At about 1100 the battalion, less Company L, was assembled and within the next two hours the missing company had rejoined. The battalion, with Company L as advance guard, moved down Route Secondaire to the Wadi Mellah. Company L secured the high ground in front of the highway bridge over the Wadi, and Company I secured the bridge.

Orders were then received from the regimental commander to proceed south toward Casablanca and go into assembly area prior to continuing the attack at daylight. The battalion reached the assembly area at about 0130, and all companies established security.

3d Battalion Landing Team, 30th Infantry, commanded by Maj. Charles E. Johnson, landed troops as follows:

0830: Battalion commander and headquarters Red 2

Red 3 & Blue 1 Red 3

Red 2 & 3

0930, Company M

1030: Company K

1030: Company I

The battalion commander with his headquarters personnel marched to the pre-designated assembly area in the vicinity of the landing beach and across the Wadi Nefifikh from Batterie du Pont Blondin. By 1130 the other three companies had arrived. (Company L, commanded by Capt. Paul E. Doherty, had received permission to land on Beach Blue 2 instead of Blue 3 about 1030.) The battalion was intact, dug in and ready for a move in any direction.

While in the boats and on the beaches the battalion was subjected to intermittent artillery fire from Cape Fedala, strafing, and aerial bombardment, which resulted in a few casualties. It later received another bombing and several strafings.

When the situation in Fedala became sufficiently clarified around noon November 8. It was decided to land the 15th Infantry Regimental Landing Group, commanded by Col. Thomas H. Monroe, on Beaches Red 1 and 2 as rapidly as possible. The 1st Battalion Landing Team, which received orders to land on Beach Red 2, was actually put ashore on several different beaches because of the unfamiliarity of the naval coxswains with the shore line. Immediately upon landing the battalion was directed to move to, and hold, the bridge by which Route No. 1 crossed the Wadi Mellah.

The battalion, maintaining contact with the 7th Infantry on its right, moved into an assembly area east of the bridge, and sent outposts across the bridge with the mission of holding the crossing. This was done just prior to darkness November 8.

At 1600 Colonel Monroe was directed to land the remaining element of the regiment as rapidly as possible. That evening, the remainder of the landing group was landed in darkness all along the beaches from Fedala northward.

In contrast to the token resistance or quick capitulation on the part of most of the land forces resisting our invasion, the French naval forces, as expected, put up a wicked, last-ditch fight.

John A. Moroso, III, Associated Press, described it from a grandstand seat aboard the light cruiser Augusta, General Patton's command ship, in a dispatch dated November 8: *

The audacious and well-trained Vichy French naval force today staged a furious, reckless and soul-searing battle against American ships attempting to land troops at Fedala, French Morocco.

The American force, the greatest of its kind in history, had crossed the Atlantic without casualty. With more than 100 ships and thousands of men determined to open the long awaited second front we waded through Axis submarines.

Here is the battle as I logged it until the order to cease-fire reached the crew:

11:25 p. m. -We arrived at the designated area for operations in Stygian darkness and a slight rainsquall. We are surprised that all navigation lights are on.

11:45 p. m. -At Casablanca and Fedala the lights go out suddenly and village blacks out. We are six miles offshore and we make several whistle signals. They know something is wrong.

12:05 a. m. -Our first motorboat leaves the transport and we start loading troops into landing barges.

4:45 a. m. -Destroyers go almost to the beach to help barges land. The swell is heavy and some boats are damaged. Overhead the big and Little Dipper and Orion stand out brilliantly as the Rev. Father O'Leary of Boston offers prayer. Lt. Comdr. George K. Williams of Salt Lake City gives last-minute instructions.

4.55 a. m. -Our troops machine-gun a searchlight that appears on the beach. Red tracer bullets scream through the night air. Minutes later a destroyer machine-guns and then shells the French tanker Lorraine which disobeyed a command to stop. The Lorraine fires back and then gives up to a boarding party. Hell starts popping off in the dark.

5:47-The captain asks for the range on the powerful Chergui battery.

6:00-Heavy firing is heard dead ahead.

6:12-Chergui opens with a terrific cannonading and our ships reply instantly. The sky fills with flame and smoke.

6:20-A destroyer says Chergui has his range and he will need help. We give him plenty after closing to 11,500 yards.

6:35-We give Chergui rapid fire that obliterated our target in smoke and dust.

6:45-We give Chergui a round of drum firing. An oil storage tank and two buildings break into fire, our plane spotter tells us. Three of four guns have been knocked out. Suddenly I note that our landing boats, loaded with soldiers, are making their way ashore in the midst of this inferno.

6:53-Our plane reports the fourth gun smashed. Three minutes later two of their guns reopen fire. The Army reports no resistance was offered to landing.

7:01-Chergui is silent again and we close to 10,000 yards making fifteen knots. Later, one gun puts a shell 400 yards from us, and water cascades skyward.

7:08-Seventeen American planes approach us.

7:10-Scores of landing boats are now in the water, heading shoreward. We fire fifty rounds in five minutes.

7:18-Eleven friendly planes zoom over us. We need them because shells are coming closer and submarines have been detected.

7:21: -A tremendous salvo shatters the glass on our bridge.

7:25-Chergui has been silent five minutes, Lt. Eugene Bertram, senior aviator from Spokane, Wash., reports.

7:30-Our planes are bombing and strafing Chergui. Thirteen Grummans, United States Navy fighter planes join them.

7:32-The French battleship lean Bart begins a long-range duel with one of the battlewagons. Huge flashes spring up and the lean Bart takes a few pot shots at us from a distance of twelve miles. More glass shatters on the bridge.

7:36-My head is reeling from the blast.

7:39-They have fixed the gun at Chergui and are shooting at us again. We pound them brutally and in two minutes score a direct hit.

7:41-These Frenchmen are tough. Two of Chergui's guns are going and we silence them with a round of rapid fire.

7:58-One of our destroyers fires at one of our planes and we warn him.

7:59-Our starboard 5-inch batteries blast away at French planes strafing soldiers on the beach and men in small boats.

8:00-Planes begin attacking transports and all hell breaks loose. Right in the middle of this those obstinate Frenchmen at Chergui get another gun going.

8:05--We put up two more planes for spotting.

8:10-They report Chergui is silenced.

8:14-The planes tell us the location of the French antiaircraft guns ashore. We blaze away at them.

8:19-The French ships escape from Casablanca under a smoke screen. We are ordered to destroy two cruisers coming our way and steam away at twenty-five knots.

8:28-Our destroyer screen reports the cruisers are firing on them. Most of us are scared as hell, but we all try to hide it.

8:35-We fire two batteries at the cruisers. We hear that some French ships have headed for the open sea.

8:50-We make contact with the French cruisers. Shells begin to fall all around us and we and our flagship give them plenty. The cruiser lookouts report one French cruiser is hit and possibly the other.

8:59-After a furious action the Frenchman reverses his course toward Casablanca. We speed up to thirty knots to chase them. Right in the middle of this the Army sends us this message: "Admiral refused to see me. I delivered message to him at Casablanca. French army does not wish to fight. Citizens welcome us and hold us in high esteem." We learned later that only the French navy wants to continue the battle and they fight like mad dogs. A shell plunks into the water twenty feet from me.

9:05-We fire away with renewed energy and our lookout reports we have twenty-three hits on one cruiser. She is smoking, but continues to fire at us. She is doing a fine job. We hear later that both the cruisers we have engaged are beached, but this is not confirmed.

9:30-A submarine is spotted off our starboard bow, but the captain tells us to ignore him. We are zigzagging at thirty-two knots, too fast for him to hit us-we hope. A few minutes later another submarine is sighted to port.

9:35-We are ordered to return to Fedala to protect our transports. This makes us mad as hell.

9:49-We are told French destroyers are coming out of Casablanca. Our orders told us to destroy them. Our battleship smacked a French cruiser, setting her ablaze.

10:01-We are doing a wonderful job, radio message says.

10:09-Shells appear from nowhere. Their bursts are a peculiar magenta color. I think we are gone this time. Shells whistle over my head. They are shortening range now. They have us. That last one hit about twenty feet away to port. We turn. Their range is short by 400 yards. We open with rapid fire and straddle a destroyer behind a smoke screen. These cagey Frenchmen are hiding in the sun and all we have to fire at is flashes. They are giving us fits.

10:20-Their subs are in on us, firing torpedoes. We hit a destroyer as a torpedo goes by our port side.

10:25-Two French submarines have periscopes up. Five torpedoes head at us. Watching their wakes, we reel into a zigzag and luckily go in between them.

10:29-They straddled us again and we can't see them. We go into furious rapid fire. Our ship is reeling from our own gunfire. I suddenly notice a number of birds swimming in the water. They are totally unaware of the battle. How I envy them.

10:47-Lookout reports periscope to port. Boy, how we could use some planes. They must be somewhere else. Somebody reports a torpedo wake, but we are too busy with the destroyers to watch it.

10:57-A battleship is coming to help us. We are going to box in those destroyers and let them have it from all sides. Our guns thunder steadily and my head is a mass of pain.

11:30-The French ships appear to be running away. Thank God we are returning to Fedala to guard transports.

11:40-From ashore the Army sends word our officers are conferring with the French on whether naval gunfire must cease during an armistice. I run down to the captain's cabin-where I am living. I find blood all about. However, our four wounded are not in critical shape.

12:17 p.m.-We scatter from general quarters. We had been firing since six o'clock this morning, and have had no food. Our fliers return and tell us how we pounded the Chergui battery to pieces.

12:55 p.m.-The French navy is ignoring the armistice at Fedala. Two cruisers and two destroyers just left Casablanca and are heading for us. In addition a French bomber attacked the beach during the armistice.

1:08-We contact the French squadron and blaze away. It turns back toward Casablanca-and lets us have it. Our flagship falls back and we find ourselves fighting all four ships. The bursts are coming nearer and nearer.

1:30-Our flagship gets in the battle. Our planes depth charge a submarine off our port bow. The French are using submarines with their surface ships, but they have had no luck. Some Navy dive-bombers appear and we shout with joy. One of the French destroyers is reported dead in the water. Our dive-bombers roar in on the French ships and one of the destroyers is hit.

2:03-Planes report that the French cruiser is being towed toward Casablanca and fifteen minutes later the planes tell us a French destroyer has been beached inside the harbor. We believe we hit at least three ships.

2:26-The Army tells us Fedala has been taken and that minesweepers have been ordered to clear out the French minefields. The officers and I limp below for coffee and sandwiches.

3:20-French bombers attack our soldiers on the beach.

4:27-We don't even get up when planes drop depth charges off the starboard bow. We want to rest and eat. We expect a night riddled with submarine attacks and French planes at dawn.

The situation at midnight was generally as follows:

The Division and its attachments had succeeded in landing all the important units of the three regimental landing groups, and were in the process of bringing in the Armored Battalion Combat Team; had seized all its initial objectives but had stopped short of its D-day objectives because of lack of transportation for moving troops and supplies; and had brought ashore sufficient supply and control personnel to make possible continued coordinated operations the following day.

The biggest disappointment, amounting almost to a catastrophe, which threatened the entire operation, was the realization that because of the terrific undertow and heavy surf all plans for unloading equipment and supplies over beaches were absolutely impossible of accomplishment. Hundreds of landing craft were beached, only to find that retraction was impossible. The raging surf turned LCM’s and Higgins boats end-over-end. The morning of November 9 disclosed a scene on the beaches of waste and destruction that was symbolic of total war. The obvious solution to unloading was the maximum use of the port of Fedala. This was exploited to the utmost.

It was believed not much resistance could be expected from ground forces during the advance on Casablanca, but there was good reason to believe that all naval elements in Casablanca, including ships based there, marines, coast defense guns, and antiaircraft batteries would provide stiff and determined resistance.

Orders were issued to all regiments as follows: 7th Infantry was to advance toward Casablanca on the right, 15th Infantry on the left; Division reserve was 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry. The remainder of the 30th Infantry stayed on its objectives of November 8 and performed local missions.

The 7th Infantry jumped off at 0730, the 15th at 0700. Both continued without opposition until halted by Division order, the 15th at 1100, and the 7th around 1400. This order was issued because of the extremely critical supply situation caused by lack of transportation ' and it was not desired to over-extend the supply lines. The advance was to continue at 2400 that day. The 7th was to reach a coordinating line on the outskirts of Casablanca at 0700 November 10. The 15th was to move onto high ground extending from Bled Oulad Cheikh eastward through Hill 92 and high ground in the vicinity of Oulad el Melouk.

A description of the march that night, written by the commanding officer of Company H, 7th Infantry, Capt. Gilbert C. St. Clair, is presented here to illustrate the condition of most of the men at this time:

... In column of companies, at 0001 of the 10th of November Company H was again on the move; tired men shifted their loads and groaned very quietly; the silence in which the battalion moved was worthy of real veterans; and the knowledge that we were approaching the objective, with the probability of real action and, incidentally, expending a good part of all that heavy ammunition we had been carrying since early morning of the 8th, encouraged every one.

Tired legs stretched out, bent backs straightened, deep breaths could be heard; and across the Bled (open country) toward Casablanca marched the battalion. After a while we were on the smooth pavement of a highway.

In the darkness of that night, with a thin rain coming down persistently, and a chill wind that penetrated to the very bones, no man but could appreciate the smooth walking of a surfaced road, after all that stumbling, shuffling, sinking, on plowed fields, and climbing walls and fences.

All the length of the column, long as it was, and wide, no sound could be heard other than a low rustling of shoe leather meeting asphalt, but off the front and to right and left, hundreds of dogs howled a continuous alert, keeping up with the column, never quite dying down, gaining in volume occasionally.

Periodically, almost monotonously, the batteries of Ain El Diab roared, accompanied by a great flash. The rush of wind and the scream of shells passed over our heads. After a while the men forgot to duck. That instinctive shrinking of heads into shoulders had not been due to fear but to unfamiliarity with the sound.

Now, from time to time, a new noise could be heard; a man would stumble, fall forward on his face, get up, and try to pick up his load again, but though the spirit was strong, endurance had reached its limit. This was particularly true in this company. Heavy machine guns and the corresponding load of ammunition, heavy mortars and their heavy shells, were never meant to be man-carried day after day, night after night, by soldiers who had their own individual weapons.

They kept up, and they fell, not once, but many times on that march to Ain Sebah, and always they got up again and walked some more, and were grateful for the rests that had to come more and more frequently now.

As the order to advance was being issued around 2300, patrols of the 15th Infantry encountered enemy patrols south of the battalion positions and encountered an enemy defense line organized north of the Tit Mellil crossroad. The commanding officer informed Division Headquarters that a night march across country on unfamiliar ground against hostile automatic weapons and organized defense would be extremely hazardous. He was ordered to hold up until dawn.

The 7th Infantry, despite intensified shelling from land and naval artillery, commenced moving at 0030 and moved steadily until shortly after daylight, when hostile artillery and small arms halted the advance of all but Company L, which continued in the face of fire received from small enemy forces.

During the morning platoons of Companies I and K ' 7th Infantry, attacked and captured a battery of antiaircraft guns located about 1200 yards southeast of Point Oukacha.

The 2d Battalion, on the left, had moved more rapidly during the approach march, but a half hour prior to daylight began receiving machine-gun, rifle and artillery fire from front and flanks. A short time later the battalion commander ordered the elements in contact to move to the left (south) flank. The companies became somewhat disorganized, largely as a result of losing the commanding officer of Company E, who was wounded, and the commanding officer of Company F, who was killed. The battalion commander led the bulk of the battalion to the south, clearing out hostile riflemen and a number of machine guns en route, to high ground near Route Secondaire No. 106. Leading elements of the battalion, principally two platoons of Company E and one of Company G remained in contact with the enemy all day. During the progress of the morning, one hostile artillery piece was captured, its crew destroyed, and the crews of two other field pieces driven from their guns.

The platoon of Company G undertook to envelop the hostile left flank but was unable to advance over the open terrain. It later withdrew to a line formed to provide protection for the 10th Field Artillery Battalion guns in the rear.

As soon as the situation of the 2d Battalion was clarified, the Ist Battalion was directed to attack, with tank and artillery support, in the previous zone of action of the 2d Battalion and to capture the military barracks area on the outskirts of Casablanca. It crossed the line of departure at 1200 and at darkness held a line immediately in front of the barracks area, which was held during the night.

The 15th Infantry, meanwhile, had jumped off at dawn, and immediately encountered enemy positions. Enemy rifle and machine-gun fire was heavy; it was estimated that the hostile positions were held by a squadron of cavalry, organized in depth, with machinegun crossfire covering their front.

Under covering artillery, machine-gun, and 81mm mortar fire, enemy positions were finally enveloped and the hostile forces withdrew to the south and west of Tit Mellil. The enemy, as they withdrew, mounted horses which had been held in the rear. A tentative enemy attempt to establish a line was discouraged by accurate long-range machine-gun and 37mm antitank fire, employing high-explosive shell. Thereafter enemy cavalry withdrew toward Casablanca and contact was lost. The 15th Infantry suffered only slight casualties in the engagement.

By 1300 the 15th Infantry had pushed south of Tit Mellil and reorganized. At 1400 a platoon of light tanks was attached to the 1st Battalion. By 1700 the battalions were on their objectives.

Just prior to this time the 2d Battalion received a 30-minute artillery concentration fired from a park in the center of Casablanca. The battalion withdrew about 500 yards out of the impact area and spent the night there.

The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, which was in Division reserve, stayed near the Division command post at Villa Coigny until morning of November 10 when it moved to an assembly area about halfway from the Route No. 1 intersection on Route No. 7 to Tit Mellil.

This battalion was not committed on the 9th or 10th although strafed on the 9th and subjected to artillery fire believed to have been observed by civilians on nearby hills. On the 11th Company L and a machinegun platoon was sent to high ground southwest of Tit Mellil with the mission of protecting the Division against French troops reportedly moving north from Marrakech. News of an armistice was received as soon as this company arrived in position. The remainder of the 30th Infantry underwent a small local patrol action during which there were a night attack from a Goum patrol in which four men of Company B were stabbed and two taken prisoners, a platoon-sized counterattack and a major armor scare.

The latter scare with which the regiment made extensive preparations to deal, never materialized because naval dive bombers, called into action by Lt. (j.g.) J. B. Furstenberg, naval air liaison officer with the regiment, strafed the column, destroying several tanks and completely disrupted the enemy and rendered him unable to attack.

At Division Headquarters preparations for the assault on Casablanca began about 1400 November 10. Arrangements had been made for naval gunfire and dive bombing support during the attack, and the details were discussed with the commanders concerned. The attack was to employ all the striking power then available to the Division-the armored battalion, all the Divisional artillery except that supporting the 30th Infantry, Cannon and Antitank Companies of the 7th and 30th in addition to the organic infantry firepower. H-hour was set for 0730.

During the night prisoners were taken by the regiments, all of whom stated that orders had been issued them to cease firing pending an armistice.

At 0230 a telephone call was received from the 30th Infantry. Two French officers and four enlisted men in a French car, flying a white flag and sounding a bugle, had entered Company G's area and stated that they had authority from the Commanding General in French Morocco to seek an armistice.

They were directed to Task Force Headquarters at the Miramar Hotel in Fedala. Task Force Headquarters was notified, and General Campbell, in Fedala, was called and directed to represent the Division at the parley. Similar reports later came from 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments.

One French officer, picked up by the Division Ordnance Officer and brought to the command post, carried a copy of orders issued by General Desre, commanding the Casablanca Division, directing the cessation of hostilities. This officer arrived under guard at 0620.

Units were notified of the possibility of an armistice. When General Patton arrived at the CP at 0655 with definite word of the truce, immediate orders were issued calling off the attack. Some elements of the Armored Battalion had moved to the line of departure and delivered a brief attack against an artillery position, but broke off when they received word of the situation.

Artillery attached to the 7th and 15th began registration, the former resulting in the death of several French soldiers, but aside from these instances, it is believed there was no other fighting or firing.

Naval dive-bombers were circling above their carrier with ready lights on when word of the armistice was put through to them. They came in and circled the northeastern outskirts of Casablanca and were over their targets at H-hour, but apparently received word in time to avoid delivering the attack.

After General Patton had arrived at the advance Division CP at Villa Coigny and gave the order to cease hostilities, General Eagles, Mal. Albert A. Connor and Col. Harry McK. Roper left for Casablanca to arrange for the capitulation of the French. On the way they stopped at the 15th Infantry CP, picked up Capt. Burton S. Barr and 1st Lt. Walter Millar and took them to Casablanca with them. Captain Barr carried a United States flag into Casablanca. On the outskirts of town they met some French officers whom General Desre' had sent to lead them into the French headquarters. The Frenchmen said they wanted to clear out some mines along the road before the party proceeded. The 15th Infantry sent some troops to assist with the clearing of the mines, and the group went ahead with a white flag on the French car. All the way into Casablanca the crowds lining the streets cheered and clapped.

At French headquarters General Eagles arranged with Admiral Ronarc'h to call Admiral Michelier and tell him to be present at 1030 to go to Fedala, where they were to be at 1130. Prior to 1030 General Anderson arrived and had a conference with General Desre' and Admiral Ronarc'h. They discussed mutual release of prisoners, which was arranged; return of certain French troops from Casablanca to Mediouna; obtaining of American dead from the French morgue where they were being held, and the use of part of the European cemetery for burial of American dead.

General Eagles by this time had departed with Admiral Michelier for Fedala, where the meeting was delayed until the arrival of General Nogues from Rabat in the afternoon. Certain terms of armistice had been previously prepared by General Patton's staff, but when information was received from Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's headquarters concerning terms of the armistice arranged by Eastern Task Force they were found to differ so widely that, the armistice could not be concluded in Fedala at that time.

However, hostilities were definitely ended with the exception of action by submarines in sinking our transports, and it is probable that the subs were German. Local movements of French troops were not restricted, and no incidents were reported between them and the occupying United States forces. Elements of Sub-Task Force Brushwood went into defensive positions in Casablanca and Fedala, and began the job of unloading remaining transports in Casablanca harbor. The operation was ended.

"Thanks for the birthday present, Andy!" General Patton had said to General Anderson when he stopped into the Division CP that morning. The second armistice, twenty-fourth anniversary of the first Armistice, and the General's birthday were all rolled into one on that November 11, 1942.

That afternoon and evening the Division CP was moved forward to the Villa Mas in Casablanca.

It is desirable to mention here the activities of some of the component units of the Division as well as those attached, in tribute to the yeoman service performed by them during the three-day operation. Some already have been mentioned. Elements of the 39th Field Artillery Battalion were in close support of the 15th Infantry. The battalion commander came ashore with the regimental commander at 1530 November 8, and a short while later led Battery A, which landed at 1600, to a new position three miles inland. This battery later displaced all its guns at once with a jeep and a civilian truck and on the morning of November 10 placed fire on the enemy at Tit Mellil positions and aided in destroying resistance at that point. Shortly after, with a liaison officer conducting the adjustment, the battery neutralized enemy cavalry firing from a building in a field. Several rounds of counter-battery fire fell on the battery in this action.

The other two batteries did not get into action in time to aid the advance. The battalion, however, was in position with eleven guns the morning of November 11 with survey and registration complete, ready to support the attack of the 15th Infantry when hostilities were called off.

Battery B, 9th Field Artillery Battalion, did salvage work along the beach until it landed two self-propelled 105mm howitzers the morning of November 11. These were immediately dispatched to the front and were in firing position at 0800, too late to participate in the action as the armistice had already gone into effect. A third gun was later landed but the fourth was lost in the surf.

The 1st Battalion Combat Team, 67th Armored Regiment, 2d Armored Division, commanded by Maj. R. E. Nelson, and consisting of an armored battalion reinforced by armored infantry, artillery, engineer and reconnaissance elements, landed one platoon of tanks from Company A the night of November 8. This platoon immediately proceeded to the high ground east of the railroad station at Fedala.

As the other elements of the unit were unloaded, they were assembled in the same general area. Due to the swell and the shortage of tank lighters, unloading of the transports Arcturus and Biddle was slow, but most of the vehicles were unloaded by 1900 November 9. The process was hastened by moving the Arcturus into the port of Fedala at 1300 November 9, and unloading directly onto the pier.

The mortar and assault platoons of Headquarters Company, and Battery A, 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, were actually the only United States troops who began the attack as scheduled on the morning of November 11, but as mentioned before, their fire on a gun position was broken off immediately upon receipt of word of the armistice.

On November 9 the Division Engineer and the Signal Officer checked the railroad telegraph in Fedala, located prospective water points and obtained wrenches from the town engineer, and reconnoitered for crossings of the Wadi Mellah. A detail under the 10th Engineer Battalion supply sergeant checked the city and beaches for engineer supplies. At about 1900 the battalion command post was set up in the port area of Fedala.

On November 10 details were sent along the beaches to salvage all possible equipment. Repair of the shunting-engine and railway in the port area was commenced under the Assistant Division Engineer. Power on the Fedala-Casablanca line was found to be interrupted. That evening the Division Engineer went to the Division command post to discuss plans for the demolition of water aqueducts and power lines leading into Casablanca, and the company commander and one platoon of Company C were ordered to stand by at the battalion command post to perform this mission, which was never found necessary. A water point was established at Tit Mellil.

The chief work of the 3d Medical Battalion, other than that of the collecting companies that were assigned to regimental landing groups, was in establishing and operating Division clearing stations. The work was made enormously difficult by the shortage of equipment and transportation. Coupled with this hampering factor was the burden of casualties caused by the sinking of four transports off Fedala November 11 and 12 probably by German submarines.

For this operation, the battalion was divided into amphibious collecting companies with the assault landing groups, and one such company under Division control; two clearing platoons; and headquarters and headquarters detachment, which remained with Group 3 at Camp Pickett. Equipment and supplies were reduced to those absolutely necessary for the amphibious operation. The Division Surgeon's office was likewise split into an "A" and "B" group, corresponding with the method used in landing the Division Headquarters.

The abbreviated collecting companies with the assault landing groups landed and functioned as prescribed, as did the two clearing stations, one at the Casino and the other at a winery about six miles southeast of Fedala, closer to the front. The collecting company, under Division control, was landed and attached to Regimental Landing Group 15 after it was committed to action.

The 3d Signal Company had a difficult time. Prior to 0900 November 9, when the first wire net was laid, all communications had been by runner, radio or direct liaison. The company came ashore on the afternoon of the 9th, and that night and the following night vehicles and equipment were landed. It had been impossible to land them before this. Until the evening of the 9th the company had only one jeep, three SCR-284 radios hand-carried and hand-carried wire and telephone- equipment. One radio team was attached to each of the assault landing groups and one radio operated as net control at Division Headquarters.

Maximum use was made of existing wire facilities such as open-wire lines and switchboards. One of two major problems was the destruction of lines by shelling and the other was the foreign construction of wire, switchboards and telephone circuits.

Elements of the 3d Quartermaster Battalion were embarked on three vessels: the Leonard Wood, Rutledge, and Procyon. The Division Quartermaster and eleven enlisted men landed at 0600 November 8 and at 1400 the officers aboard the Rutledge were sent ashore to meet the Quartermaster's party in the vicinity of the Casino. Reconnaissance was undertaken for Class 1, 11, 111, and IV dumps. The office of the Quartermaster was established at La Compagnie du Port de Fedala adjacent to the west dock.

The 436th AAA AW Battalion was landed at Fedala November 10, although some officers and men had preceded it on November 8 and 9. The thirty-two 40mm guns on truck-drawn mounts were emplaced for the temporary protection of Fedala. The one officer and forty-eight men who remained aboard ship for unloading were among those torpedoed November 12 and suffered many casualties.

On November 11 Batteries C and D moved to Casablanca to provide antiaircraft defense of the airport while Batteries A and B consolidated their positions in Fedala.

The 36th Engineer Regiment (Combat), which underwent extensive training in the organization and operation of shore party installations before leaving the United States, provided these services for Sub-Task Force Brushwood. One battalion was attached to the assault landing groups, with the companies sub-attached to the battalion landing teams for initial phases of the landing.

The 2d Battalion, 20th Engineer Regiment, commenced landing in Fedala the afternoon of November 8 and by the next day had completed taking over police and local security missions in the town. Throughout the operation they continued to perform these functions. They relieved the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, which was enabled to go into regimental reserve.

The 204th Military Police Company suffered one of the most unfortunate disasters of the entire operation. Four landing craft filled with officers and men were disembarked at 0200 November 9, and before daylight had entered Casablanca harbor, instead of Fedala. The boats were in column about a hundred yards apart. Second Lt. Edward W. Wellman, who was in one of the boats, tells about it:

We were supposed to land on the beaches of Fedala, but through error, the assault boats headed toward Casablanca, fifteen miles away, where the French fleet was quartered.

It was not until we were in Casablanca harbor that we realized that the fire toward which we were headed was not from oil tanks on Cape Fedala, but a French ship hit by our naval fire.

Two of our boats drew back.

The other two had drawn near the vessel, which, in the darkness, they thought was a United States destroyer.

I was in one. When the men in the other hailed the vessel, a foreign voice answered. They shouted back, "We are Americans."

A burst of machine-gun fire came from the destroyer, then only fifteen yards away, and the first burst fatally wounded the Captain (Capt. William H. Sutton, the Commanding officer).

Realizing that resistance was useless against a destroyer, the men stood up and threw up their hands-some even tearing off their undershirts and waving them.

The destroyer, perhaps thinking they were up to a trick, immediately opened fire with 3-inch shells.

Some men in the boat were killed by the shells and machine-gun bullets. Then Sgt. Claude Cunningham, of Memphis, Tenn., sent the survivors over the side into the water.

The French kept on pumping shells into the boat until it sank. Under international law, they could do this, since it was an assault vessel.

I was in the second boat, only twenty yards behind the first, and we shouted to the third and fourth boats to get away. Then we too turned and tried to escape by zigzagging.

The destroyer was pouring 3-inch shells our way.

A splinter took away the front of one of my shoes splitting two toes.

Another shell blew a leg off the coxswain.

The air was full of metal. A second lieutenant jumped up to take the wheel. A moment later he got a machinegun slug through a thigh.

As I started to climb up for the wheel, a shell crossed my lap and blew up the motor. Burning gasoline spread over the boat so I gave the order for the men to go over the side. A destroyer picked us up.

The men in the first boat swam for the shore. Hundreds of French civilians waded out to, drag them to safety. They chased away the Moroccan police and took off their own coats to wrap our dripping soldiers.

A French officer grabbed me and asked how many boats there were in the attack group. I told him I could tell nothing but my name, rank and number. The officer ran excitedly to the bridge. They apparently thought the whole invasion was being centered at Casablanca, instead of Fedala, and steamed back to port.

There were no doctors on the destroyer but our six wounded didn't let out a whimper ... We were taken to a French military hospital jammed with their own wounded.

Lieutenant Wellman added that the commanders of the two boats that escaped, Lts. Arthur Erwin and Thomas W. Kelly, Jr., of the 20th Engineers, refueled and landed at Fedala Beach as originally planned.

The lieutenant and twenty-four men, the only survivors of the two boats which did not escape (four other men were captured), reported to the Division CP at 1000 November 9 and were attached to the Provost Marshal's office for duty.

On the evening of November 11 between 1930 and 2030 the transport Hewes was torpedoed, presumably by a German submarine. About fifty casualties were received at the Casino clearing station at Fedala; most of the men suffering from exposure, cuts, and bruises. Up until Thursday evening the clearing stations continued to receive army casualties and wounded native and French civilians, including some severe injuries which involved amputation. Among them were cases of natives who had picked up fragmentation hand grenades and pulled the pins.

At about 1730 November 12 the Scott, Bliss and Rutledge were torpedoed. Some 1500 wet survivors, some of them terribly burned, came ashore by 2200. The quartermaster battalion at once issued at least 1200 woolen blankets to the clearing station, and issued food and coffee all during the night. The battalion surgeon assisted in attending the wounded, of which there were about 355.

That the 3d Infantry Division succeeded in accomplishing its mission in French Morocco is a tribute to the perspicacity of its commanders, and to the courage and tenacity of its soldiers. Consider these facts:

Some of the transports became lost, initially.

H-hour had to be changed virtually at the last minute, and all commanders did not receive this information.

Coxswains were not familiar with the coastline and did not become familiar with it even after several trips to the beaches. This resulted in repeated landings of units on the wrong beaches.

The bulk of the landing boats hit the rocks, rather than the beaches. Many of those boats that did not broach-to or capsize were left on the beaches to be hammered to pieces by the tide.

The original plan of landing supplies by small boats was virtually impossible because 219 out of 320 small boats were lost during the first day of operation.

Transportation was almost nil; seriously hampering bringing up those supplies that did get ashore, again traceable to the shortage of small boats.

There was no transportation for wire, curtailing communications almost to the zero point, making imperative the maximum use of runner and radio.

Despite these handicaps, Casablanca was taken, and the United States had her port on the Atlantic Coast of French Morocco through which to move the men and material which played such a large part in the subsequent defeat of the Axis in Africa.

Outside reaction to the African landing was varied. Hitler publicly promised "terrible vengeance." Allied peoples were very enthusiastic, in many cases wildly optimistic. The invasion was hailed by many newspapers in the United States as the "Second Front," an event for which the occupied countries of Europe, the Russians, and the citizens of Britain and the United States had so long and eagerly waited. It was not.

Only a few leaders, civil and military, actually knew how many bitter months yet remained before the actual Second Front was finally to open in Normandy on June 6, 1944.

There yet remained much "blood, sweat, tears and toll," not only for the 3d Infantry Division but also for all the United States Army in the Mediterranean Theater.

The bitter days of Kasserine and Faid Pass and Hill 609 lay ahead for those in the gallant 34th Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions.

The "Fighting First" and the 9th Divisions were yet to participate in the bloody fights at El Guettar and Mateur.

Bloody Ridge in Sicily for the 45th Division.

Salerno for the 36th Division.

The desperate, disheartening, almost hopeless battling for the mountain heights of the Gustav Line in Italy-Mignano and Cassino.

The Anzio Beachhead.

Yet, the battle had been joined. It was against the French, true, who immediately after the Armistice became our staunch, and in time strong ally. Still, the 3d Infantry Division, and all those who made the landings on the morning of November 8, had been blooded for the bitter battles that were yet to come, and from which they were finally to emerge triumphant.

'That is why the landing at Fedala was so important in spite of its short duration. The revelation of the great number of mistakes made by an organization in its first action, and the overcoming of all difficulties to attain the final objective was prophetic of the future career of the Division in all its battles in World War II. The first action is usually the most important from the standpoint of the quantity of lessons learned, and that is why so much space has been devoted here to telling about Casablanca and Fedala.

Confident in its newly acquired maturity born of battle, the 3d Infantry Division looked ahead.