1. Hq & Hq Co, 3d Inf Div 2. 7th Inf Regt 3. 15th Inf Regt 4. 30th Inf Regt 5. 3d Inf Div Artillery 9th FA Bn(-LT) 10th FA Bn(-LT) 39th FA Bn(-LT) 41st FA Bn(-LT) 6. 3d Rcn Troop

7. 3d QM Bn 8. 3d Signal Co 9. 3d Med Bn 10. 10th Engr Bn 11. Attached Units 756th Tk Bn 443d AAA AW Bn 436th AAA AW Bn 36th Engr Regt 2d Bn, 20th Engrs Co A, 204th MP Bn

In the pitch-black hours preceding the dawn of a memorable African morning a mighty armada of ships lay offshore the resort town of Fedala, French Morocco.

It was November 8, 1942.

Three months earlier United States Marines, in the United States' first offensive effort of World War II, had assaulted the beaches at Guadalcanal and struck at the enemy in the Pacific. Now was the time for the United States to commit her strength in another theater, against the enemy whom almost all had privately acknowledged to be the common foe prior to the beginning of the war against Japan on December 7, 1941 Nazi Germany.

To engage the enemy initially where planned gave rise to a paradox. It was necessary first to fight a people who always had been-and again would be our ally. It was necessary to establish ourselves solidly in North Africa in order to carry our share of the fight to Rommel's Afrika Korps, even then fleeing before the hammer blows of a rejuvenated, victorious British Eighth Army in Egypt. So arose the necessity of attacking and seizing the French garrisons at Fedala, Casa

Armd Bn LT 67th Armd Regt 2d Armd Div

Det ATF 12th GASC

562d Sig Bn ATF

16th Obsn Sq

21st Engr Bn (Avn)

68th Obsn Gp ATF

122d Obsn Sq ATF

12th Serv Cmd ATF

41st Serv Gp ATF

Det 1st Armd Sig Bn

Det 239th Sig (Opr)

Det 122d Sig Co (RI)

Det 163d Sig Co (Photo)

Det C, 829th Sig (Opr)

Sp Rad Co (1st Bdc)

Ctr Rad Co (1st Bdc)

Prs Interr Group

Cvl Govt Pers

Det 66th Engrs

Pub Rel Officers

Counterintelligence Group

Blanca, Safi, and Port Lyautey on the Atlantic coast, and Oran and Algiers and the surrounding area on the Mediterranean coast.

The 3d Infantry Division was one of five divisions that began the United States' offensive against Hitler's far-flung empire.

United States pilots and seamen had been battling German aircraft, submarines and warships for many months; United States tank crews had supported the British in the African desert; but the United States doughboy did not begin his steady, unremitting fight until that chill morning on the beaches of French North Africa.

This landing, which fittingly enough was designated "Operation Torch," was made while the vast array of special amphibious craft and equipment, later to carry our troops ashore in dozens of smashing blows, was still on drawing boards or factory production lines. There were no LSTs, LCIs or "ducks" at Fedala, only big gray transports and their small transport-borne landing craft. This meant that the Division's heavy supporting weapons and trucks had to be painfully ferried ashore, one or two at a time, in LCMs (Landing Craft Mechanized) designed to carry one light tank each. It meant also that transportation had to be scaled down drastically to conform to the "Amphibious Tables of Organization" previously developed by the Division.

Even the artillery complement was affected; light battalions were equipped with 75mm pack howitzers, which were broken down and carried in LCPs (Landing Craft, Personnel, known familiarly as "Higgins boats"), while the medium battalion used half-track 105's ferried ashore in LCMs.

In effect, each battalion landing team was a small task force-a separate entity in itself; the theory being that each battalion commander had at his disposal all the elements of a force that would be self-sustaining for several days. This was later basically altered to follow a theory of more interdependence with regiment and Division.

Supply was predicated on bringing rations, ammunition and gasoline ashore by small-boat shuttle, although it was hoped the port of Fedala would be freed at least by the second day, enabling transports to come in one at a time and unload at the pier.

Operation Torch had the strategic aim of cutting North Africa out from under the Axis' European edifice, opening the Mediterranean to Allied shipping. And providing a base for later offensive operations against the continent of Europe. Casablanca, Oran, Algiers, Bizerte and Tunis were all big ports, and there were enough potential air-base sites in eastern Algeria and Tunisia to accommodate all the planes the Allies could put onto them.

The tactical mission of the 3d Infantry Division was to capture the great city of Casablanca, largest port on the west coast of Africa, the only one on the Atlantic Coast of French Morocco capable of being used as a base of operations for large bodies of troops. It was farthest of the five ports from Axis bomber bases.

Reinforcing the Division were the 67th Armored Battalion Combat Team from the 2d Armored Division; two companies of the 756th Tank Battalion (light); elements of the 443d AAA AW Battalion, 436th AAA AW Battalion, 36th Engineer Regiment (C); and one battalion of the 20th Engineer Regiment and several smaller attachments.

To accomplish this mission, the Division was directed to land on beaches in the vicinity of Fedala, a small port sixteen miles northeast of Casablanca; seize Fedala as a temporary base of operations; and attack toward Casablanca. Landings by other units were to be made at Safi, 120 miles southwest of Casablanca, which had a small harbor suitable for landing armor, and at Port Lyautey, eighty miles northeast of Casablanca, which had an airfield on which could be landed planes from Casablanca.

Fedala, in normal times, has a population of about 2500 Europeans and 13,000 natives. Cape Fedala at the west end of town projects northward from the coast about 1000 yards, providing some protection for the harbor and serving as a base for one of the two jetties which enclose the harbor.

About three miles northeast of Fedala, and immediately north of the deep-cut ravine of Wadi Nefifikh, is Batterie du Pont Blondin, at that time a defended locality and seacoast gun emplacement. Pont Blondin itself is a highway bridge across the Wadi Nefifikh.

Immediately west of Fedala another stream empties into the sea. A few hundred yards inland the course of this stream flows between steeply sloping banks that form the Wadi Mellah. The terrain between Fedala and Casablanca is gently rolling, largely cultivated, and ideal for motor and mechanized operation, since there is a good network of roads and trails.

Information furnished by the War Department and other sources indicated that the attitude of the French armed forces was highly uncertain; many high French officers were known to be friendly to the Allied cause; yet others were known to be solidly under Vichy control or even pro-Axis, so that the places where the enemy would defend and the extent of his resistance could not be accurately estimated beforehand. It was believed, however, that the navy was under a strong Vichy influence but would strongly resist any attack, whether Axis or Allied.

Intelligence reports showed about a battalion and a half of infantry in Fedala, two or three antiaircraft batteries and a coastal gun battery on Cape Fedala, a field artillery battery and two troops of Moroccan Spahis (Cavalry). In Casablanca there were believed to -be three or four infantry battalions, four troops of Spahis (one mechanized), and four battalions of field artillery.

In, devising the tactical plan for the landings, the Division Planning Staff recognized the necessity of destroying, at the earliest possible moment, the powerful enemy batteries on Cape Fedala and north of Pont Blondin. Until this was done, no craft could safely approach shore nor could the port of Fedala be used to supply troops in their push on Casablanca. The 7th Infantry was assigned the mission of capturing the town and cape of Fedala, and neutralizing the guns on the Cape. The 30th Infantry received the mission of attacking and reducing Batterie du Pont Blondin and protecting the rear and left flank of the Division. The 15th Infantry was to land as the Division's reserve regiment, prepared to pass inland on the left of the 7th Infantry and, in company with the latter, take up the drive on Casablanca.

To avert unnecessary fighting in case the French were of a mind to welcome us ashore, President Roosevelt and the Allied High Command broadcast to the people of North Africa at 0100, November 8, before any of our troops had touched foot on shore, telling them to expect us and to stack their arms and point their searchlights in the air if they desired to cooperate with us.

A special mission had also been assigned to Col. W. H. Wilbur, who was to drive to Casablanca in a jeep, protected by a white flag, and offer friendly armistice terms to the French authorities there. United States flag arm bands were worn by all personnel and United States flag transfers were applied to all vehicles so there would be no doubt as to the identity of the assailant-liberators.

On November 7, the day before the landing, the powerful Western Task Force convoy, composed of nearly eighty transports, warships and airplane carriers, turned northeast from a deceptive course laid toward Dakar and began deploying before dark as the groups destined for Safi, Fedala and Port Lyautey made for their respective transport areas.

Some difficulty was encountered by vessels in the 3d Infantry Division convoy (known as Sub-Task Force Brushwood) during the evening of November 7 when two 45-degree turns were made while approaching the transport area, and some vessels misinterpreted the signals for the turn. At 0200 the Division Commander, Maj. Gen. Jonathan W. Anderson, and his staff, aboard the Leonard Wood, were informed by the Navy that four ships had moved into the assigned areas, and were assumed to be those bearing the four assault battalions. This later turned out not to be the case, as one of the ships was carrying a reserve unit.

It was now just two hours before H-hour.

The boat-employment plan had envisaged borrowing small boats from transports which did not carry assault battalions and as these ships were then only slowly finding their way into the transport area and sending their landing craft to be loaded in small driblets, the question of whether the assault waves could be formed in time to hit the beaches at 0400 became critical.

At 0415 word was received from the destroyers marking the line of departure that some of the assault battalions had only one wave present for dispatch to shore. It thus became imperative to set H-hour back in order to give the four battalions concerned time to get at least four waves ashore without interruption.

The new H-hour was set at 0445, and the change announced to all vessels.

The landing plan was fairly simple, and may be generalized as follows:

On the extreme left, or northeast flank of the Division, Company L, 30th Infantry, was to land on Beach Blue 3, beyond Batterie du Pont Blondin, and assist in its capture by attacking from the rear. The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, was to land on Beach Blue 2, immediately southwest of the battery, and assault it from the Fedala side.

Next in order was 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, scheduled to land on Beach Blue 1, proceed inland and seize the remainder of the beachhead line in the 30th Infantry sector.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, had a mission similar to that of its neighbor on the left, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, which was that of advancing inland and seizing the bulk of the regimental beachhead. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, was prepared to land on Beach Red 2, immediately northeast of Fedala, then turn to the right, capture the town, and reduce the coastal battery on the Cape.

The Reconnaissance Troop and Company L, 7th Infantry, were both to land at Yellow Beach southwest of Fedala. The Reconnaissance Troop was to assist Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, by attacking defenses on the Cape, while Company L was to advance inland and seize a crossing over the Wadi Mellah.

The grinding of ships' engines dies away and the quiet seems strange after so many days at sea, just as the absence of gunfire after days of continuous combat becomes a silence strong enough to be heard in the ears of the battle-weary soldier. The anchor chain rattles loudly.

There is suddenly the sound of many footsteps and voices topside; gear being kicked around; sailors stumbling over Army equipment and cursing all landlubbers (some of whom have spent as much time afloat as ashore for several preceding months); power winches starting up preparatory to lowering landing craft into the water; clanging, apparently meaningless bells; orders shouted in that strange Navy idiom: "Sea detail report to aft steering"; and the sleepy soldiers in green herringbone twill with a United States flag armband around the left sleeve-some with faces painted black in close company in the stuffy holds, each trying to get his equipment and put it on in the dim blue lamplight; belt, haversack with full field pack, rifle, tommy gun, or some with that strange new weapon already dubbed "bazooka," which was so secret prior to embarkation that no one had the chance to fire it.

Chest bumps rear of the man next higher up on the steel steps, with somebody pressing closely behind and making the blue light a little bluer when a canteen slaps against his face; gripping the handrail on either side for support and aid in pulling the weight of man and equipment upward. There are low-toned imprecations against the restrictions of space with so many soldiers and much equipment packed into that space; constant urging from N.C.O.'s and officers to keep moving onto the already jammed deck which is milling with silent soldiers and harassed sailors.

Over the rail eventually, slowly, feeling for the rope net first with the feet, then the hands; descent to the waiting boat which is pitching on the high swells and provides a momentary test of balance as each soldier poises on the gunwale before helping hands assist him in getting down to the deck. Soon it's all loaded and somebody yells, "Shove off!" The coxswain accelerates the motor a little to clear the steel sides of the ship, then feeds it a little more gas, and the endless cruising begins.

Presently a thousand men will say to themselves the pertinent cliche' "This is it," and shake a little with cold as each downward lurch of the craft propels a cold spray skyward to descend a moment later on the huddled, shivering figures. A chronic whine in the engine rises to a shrill scream over the roar of the engine, and the run to the beach begins.

Correspondent Harold V. (Hal) Boyle, landing with the 30th Infantry, pictured the following scene:

Our section of the convoy reached its journey's end in a light rain. Darkest Africa was only a dim glow as we pulled away from the transport and circled toward our rendezvous point.

Phosphorescent flecks gleamed briefly in the water and was gone like drowning fireflies when the boats assembled. We turned suddenly toward shore at full speed with motors roaring.

We were in the third assault wave. The first two waves, which preceded us by a matter of moments, landed safely on a four-mile stretch of beach between Cape Fedala and the Pont du Blondin area known as the Riviera of French Morocco.

They had reached shore in the darkness, completely surprising French batteries at each end of the beach. As we neared the coastline, however, a bright searchlight stabbed the skies at Pont du Blondin and then swept seaward, catching our assault wave.

In a bright glare that dazzled the coxswains, we ducked to the bottom of the boat. Machine-gun bullets ripped across the water at us. A naval support boat on our left flank opened fire at the searchlights with .50-caliber machine guns.

We could clearly see, in quick glimpses, the red path of the tracer bullets striking above, below, and to the right of the shining target.

Then came a grinding crash as our landing boat smashed full speed into a coral reef that has helped to win this shore the name of Iron Coast.

The craft climbed futilely then fell back in the water.

From its ripped front ramp the water climbed to our shoetops, then surged to our knees.

"Every man overboard," said the boat commander.

We plunged from the ' sides of the settling craft up to our armpits in the surf and struggled to the reef. Waves washed over our heads, doubling the weight of our 6o-pound packs with water, but sweeping us nearer safety.

I grabbed an outcropping of coral.

A soldier, there before me, lay on it completely exhausted. He was unable to move and was blocking me. Twice the surf pulled me loose and twice it returned me.

My strength was ebbing fast when another soldier pulled up the man before me and lent me a wet hand to safety.

When I could stand again I saw about scores of dripping soldiers, their legs weary and wide-braced.

Staff Sergeant John Anspacher, my public relations escort, and I discarded our lifebelts and turned toward the shore. We had to clamber across a 100-yard patch of spikesharp coral reef and wade to the shore.

The way those soaked men, a few moments before so weary they could not stand forgot their fatigue on seeing their objectives is a never-to-be-forgotten example of soldierly fortitude.

Forlorn on a hostile coast, with much of their heavy equipment fathoms under the salt water, they quickly organized and turned to their assigned tasks when we had crossed the beach and flung ourselves beneath a covering grove of pepper trees.

I found I had a two-inch gash on my right thumb and a lacework of cuts on both hands to remember our soggy trek through the coral.

Our grove quickly became dangerous. We were caught between our own fire and the batteries of Pont du Blondin above us. After one shell showered dirt only a few yards behind us we split away from the beach and, turned toward Cape Fedala . . ..

The actual places of landing bore only a faint resemblance to those laid down on paper, due to the blackness of the night, the lack of landmarks, failure of transports to rendezvous at the proper locations, and insufficient training and briefing of small-boat crews. To make matters tougher for the infantry, there was a fairly heavy surf running and. many small boats broached and were overturned upon beaching. At some points the boats struck offshore bars, and many went aground on a coral reef which lay between Beaches Red 2 and 3, northeast of Fedala.

In spite of these difficulties infantry units were able to reorganize and proceed to their objectives, with the exception of the two flanking companies, whose experiences will be discussed later. Thorough instruction of all personnel in their missions and duties and determination to get ashore and reach their objectives enabled commanders to collect scattered elements of their units and to accomplish their missions.

The Ist Battalion Landing Team, 7th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Roy E. Moore, started landing at approximately 0500 on the beach and reefs about one mile cast of Fedala. Many of the boats struck the reefs separating Beaches Red 2 and 3 with the result that personnel were battered and cut getting ashore on the rocks through the surf, equipment was soaked or lost, and organization of the advance was rendered extremely difficult.

The first two waves apparently landed without opposition, but from that time on the beach was covered intermittently by an enemy searchlight and by artillery and machine-gun fire from Fedala and Pont du Blondin. The bulk of the initial waves went ashore at Beach 3 because of the unfamiliarity of the coxh, pre-designated landing places together instead of 2 swains’.

At about 0530 Colonel Moore's wave (the third) landed on the rocks cast of Beach Red 2. After spending a half hour getting from the rocks to the beach he found elements of his two assault companies, A and C. Both companies were ordered to proceed toward their objectives as planned. Advance guards were ordered out to precede the advance of the two companies, and a patrol sent to cover the left flank. The advance on Fedala began.

The battalion had not proceeded far when Company A observed enemy Senegalese troops "skylined" against a ridge. The two assault platoons immediately took cover. When the Senegalese, about a company in strength, became aware of the presence of Americans they became disorganized and were captured without resistance. Company A proceeded rapidly toward Fedala. It entered the town, passing on the way small groups of Senegalese who gave no trouble.

The 1st platoon, Company A, surrounded and entered the Miramar Hotel. It was intent on capturing the members of the German Armistice Commission in Fedala, known to have been staying at the hotel. The Commission had escaped in the confusion, so the platoon gathered what papers were left. A C.I.C. detachment completed the search of three floors of the hotel, finding documents of military value, equipment, and money.

While elements of Company A and the C.I.C. detachment were in the Miramar, friendly naval shells began to fall on the building and at least two direct hits on the hotel served to speed them in rejoining their company, which had proceeded through town and made its way to an area just above a Casino, where the men took cover from the shelling.

The 3d platoon, Company C, meanwhile, had intercepted the fleeing Commission by stopping their cars.

The members, ten German officers and men, were disarmed and searched.

Colonel Moore arrived at Boulevard Moulay Youssef, the first street in town, shortly after the first elements of the battalion had passed through the town, and encountered a small group of Senegalese who promptly surrendered. He proceeded to his battalion CP near the Miramar Hotel, and at about 0700 his CP group began to arrive. He sent his executive officer, Capt. Everett W. Duval, back to the rear in an attempt to get the Navy to cease firing. Captain Duval found the Assistant Division Commander, Brig. Gen. William W. Eagles, and gave him the information.

General Eagles immediately got in touch with the Leonard Wood and sent the following message: "Stop shelling Fedala."

Shortly thereafter Colonel Moore was guided to General Eagles, and there gave him the situation, repeating the request for a cessation of naval fire.

The Division Commander on the Wood, fearing an enemy transmission for purposes of deception, asked for verification on the previous message. General Eagles sent him the following: "For God's sake stop shelling Fedala-you're killing our own men and friendly French groups-the shells are falling all over town-if you stop they will surrender."

The shelling was finally halted although Col. A. H. Rogers, commanding the 30th Infantry, desired to have it continued in order to interdict two light artillery pieces on Cape Fedala which were firing northeast upon Beaches Red 3, Blue 1 and 2.

At about 0900 four tanks of the 2d platoon, Company A, 765th Tank Battalion, went by the Miramar Hotel in the direction of Cape Fedala. Riding on the foremost tank was Colonel Wilbur, who had completed his mission to Casablanca. He had taken command of the tanks with the idea of attacking the Cape and silencing the gun that was giving the landing waves much trouble and causing casualties. He had just come from the beach.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry was prepared to attack twenty minutes after the tanks had arrived at a forward position, where the battalion commander had gone to reconnoiter for his attack on the Cape.

At 1030 Capt. C. C. Crall reported to Colonel Moore and said that Company B was in its reserve position.

The fire-control station of the battery on Cape Fedala was on a small hill. Between the hill and Company A was open ground, and the station was well protected with bands of barbed wire. Company A opened fire on it with all weapons.

When some of the wire had been cut one of the light tanks started to go through it, but hit an embankment and turned over. The enemy immediately opened fire, which was returned by the assaulting troops. The station was reached and overcome. There were twenty-two prisoners and approximately five dead.

After going through town, Company C's 1st platoon had moved rapidly, and had advanced to within 150 yards of the battery without opposition, when the naval barrage came down. After about twenty minutes of shelling, Capt. Herman E. Wagner, the company commander, was able to get forward and contact the platoon, telling its leader to withdraw about 300 yards to the rear, where the balance of the company was. When the naval barrage failed to lift, it was decided to move the company to the south, in the vicinity of a racetrack, to avoid further casualties. The company immediately came under direct fire from an enemy antiaircraft battalion stationed there. The company shifted about to attack this new menace to its security.

The company maneuvered into position and opened fire, and individuals began working their way forward. A lieutenant and a sergeant moved in close with a rocket launcher and fired a few rounds. A white flag was raised, but when the two stood up to take the surrender they were cut down by a fusillade of fire. The company resumed fire on the enemy and shortly thereafter there was an actual surrender. The sergeant and lieutenant died a short time afterward.

At the battery, the tanks had arrived at the fire-control station. The French officer who had been in command insisted on lowering the French flag, so at 1201 Capt. Albert Brown hoisted a United States flag while the United States and French soldiers stood at present arms or hand salute.

Colonel Moore arrived at the station and ordered Captain Brown to prepare for an attack on the tip of the Cape, on which remained some enemy fortifications of which had to be taken in accordance with the original battalion plan.

Company A was organizing for this attack, to jump off at 1330, preceded by a five-minute mortar concentration of battalion heavy weapons, and to be accompanied by the tanks . . . when a French civilian arrived from the tip of the Cape. He said the French there wished to surrender, providing the rights of prisoners of war be granted them, and that if a United States officer came with him, the French commander would discuss the surrender. Captain Brown went alone, where he found an officer and fifty or sixty men who had already piled their arms and ammunition on the ground and was lined up. Captain Brown sent back for ten men to guard the prisoners. Col. Harry McK. Roper, War Department observer attached to the 3d Division, arrived at this time and ordered that a search be made of the surrounding buildings. Twenty more prisoners were taken as a result of this search.

Company B, less the 2d platoon, which had been sent on battalion order to reinforce the attack on the Cape, dug in on its objectives which it had reached much earlier. One squad entered in a firefight with French marines on a patrol boat mounting a machine gun. The enemy was driven off the boat and retreated. The remainder of the platoon assaulted and captured a warehouse containing arms and ammunition.

Battery A of the 10th Field Artillery Battalion came ashore at 0900, its four gun sections landing on four separate beaches. The Ist section opened fire on sandbagged emplacements on Cape Fedala shortly thereafter, and was joined at 0930 by the 3d section. The 2d and 4th sections landed in the 30th Infantry area and joined Battery B, 41st Field, until they could be moved into their own battery position. The battery commander and his party had landed at dawn on the reefs between Beaches Red 2 and 3 under artillery and machinegun fire.

The 75mm guns at the base of the oil tank on the Cape were taken under fire and silenced by one section of Battery A under the direction of Maj. Walter T. "Dutch" Kerwin, S-2 of 3d Infantry Division Artillery, who had come ashore to supervise operation of the shore fire-control parties working with the warships.

In connection with the action of the Ist Battalion, the report of Col. W. H. Wilbur is interesting. Colonel Wilbur came ashore in one of the boats of the 1st Battalion, in an amphibious jeep that had been equipped with a radio, a United States flag, and a white flag. He carried letters signed by Maj. Gen George S. Patton and approved by the President, directed to the Commanding General of the Casablanca Division.

According to his report he reached land about 0530. Before reaching the beach a searchlight was turned on the boat and a .50-caliber machine gun opened fire. When the beach was reached, the motor of his jeep would not start so he commandeered the next jeep to land, transferred the flags and set off for the line of dunes with his own chauffeur driving the jeep. He contacted the French without being fired upon and drove into Casablanca followed by a French captain in a civilian car.

At Division Headquarters he found the French General Desre' and Admiral Ronarch, whom he told he had a letter from the President of the United States. Neither would take the letter, both saying that an Admiral Michelier was in command, so he placed it on General Desre’s desk and left.

The French captain then guided him to the French admiralty, in the attempt to confer with Admiral Michelier. As the party approached the admiralty friendly naval shells, and bombs from United States planes, began falling. Another French captain (naval or army unspecified) stopped him, apparently angry at the shelling and bombing. He refused to admit the colonel to Admiral Michelier's office, continuing to refuse after twice entering the office to consult with the Admiral. When Colonel Wilbur remonstrated he was told to get out.

Colonel Wilbur drove back to Fedala, encountering French sailors whose attitude was very threatening. They passed numerous groups of French soldiers.

He stopped at the command post of Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, and was told that the battalion had come ashore as planned.

He then moved to 3d Division Headquarters which was then established, and sent the following message by voice radio to General Patton: "Letter to the Commanding General Casablanca Division has been delivering in the vicinity of Cape Fedala was done by one destroyer which apparently had not received the cease-fire order.

The 2d Battalion Landing Team, 7th Infantry, commanded by Lt, Col. Rafael L. Salzmann, was less fortunate even than the 1st Battalion was in the location at which it was landed.

Companies E and F, the two assault companies, were landed on a beach east of the Mansouriah railroad station, about twelve kilometers east of their assigned objective, against no opposition but on rough, rocky reefs, which damaged many boats and caused much equipment to be lost. After organizing, the companies moved west along the railroad toward Fedala. They crossed the Wadi Mellah and continued on toward their objectives under occasional strafings by single enemy aircraft which were, however, kept off by rifle fire. At 1430 they were met by the battalion commander north of Fedala and led to their initial objectives which were the road and railroad crossings over the Wadi Mellah.

Company G was scheduled to land at Beach Red 3 in battalion reserve. Instead, part of the third wave landed on a beach northeast of Fort Blondin, and the remainder landed farther to the east and out of sight of the right group. Part of the fourth wave landed at Beach Red 3 and the remainder at Beach Red 2 with one squad near Fort Blondin.

Those who landed nearest Fort Blondin-four squads of Company G and a section of heavy machine guns and a section of mortars of Company H proceeded to attack the fort. Their landing had been made under naval gunfire and some fire from the fort. When the naval gunfire ceased, the fire from the fort was very weak. Under the covering fire of the heavy weapons, the small unit led by Colonel Salzmann personally attacked the fort. They captured some prisoners and turned them over to the 30th Infantry, which had attacked and entered the fort first from the other side.

After Colonel Salzmann had conferred briefly with Maj. Edner J. Nelson, executive of 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, who was in the fort with other personnel of the 30th, the elements of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry withdrew to move to their own objectives on the Wadi Mellah.

The 3d platoon of Company G less one squad, landed at Beach Red 2. The platoon leader knew that part of the battalion's objective was the railroad crossing over the Wadi Mellah, so he led his platoon there, in advance of any elements of our forces. He was joined by a section of Company H's machine guns. Upon arriving at the crossing it was necessary to drive out detachments of the enemy.

The entire battalion was on its objectives by 1700.

Battery B, 10th Field Artillery Battalion, was landed at 1600 and went into position west of the Wadi Mellah in the area of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry.

The first wave of 1st Battalion Landing Team, 30th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Fred W. Sladen, Jr., hit the beach at 0510 and was not detected by the enemy. The second wave three minutes later received machinegun fire, probably "overs" from Fort Blondin aimed at 2d Battalion units landing to the east. The third wave, which hit the beach at 0535, was illuminated before landing by the searchlight on the point and was machine-gunned from the same place. The light was shot out at 0530 by assault boats and scout boats.

In spite of a lack of small boats, all rifle companies were ashore by 0600. Most of the boats landed on Beach Blue, but part of Company C and part of Headquarters Company were landed east of the battery at Pont du Blondin. Colonel Sladen and some of the shore party landed east of the beach on the rocky point. The boat was wrecked and everyone had to swim ashore. Part of Company D landed on the reef west of the beach. In spite of the mix-up, boat groups quickly rejoined their companies and all units pushed rapidly toward their objectives.

At 0700 a squad from Company B; the 2d platoon, Company C; and one section of the 2d platoon and a section of the mortar platoon, Company D, halted an electric train moving toward Rabat, about two kilometers west of the Wadi Nefifikh. Seventy-five French military, naval, and air corps personnel were made prisoners. At 0800 identification and information from these prisoners were obtained by the regimental interrogation team.

By 0830 Companies A and B had reached the Division objective on the high ground southeast of the beach and began organizing it for defense. During the day Companies C and D and other elements of the battalion established bivouac areas, established a roadblock on Route No. 1 at St. Jean de Fedala, set up antiaircraft and antitank security, and organized the command post near Route No. 1, southeast of Fedala. Nearly all units were subjected to artillery fire, strafing and bombing on their way to objectives.

During the morning a Company C roadblock halted a car and captured three French colonels who were attempting to escape.

The first of the four gun sections of Battery A, 41st Field Artillery Battalion, landed shortly before 0700 and was put into position 500 yards off the beach. Its first four rounds were fired at the Batterie du Pont Blondin. Another round was fired at the electric train heading into the 1st Battalion sector, hitting behind it and uprooting a rail.

After bringing up ammunition and establishing an observation post, the battery began adjusting on the Cape Fedala battery, but ceased firing when the Navy opened up on the same target.

The experience of the 2d Battalion Landing Team, 30th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard, was similar to the 1st Battalion's in getting its personnel away from the transport, because none of the boats scheduled to report to the transport Dickman had arrived by 0430. The reassignment of some personnel and shifting of equipment which was necessary as a result of the shortage of boats took considerable time.

The first 30th Infantry unit to set foot on Moroccan shores was the assault wave of Company B, commanded by Capt. Charles C. Nalle, which landed on the west side of Beach Blue 2. As this company and succeeding waves were coming ashore-at about 0500-a searchlight from Fort Blondin came on, shining in the air. The troops had been informed that a searchlight pointed at a 90-degree angle and held stationary would indicate that the French units at that point were friendly and ready to surrender without fighting, but this soon proved to be false. (It is believed the French placed the light in the air because they thought the landing boats' roar was that of airplane motors.)

Just before the second wave landed on the east bank of the Wadi Nefifikh at 0530 the Fort Blondin searchlight came on again and this time was directed at Beaches Blue I and 2, and at advancing landing boats. Naval support boats and several landing boats directed machine-gun fire at the light, which was destroyed in short order.

A few minutes later, as Company C's assault wave was debarking and as units of the 3d platoon and weapons platoon, Company B, were wading the Wadi toward its bank, machine-gun fire from Fort Blondin began crisscrossing the beach.

Among the units which were finally organized for the attack were the bulk of Company F, under Capt. Walter A. Cromer, most of the 3d platoon and mortar section of Company E, led by 2d Lt. Jesse G. Ugalde, together with a squad from Company F, all three coordinated and led by Capt. Mackenzie E. Porter, commander of Company F; a boat group of Company G under 1st Lt. C. L. Elmore, and the lst mortar section of Company H, the mortar platoon of which was commanded by 1st Lt. Charles W. Morse, Jr.

As the bulk of Captain Cromer's company organized and began advancing for the assault on the fort from the east, heavy naval gunfire opened on the fort, with "overs," "shorts," and "wides" hitting all around the various advancing troops of the 2d Battalion LT-30. Company F troops-six killed, three wounded suffered heaviest casualties from this fire. (First 3d Division soldier to die in action in World War II was Pvt. Earl F. Takala of Company F, who was killed in this barrage. In his honor the Division's bivouac camp at Rabat, and later another bivouac at Port Lyautey, were named Camp Takala.)

Throughout this prolonged naval fire and the .50caliber machine-gun fire which opened the assault on Fort Blondin, Capt. Elmer Egleston, 2d Battalion surgeon, and Ist Lt. James P. Flynn, battalion chaplain, were doing more than their duty of finding and caring for the wounded. Both officers encouraged the men to go forward, take proper cover; breaks up huddled groups, and find their parent units. In general they displayed qualities of courageous leadership that stand above the ordinary.

When the naval fire let up slightly-toward 0700Captain Cromer organized his men for an assault from the northeast. At about the same time Captain Porter, having his own heavy weapons company emplaced, obtained permission from Maj. Edner J. Nelson, 2d Battalion executive officer, to organize a scattered group of disorganized and officer-less men from Companies E and F into a three-pronged assault on the fort from the west and southwest. Meanwhile Captain Porter's 81mm mortar section, led by Sgt. Franklin H. McNeeley, from a position south of the Fedala-Mansouriah highway bridge was lobbing shells into the fort. Before receiving the "cease fire" order-when advancing foot troops were observed within 200 yards of the fort, the section had lobbed seventeen shells into the battery. Observing and sensing of bursts was extremely difficult due to the simultaneous fall of naval gunfire. That the shells had their effect, however, was beyond doubt, and it was believed that one or more was responsible for destroying the fort fire-control mechanism.

In addition to this shelling, Battery A, 41st Field Artillery Battalion, from its position in the 1st Battalion LT-30 sector, fired four 75mm howitzer shells into the fort during the same period.

Maj. Robert D. Henriques of the British Army, an observer attached to Western Task Force, materially aided the organization of the assault from the southwest, for which important action he was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

As Captain Porter's group was preparing to hit from the southwest, Captain Cromer's leading elements reached the open ground about fifty yards west of the buildings at Chergui, and were fired on by a machine gun placed near the Fort Blondin entrances. One man was wounded. The company's mortar section was then placed in position near the Chergui restaurant.

At 0700 Captain Cromer sent up a green star Parachute flare and at about the same time, from the other side, Captain Porter ordered two yellow smoke grenades set off, both men attempting to signal the Navy to cease firing on the fort, in order that the final assault might begin. The naval spotter planes either failed to see the signals, didn't recognize them, or chose to ignore them as being contrary to their own orders. At any rate the fire did not cease. Nevertheless Captains Porter and Cromer ordered the advance to continue.

At 0715, as the detachment led by Porter was approaching from the southwest, the Navy ceased firing.

Small-arms fire punctuated the continuing advance. At the same time Company F's 60min mortars opened fire on the building from which the machine-gun fire was issuing. After four rounds had plunked ' on the target a white flag on a rifle was thrust from the window.

As the white flag appeared, Captain Porter entered the fort, followed immediately by Lieutenant Ugalde and his men from Companies E and F. The French commander and his men came into the court, their hands high in the air, and surrendered to Porter. The time was 0730.

Men from Companies E and F were immediately ordered to remove enemy personnel from the four gun positions and gather all prisoners in one spot in the center of the emplacement, which was done. The commanding officer and his seventy-one remaining enlisted men, including four wounded, were made prisoners.

Major, Nelson arrived at 0740, followed closely by Cromer and the bulk of his company, together with Lieutenant Gibson's 3d Platoon, Company E. The 2d platoon, Company E, which was also heading for the fort at the time of the final assault, stopped its advance when the white flag was raised and took up a defensive position east of the highway at once. At the same time a Company G boat group, consisting of a machine-gun squad and 3d platoon rifle squad, both led by Lieutenant Elmore, which had participated in the firing on the fort, entered the emplacement.

About fifteen minutes after Major Nelson's arrival, eight enlisted men from 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, entered, followed by Lt. Col. Rafael Salzmann. Colonel Salzmann, who spoke fluent French, conversed freely with the defeated fort commander and conveyed many of the commander's requests for burying the French dead, caring for the wounded, and disposing of effects to Major Nelson, who was then in charge of the battery.

At about 0755, just after Colonel Salzmann stepped into the fort, Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard, 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, commander, came on the scene and found the fort being organized for defense by Captain Cromer. Captain Egleston, Battalion Surgeon, was caring for the French wounded. Colonel Bernard thereupon directed Cromer to take charge of the position, the 3d platoon, Company E, to rejoin its parent unit and the 2d platoon to take up a defensive position along the West Bank of the Wadi Nefifikh south of the Fedala-Mansouriah highway.

A portion of Company E had gone up the Wadi Nefifikh looking for a garrison that was thought to be located at the rear of Fort Blondin on the east side of the Fedala-Mansouriah highway. After searching the area thoroughly, and being showered with "overs" from the Navy shelling of Fort Blondin, the patrol found the garrison to be no longer there. Two detachments were sent out to take over the Moroccan railroad and Route Principale highway bridges in case Company G had not already done so.

The landing of Company L, 7th Infantry and the 3d Reconnaissance Troop, which were to have come in together on Beach Yellow 2 at H-hour, was one of several instances in which units were entirely unable to perform their missions because of the time and place of landing. Because their transport was hours late in reaching the transport area, these units were not put into landing craft until approximately 0500, fifteen minutes after they should have been on the beach. Dawn was breaking before they finally approached their landing place. As they came in toward the beach, however, they got caught in heavy naval gunfire-believed to have originated with French cruisers at Casablanca-firing at our warships, and the small-boat crews circled and headed back.

The 3d Reconnaissance Troop was on the water approximately seven hours before being returned to their transport, where they remained until the evening of November 10, taking no part in the action. The fact that they would have been landed by daylight when all chance of surprise had been lost would have greatly reduced their value in the fight for Cape Fedala.

The same lack of surprise applied to Company L, 30th Infantry, which finally landed at Beach Blue 2 south of Pont Blondin at about 1030, in roughly the same spot where the 2d Battalion had landed earlier. The company rejoined its battalion, which was in regimental reserve near the Villa Velozza, immediately after landing.

The 3d Battalion Landing Team, 7th Infantry, commanded by Mal. E. H. Cloud, began landing on regimental order at about 0930 and went into assembly area southeast of Fedala near the Regimental command post.

Company -1 landed at about 0815 on Beach Red 3 under fire of a battery of French 75's. In about an hour they had assembled and reorganized.

Company K also landed at Beach Red 3.

Company M landed at the wrong beach in the face of heavy artillery fire and was just beyond the line of dunes when an enemy plane dived and strafed it. The company reached the prearranged coordinating line at about 1000 or 1015.