"In Which We Carve Our Name"
 Sicily
Chapter 4 Part 1

TROOP LIST-Operation "Joss" Third Infantry Division (Reinf)

Organization for Combat

1. Hq & Hq Co, 3d Inf Div

Det CIC Pers

Two IPW Teams

Det Civ Affairs Pers

Det Pub Relations Pers

Censorship Det

Broadcasting Det

Naval Party (Liaison Only)

2. 7th Inf Regt

3. 15th Inf Regt

4. 30th Inf Regt

5. 3d Inf Div Artillery

9th FA Bn

10th FA Bn

39th FA Bn

41st FA Bn

5th Armd FA Gp

77th FA Regt

2d Bn, 36th FA Rgt

Btry B, 1st FA Obsn Bn (S&F) (-Flash Det)

Survey Plat, Co B, 66th Engr Bn (Topo)

Naval Shore Fire Control Parties

6. 10th Engr Bn

7. 3d Ranger Bn

8. 4th Tabor Goums

9. 3d Cml Bn Mtz (Mortar)

10. 3d Rcn Troop

Co A, 51st Sig Bn (-) 14. Hq & Hq Btry, 105th AAA AW Gp, with attchd units

SOMEWHERE in the gloomy interior of a captured enemy emplacement a bell rang. Correspondent Michael Chinigo of International News Service picked up the receiver of an Italian field telephone, and spoke a word of question, in Italian. A worried "brasshat," volubly querulous, had received a disturbing report that United State's troops were then landing in force all along the Southern coast of Sicily, and this, signor, was most disquieting. Please, I beg of you, say it isn't so.

When the flood of words had subsided somewhat, Chinigo seized his opportunity to break in. In firm tones he assured his questioner that all was quiet, the situation well under control. The "brasshat," his fears allayed, hung up. Chinigo, amused, did likewise. Then he went out to watch the LSTs unload.

Unfortunately for the Italian general's later peace of mind he had been only too well informed the first time. At 0200 that morning, July 10, 1944, the seaborne invasion of Sicily had commenced. The investment of the outer fringe of Festung Europa was underway. It was to carry the Allies almost nonstop into the inner bastions of Germany's defenses, eliminating almost parenthetically along the way the junior Axis partner, Italy. It was to pile on an additional crushing loss of prestige to a nation that had two months before lost an entire army in the tip of Tunisia. It was to give the Allies an invaluable base for further operations in the Mediterranean Theater, including the final, brilliantly executed invasion of southern France.

The wresting of Sicily from the Axis meant much more than the mere seizure of enemy territory. A popular military cliche' has it that "he who controls Sicily controls the Mediterranean." Since the days of the ancient Romans and Cathaginians the island has been the traditional stepping-stone from Europe to Africa and its people have known many conquerors. One inherited characteristic of the Sicilians, springing from the constant infusion of the warrior blood of new races, is the fiery Latin temperament, unsurpassed for sheer intensity anywhere on the Continent; the temperament which has given the country so much colorful notoriety and Internal dissension.

In this war Great Britain held Gibraltar, Suez, and Malta, but Axis-controlled Sicily in the center of the Mediterranean was a constant threat to Allied shipping. From Italian naval bases at Palermo, Syracuse and Catania, packs of German and Italian submarines, plus a few surface vessels, constantly harassed Allied ships carrying supplies for operations against the enemy in Egypt, Libya, Tripolitania, and Tunisia. Ships bearing cargoes destined for the Near, Middle, and Far East continually ran the gantlet of enemy air squadrons whose fields were on Sicily. Sicilian-based Axis bombers made little Malta a hell on earth-"the most bombed spot in the world"-at least up until the time the RAF and AAF intensified their pilgrimages to Berlin.

A lesser reason for the invasion of Sicily was economic. Despite its square miles of mountain "badlands," the island is fertile and its people primarily agricultural. Deprived of its possession the Axis aggressors would lose not only a large quantity of tribute in the form of agricultural products, levied annually against the populace, but also a certain amount of mineral resources and industrial products, a triple blow not necessarily crippling, but not helpful to the industries of Italy and Germany, battered as they were even then by the Allies' aerial blows.

It is only three miles across the Straits of Messina (where, according to Homer's Odyssey, the twin monsters Scylla and Charybdis jealously mount guard against unwary voyagers) to the Italian province of Calabria. The capture of Sicily would aid the Allies in gaining a literal "toehold" on the boot of Italy. Possession of Sicilian airfields would mean increased bombing of targets in southern Europe extended fighter range. When the nearest fighter bases were in Africa, long-range bombers of the MAAF were obliged to fly unescorted over long, dangerous round-trip missions and their casualty figures, reflected the need for fighter escort. Possession of the airfields was also vital to the eventual support and fighter protection of our landings on the Italian mainland.

Thus it was that the pre-dawn of July 10, 1943, found the 3d Infantry Division, powerfully reinforced, forcing its second assault beachhead in World War II, in the region of Licata, near the center of the south Sicilian coast.

We were traveling in excellent company. Several miles to the East in the vicinity of Gela the Ist U.S. Infantry Division established its foothold on the island. To the right of this force was a combat team of the 9th U.S. Infantry Division and the entire 45th U.S. Infantry Division. The latter division, shortly to prove itself a first-class assault formation, was previously untried in combat. Its mission was to drive inland and contact the left elements of the Eighth British Army that landed between Pozzalo, around Cape Passero, and northeast to Syracuse.

On the night of D-minus-one paratroopers of the 82d U.S. Airborne Division landed behind enemy lines. Their primary mission was to seize an enemy airfield, and then to destroy enemy communications and harass the enemy's attempts to move UP reinforcements. In its initial "jump in anger" many of the paratroopers were dropped in locations widely scattered from each other, bearing little resemblance to previously scheduled DZs (drop zones) because of faulty navigation on the part of the C-47 crews. Worse than this, however, was the tragic occurrence when the twenty-three fully loaded transports were shot down off the Gela area. Due to failure in coordination, a large flight of C-47s flew over friendly naval vessels that had just undergone a severe enemy air attack. The recognition code for the night of July 11- 12 was "red-red," two colors indistinguishable from the streams of upward-bound anti-aircraft tracer. The AA gunners, quite naturally assuming that another enemy bombing was in progress, turned the full force of their combined firepower on the low flying, lumbering '47s. Many of the paratroopers and plane crews never had a chance to escape the vicious welter of hot metal.

Principal military objectives of the 3d Infantry Division after clearing the beaches, were the port of Licata and the nearby airfield. Licata, a town of approximately 30,000 in normal times, lies near the center of the south Sicilian coast at the mouth of the Salso River. To the west, paralleling the coast is a long steep ridge, topped by Monte Sole. On the eastern end of the ridge is Castel Sant' Angelo, a relic of former days and a prominent landmark. (Future visitors in Rome, veterans of Sicily, were destined to wonder at the familiar ring to the name of the Eternal City's famous relic and tourist attraction, the Castel Sant' Angelo.) Except for this ridge the ground around Licata is flat or low and rolling for a radius of about six miles, with a few minor hills immediately to the northeast of town.

Surrounding the Licata plain is a ring of hills ranging in height from 1200 to 1600 feet. There are many rocky ridges and steep-walled ravines in these hills that favor the defense, but as later events showed, the enemy was never able to make full use of this peculiarity of terrain. The port itself is a small one, completely enclosed by three breakwaters. The airfield was an uncompleted strip about two miles Northwest of the town. This field had never been used by the enemy, but was a potential base for speedy development and exploitation.

The invasion convoy sailed in three echelons. The first echelon left Bizerte on July 6, and made a short stopover at Sousse, Tunisia. The fighting doughboys here got the chance to stretch their amphibious legs and to undergo a few limbering-up speed marches, after which they re-embarked. The medium speed convoy of LSTs and a slow convoy of LSTs composed the other two echelons, and set sail July 7. The three convoys took separate routes for purposes of deception, as well as for achieving a successful compromise between the varying speeds of the type of ship in each echelon. The final rendezvous was made on July 9, off Gozo Island, near Malta.

For a short time then, it seemed as though the gods of Fortune were leagued against the Allies. Perhaps the ancient deities of the Mediterranean were determined that the upstart mortals should at least taste of the type of weather which those all-powerful beings could invoke even over that notably calm, watery arena of age-old naval battles. For the sky clouded over, the wind commenced to blow, and the sea began acting as though it were en rapport with its mammoth sister to the west. The elements seemed bent on proving themselves "mightier than them all." The success of the entire operation hung by a thread. It seemed for a space as though the months of laboriously conceived work and planning might be entirely wasted, and more terrible yet it appeared the entire invasion convoy might enter battle under absolutely adverse and highly hazardous conditions to the jeopardy of thousands of lives. The brand-new landing craft were as yet untested. There was one thought paramount in the minds of every person aboard each of them: "Will they be able to withstand the fury of the storm?" Luckily they were.

An apocryphal story has been told in at least one place of Seventh Army Commander Patton's decisive conference with his meteorological officer.

"How long will this storm last?" asked the General.

"It will calm down by D-Day," replied the weatherman.

"It had better," replied the General.

Despite the unspoken promise contained in General Patton's words (or perhaps because of it) the weather miraculously reverted to its habitual calm just in the nick of time.

In the 3d Division fleet a masterstroke by Rear Admiral R. L. "Push-'em-in-closer" Conolly recovered the time lost by the LCTs in the storm. They were ordered to take a new and much shorter course, which they did, and the flotilla did not stop until it reached the Sicilian beaches-on time within seconds.

There were many seasick boys looking forward to seeing land by this time, even hostile land. Perhaps the reason for the untamed fury with which the 3d Division hit the Sicilian beaches can be traced partly to the fact the majority of soldiers were so damned sick that the prospect of hastening what seemed a lingering death was almost welcome. The thought that we were soon to be fighting against the very persons whose former aggressions had indirectly caused all this misery was almost certainly a strong contributing factor to the forbidding mood of the invaders. There was little mercy, and likewise a negligible quantity of thought, wasted over the coming doom of many Italian and German defenders.

The final estimate of enemy strength in Sicily that could be mustered against the Division at H-hour or thereafter included:

207th Coastal Division, in the Licata area;

26th (Arietta) Division, in the vicinity of Sciacca, 65 miles west of Licata;

4th (Livorno) Division, at Caltagirone;

54th (Napoli) Division believed near Catania;

26th (Aosta) Division, in the Marsala-Trapani area;

Army and Corps troops, mainly manning heavy guns around Caltanissetta, Campobello, Agrigento, and Porto Empedocle;

About 34,000 German troops known to be in the vicinity of Palermo, and on the major airfields.

Enemy air strength in Sicily and Italy was estimated at 945 modern-type combat planes, of which in late June only 552 were believed serviceable. In addition there were several hundred obsolete German and Italian planes of various designs.

From the foregoing estimates of enemy strength on land and in the air, it appeared that the defenders of Sicily could put up a stubborn fight. The type of fortifications and annotation of defenses seemed to justify the expectation on our part of a tenacious, all-out battle to get ashore and hold.

By 0135, July 10, the Division Headquarters Ship, USS Biscayne, had dropped anchor off the coast. It was safely and correctly assumed aboard the Biscayne that all other craft had reached their areas and were preparing to disembark the troops, since the units had been instructed to break radio silence and report only in case of emergency.

Just before 0200 heavy gun and antiaircraft fire was heard coming from the direction of Gela, where the 1st Division had met resistance. Despite a column of German tanks, which at a later hour actually drove between two regiments of the Ist, the division succeeded in repulsing the attack, to secure firmly its beachhead.

As the 3d Infantry Division was preparing to debark its troops, searchlights from Licata and the surrounding heights to the west suddenly blinked on, and their dazzling beams swept over the sea off Yellow and Blue Beaches. From the bridge of the Biscayne the craft in the transport areas stood out in dark, ominous relief.

Without warning four searchlights converged on the Biscayne. The ranking naval officer made a quick decision to open fire, but withheld execution of the order to confer with General Truscott. Outcome of this brief parley was the abeyance of fire until the enemy should open up in proof that the ship had been observed. Amazingly, the lights soon went off. It seems apparent that although the Biscayne had been caught in the cone of four powerful searchlights for ten minutes at a distance of only 7,000 yards it had not been seen. At least the shore batteries did not fire, and the landing operation went forward as planned.

At H minus 30 minutes units of the U. S. Navy shattered the fearful silence of the black morning, when the two cruisers, USS Brooklyn and Birmingham, protected by a part of the invasion fleet's destroyer force, steaming up and down the coastline, began a pre-arranged bombardment of enemy positions in a diversionary demonstration outside the assault area in the vicinity of Agrigento. After the assault waves of the division had landed, the cruisers mentioned stood off the assault area firing on call at pre-arranged targets, while the U. S. destroyers Buck, Ludlow, Roe, Swenson Edison, Woolsey, Wilkes and Nicholson, together with nineteen smaller British craft, curved shoreward, firing as they went, to destroy targets as requested by the infantry and cover its landing.

By 0340 reports began sifting in to the headquarters ship that flotillas were all in proper position and that small boats were off and away. This was followed by reports that small craft had landed and were returning. At 0440 a message was sent to General Patton to the effect that the first waves bad landed on Blue, Yellow and Red Beaches.

No word had been received from Green Beach. At 0500 the Division Artillery Air OP aboard an LST was contacted by radio and told to have a Cub plane stand by. Through a misunderstanding two Cubs took off from the improvised flight deck and were on the way inland by daylight. Shortly afterward one Cub observer reported that our troops could be seen climbing the hills back of Green Beach. For two hours these planes, piloted by 1st Lts. Oliver P. Soard and Julian W. Cummings, continued to spot enemy artillery positions and report progress of our troops.

Prior to the landing, seven areas were thoroughly analyzed for defenses. These included the four beaches, Blue, Yellow, Green, and Red, on which the landings actually were made. The entire width of the Division zone, including the all-important terrain to the flanks, had been subdivided for purposes of study and planning into seven parts, although not so designated by either number or color. Enemy static defenses consisted of beach obstacles, barbed wire, pillboxes, trenches, fortified blockhouses, and antitank ditches. Defending these were machine-gun positions, rifle pits, emplaced antiaircraft guns, and registered artillery batteries.

Only four battalions carried out the initial assault: one from each regiment and the 3d Ranger Battalion attached. The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, landed on the right over Beach Blue; 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, landed on Beach Yellow. The 3d Ranger Battalion went ashore at Beach Green, and Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, landed -on the left at Beach Red.

During this time, commencing shortly after 0100, enemy planes were over the flotillas, periodically discharging red flares. Brilliant yellow chandelier flares followed, but no other hostile action was taken at that time.

Greatest difficulty in landing was experienced by Lt. Col. Roy E. Moore's Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, where machine-gun and artillery fire were received for some time. The attackers began landing at 0400 and received no fire until they had crossed the beach and reached the foot of the bluff rising from it. Then the enemy opened fire. The men ran through gullies to the top of the bluff and within an hour had overcome resistance in the immediate beach area. Over this beach the Navy was able to claim one of a number of valuable assists. In one instance, naval gunners on an LCI slugged it out with a couple of enemy machine-gun nests above the beach and destroyed both of them. Then enemy 47mm guns on the left flank scored hits on two LCIs. Naval guns promptly got the range and silenced the enemy position. By 1000 7th Infantry had taken all its objectives.

The 3d Infantry Division Artillery also took part in the fight on Red Beach. By 0630, 10th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Kermit L. Davis, with the 62nd Armored FA Battalion and Battery A, 9th FA Battalion, had landed and gone into position from 500 to 1500 yards inland. Once set up, these guns fired on every target the observers could spot for them, including enemy mortars, infantry, an enemy gun battery, machine- gun nests, and an OP.

The 3d Ranger Battalion began disembarking on Green Beach at 0300, achieving tactical surprise. The men were able to cross the beach and pass through a wide band of defensive wire before the enemy was aware of the situation. When he opened fire the gun flashes gave away locations of the enemy weapons and the Rangers were easily able to subdue them.

Lt. Col. William N. Billings' 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, following the Rangers, landed without opposition, reorganized immediately and begun pushing eastward along the Monte Sole hill pass toward Licata. At 0735 a United States flag, carried specifically for that purpose, was raised over Castel Sane Angelo. Then, after the naval shelling of Licata, the 2d Battalion and other regimental units together with the Rangers approaching from the east entered and captured the town by 1130. The first major objective was taken.

The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Ashton H. Manhart, made its regiment's initial assault over Beach Yellow, commencing at 0345. The landing was not opposed until the boats actually beached; at which time the enemy opened fire with machine guns and small arms. The battalion quickly cleared the beach defenses, seized the spurs overlooking the beach, and then reorganized to move west. The battalion entered Licata at about 1130; at about the same time 2d Battalion and Rangers entered from the west and 1st Battalion from the north.

The 1st Battalion, commanded by Maj. Leslie A. Prichard, landed at 0445, pushed a mile inland to its assembly area, then advanced on its first objective, the high ground immediately northeast of Licata at 0600. The objective was reached at 0800 and at 0930 the battalion received orders to advance on Licata. One platoon, however, was detached to protect the undamaged bridges over the Salso River and the remainder of the battalion forded the Salso about two miles upstream from the town and moved on Licata from the north.

The assault group for Beach Blue-2d Battalion, 30th Infantry-began landing at 0330. Like the other assault waves this unit, commanded by Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard, achieved tactical surprise. The force, however, soon met rifle and machine-gun fire from pillboxes on the beach and artillery fire from a strongpoint cast of the beach. Prearranged naval gunfire soon neutralized this enemy artillery. The battalion, employing its 10-man antipillbox squads, cleared the beachhead in its sector and advanced against the enemy strongpoint at Poggio Lungo, which it occupied at 0845. Meanwhile, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 30th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Cols. Fred W. Sladen and Edgar C. Doleman, respectively, landed approximately on schedule and moved inland to take and hold their initial objectives.

The same held true for 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, under the command of Mal. Everett N. Duval, and 3d Battalion, 7th, commanded by Lt. Col. John A. Heintges.

All units received necessary field artillery support at the right time. With minor exceptions, all battalions of Division Artillery landed on schedule and went into position, firing where and when needed. In addition, Cannon Company, 30th Infantry, and Company 1, 66th Armored Regiment, both supporting the 30th's 2d Battalion, moved in and destroyed several enemy strongpoints.

Before evening the eight-by-fifteen-mile beachhead had been secured, and supplies and reinforcements were pouring in through the captured port of Licata. Aggressive reconnaissance already was being pushed to the front and flanks. Nearly 3000 prisoners, preponderantly Italian, were taken by the Division on D- Day

The next twelve days were to be hectic ones for the 3d Division. Under the influence of the personalities of two hell-for-leather generals, one the ex-cavalryman Truscott, the other the ex-tanker Patton, the Division was about to "carve itself a slice of Sicilian real estate" from Licata to the capital city, Palermo, on the north coast; a distance of over 120 miles.

On July 11, D-plus-one, two regimental combat teams, the 7th and 15th, each captured a town. The 7th took Palma di Montechiaro against uncertain Italian resistance, and the 15th, Campobello. By seizing Palma, the 7th forced the enemy to withdraw in the direction of Agrigento and also opened up another north-south highway for the Division.

In the fight for Campobello the 15th Infantry met the first organized German opposition in Sicily. The regiment broke through this resistance to take the town, destroying in the process two Italian 90mm self-propelled guns and an Italian light tank. Following seizure of Campobello the 15th contacted Combat Command A (CCA) of the 2d Armored Division at Naro and the 30th Infantry at Riesi.

Two spectacular actions took place on July 11; one credited to the 30th Infantry, the other to an officer of the 15th Infantry. The 30th was holding its original position after the landing, but was concentrated and alerted for movement, when a patrol was sent out with the mission of contacting Headquarters, 11 Corps at Gela. This group, consisting of one rifle platoon, a platoon of medium tanks, and two platoons of the regimental Cannon Company, set out eastward along the coastal road.

En route the patrol fought its way through three enemy positions, taking 400 prisoners. The patrol leader, Maj. Lynn D. Fargo, contacted General Patton, commanding the Seventh Army, at Gela at 1430 and began the return trip. On the way back the patrol reduced another enemy strongpoint and captured an additional 153 prisoners.

It was the same day, July 11, that 2nd Lt. Robert Craig, a member of the 15th Infantry, performed the action for which he was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. It was at Favarotta that Lieutenant Craig's company was blocked by fire from a concealed gun. With the aid of Cpl. James Hill, Craig located the gun and crawled to within thirty-five yards of the emplacement before the enemy saw him. The lieutenant shouted for Hill to cover him, while he ran head on through the machine-gun fire until he reached the gun, whose three-man crew he killed with his carbine. This allowed the company to continue the advance. Later in the day Craig and his platoon found themselves on a slope on which there was no cover, ambushed by a large group of Germans. Craig ordered his men to withdraw to the cover of the hill crest while he himself charged forward about seventy-five yards, and opened fire. He killed five enemy and wounded three more before he fell under the concentrated fire of an estimated one hundred enemy guns.

By midnight of July 12 the entire Division and attached units* had completely reorganized and was systematically enlarging the beachhead. Units boldly moved forward, capturing several towns and establishing strong contact in all sectors. The 7th Infantry had contacted CCA near Naro; 15th Infantry had captured Ravenusa and ' Sommatino; the 3d Battalion 30th Infantry had taken Riesi, and the regiment minus 3d Battalion occupied Naro. CCA took Delia and Canicatti. In the action around Naro the 30th Regiment destroyed and' captured four 40mm AT guns and considerable small arms and equipment.

Two other accomplishments had been marked up by midnight of D-plus-two. The first LCIs that had landed were back again, this time with material and follow-up troops, and men of the 815th Aviation Engineer Battalion had begun work on the uncompleted German landing strip outside of Licata.

The following day, July 13, saw the beginning of one of the many spectacular moves of the 3d Infantry Division in Sicily. General Patton told General Truscott that he did not desire a major effort made at this time to capture Agrigento, but that he had no objection to a "reconnaissance in force." To this reconnaissance mission, then, General Truscott committed the 7th Infantry Regiment, with the reservation that it was not to become involved in a battle from which it could not be readily withdrawn.

The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 7th occupied high ground east of the Naro River and patrolled to the front while the other battalion remained in assembly northwest of Palma di Montechiaro. The advance was begun on July 16, with 2d Battalion moving around to the north of Agrigento and 1st Battalion attacking directly to the west, crossing the Naro River north of the main highway. At 1430 3d Battalion entered the scrap, attacking west along the highway toward Porto Empedocle.

Although communications between 2d and 3d Battalions were sketchy and out completely much of the time, the gamble succeeded largely because of the speed and daring of the maneuver. The appearance of 2d Battalion on the high ground north of Agrigento took the defenders by surprise and 3d Battalion met little opposition in its rapid advance west along the highway.

The 3d Ranger Battalion, which had moved out ahead of 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was able to circle Agrigento on the northeast and enter Porto Empedocle at 1900 against little opposition en route. The 3d Battalion, 7th, however had been in Porto Empedocle since 1430, entering the town from along Highway 115.

The 1st Battalion advanced directly into Agrigento from the east, overcoming scattered strongpoints and engaging in some street fighting. The city was captured and outposted by 0300 July 17.

While success of the maneuver was in great measure due to the audacity of its planning and the speed and endurance of the infantry, credit is also due to the attached artillery units who worked with 7th Infantry during the time. For at 1410, July 16, artillery observers moving by motor toward Agrigento spotted large enemy reinforcements. Guns of the 10th Field, 58th and 65th Armored FA Battalions, and 77th FA Regiment caught the convoy coming down from Aragona and when the shooting stopped it was apparent that the convoy had been broken up with an estimated loss of fifty vehicles and at a cost to the enemy of about a hundred killed and wounded.

The capture of Agrigento gave the Division about 6000 prisoners and the most important city in that part of southern Sicily, plus the port of Empedocle. It also cost the enemy besides human casualties, many destroyed transports and guns, about fifty assorted field pieces and a hundred vehicles captured.

During the fight for Agrigento another member of the Division, 1st Lt. David C. Waybur of the 3d Reconnaissance Troop, performed the action for which he was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, marking up the second of two such caliber deeds within one week. While leading a three vehicle patrol on a volunteer mission to contact an isolated unit of Rangers, Waybur found himself and his group waylaid at night by four Italian light tanks. Men of the patrol immediately opened fire with their machine guns, despite the fact they were combating armor, and soon most of them were wounded. Waybur, himself severely hit, took up a tommy gun and, standing but a few yards from the leading tank and in its direct line of fire in bright moonlight, opened up. By firing through the ports he killed two of the crew. The driverless tank veered erratically and toppled over into a creek bed. The patrol remained in position all night. Just before reinforcements arrived, the tanks withdrew.

Between the capture of Agrigento on July 17 and 1800 July 18 when Joss Force, which was the 3d Infantry Division reinforced, was dissolved, the Division and its attachments also captured Serradifalco, San Cataldo, and Raffadali. As a result of the breaking up of Joss Force on the 18th the Division reverted to its normal combat strength, plus a tabor (about a battalion) of Moroccan Goumiers. At the same time Joss Force was dissolved the Division was incorporated into Provisional Corps.

The first order from Provisional Corps directed the advance on Palermo. For battalions of the 3d, taking a short rest following the quick slashes northwest from Licata in the harrowing heat, it was a dramatic announcement that was relayed to them from General Truscott: "I want you to be in Palermo in five days."

Palermo! The city was over one hundred miles by chokingly dusty road, under the fiery Sicilian sun, with water scarce and hard to supply rapidly moving battalions.

Nevertheless the Division prepared for a most spectacular move; the breathtaking dash across Sicily to capture the island's capital and leading city ... a race then unprecedented by foot soldiers in either of two World Wars, and comparable only in relatively modern war to several of the rapid cleavages of Sherman or Stuart in the Civil War. At that, Stuart at least had moved on horseback. This was a rugged hundred miles even if traversed strictly by road, that was scheduled to feel the tramp of doughboy brogans every foot of the way.

Plan of the general advance was simple in itself but, because of the speed, offered tremendous difficulties in the way of supply, communications and artillery support.

With the 7th Infantry in Division reserve, the first phase of the drive to Palermo was borne by the 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments and 3d Ranger Battalion. The 15th advanced north of Aragona toward Casteltermini, meeting scattered resistance and some artillery fire. South of Casteltermini demolitions in the form of blown bridges and tunnels impeded the advance, but not for long.

The 30th moved forward from Aragona toward San Stefano Quisquina, also encountering demolitions. One of these was particularly difficult; the enemy had blown a section of a road along a cliff just south of the Platani River, necessitating hard work by Lt. Col. Leonard L. Bingham's 10th Engineer Battalion to make the route passable for jeeps. Despite the magnitude of the job, by midnight jeeps of the regiment had passed the obstacle.

Moving northwest from Raffadali toward Cattolica the Rangers met no resistance and continued on toward Calamonica where they outposted the left flank of the Division. During the day they also made and maintained contact with the 82d Airborne Division, operating on the 3d's left.

Next day, the 20th, 15th Infantry continued the advance on the right, passing through Casteltermini and Castronuovo and occupying the area just southwest of Lercara Friddi, where it covered the assembly of the 7th Infantry. Resistance again was light, taking the form mainly of armored vehicles, artillery, and mines. Many prisoners were captured and much equipment was taken.

The 30th Infantry captured San Stefano Quisquina, but had a fight doing it.

At 2215, July 19, Colonel Rogers, on orders of General Truscott, ordered his 3d Battalion to move cross-country and seize high ground northeast of town. No roads existed, therefore during the marching over mountainous terrain the battalion was unable to receive rations or additional water for July 20 (a situation which later became familiar along the island's north coast). The battalion set a record for marching that perhaps still stands for World War 11: 54 miles in 33 hours, cross-country, to reach the assembly area for the attack on San Stefano Quisquina at 0945, July 20.

Commencing at 0500, July 20, 1st Battalion moved cross-country west of Highway 118 to attack the west side of San Stefano, and 2d Battalion moved along Highway 118 in regimental reserve to an approach south of the city. The 41st Field Artillery Battalion, regimental Antitank and Cannon Companies, and attached artillery moved by bounds from the vicinity of the road north of the stream crossing of the Platani River to positions from which they were prepared to support the attack of infantry battalions on San Stefano.

At 1130, 3d Battalion, having overcome intermittent resistance, reached the east outskirts of San Stefano to encounter strong resistance, including machine-gun and artillery fire. The heights were, immediately attacked, but progress was slow until a coordinated attack was launched from the west.

Meanwhile the motorized advance guard of the regiment, consisting of a platoon of the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, 2d Armd Division, led by Lt. James Fontone, a platoon of the 3d Reconnaissance Troop under 1st Lt. William Gunter, and the 30th Regimental I & R Platoon commanded by 2d Lt. Samuel W. Riley, had by-passed blown-out bridges and skirted minefields to reach a position a hundred yards from San Stefano.

At about 1200 Colonel Rogers joined Lieutenant Riley and four men of his platoon at the I & R observation post which was located 700 yards from an Italian roadblock position before the city. Here he discovered two enemy batteries going into position to fire on our approaching infantry when they came within range. Organizing a fire unit from his reconnaissance elements, consisting of three 37mm guns, one 75mm gun, three 60mm mortars, one 81mm mortar, five .50-caliber machine guns, four .30- caliber machine guns and fifteen riflemen, Colonel Rogers ordered them to open fire at the maximum rate. The sudden hail of -fire achieved complete surprise. The gunners abandoned their pieces without firing a shot, as did the gunners of thirty-two machine guns, all of them making off toward San Stefano, several hundred yards to the rear. Pressure on the 3d Battalion on the right was relieved. Rogers ordered 1st Battalion to attack east of Highway 18.

The 1st Battalion drove toward the southern entrance of the city, assisting 3d Battalion in its difficult task of clearing the eastern slopes of the mountains which bordered San Stefano.

Once again under the personal direction of the 30th regimental commander, the 41st Field Artillery Battalion, with one battery initially, and subsequently with the entire battalion, placed heavy concentrations on the highway north of the city, preventing the escape of enemy personnel and transportation. Regimental Antitank Company also placed direct 57mm fire on retreating vehicles, and Company D laid 81mm mortar fire to the same effect. The intense fire destroyed numerous enemy vehicles and trapped at least a hundred pieces of transportation. The better vehicles captured in this haul were used by the 30th to speed movement of the regiment northward.

Immediately following this action the hard-pressing reconnaissance and battalion elements rounded up at least 750 prisoners.

The coordinated attack on San Stefano had begun at 1330 and continued throughout the afternoon. The city was entered by 3d Battalion at about 1700, followed by Ist Battalion.

The 2d Battalion, which had reached the southern city outskirts at about 1600, was ordered to prepare to push on to Prizzi, while 1st and 3d Battalions were to hold positions on the mountains north, northeast and northwest of San Stefano. The 41st Field Artillery Battalion, in position south of the city, commenced registering on all routes leading north from it.

Next day the 7th Infantry led the advance on the Sicilian capital. Attacking west from Castronuovo at 0555 with two battalions abreast, the regiment captured Prizzi and seized the high ridge beyond it by 0930, taking 500 prisoners in this area. The battalions then reorganized and continued the advance to the north, the 3d moving on Corleone at 1400 followed by the 1st at 1500. The 2d Battalion, which had left its area near Raffadali at 0130, arrived in the assembly area beyond Castronuovo and after being held in trucks as a mobile reserve, then moved on to Prizzi. At 1840 3d Battalion entered the town of Corleone, most important city between Agrigento and Palermo, and by 2100 the entire regiment was concentrated north of Corleone. At 2200 the 2d Battalion had moved forward by truck, detrucked just north of the town and then begun an advance toward Marineo.

The 15th Infantry, with the 4th Tabor of Goumiers attached, followed in the trace of 7th Infantry, one battalion passing through the 7th and starting up the secondary road which runs through Piana del Gresi toward Palermo.

At 1017 30th Infantry sent Company F (reinforced) north and west to Roccamena with the mission of securing the high ground in that vicinity and protecting the Division's left flank. The remainder of the regiment, with two battalions of field artillery in addition Ito the 41st Field, 65th Armored Field, and the 1st Battalion, 77th Field, was ordered to move to Roccamena to await further orders.

The regiment moved as ordered but a change in the plan was caused by an order from Provisional Corps changing the left boundary of the Division. The regiment was ordered to concentrate in an area about two miles south of Corleone, leaving Company F, reinforced, at Roccamena. This order necessitated a retracing of the line of march of 2d Battalion, which had been in the lead, from a position eight miles north of Campoflorita to the new area south of Corleone.

July 22 was one of the great days for the 7th Infantry, commanded throughout the Sicilian campaign by Col. Harry B. Sherman. By 0300 2d Battalion had reached a point two miles southwest of Marineo, meeting very light resistance. At the same time the Division field order was issued for the advance on Palermo.

The 1st Battalion entrucked and passed through 2d Battalion just north of Marineo. The 3d Battalion entrucked at Corleone at 1115 and after detrucking passed through 1st Battalion at Misilmeri at 1300. Supporting artillery, the 10th, 65th and 77th Field, moved forward also to support the attack.

At Misilmeri 1st Battalion moved northwest across the mountains in order to enter the Palermo plain from the south. Some resistance was encountered and sixty German port troops were taken prisoner. At 1445 orders were received from General Patton that no troops other than patrols were to pass the line extending from Villabate through Belmonte to Monreale until further orders. The 7th Infantry, having sent motor patrols into the city at 1400, occupied posisitions along this line, prepared to move forward on order. At 1900 civilians representing the people of Palermo offered the surrender of the *city to Brig. Gen. William W. Eagles, assistant division commander. At 2030 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was sent into the city to guard important installations.

The entire phase just concluded was well summed up by Will Lang in Life Magazine:*

. . . The "Truscott Trot," as his men dubbed their grueling pace, proved more prescient than sadistic once the 3d Division had landed at Licata in Sicily. There followed an operation which is already classic in military annals for speed and success. After seven days' fighting the, division captured Agrigento . . . and five days after that its patrols entered Palermo, fully 100 miles to the north. The bulk of this latter distance was covered by all three regiments in three days. On the 14th day the Division rested after having slyly gained for Truscott one of his most memorable firsts-the entry into Palermo.

As the various American forces approached Palermo, Patton defined a "blue phase line" just four miles short of the city beyond which no infantry excepting patrols, were to go. Patton's tanks had been chosen to make the victorious entry into the island's capital. This they did, with banners flying and cameras grinding. But inside the city they found the 3d Division's Lt. Col. John Heintges and his entire battalion quietly patrolling the streets...

While 7th Infantry was busily herding thousands of Italian and German prisoners together, the other two regiments were mopping up pockets of enemy resistance. The 15th Infantry, following in the wake of the 7th, reached the Seventh Army limiting line and was on the heights overlooking Palermo at 1445. Light resistance encountered north of Piana dei Greci was neutralized by the regiment's Cannon Company and attached artillery.

At 1400 the same day 30th Infantry had moved out from its area south of Corleone, following in the route of the 7th. The regiment concentrated just south of Misilmeri where it was prepared to move on short notice to any point desired by higher headquarters. The race to Palermo was over and the Division was allowed to rest for a few days before resuming pursuit of the faltering but still strong German and Italian armies.

Second Phase

By the time 3d Division captured Palermo, 2d Armored Division had cleaned up all of western Sicily west of the 3d's boundary. 11 Corps had moved north, east of the 3d, so that its front extended on a line from Monternaggiore through Petralia to Nicosia. Over in the eastern part of the island the British Eighth Army was fighting on a front from south of Nicosia through Catenanuova to just south of Catania. The stage was set to push east along the north coast to Messina. The United States 45th Infantry Division was chosen to lead the advance while the 3d Division enjoyed a well earned rest.

The 45th pushed off but met heavy resistance and by the time the division got to San Stefano di Camastra, on the north coast road, it was decided that the 3d would relieve it. The relief began July 31.

The weather by this time, if it were possible, had grown hotter. At the peak of the day, around 1100, temperatures soared to between 100 and 110 F. It was muggy, sticky. The sun dawned each morning in an absolutely flawless blue sky, and before it was well into the zenith, men began sweating and cursing its relentless, burning rays. Not a breath of air stirred but that it was hotter than the normal motionless air and felt as though it had been piped through a blast furnace.

The single ribbon of road leading along the north coast of the island between Palermo and Messina was often as not thoroughly chewed up, cratered, and mined. On either side the broad shoulders were covered with finely ground dust which rose to treetop height under the churning treads of the constant two-way traffic of supply vehicles and ambulances.

Water, which until Palermo had been scarce, was now to become more precious as relief for alkaline throats than the finest of aged beverages. It was a common sight to approach large groups of men clustered around a small pipe cemented into the side of a rocky cliffside, from which a small trickle of cold water flowed. These men would edge their way in in the at tempt to fill their canteens, then double-time for several hundred yards to arrive, soaked with perspiration and covered with a film of dust, back in place in their rapidly-marching columns. Foresighted soldiers carried as many as four canteens, often one or two U. S. style, with possibly Italian or German models which had larger capacities.

It was a case of sanitation be damned. The drinking of unchlorinated spring water was at no time officially condoned. All men knew they were supposed to dissolve halazone tablets into unpurified water before drinking it, but it was hard to tell that to thousands of soldiers, constantly thirsty, when water points were so few and far between. More than once it became literally a life-and- death matter to various forces isolated on forbidding heights, to get water. That the barest minimum necessary to sustenance was achieved is a tribute to many anonymous men, stout-hearted and strong of back, who carried five-gallon cans over heartbreakingly steep, rugged slopes; to the persistence of the men of the 3d Provisional Pack Train who led their mules as far as those agile animals could go, and then carried the precious cans the remainder of the way on their backs. It was also a commentary on human nature that men, deprived of water in inaccessible places, yet knowing the enemy ahead controlled watering spots, would fight like supercharged demons, preferring-if it became a matter of hard choice-to stop a piece of flying metal than to die agonizingly with their throats choking for moisture.

The single road was generally quite narrow. It wound between sea and mountain. At times the north side of the road edged gently into flat ground, covered with olive trees, to slope gently to the water's edge. The opposite side might ascend gently into higher ground, then rise abruptly to lofty peaks. Along the greater part of the route however, the terrain was sharply defined, and on one side sheer hundred-foot drops to rock-lined surf confronted the unwary driver, while on the island's side great, towering rock cliffs, presenting few toeholds, jutted toward the sky. In such places the road was carved from the mountainside itself.

On the maps each projection of terrain is referred to "is a "hill," in many cases probably the cartographers' little joke. To the men who had to climb them the humor was salted with plenty of sweat.

Is it any wonder then that an enemy who, with the exception of a couple of notable battles, was fighting a delaying action could defend with such relative ease, deploy a minimum number of men, and still make the fight of the 3d Infantry Division as harrowing as any fought anywhere? It is to the everlasting credit of the doughboys that the ninety miles from San Stefano di Camastra to Messina was covered in seventeen days following completion of the relief.

The 30th Infantry led the advance initially along the north coast. The Ist Battalion detrucked in the San Stefano di Camastra area at 1115, July 31, and marched south to Reitano where it contacted the 179th Infantry of the 45th Division. The 2d Battalion completed detrucking at 1315 and moved east along Highway 113 toward San Stefano, effecting contact with the 157th Infantry of the 45th Division one and one-half miles West of the town.

At the riverbed just west of the town a blown bridge and mines were encountered and at this point the battalion left the road and moved to positions about 4,000 yards southeast of San Stefano. All that night the 10th Engineers, supervised by Colonel Rogers, worked to ready the by-pass to enable the Division timetable to be met. A combat and reconnaissance patrol entered San Stefano and proceeded two miles east, meeting no enemy activity other than sporadic artillery fire. By 2130 the battalion had moved along steep mountain trails to a point six miles southeast of San Stefano.

The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, detrucked at 1505 and remained in an assembly area near the detrucking point, moving east at 2100. Company C, 10th Engineer Battalion, moved immediately from the detrucking area and began the repair of by-passes in the San Stefano area.

The 15th Infantry, meanwhile, had gone into bivouac in the area just east of Castel di Tusa and prepared to move on to the east. By midnight of August I the entire Division was concentrated in the San Stefano area, poised to begin its relentless drive to the east. Effecting this concentration was not an easy matter. The highway and bridge situations already mentioned were bad in that they hindered the orderly relief of the 45th Division. Order was soon formed from seeming chaos, however, and the Division began its attack hampered only by Germans, heat, and miserable communications caused by the one, lone road.

At 0500, August 2, 30th Infantry attacked to the east over steep cliffs and extremely rugged terrain. Its mission was to seize the bridge west of Caronia, to capture the town itself, and to cut the road east of the town. The 41st FA Battalion supported the attack. The 1st Battalion reached its objective by 0900 and sent a patrol to the northeast of Highway 113 and thence back through Caronia. The 2d Battalion attacked from its position to seize the high ground just south of Caronia, arriving at its objective by 1500, although advance patrols- entered the town at 1430. The 3d Battalion moved down the highway and advanced to the east along it.

The 3d Battalion seized the bridge and Company L entered the town at 1215. The enemy reaction was violent, and took the form of copious artillery and mortar fire, long-range machine-gun fire and treacherous minefields. 'This was the first German resistance of any nature met by the 30th Infantry since landing overseas. From 1000 to 1030, and then intermittently until 1100, the regimental command post, but 800 yards behind 3d Battalion, underwent an intensive enemy artillery concentration, which resulted in two killed and eleven wounded. General Truscott was there to "sweat it out ' " and among the casualties was Lt. Col. Lionel C. McGarr, executive officer, who was seriously wounded by a mine explosion while he was en route to Caronia.

Blown bridges hindered moving up organic transportation. Mortar, artillery, and machine-gun fire inflicted approximately forty casualties in the 3d Battalion as it assaulted Caronia across rugged, shrubcovered terrain.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, now moved out along the coast road to the vicinity of Caronia, followed by the remainder of the regiment. Progress was extremely slow because of the numerous blown bridges, minefields, and the slow movement of the troops in front.

The 2d Battalion moved through the 30th Infantry at 1545 and continued east along Highway 113. Foot troops were able to by-pass the blown and mined bridges but the vehicles had to wait until the engineers constructed by- passes. The 2d Battalion reached its objective at 2345 and patrols were sent forward to the east. The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, passed through the 30th Infantry at 1730 and started cross-country at 1845 to a position two miles west of San Fratello. The first of the two bloodiest battles on the north coast of Sicily was about to begin. Again, however, during this day resistance mainly took the shape of enemy mine-fields.

Sergeant Jack Foisie, Stars and Stripes correspondent, graphically described this "minefield resistance."

You march in extended order and you keep looking for snipers in the hills, and mines under your feet. Your eyes soon get tired from looking but you keep on looking first at the hills and then the road.

A jeep passes you by; it Is the first vehicle through the by-pass and you think it is going to get into town before you. You curse the mobility of the army.

The jeep enters a tunnel and there is a muffled explosion. The medics start to run down to the tunnel and someone says, "Yeh, you'd better let me go first" and an engineer with a mine detector begins sweeping a path for them. You are suddenly glad you are an infantry man-but only for a minute...

On the bend in the road are what look like small. shell craters in the asphalt surface. You wonder who did the nice shooting, and then a smart sergeant says, "watch out for those soft spots, they're antitank mines." Sure enough, an engineer comes along and probes with a bayonet and it strikes metal.

"Take it easy, Joe," says the' guy who's working with him, "those things are touchy." The two get down on their knees around the mine and from a few yards off, it looks like they're shooting craps. If you're' a damn fool you come closer and, looking over their shoulders, you see them dig out the dirt around the mine and then work their hands under the mine to see if it's boobied, that is, if it will explode when lifted up. Satisfied, the engineer called Joe lifts out the German Teller mine and the other guy unscrews the caps and defuses it. "Now it's completely harmless," says Joe, and he lays it down very carefully way off the road. There is a pile of these Teller mines; they look just like an oversize discus.

You've been walking over an hour now and the white lines of salt begin to appear on your sweat-soaked shirt. Your canteen is still half-full but the water is more than lukewarm. There is a spout of cool mountain water emptying into a cement basin in the shade of a grove of bigleafed trees. "How about a ten-minute break?" Okay, but you'd better jump from the asphalt to the bank; those shoulders are always mined.

So you leap over the soft shoulder and land on the bank; you lean back and relax. The weight of the pack leaves your shoulders. The grass is cool and soft. You stretch out flat-and that saves your life. The guy who had been marching out in front of you, the fellow carrying a Browning Automatic Rifle-had been the first to refill his canteen from that spout of cool water, and the first to find that the Germans had put a ring of S-mines around the foot of the basin.

Part 2---Home