elements) which attacked south to the town from assembly areas. The town was cleared in short order. During the attack on the two villages approximately 200 prisoners were taken; a 105mm gun with crew, an 88mm gun with crew and two 120mm mortars were captured intact.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, now did some broken-field running. Having crossed the canal on footbridges at 2330, the battalion moved rapidly toward Wilir-en-Plaine, and was approaching it by 0130 in the face of tank fire and some small-arms resistance. Companies F and G entered the town at 0205 as two enemy tank destroyers penetrated between the two companies and the battalion OP group, a member of which was Maj. Jack M. Duncan, the battalion commander. A phenomenal 500-foot bazooka shot by Pfc. Joseph L. Bale destroyed one of the tank destroyers, setting it on fire. The other fled as did the accompanying enemy infantry.

By 0315 the battalion was meeting scattered resistance in Wilir-en-Plaine. At 0630 there was a strong counterattack of enemy armor and infantry. Fierce fighting ensued. By noon the battalion controlled the northern half of the town and was fighting in the southern portion.

During this time 254th Infantry had launched an attack south from Jebsheim to the Colmar Canal and east toward the Rhone-Rhine Canal. At the time 7th Infantry began its crossing of the Colmar Canal, all resistance in Jebsheim had ceased. Five hundred and seventy-five prisoners were taken there the last day of fighting.

The bitter fight in Wihr-en-Plaine conducted by 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, with Company L attached, continued on through the 30th of January. After repulsing a second counterattack early in the afternoon, 2d Battalion and Company L attacked south at 1430, with the 7th Infantry Battle Patrol also participating. Some more of Wihr-en-Plaine was cleared after a hard, close-in fight, and another counterattack at 1830 was repelled. The 2d Battalion jumped off to attack Wihren-Plaine's southwest edge at 2230 followed by elements of CC4, which were to pass through the battalion and enter Colmar providing a bridge were seized.

The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, assembled east of captured Fortschwihr at 1640, January 30, and attacked the woods to the southeast. Little or no enemy resistance was encountered by the battalion. Company B was reported on its objective at 1830, Company A on its objective by 1835.

The 1st Battalion remained in position until noon the following day. The 2d Battalion, minus Company F, which was guarding a bridge across the Canal, remained in Fortschwihr.

Elements of the French CC5 attacked Urschenheim from Muntzenheim at 1700. After an extremely stiff fight the town was reported clear at 2000 and Company 1, 15th Infantry was ordered to take it over, which it did at 2200.

The 30th Infantry held and cleared the south bank of the Colmar Canal, blocking to the east and west. It was shot at from the south where enemy groups still held out. The 28th Division had not yet attacked south into Colmar, leaving the regiment's right flank open.

The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, remained in blocking positions to the east in Wickerschwihr, with Company A outposting bridges. Company A was relieved of these positions early on January 31 by elements of the 75th U. S. Infantry Division, which had been brought down from the northern Allied front and was in the process of being placed into position between the 3d and 28th Divisions.

The 2d Battalion also remained in position for the January 30-31 period, as did 3d Battalion, although the latter, and especially Company L, was subjected to very heavy artillery, Flakwagon, machine-gun, and rifle fire in its mission of blocking and clearing. At 1500 an enemy group of about forty men began an attack toward Company L, but artillery and mortar fire stopped them.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved south from Bischwihr at 1700 and entered the Niederwald woods. The battalion encountered only light resistance. At 0700 next morning a reported 200 enemy approaching the southern edge of the woods were taken under artillery fire and routed. An armored infantry force from CC4 joined 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion continued scouring Le Niederwald for isolated groups of enemy.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, continued its fight throughout the night of January 30-31. At 0120 Companies E and L (attached) were 300 yards short of a key road junction in Wihr-en-Plaine, near Horbourg, encountering stiff enemy resistance. They had made only fifty yards and were held up by an antitank ditch at 0435. Company E received a counterattack at 0700 and repulsed it only after bitter fighting.

The 3d Battalion (minus Company L) entered the woods northwest of 1st Battalion and encountered strong small arms resistance. Company I followed 3d Battalion and engaged the enemy in the woods in a firefight, killing many enemy and taking sixteen prisoners.

The 2d Battalion seized the road junction in Wlhren-Plaine by noon and pushed on to Horbourg.

French CC5 pushed on from Urschenheim to Durrenentzen, and engaged the enemy there in a hard fight. Before the town was taken the French lost nine tanks.

The 2d Battalion and Company L, 7th Infantry, together with CC4 attacked Horbourg shortly after noon January 31. By 1435 they were in the town fighting a stubbornly resisting foe. By 1535 they held half the town and were fighting from house-to-house as the French armor drove on through. Artillery was directed on enemy withdrawing from the town. A TOT was placed on the west side of the III River and advance elements of the 2d Battalion reached the- III at midnight putting the town completely in our hands.

The attack was about to go into its final phase. The 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments concentrated on .clearing out all enemy west of the Rhone-Rhine Canal which ran north from Neuf-Brisach. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, attacked cast from Urschenheim to clear the woods and secure a bridge across the Rhone-Rhine Canal near Kunzheim. During the advance, which was led by Company B with armor, 1st Battalion destroyed two enemy tanks and damaged one. The 2d Battalion attacked at 0100, February 1, on the regimental left flank, and advanced to the east along the Colmar Canal, reaching a position from which it could cover the bridge with fire. The 3d Battalion prepared to make an attack to clear the woods between the 1st and 2d Battalions.

The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, moved out at 0100, February 1, to clear a stretch east of the Rhone-Rhine Canal. Company A, in the lead, reached its objective at 0625 and fired on enemy vehicles with Cannon Company and artillery fires. At 0637 Companies B and C reached the west side of the canal. Company C crossed the canal on locks at 0717. At 0722 Company A repulsed a two-tank attack. The battalion took 124 prisoners in the twenty-four hours ending noon of February 1.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, continued clearing objectives west of the Rhone-Rhine Canal during the February 1-2 period. The 3d Battalion repulsed a 40 man, two-tank counterattack, shortly after noon of February 1.

The next play belonged to 7th Infantry. During the night of January 31-February 1, the regiment was relieved from its newly won positions by elements of the 75th Infantry Division and assembled in Urschenheim. From here the battalions moved to Wickerschwihr, and foot elements moved by marching to the Rhone-Rhine Canal.

Artzenheim, on the east side of the Rhone-Rhine Canal, had been taken by the French 1 DMI. The plan now was for 7th Infantry to attack south from Artzenhelm in the direction of Neuf-Brisach, which lay close to the Rhine River and east of which were the two bridges over which the Germans had been supplying the bulk of their bridgehead forces for so long.

The attack got off at 0500 February 2,'2d and 3d Battalions abreast. By 0615 Company I had penetrated to the northern edge of Kunzheim. The 2d Battalion became engaged in a small arms and machine gun fight for Baltzenheim at 0800, while 3d Battalion fought to clear Kunzheim. By 0900 both towns were cleared.

With Kunzheim taken, next step was Biesheim, then the final objective, Neuf-Brisach. Leading elements of the 30th Infantry were cleaning out the southern edges of the Schaeferwald woods, a southwestern projection of Bois de Biesheim, directly east of Widensolen. To the south, athwart the 30th Infantry's path which was clearly outlined and guided by the converging lines of the Widensolen and Rhone-Rhine Canals, were the northern moats and city wall of Neuf-Brisach.

The 15th Infantry moved behind 7th Infantry into Kunzheim, ready to follow the 7th, then to continue branching out to the southeast, to clean out the enlarged zone of advance caused by the southeast bend of the Rhine in the vicinity of Fort Mortier.

At 0230, February 3, Col. Heintges' 2d and 3d Battalions attacked, 3d Battalion on the right following the east bank of the Rhone-Rhine Canal. The 1st Battalion was in reserve, and followed at 0600.

The 2d Battalion passed through enemy in trenches north of Biesheim in the darkness, and entered Bieshelm at 0400. The battalion's hardest fight was encountered in these trenches.

It was in the light of a waning moon that the advancing infantry was ambushed. Enemy forces outnumbering the infantry point four to one poured withering artillery, mortar, machine-gun and small-arms fire into the stricken men from the flanks, forcing them to seek the cover of a ditch which they found already occupied by enemy foot troops. As the opposing infantrymen struggled in hand-to-hand combat, T/5 Forrest E. Peden, an artillery forward observer from Battery C, 10th Field Artillery Battalion, accompanying the infantry, courageously went to the assistance of two wounded soldiers and rendered them first aid under heavy fire. With radio communications inoperative, he realized that the unit would be wiped out unless help could be secured from the rear. On his own initiative lie ran eight hundred yards to the battalion command post through a hail of bullets, which pierced his jacket, and there secured two light tanks to go to the aid of his hard-pressed comrades. Knowing the terrible risk involved, he climbed upon the hull of the lead tank and guided it into battle. The tank lumbered on through a murderous concentration of fire until it reached the ditch. A direct hit struck the tank, just as it was about to go into action, turning it into a burning pyre and killing T/5 Peden. His death was not in vain. The remainder of the battalion was guided to the scene of action by the flames and relieved their embattled comrades. Peden was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

The 3d Battalion, on the other hand, became involved with enemy along the canal, and initially only Company I succeeded in entering Biesheim. Enemy in the "Jewish Cemetery" also took Lt. Col. Lloyd B. Ramsey's assault elements under fire from their east flank. Maj. Kenneth W. Wallace's 1st Battalion, following the 2d Battalion under Maj. Jack M. Duncan, discovered when daylight came that the hardest enemy opposition had actually been by-passed and that a very determined group held out in the Jewish Cemetery and in pillboxes echeloned in depth between that point and the Rhine. The 1st Battalion was involved in a stiff fight all day and half the night of February 3-4, when the cemetery and surrounding area finally were reported clear. At 0400 the battalion was ordered to return to Kunzheim, pending further action.

During most of February 3 the 3d and 2d Battalions continued to work on Biesheim and it was cleared of Germans by 1700. The 3d Battalion captured 250 prisoners and 2d Battalion took about 150.

Meanwhile the 30th Infantry had attacked south along the west bank of the Rhone-Rhine Canal on February 3 and elements of the 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col. Mackenzie E. Porter, reached the canal bridge cast of Biesheim, where enemy fire was received.

Maj. Kenneth B. Potter's 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, attacked east during the early morning hours of February 4 to assist the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, in clearing the cemetery area. A small task force from the battalion then moved north from Biesheim to clear up scattered enemy resistance elements along the Kunzheim-Biesheim road, and it was this that shortly thereafter enabled Major Wallace's Battalion to return. to Kunzheim.

During the night of February 3-4 and February 4-5, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, commanded by Maj. James A. Osgard, sent patrols toward Neuf-Brisach, as did the 1st Battalion. Elements of the 1st Battalion encountered some enemy pillboxes at 1925, February 3, succeeded in eliminating two of them by 2100, and at 2340 sent a platoon from Company A to occupy the pillboxes.

At 0435 a five-man patrol from Company A went to a point approximately 500 meters north of Neuf-Brisach and succeeded in returning with twenty-four German prisoners. Major Osgard's 2d Battalion, and 3d Battalion, under Maj. Christopher W. Chaney, maintained aggressive combat patrols to the front and flanks during the 24-hour period beginning noon February 3.

At 0015, February 5, 7th Infantry left the line of departure at Biesheim. The 1st Battalion's mission was to seize the crossroads north of Vogelsheim; 3d Battalion on the right had the mission of seizing the railroad station and sealing the northeast and east entrances to Neuf-Brisach. The 2d Battalion was then to pass through 3d Battalion and seize the hospital and factory area southeast of Neuf-Brisach. The 15th Infantry already had moved to the southeast of Biesheim, where elements of 1st Battalion had seized a crossroads there. Maj. John O'Connell's 3d Battalion cleared the Boulay Woods along the banks Of the Rhine and was then moved south to continue clearing the woods to the south. Lt. Col. Eugene Salet's 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, also worked on the territory along the banks of the Rhine, operating south of the 3d Battalion.

The 7th Infantry succeeded in clearing Vogelsheim by 0630, February 5, and 2d Battalion moved through on schedule, clearing out the hospital and factory area with little trouble. During the night of February 5-6 a patrol from Company K, led by Sgt. Chester M. Owens, reconnoitered to the east and northeast of Neuf-Brisach, and succeeded in reaching the northteast wall without being fired upon.

The 15th Infantry encountered considerable trouble at Fort Mortier, southeast of Biesheim, on the afternoon of February 5, but the fort was cleared out by 2100. The 1st Battalion accomplished this mission. The 3d Battalion continued to move south. By 1730 Company K had cut the main highway bridge approach, and Company I had moved even further south and cut the railway bridge approach.

Neuf-Brisach was now nearly sealed off. During the night of February 5-6 the enemy began evacuating the fortress city,^. Preparatory to this, however, there was a stiff fight north of the city. The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, during the night of February 4-5 assigned Company C the mission of ascertaining the condition of a bridge across the Widensolen Canal just east of Petite Hollande Ferme. At 0430 the four men of the point of 1st Lt. Louis J. Lombardi's 2d platoon were fired upon by machine guns in the vicinity of the bridge and from machine guns at the farm. The platoon thereupon withdrew slightly and dug in along the east bank of the canal.

Company B, 30th Infantry, attacked through Company A along the west bank of the Rhone-Rhine Canal a few minutes after 1500, February 5, with predesignated phase lines. The attack was successful. The company "peeled off" to the right by platoons, with armor support, and took seventy-eight prisoners, wounded fourteen more, and killed four.

The company set up an outpost line between canals and shortly thereafter Company C, moving south along the Widensolen Canal, contacted Company B's right elements, and the two companies set up their defense.

That same night of February 5, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, moved by marching to Biesheim and at 2030 the battalion attacked toward Vogelsheim in column of companies. The area east and south of Vogelsheim was interdicted by our artillery as the battalion advanced. Light opposition was encountered and the town of Vogelgrun was reported clear by 2315.

After the 2d Battalion's successful attack on Vogelgrun, the 3d Battalion launched an attack on Algolsheim. The enemy here was supported by at least three tanks, and intense artillery fire was received from enemy Flak guns east of the Rhine. Under the command of Lt. Col. Christopher W. Chaney, the battalion fought through the afternoon of February 6 and into the morning of February 7 to clear the town, beating off one enemy counterattack after the town was taken.

Pfc. Kenneth E. LaRue of Company B led a patrol to the northeast wall of Neuf-Brisach during the night Of February 5-6, with a mission of determining the condition of the railroad bridge in that vicinity. The men found strong demolition charges laid, but the bridge was intact. The patrol drew four or five rounds of sniper fire and observed about five men in a nearby grape vineyard. These were captured the following morning by Company C personnel.

At 0900, February 6, elements of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, reported heavy enemy traffic evacuating from the town on the southeast road leading from Neuf-Brisach. Major Duncan ordered artillery, tank, and infantry weapons fire laid on this traffic.

At 0800 Sgt. Elbert Tapley of Company C, 30th Infantry, led a three-man patrol to the north wall of town and was fired on by an enemy machine gun. However, the patrol remained in wait and at about 1000 observed a white flag above the arch entrance way into the town. Sergeant Tapley returned to find his company moving one platoon down to the northwest wall.

At about 0930 a Company B platoon under S/Sgt. Richard B. Weiler moved south in column. As the men neared the railroad bridge they observed a civilian who, after some persuasion, jumped down into the dry moat and led the platoon to a narrow, low-ceilinged 60-foot tunnel which led through the wall into the town.

The 3d platoon, Company C, under 1st Lt. Hennon Gilbert, however, had preceded the Company B Platoon. Led by Sergeant Tapley the platoon approached a blown bridge on the northwest edge of town, and two young French children went down into the moat to guide them through the archway into town.

Since this platoon entered first, it took all the prisoners. In one building in the north part of town there were thirty-eight. The others drifted in in groups of three and four until a total of seventy-six had been accounted for. There was no fighting in the town.

By 1115 it was radioed that the town was clear of enemy.

The ending was as anti-climactic as the fighting which preceded it had been fierce. The fact that entry into the town was made easily did not detract from the work of the regiments in Neuf-Brisach's near vicinity.

Thus fell Neuf-Brisach, entered by 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry. Built in 1472, and first destroyed by the Germans in 1870, the town had been built to withstand a siege. The 3d Infantry Division's chosen method of attack made direct assault unnecessary. The Division's work was done.

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

As authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. 1, WD Bul. 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. 111, WD Bul. 11, 1942), the following unit is cited by the War Department for outstanding performance of duty in action during the period indicated, under the provisions of section IV, WD Circular 333, 1943, in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:

The 3d Infantry Division with the following-attached units:

254th Infantry Regiment, 99th Chemical Battalion, 168th Chemical Smoke Generator Company, 441st Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP), 756th Tank Battalion, IPW Team 183, fighting incessantly, from 22 January to 6 February 1945, in heavy snow storms, through enemy-infested marshes and woods, and over a flat plain criss-crossed by numerous small canals, irrigation ditches, and unfordable streams, terrain ideally suited to the defense, breached the German defense wall on the northern perimeter of the Colmar bridgehead and drove forward to isolate Colmar from the Rhine. Crossing the Fecht River from Guemar, Alsace, by stealth during the late hours of darkness of 22 January, the assault elements fought their way forward against mounting resistance. Reaching the III River, a bridge was thrown across but collapsed before armor could pass to the support of two battalions of the 30th Infantry on the far side. Isolated and attacked by a full German Panzer brigade, outnumbered and outgunned, these valiant troops were forced back yard by yard. Wave after wave of armor and infantry was hurled against them but despite hopeless odds the regiment held tenaciously to its bridgehead. Driving forward in knee-deep snow, which masked acres of densely sown mines, the 3d Infantry Division fought from house to house and street to street in the fortress towns of the Alsatian Plain. Under furious concentrations of supporting fire, assault troops crossed the Colmar, Canal in rubber boats during the night of 29 January. Driving relentlessly forward, six towns were captured within 8 hours, 500 casualties inflicted on the enemy during the day, and large quantities of booty seized. Slashing through to the RhoneRhine Canal, the garrison at Colmar was cut off and the fall of the city assured. Shifting the direction of attack, the division moved south between the RhoneRhine Canal and the Rhine toward Neuf-Brisach and the Brisach Bridge. Synchronizing the attacks, the bridge was seized and Neuf-Brisach captured . . .

GO 44 WD 6 June 1945

Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, who had commanded 3d Infantry Division since February 17, 1944-through the push to Rome, Southern France, and the Vosges Mountains, had this to say to the Division upon the completion of the 16-day attack against the Colmar Pocket:

"In crossing the Fecht and III Rivers, the Colmar and Rhone-Rhine Canals, and your attacks toward Neuf-Brisach, culminating in the routing of the Germans and the capture of the Neuf-Brisach area, you have participated in the most outstanding operation in the career of your Division.

"You drove on relentlessly day and night through the worst of weather. Your action not only enabled you to advance, but also made possible the advance of all other forces in the bridgehead and hastened the collapse and elimination of the German-held Colmar Pocket.

"As your commander, I congratulate you on your outstanding performance and am proud of the honor of being in command of such a superb group of fighting men.

Said Maj. Gen. F. W. Milburn, XXI Corps Commander: "The operations of the XXI Corps in the Colmar area have been successfully completed. Colmar has been liberated and the enemy has been driven to the east of the Rhine.

"The success of these operations has been due to the loyalty, the gallantry, and the unselfish devotion to duty of the many thousands of officers and enlisted men of the units that constitute the, XXI Corps.

"The 3d Infantry Division was particularly outstanding in these operations. It performed its assigned missions with great enthusiasm. It completed these missions successfully, contributing materially thereby to the great victory achieved by our units.

"I wish to commend you, the officers, and enlisted men of the 3d Infantry Division for the superior manner in which they performed during these operations. Their actions were superb, and they reflect the finest traditions of the Armies of the United States."

" . . . This commendable operation," said Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers, Sixth Army Group Commander, "is in the best tradition of the 3d Infantry Division and has added another glorious chapter to your outstanding record which includes almost 400 combat days and nineteen Medals of Honor. I congratulate each officer and man on this fine organization of which you should all be justly proud."

Bare statistics shed further light on the Colmar accomplishment. The 3d Infantry Division, reinforced, during the 16-day period, captured twenty-two towns, over 4,200 prisoners, and killed an enemy total disproportionately high to the total number captured. It virtually destroyed the 708th VG and 2d Mountain Divisions, badly mauled the 189th and 16th VG Divisions, and destroyed a great amount of all types of enemy materiel.

General Charles de Gaulle, head of the Provisional French Government, chose another way of saying, "Thanks." On February 20, 1945, there was a notable ceremony in Colmar. The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, represented the 3d Division's infantry; a battery of the 41st FA Battalion, the artillery. The 3d Reconnaissance Troop was also represented by a platoon.

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, commander of the First French Army, pinned the Order of the Croix de Guerre to the Division's colors. He then conferred the Legion D'Honneur, 3d Degree, and the Croix de Guerre with Palm on the 3d's Commanding General, John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel.