Chapter 3

We Learn the "Truscott Trot'

And Prepare to Invade Sicily

THE battle for Casablanca, like a brief, feverish nightmare, was over. Hardly had the men of the Division become accustomed to the sights and sounds of battle when they found themselves again faced with a long period of marking time. During the eight months before they were again committed to combat, however, their eyes were turned to the east where the slow, terrible drama of Tunisia was being enacted; and finally toward Sicily, where the Division itself was to participate in one of the great amphibious assaults in World War II.

Meanwhile there were the sights, sounds-and smells of a fascinating new country to keep the men occupied. They learned about medinas-the old native towns which squatted anachronistically amid the modern cities of western Morocco; about French food and customs, French men and women; about mangy burros, wooden plows, Arab beggars; about gasogenes, chicory coffee, and the thousand subterfuges by which a people accustomed to colonial luxury attempted to shore up their living standards.

When Casablanca fell on November 11 at 0655, units of the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments, poised on the outskirts of the city, entered, without firing a shot, and occupied the port area, the power plant, and other strategic objectives. Gazes airport on the southeastern edge of town was taken under protection by the 436th AAA AW Battalion. The two regiments took over guard duties in the city and port, while the 30th Infantry and 36th Engineer Regiments remained in Fedala to guard and operate the port under the supervision of a rear Division CP, commanded by Brig. Gen. William A. Campbell.

The main Division CP was established in the fashionable Anfa district in the southwestern outskirts of Casablanca. The CP itself was in the luxurious Villa Mas, home of Pierre Mas, wealthy publisher of Le Petit Marocain and other Moroccan newspapers. The nearby Italian and Japanese consulate buildings were also used for offices while the swank Anfa hotel and Villa Mirador on top of the hill were used as residential quarters for the staff.

During its stay in Casablanca the Division completed unloading the vessels of its convoy in Casablanca harbor, established liaison with French Army authorities, provided some security for the Casablanca area and straightened out problems of personnel and equipment occasioned by the landing, insofar as facilities permitted.

Transports, which had brought the Brushwood force to Africa, were still lying off the port of Fedala. As previously noted, one was torpedoed and sunk the evening of November 11, and three more the following evening. On November 13 the ships were moved into Casablanca harbor, and unloading began immediately, with at least one infantry battalion being constantly on duty to perform this work. The reason for the urgency was that another convoy was expected on D-plus-five (November 13). It actually arrived two or three days late, and lay off the port one day before king brought in.

From the close of the Casablanca operation until April 28, 1943, the 30th Infantry was destined to be scattered throughout French Morocco and western Algeria, serving as border, school, and line-of-communication guard troops.

The Ist Battalion, under command of Lt. Col. Fred W. Sladen, marched from its positions near Fedala on November 12 to Rabat, colorful, historical Moroccan port, where for almost a month its companies guarded the Rabat airport, the city of Rabat and all roads leading to the vicinity.

On November 12- the G-2 office published the first issue of the Daily News Summary, and this summary continued to appear daily until the Division began loading for the Sicilian operation. It is believed to be the first news-sheet published by United States troops in the North African Theater.

During the next week and a half there was very little training activity, units being occupied in guard and labor duties, care of equipment, completing reports on the operation, and taking in the sights of the strange new country.

Relationships with French military personnel rapidly changed from cool correctness at the moment of surrender to warm cooperation. Pro-Germans and Vichyites, of whom there were a small number, found it expedient to hide their sentiments as the great majority of French officers began studying American organization and methods, with the unconcealed intention of some day joining the battle against the "Boche." Capt. Donald H. Lieb was sent to Casablanca Division headquarters as American Liaison Officer, while Capt. Anthony du Pradel joined the 3d Division as French Liaison Officer.

A striking illustration of the new spirit was the visit of Major General Anderson to the headquarters of General de Division Henri Martin in Marrakech, in accordance with the desire of Major General Patton, Western Task Force commander. On the afternoon of November 17 General Anderson, accompanied by Col. Harry McK. Roper, Lt. Col. Edgar C. Doleman, Maj.' Albert 0. Connor, and Capt. William H. Ellsworth, flew, to Marrakech by Army transport.

There the American party was entertained by General Martin and by his Excellency Hadji Thami El Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakech. Both the Pasha and General Martin welcomed General Anderson's party warmly, and vowed that North African forces would soon be in the fight on the Allied side. History knows how soon their promises were made good; before the year's end French troops had drawn German blood along the Grande Dorsale in central Tunisia.

Further to seal the rift caused by the brief hostilities, joint ceremonies for American and French soldiers killed during the operation were held in Casablanca November 23. Chaplains from the Division participated in both the Catholic and Protestant services. Meanwhile many of the Division's wounded had been evacuated to the United States aboard vessels of the D-day convoy, while nontransportables and those with superficial wounds remained behind in the French military hospital, which had been taken over by United States authorities.

Much of the administrative work during this period was done with the aid of equipment left behind by the German Armistice Commission, which had hastily evacuated the Villa Mas, Anfa Hotel and Villa Mirador. Mimeograph machines, paper, ink, stencils, notebooks, and office supplies of all descriptions virtually kept the Division offices going when American supplies were not to be had. Oddly, planning for the operation apparently had not contemplated that any administrative work would have to be done for a long time after the landing, and such things as American envelopes were very scarce for months following November 8.

On November 25 the Division CP was moved from Casablanca to the Casino in Fedala, a large, drafty wooden structure whose western windows overlooked the beaches on which the original landings had been made. The nearby Miramar hotel, from which the German Armistice Commission had fled on the first morning, was taken over for staff quarters.

Units of the Division made the trip from Casablanca to the Fedala area in a one-day march, as organic transportation was still on a slim amphibious basis. The move was made to get troops into training areas and away from Casablanca, which was already beginning to fill up with service troops.

(On November 27 the French fleet was scuttled at Toulon, * In Tunisia Allied advance units were locked in combat with Germans around Tebourba, almost within sight of Tunis. The Germans were rapidly reinforcing, and hopes for the quick seizure of Tunis and Bizerte were approaching the vanishing point. But in Libya, the gallant, British Eighth Army was rolling in high gear following its successful drive from El Alamein, October 23.)

The Division was not by any means on a non-tactical basis, even in Fedala. The favored German capability at the moment was to make a lightning move into Spanish Morocco, occupied by Franco troops, and attack out of the almost trackless Rif hills against the thinly-held Allied supply line running from Casablanca through Port Lyautey, Meknes, Fez, Taza and Oudjda to Oran and eastward. Terrain studies of western Spanish Morocco . were initiated; order-of-battle of Spanish troops was plotted and brought up to date. The Division itself moved to Rabat on December 5, sending patrols up toward the Spanish Moroccan border, and checking strength and dispositions of French troops on border duty.

On December 4, 30th Infantry, less 3d Battalion, wa's transferred to control of Western Task Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, and alerted for movement by air, rail and motor to Oudjda, French Morocco. Company C, commanded by Capt. George Abbott, was placed in air transports and flown to Oudjda to guard the airport there against possible German parachute invasion or land invasion through Spain and Spanish Morocco.

On December 5-6 the remainder of Ist Battalion was moved to Oudjda by truck and train to reinforce Company C and to strengthen the defenses of northern French Morocco and protect the vital line-of- communication supply line from Casablanca to Tunisia.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, and special units, less the platoon of Cannon Company with 1st Battalion, remained in the Fedala area until December 6, when they were moved by truck and train to Guercif, French Morocco, an old French Foreign Legion post used during the Rif Campaign of the French in the mid-twenties.

The battalion and regimental special units remained in the Guercif area, guarding the airport and maintaining motor, rail, and air patrols, the last consisting of one Division Artillery and one I Armored Corps cub plane in the Taza-Guercif-Taourirt-Spanish Moroccan border areas, and necessitating a daily flight of over 200 miles. The 2d Battalion patrols met Ist Battalion patrols at various contact points between Guercif and Oudjda.

Col. Arthur H. Rogers' staff had prepared an elaborate "staff study" of enemy capabilities, one of which was a paratroop attack from Spanish Morocco, against which an alert system was established, in addition to preparations made for dealing with land attack. A joint French-American system of guarding and patrolling, also under Colonel Rogers' command, was established in late February and March, continuing until April 19, when full responsibility was assumed by the French.

The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, under Maj. Charles E. Johnson, remained on guard and labor-battalion duty in the Fedala area from November 12 until the first week of January, serving one week in late December as Casablanca port battalion troops-a desperate measure adopted to speed ammunition and supply shipments from that crowded port to the hard-pressed Tunisian front.

In Rabat, Division headquarters was established in the Chamber of Commerce building, while the smart Balima hotel was taken over for staff quarters. Enlisted men were put up at the Grand Hotel. The troops, most of whom had marched from Fedala, were initially bivouacked in the outskirts of Rabat, but were soon moved to the cork-oak Foret de Mamora about eight miles east of Sale, twin city of Rabat.

Because there were no administrative or base section troops in Rabat, the Division headquarters was split in order to establish a headquarters for Third Military Area, which included a part of western Morocco with Rabat as its capital. Col. Walter E. Lauer, Division chief of staff, was placed in command of the area headquarters, which administered nondivisional units and handled civil affairs.

On December 14, the Division opened a school for twenty-eight French officers and fifty noncommissioned officers, to train them in use of American weapons, motor vehicles and armor. The school was well-planned, competently run, and resulted in a thorough grounding of the French students in the subjects taught, as well as improved relationships between the two armies. The French quickly earned respect because of their knowledge of weapons and their excellence as artillerists. A second school, identical in subject matter but with new students, opened on January 11. This day there was a demonstration for the French press, in which all divisional weapons were fired.

December 20 saw another outburst of Franco- American solidarity, when the 3d Infantry Division, together with elements of the 2d Armored Division, and French troops, paraded through downtown Rabat. Large cheering crowds watched the parade, which was lavishly written up in the press.

On December 23 the Group Three convoy, which had remained at Camp Pickett, arrived at Casablanca. This convoy brought the Division's transportation virtually up to normal strength, and partially answered the query of a disillusioned Frenchman upon seeing the Division's earliest North African road march, "But where are all your big American trucks?" The fourton prime movers of the medium artillery battalion and the big wreckers of the Ordnance Company looked good after several weeks of moving in half-tons and a tiny fleet of "two-and-a-halfs." Arrival of personnel sections, the APO, and other administrative units also took a great burden off the harassed tactical sections of unit headquarters.

(On the evening of December 30 an estimated six to ten enemy bombers came in over Casablanca and dropped several bombs, doing slight damage in the port and killing some Arabs in the New Medina. Two planes were reported shot down. Those who were in Casablanca at the time said the ack-ack was like a Fourth of July demonstration. Except for the Fedala torpedoings, this was the only direct enemy action against western Morocco during the Division's entire stay.)

On January 29 ceremonies were held in the lovely cathedral in Rabat for 1st Lt. Clement Falter, Catholic chaplain who was killed on the beach at Fedala. He was believed to be the first American chaplain killed inaction during the war.

The 3d Infantry Division was present at the making of world history on Thursday, January 21. On this day President Franklin D. Roosevelt reviewed troops of the 3d Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions on the main highway leading north from Sale. He wa's accompanied by many dignitaries, civil and military, including his secretary, Stephen T. Early; Harry Hopkins, personal agent and adviser; Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, commanding Fifth Army; Maj. Gen. George S.Patton, Jr., commanding I Armored Corps; Maj. Gen. Jonathan W. Anderson, commanding 3d Infantry Division; Maj. Gen. Ernest Harmon, commanding 2d Armored Division; and Maj. Gen. Manton Eddy, commanding 9th Infantry Division.

The President, wearing a gray business suit and gray felt hat, with a black band around his left arm, in mourning for his mother, rode in the front seat of an army jeep down the long line of troops, which extended about one mile along the tree-lined highway, and which represented all separate units of the Division. General Clark and General Anderson were in the rear of the jeep during its progress past 3d Infantry Division troops.

Soldiers were in full field uniform with bayonets fixed, and heavy weapons and some organic transportation from each unit was lined up behind the troops east of the highway.

After passing the length of the column, the President met and congratulated heroes of the November landing operation from both the 2d Armored, and 3d Infantry Divisions, and ate lunch at a mess prepared by Service Battery, 39th FA Battalion. Bands of the 7th Infantry and 3d Infantry Division Artillery took part in the ceremonies.

The visit was such a closely-guarded secret that no one, with the exception of those concerned with the planning, knew he was to see the President until shortly before his arrival.

As he passed the President returned the salutes of the units and spoke words of greeting to those along the way.

P-40 pursuit planes were over the line of march much of the time.

The President came by automobile with his party from Casablanca, arriving at the head of the 3d Infantry Division troops about 1140 and completing his visit at about 1205. A strong, chilly wind sprang up about the time the President arrived, so that those who took part were well-chilled by the time the Commanderin-Chief had departed around 1200.

A number of Army and Navy officers, in addition to those named, as well as secret servicemen, military police, press correspondents, and cameramen accompanied the President on his tour. The party left for Port Lyautey after lunch, presumably to put the President aboard a plane for Casablanca.

It was later learned that the President had attended the historic conference at the Anfa Hotel, together with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Basic plans were laid there for the 1943 offensive against the European continent, and this second of many well- publicized meetings between these two public figures made front page headlines in every newspaper in the world as the "Unconditional Surrender" Conference, so dubbed when Roosevelt and Churchill borrowed a famous phrase from General Ulysses S. Grant, and upon the President's insistence, announced that the Axis powers would feel the full force of Allied power until they should surrender unconditionally.

Guard of the conference area was assigned to 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, under command of Lt. Col. Charles E. Johnson. From January 8 to 23 the battalion provided security for the area, inspecting houses in the vicinity and keeping a close check on personnel entering and leaving the Anfa.

Personages who attended the Conference read like a military Who's Who. The complete roster of the United States delegation included:

The British delegation, headed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill included:

On January 23 the Division G-2 and G-3 offices moved into the field, in preparation for the commencement of training.

On February 18 Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy visited the Division CP in the field southeast of Port Lyautey. The 3d Reconnaissance Troop formed the guard of honor and the 3d Infantry Division Band provided music for the occasion. General and Special Staff officers of the Division, as well as General Anderson and unit commanders,, formed a receiving line for the guests.

Meanwhile General Anderson had received orders re-assigning him to the United States. On February 20, following a ceremony at the Division CP, Col. Robert C. Macon was presented with the stars of a brigadier general. General Anderson said farewell to his staff. He left for the United States on February 22, and General Campbell assumed temporary command of the 3d Division.

(On February 16, the German 10th Panzer Division, which had made an undetected move north from the Mareth line sector, attacked inexperienced United States units deployed on and between three or four isolated hills west of Faid Pass. In two or three days the attack rolled past Sidi Bou Zid, Sbeitla, through Kasserine Pass-and the Germans were bearing down on the advanced Allied base at Tebessa, also the location of 11 US Corps headquarters. Whole infantry and artillery battalions were swallowed up in this enemy drive; scores of tanks were lost. The commander of a United States airfield, hearing a distant ammunition dump go up, interpreted this as a withdrawal signal, and ordered his planes destroyed and abandoned th e field. The attack was finally halted by the combined action of tank destroyers and artillery units which had been rushed into the area southeast of Tebessa. But at least two United States divisions had suffered telling losses, and a great blow had been delivered to Allied morale.)

To make good the heavy casualties in men and material suffered in Tunisia-and the name "Kasserine" will long be remembered as the token of a black daythe 3d Infantry Division and 2d Armored Division were tapped for replacements. About 3,400 men, most of them volunteers, and all but 400 of them infantrymen, left the Division for Tunisia during the last week in February. The 3d sent its best men and officers, and thereby earned an enduring reputation for excellence among the units which it reinforced. Later, during preparations for the Sicilian landing, many of these men had a chance to come back to the 3d, and several hundred did so. Battle-wise and competent, they provided valuable stiffening at a propitious moment.

Maj. Gen. Lucian King Truscott, who had seen the fighting around Kasserine Pass as General Eisenhower's deputy, arrived March 7 to take command of the 3d Division, and brought with him Col. Don E. Carleton as Chief of Staff'. One of General Truscott's first acts was to gather his officers together and tell them, in unvarnished language, what had happened in Tunisia. His cardinal point: the "Boche" were not supermen. They could be beaten by applying known principles of warfare with aggressiveness and daring.

On March 15 the 15th Infantry commenced its move to Fifth Army's Invasion Training Center at, Arzew, there to begin amphibious training in preparation for the invasion of Sicily.

The training in Africa could not be confined merely to the normal Army Ground Force training, for the Sicilian operation was to be a combined operation, calling for the closest cooperation between ground, sea and air forces. "'Intensive amphibious training" was the name applied to the program. It had to be intensive because time was growing short.

On April 28 the 30th Infantry rejoined the 3d Division for the first time since conclusion of the Casablanca operation and reassembled as a regiment at Arzew.

The complete Division had now closed in at Arzew. Here General Truscott introduced something new in training methods. Soon dubbed the "Truscott Trot," the innovation proved to be a marching speed of five miles an hour for one hour, four miles an hour for the next two hours, and three and one-half miles an hour for the remainder of a 30-mile march.

Companies D and 1, 30th Infantry, commanded by Capts. Eugene A. Salet and Edward G. Paar, respectively, served as School and Demonstration Troops at Arzew, training other elements of the Division in amphibious tactics and simulating the enemy in maneuvers.

Other training at Arzew, which stressed coordination of all arms from airborne infantry to naval units, was emphasized from the beginning but physical conditioning was the immediate need. In addition to the speed marches there was log-rolling, obstacle-course running, bayonet training and training in hand-to-hand combat. Men who couldn't meet the standards were immediately eliminated.

Infantry and artillery also began to learn to work together more closely than ever before. Doughboys -learned to follow artillery barrages closely, sometimes to within 100 yards, and thereby gained confidence in the accuracy of artillery during these firing problems.

Battle conditions were also simulated by using mortars and machine guns. There were, naturally some casualties as a result of this training with live ammunition but it is undeniable that the training resulted in saving many lives later in combat.

Lessons that other United States soldiers were learning the hard way in Tunisia at this time were also taught the men. They became familiar with all types of mines and booby traps that the Germans and Italians were using in Tunisia and gained confidence in their ability to avoid or overcome these weapons.

There was also training with the Navy. This included practice landings and training in controlling fire of naval vessels by shore groups. Every type of landing craft, from LSTs and LCMs to rubber boats, was tested. This meant "dry-run," after "dry-run," until men of the 3d were ready to swear they had spent more time afloat than many of the men in the Navy.

Training in the firing of naval guns utilizing shore observation posts was a continuation, with improvements, of the methods that were first tried in the landings in Morocco. Picked groups of Division officers and enlisted men were assigned to work with Navy personnel, forming Shore Fire Control Parties. Under control of the 3d Infantry Division Artillery, their function was similar to that of the usual observation teams of field artillery.

Concurrent with the training, the Division had conceived and put into operation something new for staff work on division level, called a Planning Board. This method of preparation for a combined operation was designed to insure the utmost in cooperation between all branches of the services involved. It was named Joss Force Planning Board, after the code reference name for 3d Infantry Division Reinforced. It was headed by Lt. Col. Albert'O. Connor, Deputy Chief of Staff; staffed by Lt. Col. Ben Harrell, A C of S, G-3; Maj. Grover Wilson, A C of S, G-2; Lt. Col. Robert D. Henriques of the British Army (a member of the Combined Operations Staff of Allied Force Headquarters); Lt. Col. Charles E. Johnson, A C of S, G-4; Maj. George H. Revelle, Assistant A C of S, G-4; Capt. Robert C. Shaw, G-4 liaison officer and Lt. Col. Bruce C. Price, Adjutant General. There were also representatives from 36th Engineer Regiment (C), 2d Armored Division, 3d Ranger Battalion and the Navy.

As time went on and the planning grew more detailed a number of other men, representing all component elements which go to make up a combined operations task force, were added to the Planning Board. It can truthfully be said that one of the main factors in what was to prove the phenomenally successful Sicilian campaign was the careful, coordinated planning of infinitely numerous details.

A vital part of the work was the gathering of intelligence of the enemy. Part of the success. of the coming operation hinged on our knowing where the enemy was and in what strength; his available reserves, and the nature of his defenses. From the time the Division was given the mission of landing in Sicily until the last possible moment before D-day. and H-hour, the G-2 Section worked night and day gathering and fitting together every scrap of information about the Axis defenders. The bulky sheaf of papers that was called the Intelligence File finally included everything known about Sicily pertinent to the operation both from the military and civilian points of view.

Information on terrain, communications and customs of the people and towns was gathered. Information concerning enemy fixed defenses was compiled. The Navy supplied most of the information on beach defenses. This mass of information was then employed to build relief models for the benefit of commanders and leaders of units down to squads and platoons.

Early in the planning phase it was recognized that for a force the size of Joss (three times the normal strength of the Division with approximately fifty attached units) a special organization, other than the Division service troops, would be necessary for supply, evacuation and embarkation. This fact was emphasized by the directive that the force would be prepared to sustain itself on Sicily for from twenty-one to thirty days. It was obvious also that the formation of this special organization could not wait until the actual landing but that it must be formed if possible prior to the concentration of the force in the staging area.

Accordingly, the concept of supply control through three agencies was developed. These agencies were Force Depot, Near Shore Control, and Beach Group. Force Depot consisted of all the quartermaster, ordnance, chemical, medical, and signal supply troops attached to the Division other than the Beach Group. It was controlled by the Division Quartermaster, Col. B. M. James, who was assisted by an executive officer from G- 4 and a specially selected officer for each of the Division Services.

The mission of Force Depot was to furnish to the Joss forces all those services and evacuation normally supplied to a division in the field by an Army headquarters. The depot was set up to operate on the Near Shore (Tunisia) exactly as it would be on the Far Shore of Sicily. It was capable of establishing truckhead and railheads anywhere on the island of Sicily Ind was charged with maintaining these installations at all times within fifteen miles of the Division rear boundary. This was to result in the unique but highly satisfactory arrangement of having the command of a higher echelon of supply and evacuation directly vested in the unit being supplied.

Near Shore Control was a provisional headquarters set up to plan, control, and supervise the embarkation of all organizations and to load all supply ships. It included the Division Embarkation- Officer, the Division Transport Quartermaster (TQM) and was also the headquarters for all subordinate TQMs. This organization worked in close harmony with the corresponding organization of the Navy and with the 1st Embarkation Group of Eastern Base Section which was charged by higher headquarters with the responsibility of the supply and embarkation of Joss Force.

The Beach Group consisted of the 36th Combat Engineer Regiment, a battalion of the 540th Engineer Regiment (Port) and attached medical and supply troops.

The purpose of this group was to organize three of the four landing beaches so as to facilitate the landing of the force, to unload supplies and establish dumps, and, upon capture of a port, to repair and operate the port.

As the downfall of the German and Italian forces in Tunisia approached, the Allied command decided to exploit the successes of II U. S. Corps by committing a fresh U. S. division.

At noon on April 30 the Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division, received a warning order from the Commanding General, I Armored Corps, to be prepared to move the Division immediately to the Tunisian zone of action, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, II U. S. Corps. Purpose of the move, and the mission of the Division, was to provide 11 U. S. Corps with fresh reinforcements in order to effect the rapid destruction of the Axis army then being pushed back against the Mediterranean coast. The Division was to be relieved from assignment to I Armored Corps upon commencement of its move.

Training was halted immediately. At 2200 April 30, the order was received to begin the movement. The Division's movement order had already been prepared and was issued immediately. The 15th Infantry moved out as scheduled at 0300 May 1, five hours following receipt of the movement order from higher headquarters.

The Division's order intended that all elements of the Division be on the road by 0900 May 2 and be concentrated in the Constantine area by the evening of May 4 or morning of May 5. However, difficulty was immediately experienced in placing this density of vehicles on the road, due -to the requirements of other movements, and the Division was limited to 800 -vehicles per day past a given point.

This practically doubled the time required for getting the Division on the road. RCT 7 passed its initial point at 1200 May 1, RCT 30 at 0800 May 2, and Division Headquarters at 0400 May 3, followed by Division Artillery (minus three light battalions), 10th Engineer Battalion and Division rear echelon.

Other units followed the same route and, with minor exceptions, occupied the same bivouac areas on successive nights. By Friday afternoon, May 7, the Division was entirely concentrated in the Ghardimaou Wadi Melis area just inside the Tunisian border.

On May 7, General Truscott visited 11 U. S. Corps CP and received oral instructions to move one combat team behind the Ist infantry Division, prepared to pass through the 18th Infantry and attack the enemy on its front. At that time elements of the Barenthin regiment, which was part of the hastily-formed German Man teugel Division, was dug in on the high ground eight miles southeast of Mateur and was causing the 1st Infantry Division considerable trouble.

In the early morning of May 8, RCT 15 left the Wadi Melis bivouac and moved to a new bivouac about fourteen miles south of Mateur, prepared to execute its combat mission. Meanwhile General Truscott had gone to the 1st Infantry Division CP to keep abreast of the situation. While he was there, at about 2300 May 8, he received instructions to move the remainder of the Division into the Ferryville area, and also received a new attack mission-namely, to attack eastward from the base of the Metline-Porto Ferina peninsula and mop up any remaining resistance. Combat attachments for this operation included the 13th FA Brigade, 5th Armored Artillery Group, RCT 39, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 106th AAA AW Battalion. The 15th Infantry was instructed to move to a position west of the junction of the Ferryville-Bizerte-Tunis highways, and the Division rear CP at Wadi Melis was instructed to order 7th Infantry to move immediately to the Mateur area.

At this time the only known enemy forces in the peninsula east of the Tunis-Bizerte road were elements of the Barenthin regiment which may have been withdrawn from the high ground west of the road, and a few tanks which had been driven back into this area by the Ist Armored Division. There were other pockets of unimportant enemy units, notably a company of the Hermann Goering Division on Djebel Ichkeul whose commander refused to surrender until one of his superiors personally ordered him to do so.

At 0730, May 9, the advance Division CP was opened in an olive grove one mile south of Ferryville on Route C- 54. Reconnaissance had been sent to the TunisBizerte highway to look for a truck turn-around, and at about 0800 the head of the RCT 15 truck column passed the Division CP headed for the front.

At this time General Truscott was with General Harmon, Commanding General, Ist Armored Division, on reconnaissance along the Tunis-Bizerte highway. The attack of the Ist Armored had made such progress that the attack of the 3d Infantry Division was unnecessary. At 0830 General Truscott reported the facts to Commanding General, 11 U. S. Corps, and upon instructions from 11 U. S. Corps, released the Division's combat attachments. An attempt was made to halt RCT 7 before it left Wadi Melis, but as it could not be reached until it had got within a short distance of its bivouac south of Mateur it was permitted to close in the new area.

On May 10 the entire Division, with the exception of the rear echelon, RCT 30, and certain service detachments, was concentrated in the Ferryville area. Still under the control of Il U. S. Corps, the Division was given a mission of operating the PW cage west of Mateur, where approximately 38,000 prisoners were collected in three or four days, and of collecting captured materiel into designated salvage dumps and guarding it. One company of the 15th Infantry was placed in charge of the PW cage initially, but on the evening of May 9 the entire 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, was detailed to take over the cage, and the battalion continued to run the cage until the Division departed for the Jemmapes-Philippeville area May 15. So ended the 3d Infantry Division's brief participation in the Tunisian campaign. Training was immediately resumed.

Training in the reduction of beach fortifications, and the Division's proposed plan of maneuver, were the two most important items on the docket. Jemmapes was not ideal for this work, since the area was covered with heavy underbrush, but at the moment it was the best area available.

As a general objective all the units prepared for a landing on defended beaches and an advance inland of about five miles. Here at Jemmapes four units were picked for the specific task of assaulting the beaches. They were: 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry; 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry and the attached 3d Ranger Battalion. Other infantry battalions trained to accomplish their missions of passing through the assault battalions and seizing inland objectives. One other battalion also underwent specialized training in street fighting. Most of the training of the assault battalions and of the street fighting unit was carried on at night.

On June I the Division began concentrating in an area near Lake Bizerte in northern Tunisia. Here it was joined daily by other units comprising Task Force Joss. Training at Lake Bizerte stressed coordination with the Navy in all phases' of the operation, from the fire control of naval guns prior to and during the actual landing to the smooth disembarkation of troops on the beaches. This training of the combined forces proved effective as later shown by the manner in which all units worked during the actual operation.

Specialized training at Lake Bizerte included the removal of beach obstacles and mines, the attack against genuine, German-built pillboxes, mortar firing from landing craft, and the firing of grapnels to remove beach wire. Speed marches remained the rule to and from training areas.

After three weeks of this tough work the big dress rehearsal, Operation "Copybook," was held. It included nearly every unit in Joss Force and followed the actual plans for the landing as closely as possible. So realistic were the preparations for "Copybook" that the majority of men half believed the actual operation to be underway, and refused to be convinced otherwise until the morning for the landing found the landing craft still off African beaches.

This huge "dry-run" brought to light some faults which were corrected in time for the actual operation. There was increased confidence among men of the Division in the ability of the Navy to land all troops on the proper beaches. This spirit of harmony with the Navy was encouraged to the extent that a Division order stated that commanders of Naval craft would be invited by the 3d Division officer of each unit, representing the Naval officer's "opposite number," to a meal ashore at each army unit officers' mess.

Following the rehearsal the men were given a rest. Intensive training came to an end. Drill hours we're shortened, and there was more time allowed for recreation. The speed marches and physical conditioning continued, however, in order to prevent a drop in the already high physical standards attained.

Never, anywhere, was a combat division more fit for combat ... more in readiness to close with the enemy, than the 3d Infantry Division at this time.

The evening sun had dropped behind the tired, dusty green olive trees, but the heat driven into the ground by its piercing rays during the day was still radiating upward, bringing perspiration to the tanned faces of the men sitting in a large group toward the northeast edge of the Division bivouac area.

The group sat in a large semicircle. It was composed of every officer of the 3d Division. To the front a line of chairs conformed to the shape of the formation, and upon these chairs sat the ranking officers-the regimental commanders and the two brigadier generals. The majority of the officers sat on the upturned edges of their steel helmets.

It was not a particularly noisy gathering. The prevailing heat forbade exuberance. Rather it was a silent, somewhat speculative group. On O.D.-clad backs, white salt stains of dried perspiration indicated the exertion of the foregoing weeks.

A loudspeaker microphone had been placed in front of the group. A large red-faced man with a bushy moustache-Col. Don E. Carleton, Division Chief of Staffstepped up to it. Before he began to speak a sudden rush of withering hot air struck the assembled officers.

"Gentlemen," said the Colonel, "the first Sirocco. A hot wind that sweeps north across the sands of the Sahara, with the heat of a furnace, to die over the Mediterranean. A good omen."

There was a slight murmur of laughter, which was quickly stilled. There was a silence. The Colonel fidgeted slightly, waited. Then he looked to his right, straightened, and called out, "Attention!" The officers scrambled to their feet.

"Gentlemen, the Commanding General."

General Truscott, heavy-set, steel-gray haired, took his place at the microphone. A beam of light from the dying sun shot through an opening in the olive trees and rested on his face, causing him to wrinkle his features in a characteristic grimace. He looked the entire assemblage over, slowly.

"Gentlemen," he began, speaking very deliberately, "we are on the eve of a great adventure. We are about to set forth upon the greatest amphibious expedition the world has ever known. We are going forth to engage the enemy and to defeat him....

"I say to you, as I look upon you, that we are ready. Let us review briefly the training of the last few months....

"You have engaged in five-mile-an-hour marching-which my staff officers tell me is commonly referred to as the 'Truscott Trot'-until you are now able to march great distances over long periods of time, and arrive at your destination ready for combat....

"You have learned what it is to follow closely your supporting artillery, and your men have learned not to be afraid of it....

"You have learned how to land on your assigned beaches, quickly disembark, and move inward rapidly to seize your objectives.

"I repeat, we are ready....

"On the eve of this great adventure, we find ourselves anticipating success or-failure? No, instead we anticipate success, or success beyond our utmost expectations. We do not know the word 'failure.' We know only that we will be successful, or that we 'will be successful beyond our utmost expectations. . . ."

It was nearly dark when the General ended his speech.

The following day was July 4. The 3d Infantry Division staged a review. Certain men were decorated for actions they had performed in the Fedala landing. This time General Truscott spoke for the benefit of the whole Division. The speech was shorter, less comprehensive. It was designed to put the men in the final aggressive spirit so necessary for combat.

It, concluded: "You are going to meet the 'Boche'! Carve your name in his face!"

The Division commenced loading on its invasion convoys the following morning. The United States Army was about to teach the Axis an overwhelmingly crushing lesson in blitz warfare.

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