You are tempted to take to the railroad tracks which go straight across into town but then you remember the jeep in the tunnel ... It is decided to reconnoiter the roadblock at the entrance to the bridge. Two men are selected and you are not one of them. A halt is called while they go ahead.... One of the two scouts comes running back.

"Mines. All around the bridge. A patrol from another company coming down from the hills ran into them. Got quite a few. They need a doctor," the scout reports.

"Doctor up front! Pass the word back!" orders the point commander. The word is passed back: "Doctor up front!" There is more talk on a walkie-talkie; it is decided to try and get the doc through; the engineers will be up shortly but there is no time.

You reach the other bank and there above you on the ledge is an Italian civilian, all smiles and a mixture of languages. He is wearing sandals made out of rubber tires. Naturally, he announces right off that he lived twenty-three years in Brooklyn-they all have, it seems.

"Okay, Joe, tell us about that later. What we want to know, can you lead us around that minefield?"

He leads you along the bank until you come onto the wounded and the dead about fifty yards in front of you. You were taking the same path that these men had taken..

The file backs tip. This time the Italian who had once lived in Brooklyn is ordered to take us up over the ridge and then swing around to the road. The old man explains that he is very old and cannot make the hill. There is nothing to do but go on without a guide. Shoot the old man, you say. No, remember that he was in the lead and would have been the first one to go. Blame it on the fumblings of an old man's mind.

You climb the terraced ridge and turn toward the road. Your eyes are glued to that soil. You follow in the exact footsteps of the man in front of you. The man in the lead -perhaps he follows in the footsteps of God. Every snap of a twig, each rattle of a pebble, makes you twitch and shiver. If you think at all it is perhaps about what you said in your last letter home.

The leader reaches the bank overlooking the road. He jumps and lands on the firm asphalt surface. He is safe. The next one jumps. He is safe. Each one jumps and is safe. You jump and you are safe.

The doctor walks in the middle of the road down to the bridge. There is a cart at the end of the bridge. It was touching this cart that set off the first of the mines. The doctor goes to work.

Monte San Fratello is a 2200-foot peak standing on the east bank of the Furiano River, close to the Mediterranean. A saddle joins it to higher ridges to the south and in the saddle lies the village of San Fratello. A road winds up the western side of the mountain from the coastal highway to the village and continues on south. A short distance inland from the village the Furiano forks, forming two deep gorges with a lofty, steep-sloped nose standing between the branches.

The crest of Monte San Fratello is a high, rocky escarpment and the western slope is irregular, with many hummocks and draws. The Germans occupied dug-in positions east of the river. In addition they had thickly sown the bed of the Furiano with "S" and Teller mines and had demolished the bridge which carried the main highway across the river.

The problem thus facing the Division was by no means easy. The Germans were in position to make a strong bid to stop the advance of the 3d and these Germans were not ready to start running again. It was up to the Division to outmaneuver and outfight them.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, following a terrific two-and- one-half hour artillery barrage beginning at 0830 August 3, advanced along Highway 113 until it reached the west bank of the Furiano River where it encountered strong opposition. It reorganized and attempted to continue the attack but was halted by heavy artillery, machine-gun, and mortar fire from the east of the river and minefields in the river bed.

During the evening of the same day the Ist Battalion moved up on the south flank of the 2d Battalion and 3d Battalion advanced cross-country to positions west of San Fratello, well south of 1st Battalion.

The advance of the 3d Battalion was slow and grueling. During the long march, exhausted soldiers plodded on across deep gorges and over mountain trails so precipitous, that the mules bearing rations and ammunition were often unable to negotiate the steep ascent, lost footing and tumbled to their death hundreds of feet below. The 3d Battalion skirted two enemy minefields to find the enemy in the mountainous terrain and carry the battle to him. Ammunition, food and water supply was precariously low. Yet the advance on Hill 673 continued.

Patrols went out and preparations were made to continue the attack in the morning.

At 0600 the Ist and 2d Battalions attacked again; again they were halted. The 2d then changed direction of advance, made a lunge toward the right, but got only to the east side of the river bed when heavy enemy fire drove it back. The 1st Battalion tried several times to cross the river at a more southern point but was driven back each time.

At this point General Truscott ordered a coordinated attack on San Fratello and patrols spent the night of August 4-5 vigorously probing enemy defenses to obtain additional information concerning their strength and locations.

The 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments attacked at 0600 the following morning, the 30th minus its own 2d Battalion but reinforced by the 3d Battalion of the 15th. Moving from a line of departure that ran along the ridge from Di Nicoletta to Santa Maria, the Ist Battalion of the 30th was taken under terrific enemy artillery and mortar fire that lasted for an hour. The battalion withdrew with heavy losses.

The entire attack was destined to the same fate-every step toward the objective was made at high cost. The advance down on our slope, the crossing of the river bed, the advance up the enemy slope, offered nothing' but obstacles and clear enemy observation.

Even mule packs had difficulty negotiating the hills and maintenance of communications proved almost impossible, although mounted messengers furnished by the Provisional Horse Cavalry Troop were indispensable aids.

The terrain was so rough that it took five hours for the 3d Battalion of the 30th to reach the 3d Battalion of the 15th, which had moved secretly into positions on the Santa Maria ridge prior to the attack. Contact with our own units which were not over 1,000 yards away was frequently broken.

Like that of the 30th the advance of the 15th, which was veiled in a heavy smokescreen laid down by our artillery and Chemical Battalion, was extremely slow.

After an all-day fight that at times was disheartening, the 15th minus the 3d Battalion, which was still attached to the 30th, had reached only half way up the ridge when it was ordered to hold its positions till dark and withdraw back across the river. The 2d Battalion of the 7th aided in this withdrawal, which was completed under cover of darkness.

The coordinated attack had hardly punctured the enemy positions during the whole day and after reorganization the units were set to continue the mission the following day, August 6. The 7th Infantry, which had been held in readiness near Caronia also was to move forward with the mission of passing through the 15th, crossing the Furiano and pushing east along Highway No. 113 toward the sea.

The 7th struck early in the morning, by-passed the San Fratello action and reached Acquedolci at 0753. By Il 15, the regiment was in Sant' Agata and an hour later had made contact with the 2d Battalion of the 30th, which had made a successful amphibious landing three miles east of Sant' Agata.

The San Fratello objective fell during a night assault.

At 1830, one platoon of Company C, 30th Infantry, attacked with the mission of clearing out machine-gun and mortar fire which had retarded previous advances. Company D covered the platoon with machine-gun and mortar fire but suffered heavily from an enemy artillery and mortar concentration. The platoon, though badly disorganized, continued on and succeeded in reaching the top of the hill just south of San Fratello.

The 3d Battalions of both the 30th and 15th encountered stiff resistance at Hill 673 but had fought their way nearly to the crest at daybreak, when it was discovered that part of the ground was exposed to enemy enfilade fire from a ridge to the south and most of the men had to be shifted to other positions.

Company I of the 30th however, commanded by 1st Lt* George K. Butler, continued the attack toward San Fratello but was stopped by artillery, machine-gun and cannon fire from tanks in San Fratello. The company held its position all day while the rest of the 3d Battalion was reorganizing.

At 1930, the 3d Battalion struck again, with Company L in the assault, supported by Company K and an 81mm mortar platoon from the 15th Infantry. The hitherto indomitable enemy defense finally cracked and at 2330 Hill 673 was captured by Company L. A fierce counterattack was repelled, adding considerably to the already high total of casualties that the enemy had suffered.

It was the weary 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry which was hardest hit by the enemy counterattack. For more than 45 minutes it was subject to a violent TOTartillery concentration, after which it met the several waves of counter-attacking enemy, committing all service troops in the attempt to stop the on-rushing foe.

A large number of machine guns and mortars were also destroyed and captured during the two-day engagement. Company L, leading 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, entered San Fratello proper at 0800. Moving from there to Monte Fratello, the battalion took 500 prisoners.

The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry was committed to attack another hill mass, which they stormed under a protecting mortar concentration and seized. It then descended on San Fratello in the valley and in houseto- house fighting, fought through the town to contact elements of Co. L, 30th Infantry.

For its action from 3-8 August, the 3d Battalion 15th Infantry was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation.

The crossing of the Furiano, the struggles in the high hills and finally the seizure of the San Fratello ridge were the bitterest operations the Division had encountered since Licata.

During the night of August 7, while the rest of the regiment was making its successful attack against San Fratello by land, the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, with tanks ' armored 'artillery and other attachments, loaded into several landing craft and early on the morning of August 8 made a successful, almost unopposed landing near Sant' Agata, a 'short distance east of San Fratello on the north coast.

Certain passages from a story by Foisie in the Stars & Stripes help to tell of the results attained by this "minor" amphibious landing:

We landed seven miles behind the enemy lines at 0300 hours Sunday morning.

Our mission was to fight our way through the beach defenses to a high tableland a mile inland, there to cut the coastal highway leading to Sant' Agata and isolate the entrenched Germans holding up the American advance along the north Sicilian coast. Alone and without hope of reinforcements we were for twenty-four hours to hold off the bulk of the Axis forces to the east, at the same time keeping the net tightly closed around the enemy caught between us and the main lines.

"It is the chance that few outfits get, so let's cut the rug and knock them all the way back to Messina," were the final words of the raider commander, Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard.

Five hours after the first assault boat had touched sand we were firmly entrenched in the hills, had smeared all German traffic going in either direction. By noon the town of Sant' Agata had fallen. At 1241 hours, contact was established with the advanced elements of the main American forces, ahead of schedule.

The unparalleled success of the daring knifelike thrust at the enemy's rear resulted in the complete collapse of their strong defense line on the 2200 ridge east of Sant' Agata and sent them reeling back without being able to depend upon minefields and other Nazi tricks for delaying action. . . .

There was virtually no opposition to the landing but the battalion was later counterattacked strongly by the enemy, supported by machine guns and artillery. All positions were held. As a result of this landing' 250 enemy were killed, one hundred were captured, four tanks were disabled and fourteen trucks and four motorcycles were destroyed.

The 7th Infantry passed through the 15th Infantry about daylight August 8 and advanced along the coastal road meeting little opposition. The enemy, yielding to heavy pressure from south of San Fratello, and disorganized by the landing of 30th Infantry's 2d Battalion in his rear, had withdrawn from all his forward positions and could not offer further effective delaying action here. Contact between 7th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, was made at 1236 August 8 and a gain of more than twelve miles was the second important result of this audacious operation.

From Sant' Agata the attack was pressed vigorously by 7th Infantry along the coast with 15th Infantry moving up and attacking cross-country on its right on August 10. The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, in the meantime, without any rest, was preparing for another amphibious operation. This time the mission was to land fifteen miles behind the enemy lines and cut the highway at Brolo, halfway between Cape Orlando and Cape Calava.

On August 11, 30th Infantry, minus the 2d Battalion, continued the attack along the coastal road, while the 7th Infantry swung inland. Both 7th and 15th reached and secured positions along the important OrlandoRandazzo road that day, across extremely difficult terrain, and against increasingly strong enemy resistance.

On August 11 Colonel Bernard's force struck again. This second landing, like the first, was unopposed in the beginning. The landing craft hove to about 3000 yards off the landing beach and by 0310 the landing craft from the LST and the sixteen ducks were in their rendezvous circles. The run into the beach commenced immediately and at 0243 the first wave landed without a shot being fired. Rapid, quiet work landed the entire assault force on the beach without loss by 0400.

By daylight not a trace remained on the beach or to seaward to indicate that a landing of infantry troops had occurred, but the absence of exits from the beach to the highway was a very serious drawback to wheeled and tracked vehicles. It was necessary for the tanks and mobile artillery to go through a lemon grove, traversed by numerous ditches, then up to a steep embankment to reach the highway; moreover, there were only a few ways the vehicles could get up the embankment, namely by going under the bridges at either end of the beach.

Immediately upon landing Company E began clearing the lemon grove. Within forty-five minutes after disembarking, the grove, between the embankment and the road, was reported clear of enemy. Companies F and G had reached the road at 0345 when the leading elements heard a vehicle moving along the road from west to cast. This vehicle was allowed to pass as the secrecy of the operation had not yet been lost. About five minutes later the put-put of a motorcycle broke the silence. Overanxious riflemen shot and killed the driver. A few seconds later another small car came down the road and was destroyed by an antitank rocket shell.. As a result of this shooting the enemy opened up with flares and tracer fire in the darkness.

As the two rifle companies, followed by battalion headquarters and the supporting weapons, crawled up the steep slope at the eastern tip of the mountain, rifle and machine-gun flashes lit the night about them. Four machine guns and several rifles were quickly identified.

These were put out of action by the advancing, infantry who had to grab and hold on to the bushes to ascend the slope. Enemy fire, however, was not well directed. The bulk of the landing team was still obviously undetected. Two German prisoners were taken during the climb.

By 0530 the top of Monte Creole had been reached and within an hour all units reported by radio that they were in position and reorganized. The few men who attempted to scale the tip of the mountain after that drew heavy fire from the machine guns and 20mm guns located across the river in the hills south of Brolo. With daylight, movement of any kind became extremely hazardous. About fifteen men were killed trying to climb this slope with messages or equipment.

Before daylight Battery A of the 58th Armored FA Battalion had taken up positions in the lemon grove, firing toward Brolo. Battery B took position to fire on targets of opportunity to the west. Both batteries gave extremely effective supporting fire until they were destroyed in the late afternoon.

Their location in the lemon grove, which was dominated by high ground to the west, their proximity to the enemy on the east; and hampered by lack of direct observation on close-in targets, made their task very difficult. In spite of these limitations they succeeded in preventing the enemy from emplacing any supporting artillery on the eastern end of the position, and harassed the enemy a great deal on the west end, where the situation and terrain were more favorable to enemy action.

The tanks were also hampered, even more seriously, by the number of ditches in the lemon grove, as well as by a stone wall along the edge of the road which limited their movement. They were also under observation, and, although they were able to fire as fixed guns, they were not able to maneuver effectively, and so were relatively useless in the engagement which was about to follow.

By 0700 the enemy had recovered from his surprise and began to initiate reconnaissance. The first of these probing attempts came in the form of a motorized patrol. This force came roaring down the road from Naso. The concentrated rocket and machine-gun fire which greeted them set the two leading vehicles on fire and scattered the enemy personnel.

Shortly after this a large patrol of about thirty men began working its way down the bed of the Brolo River and was kept under observation until it got to within 700 yards. It was engaged by heavy machine-gun fire from the platoon on top of Monte Creole. The force was decimated. Its members returned again only to drag away their casualties.

About an hour later a company of enemy was located marching boldly down the bed of the Naso River. This group was caught in machine-gun and 60mm mortar fire and was pinned down. All three of these attempts having proved both abortive and costly to them, the Germans made no further attempts to attack from the south. The sector was relatively quiet until after dark.

At 0900 enemy vehicles were seen moving westward along the road from Cape Orlando, about five miles east of Brolo. The Navy opened fire. No direct hits were observed, but the enemy was forced to dismount. At about the same time one light tank and one Mark IV moved along this same road, accompanied by a small detachment of infantry. Artillery fire forced the tank to seek cover, and the infantry moved into the woods north of the road.

By this time the lack of mortar ammunition, with which these enemy soldiers could have been taken under fire, was beginning to be felt. Only harassing fire was possible. Since sixteen mules had been brought along, the mule train attempted to bring ammunition up on the hill, but was caught by machine-gun fire when it came under observation from the hills south of Brolo. All but two mules were killed. These two mules reached the top of Monte Creole late in the afternoon. Hand carry of ammunition was attempted but was only partially successful, since the trip was so long and the losses prohibitively high.

While reconnaissance of the eastern flank was carried out by the enemy, a strong attack was obviously in preparation from the direction of Brolo. At least two companies arrived in personnel carriers; several tanks came down the road and entered the town. Small groups of men also could be seen in the woods east of the town.

At 1300 the artillery fired on Brolo, intense naval gunfire was placed west of the town, and 2d Battalion dumped heavy mortar shells into the town. An hour later a friendly air mission came over and dropped bombs over a large area covering the roads and assembly areas east of Brolo.

From all appearances this bombardment from three directions and from the air ended any attempt to assault the position from the east and a column of enemy troops could be seen moving to the east in great confusion. Friendly planes which came over again at 1430 disabled many of these.

Three Mark IV tanks remained concealed in the town, however, and at about 1500 began working their way across the bridge over the Brolo River. Because of the high wall at this point and the limited observation for direct fire the artillery was unable to engage these tanks, which succeeded in penetrating the position and destroying two of the ammunition halftracks and two of the artillery pieces. One of the tanks was destroyed in this battle. The others made good their escape.

During the course of this action an especially heavy concentration of enemy artillery fire fell on Monte Creole, and kept up for an hour, causing several casualties. The tanks which had penetrated the western end of the position also delivered considerable direct fire against buildings, walls, clumps of trees and other likely places for congregation or concealment of our men.

Enemy tracer set fires on the northern slopes of Monte Creole which burned out telephone lines. The repair crews which were sent down in an attempt to fix them suffered severe losses by machine-gun fire from the German tanks and were forced to withdraw.

The volume of enemy fire was rapidly increasing on the western end of the position. Naval fire support was called to lay a concentration on the woods just west of the Naso River. An air mission on this area had been requested previously, but had not yet materialized. It was then discovered that communication with the naval support had been disrupted by the burning of the telephone lines. The naval craft did not respond.

An attempt was made to move the artillery pieces to positions from which they could lay fire on the enemy assembly areas. This resulted in their being detected by the enemy tanks. Three of our pieces were destroyed. Troops on the hill placed as much rifle fire as possible in the area but without much effect as it was primarily plunging fire. Mortar and machinegun ammunition, beyond a very small last contingency reserve which was being held out on orders of the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard, was exhausted and replenishment, although attempted, resulted in considerable casualties.

To remedy this situation Company F was ordered down into the flats to relieve elements of Company E on the east flank, who would then reinforce the west flank position. The one remaining gun of Battery A was placed to cover the road west of Brolo and the bridge across the Brolo River.

This movement began about 1500 and soon relieved the pressure on the west flank. In spite of this the enemy had been able to get small groups into the position.

At about this time the requested air attack materialized all too surprisingly. Seven A-36s swooped in low over the southern hill and planted two heavy bombs in the battalion CP and the remainder on the artillery in the lemon grove in the flats below the road. Here the lack of dispersion resulted in all four guns of Battery B's being destroyed by 1630. All supporting weapons were now gone and the infantry in the flats stood alone.

At this point the battalion executive officer, Maj. Lynn D. Fargo, returned to the CP from the flats with word that Company E had been badly disorganized by the tank fire from the rear, the enemy attacks from the front, and by the ammunition exploding in the halftracks of the artillery, two of which were now burning.

It appeared now that the position in the flats would soon become untenable. The elements there were ordered to withdraw to the hill and organize a defensive position which would be held for the night. The remaining mortar ammunition was expended in a concentration placed in the woods just west of the Naso River and machine-gun and rifle fire was directed at the bridge to prevent infiltration on that side, and to cover the disengagement.

About this time a message over the 511 radio from an unknown source was received by Colonel Bernard. It gave the electrifying news that 7th Infantry was on a hill just beyond Naso and that help was on the way. So, with the groans of the wounded in the aid station and the scraping sound of steady digging coming from all directions on the beleaguered hill, the battered battalion settled down to hold the position to the last.

A small patrol of the enemy started up the hill about midnight but was driven off by heavy machinegun fire. In the early part of the night, bursts of small arms fire and an occasional grenade-burst testified eloquently that those who had, been left on the flats were fighting their way back to the battalion. From dark until early morning hours, the movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles could be heard on the road below the position and in the town of Brolo.

At 0600 survivors on the hill looked to the west and a welcome light greeted their eyes. Friendly troops were approaching. Contact with them was made at 0836. They proved to be element's of Ist Battalion, 30th Infantry. They continued marching down the highway, passing through 2d Battalion. The hungry, dirty, tired and thirsty men were relieved. An immediate check was made of the battalion and results summarized, while the battalion and attached units moved to a bivouac area in the grove just west of the Naso River, where the battalion remained in Division reserve for the next two days.

The results of the Brolo operation were realized more in morale effect on the retreating enemy than in the punishment actually inflicted, although that in itself was quite severe. No longer could he move with any freedom in his rear areas along the remaining distance to Messina.

At any time a large force was likely to land in his rear and cut off and destroy his entire command.

As one example, a mere feint with a larger group a few days later contributed to a very hasty withdrawal of all enemy forces across the Straits of Messina, since any successful breaching of the north coast would have laid the other elements spread across the island of Sicily open to attack from the flank.

(Foregoing material on 2d Battalion (reinforced) 30th Infantry, in its landing at Brolo is from the report submitted by Capt. Walter K. Millar, Jr., A.D.C., and later of the 45th Infantry Division, who participated in the entire engagement.)

In tallying up losses at Brolo both sides were seen to have paid heavily, with the Division losing more heavily in personnel and materiel than the Germans, but gaining on the strategic side of the ledger.

The Germans lost two Mark IV tanks destroyed and two disabled; one 77mm gun with 1 1/2-ton primemover destroyed; four personnel carriers destroyed; two motorcycles destroyed; twelve Germans captured; and an estimated 100 killed.

United States losses were four officers and 37 men killed; three officers and 75 men wounded; three officers and 55 men missing. We lost also seven M-Ts (105mm full-track) destroyed, one M-7 disabled, two half-tracks (ammunition carriers) destroyed, and 14 mules killed.

According to the Distinguished Unit Citation which was later awarded the battalion, ". . . The action of the 2d Battalion was marked by gallantry, fearlessness and profound devotion to duty in the successful accomplishment of two vital missions."

During the night of August 9-10, while the 2d Battalion of the 30th was slipping through the waters of the Tyrrhenian in its second amphibious operation, the remainder of the Division had started a parallel land march east, the 7th Infantry skirting Highway 113, the 15th moving cross-country south of the highway and the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 30th edging up the coast behind the 7th.

Our artillery, displaced in positions east of Sant' Agata, supported the advance of the regiments, although enemy artillery countered on their positions frequently and with good effect. Maj. Edward C. Robertson, commanding the 41st Field Artillery Battalion, was killed during an early- morning reconnaissance just before the infantry started advancing.

Reaching the Di Zappulla river, the 7th encountered, heavy resistance and Company B sustained unusually severe losses from mines in the bed of the river, which the company crossed at daybreak. Shortly after Companies A and C had crossed the river to occupy Hill De Morco, the enemy launched a terrific counterattack and the whole 1st Battalion withdrew across the river after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy in a five-hour battle.

The 3d Battalion of the 7th attacked again that night and by 1945 was firmly established on Hill De Morco.

The 15th Infantry moved through the hills unopposed in the early hours of its march but came under heavy artillery fire after reaching Mirto and had to infiltrate across open, observed ground to cover the final steps to the Di Zappulla.

The 7th and 15th initiated attacks early on the morning of the 11th.

The 7th, veering south of Highway 113, struck at Malo, which was taken at 1030 despite heavy enemy mortar and machine-gun fire and at 1145 Pernicchia was occupied. The regiment then turned northeast toward Brolo to disrupt an enemy counterattack which was forming against the 2d Battalion of the 30th, which had made its amphibious landing at 0300 that morning. Contact with the 30th's battalion was made at noon.

Lacking artillery preparation, the 15th moved slowly behind patrols as it crossed the Di Zappulla. The 1st Battalion occupied Naso late in the afternoon and the rest of the regiment moved into the area surrounding Castel Umberto. The enemy was withdrawing rapidly in front of the 15th and steady progress was only lightly contested.

The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 30th, meanwhile, had taken Cape Orlando, which juts out into the sea midway between Sant' Agata and Brolo. Learning that the 2d Battalion was in dire straits after the seaborne landing, the 30th immediately began a speed march toward Brolo. Arriving at Monte Creole, between the Naso and Erelo rivers, contact was made with the beleaguered battalion, which was relieved by the 1st and 3d and went into concealed bivouac.

By August 12 the Division had advanced to a line running from Brole to Castel Umberto but the march had been costly, slow and difficult. An approximate casualty report submitted by the 7th Infantry on that date indicated the regiment had fifteen officers and 400 men killed, wounded and missing during the period August 7-12 and this figure approximated these of the other units in the Division.

The Division resumed the mountainous pursuit the following day with the 30th headed toward Cape Calava on the coast and the 15th pointing to Patti, a little town on Highway 113 just east of Cape Calava. The route of the 15th lay through treacherous country and all heavy weapons were loaded onto pack mules at San Angelo. The trek ahead required it. Although the march was uninterrupted insofar as enemy resistance was concerned, it took eight hours to cover the distance, a little over five miles. The men and animals were so worn that they were given a four-hour rest when they reached Highway 113, just outside Patti.

Our artillery and air bombarded the advance route of the 30th as the regiment' made its coastal march toward Cape Calava. The enemy, however, was withdrawing as rapidly as possible and the retreat had become so hasty that large stores of supplies and guns were scattered along the escape route. For instance, an enemy dump on Highway 113 yielded the following equipment, all new: 50 light MGs, 40 heavy MGs, 20 light mortars and 15 truckloads of hand grenades, ammunition flares, rockets and explosives. Coast defense batteries and other heavy guns were found undamaged in many places. Mark IV tanks were being employed to cover rear-guard engineers as they hastily prepared demolitions and laid mines along highway 113, just ahead of our advancing troops.

While no direct enemy fire was received when the 30th approached Cape Calava, the advance was halted abruptly where a section of highway was blown off the face of a cliff directly above the Tyrrhenian and at a point where Highway 113 cut through a tunnel on the tip of the cape.

Col. Arthur H. Rogers, the regimental commander, with Lt. John C. Perkins, Communications Officer ' and some communications personnel, loaded two amphibious 2V2-ton trucks with water and signal equipment and "by-passed" the obstruction via the Tyrrhenian Sea while the 10th Engineer Battalion began the task of restoring the highway, one of the most notable feats of engineering performed during World War II.

Stripped to the waist in heat that was almost unbearable, the engineers worked without rest literally to "hang a bridge from the sky," as the late Ernie Pyle described the job in his book Brave Men.

Jeep traffic crossed the gap eighteen hours after the engineers started the job and within twenty-four hours the larger trucks were moving over & ledge in perfect safety. General Truscott, to accelerate the operation and to lend heart to the weary engineers, spent the entire night at the site.

"I'm going to stay here and look impatient until they get the job done," said the General.

Pyle told of a busy engineer, engaged with an air hose, who tripped over the General's feet.

"Why don't you get the hell out of here if you're not working," suggested the irritated soldier to the anonymous figure sitting in the dark.

The General moved out of the way without a word. General Truscott, in his Jeep, was first to cross the completed structure.

The 30th continued to advance - without incident to Patti. Considerable heavy equipment, such as tanks and guns, was ferried around Cape Calava while the hastily built bridge along the cliff road was being reinforced for heavier traffic.

On August 13 the 15th and 30th Infantry regiments were moving out of the Patti area. The 7th loaded its Cannon Company on LCTs in the vicinity of Brolo while the foot troops moved out from the Cresta di Naso and advanced along Highway 113 to an area near Falcone, where the Cannon Company rejoined after landing at Patti.

Hugging the coast, the 15th moved steadily along, passed through Cape Tendari and Oliveri and occupied the high ground east and south of Oliveri. The 3d Reconnaissance Troop located four enemy pillboxes across the Mazara River in the vicinity of Castroreale Station and the Cannon Company of the 15th destroyed them by direct fire from 75mm SPs. Pack howitzers also took part in the neutralization.

The 30th passed its second day of light action as it moved to positions north of Furnarl.

On the morning of August 15 the 7th passed through the 15th and in an all-day drive took Barcellona, Mari and San Lucia and by night had enveloped the enemy at Spadafora, forcing a withdrawal from the town after considerable street fighting.

The 3d Reconnaissance Troop was especially active in front of the 7th along Highway 113 and encountered many minefields and small pockets of resistance, which were eliminated by their own pack howitzers or by on-rushing 7th Infantry men. The troop also came under occasional fire from Mark IV tanks that the enemy was using as roving artillery to cover thc'retreat and to blow bridges. Strong positions on Cape di Milazzo, which jutted like a finger into the sea, were abandoned without a fight. A large 88mm ammunition dump, several coast defense batteries, about 150 undamaged vehicles, several thousand gallons of gasoline and oil and huge quantities of lumber were taken on Cape di Milazzo. A lighthouse off the Cape yielded several long-wave transmitters and a complete radio direction finder was located at the seaplane base nearby.

Four ME-109s bombed Milazzo the following day, apparently benton destroying the spoils which already had fallen into our hands.

The last day of enemy resistance in Sicily, August 16, found the 7th moving rapidly through the hills to Rometta, then to the high ground overlooking Messina. The enemy put up stiff resistance at a road junction joining Highways 113 and 133 and the infantry by- passed the stronghold, which was later reduced by Company A of the 753d Tank Battalion, which destroyed one 88mm gun, two 77mm guns, one pillbox and a Mark IV tank. The tank, incidentally, had set afire a freight car filled with ammunition near Rometta early in the day, holding up traffic on Highway 113 for several hours.

The 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments closed in with little resistance and occupied positions beyond Messina.

The enemy completed his evacuation of Sicily during the night of August 16-17 and enemy guns from the Italian mainland hindered our convergence on the city with sporadic fire laid on roads and in the city itself.

Formal surrender of Messina was made at 1000 August 17, by Colonel Michele Tomasello, senior military authority of the city. The 3d Battalion of the 7th was the first unit to reach the town, which had been reported clear at 0500 that morning by a patrol led by 2d Lts. Ralph Yates of Company L and Jeff McNeely of 3d Battalion Headquarters. The first British patrols entered the city shortly after the 3d Battalion's patrol. General Patton, with a motorcycle escort and accompanied by General Truscott, entered the city at 1000.

The clearance of Sicily took thirty-eight days and was a well-coordinated campaign which ended in the enemy's being literally squeezed off the island. As the 3d pounded along the north coast, the 11 U. S. Corps had broken through all defenses west of Mt. Etna and the British, after taking Catania, had smashed through on the eastern slope of the Etna hill mass and were rushing pell-mell up the eastern coast intent on trapping the Germans southeast of Messina.

The infantryman is proud to say, and few will disagree, that all other arms and services are fundamentally in a support role to the infantry. Sicily was primarily an infantryman's campaign. If it was the almost perfect example of a well-executed military campaign, it is because the conquest of the island demonstrated how all branches of all services can work in the smoothest coordination so that the man who carries the M-1 rifle can fight the enemy at close range, destroy him, and move forward to occupy territory-and no war can be won without occupying the ground.

Before the first soldier could step ashore at Licata the problem of keeping him supplied had to be worked out. While the campaign was expected to be rapid, it was not expected that troops could or would move as swiftly as they did. That the entire supply setup managed to operate as well as it did, despite the handicaps of a swiftly- moving operation and the lack of good roads, was not the miracle it appeared to be, but rather the end result of sound logistical planning.

It has been related in the previous chapter in the preparation for Sicily of the formation of Force Depot, Near Shore Control, and Beach Group. It is time to mention their excellent work in connection with the successful campaign conducted by the fighting troops.

Force Depot continued operation in Africa until after the departure of the assault forces. The first groups of Force Depot landed in Sicily on D-plus-3 and D-plus-4, took over central dumps and warehouses already established by the Beach Group near Licata, reconnoitered for other installations and operations on D- plus-5. This marked the end of direct supply of troops by Beach Group and resumption of normal supply of the force.

The depot established railhead supply for all troops west of Licata and continued the operation of a daily train and advance railhead at Campobello which had been initiated on D-plus-4 by the Division Quartermaster and Division Ammunition Officer.

The 10th Field Hospital and 11th Evacuation Hospital were landed and placed in operation east of Licata under control of Force Depot.

During its period of operation the Depot supplied, in addition to Joss Force, a regimental combat team of the 9th Infantry Division, major elements of the 82d Airborne Division, and the entire 2d Armored Division. Thus, for a short period the reinforced 3d Infantry Division supplied more than 60,000 troops.

At midnight, July 17, orders were received from Seventh Army detaching all attached supply, medical and ordnance troops from the Division and attaching them to the newly created Special Engineer Brigade. This occurred nine days after the landing, just as the rapid push from Agrigento to Palermo began. Some of the units which had formerly operated under control of Force Depot, including ammunition and truck units, were removed entirely from the Division area and were no longer available to perform the necessary supply and transportation functions.

The Special Engineer Brigade, suddenly and unexpectedly thrust into the picture while the combat operation was in full swing, was unable to coordinate the remaining units to fill the gap left vacant by the dissolution of Force Depot. As a result, the entire burden of supply was placed squarely on the Division, which did not have sufficient organic transportation to maintain its own supply over the long distances which prevailed.

Near Shore Control worked in close harmony with the corresponding organization of the Navy and with the First Embarkation Group of Eastern Base Section which was charged by higher headquarters with the responsibility of the supply and embarkation of Joss Force.

The Beach Group landed before daylight with the combat troops. Shortly after daylight Beaches Yellow and Blue were organized and prepared to unload any type of craft; including LSTs, which could not be beached and had to be unloaded by a 300-foot pontoon dock.

In three days Beach Group had landed at least 188 craft and had unloaded and placed in beach supply dumps about 7000 tons of supplies of all classes. On one occasion fourteen LSTs were unloaded in five hours. On D-plus-7 the advance detachment of Beach Group entered Porto Empedocle with the combat troops and within twenty-four hours had the port in operating condition. This shortened the supply line of the Division nearly forty miles. Both Licata and Porto Empedocle continued to handle the traffic of supplies and troops throughout the entire campaign.

The very success of the operation in Sicily increased the problems of supply and transportation. Combined with the breaking up of the Force Depot, Division supply units were faced with a difficult situation. To exploit the initial success of the operation and to keep fresh troops in contact with the enemy General Truscott therefore directed the organization of a special troop movement platoon of thirty-five 2 1/2-ton trucks. These were employed continually on the drive to Palermo in shuttling infantry battalions. After carrying our troops forward, the trucks were used to haul prisoners of war to the Prizzi enclosure. The normal procedure of having empty supply trucks for this job was not feasible as there were too many prisoners. Consequently, in addition to normal supply vehicles other vehicles had to be used for this purpose.

The greatest drain on transportation was the necessity for carrying supplies from the beach dump at Agrigento to the advance Division supply dumps. This continually lengthening supply line eventually involved a round trip of 175 miles, taking twenty hours. "The Battle of Transportation" was won only by the twenty-four-hour operation of all Division transportation and by using thirty 2 1/2-ton trucks of the 3d Chemical Battalion. The victory was a tribute to the quality of the trucks which operated continually over the poorest roads without developing any serious maintenance trouble and to the drivers who drove day and night, in blackout and through numerous by-passes, with few vehicle accidents.

Greatest surprise to the Germans, and a feature upon which the support of later, more ambitious, amphibious operations was predicated, was the excellence of the naval gunfire support. In his report of naval gunfire, Lt. (jg) Hubert C. Manning, Navy liaison officer, was enthusiastic over the coordination of Navy and 3d Infantry Division.

For the first time in any operation, naval gunfire was directed successfully from an artillery fire-direction center, in this case the FDC of 10th FA Battalion. Direct hits were made on the railway battery on the mole of Licata and on gun positions northeast of Licata. In all, the Navy effectively screened and protected the assault forces and delivered smashing blows at enemy shore installations during the initial phase of the assault. When the push to Palermo began the Navy continued to assist the Division. When fire was needed during the fight for Agrigento, field artillery units could not reach their targets unless they went into positions lacking both cover and concealment. The Navy fired the missions. The missions were successful.

When the 3d Infantry Division began the advance along the north coast of the island the Navy was again available. All during the drive, especially in the engagements at San Fratello, Sant' Agata, and Brolo, naval gunfire proved tremendously effective. Crowning achievement of the Navy, according to many enlisted personnel, was the direct gunfire on the north coast which destroyed a Mark IV Tank at a critical moment.

The civilian reaction was interesting. In a country supposedly tightly controlled by, and wholeheartedly in favor of, the Fascist political rule, the "enemy" was greeted with open arms (and palms). As units moved through the towns and villages the civilians lined the streets, clapping and cheering-and begging for " mangiare, caramelli, un sigaretto." In the beginning the troops took pity on the obvious poverty and squalor and gave freely of their rations, candy, and cigarettes. Later the ascending prices of wine and eggs, which were the reward of generosity, began to change the attitude of the troops. Generally, however, the people were glad to see the Americans. The Fascist regime, it seemed, contained more slogans than food. "Credere Obedire-Combattere" (Believe-Obey-Fight) was a little hard to digest without spaghetti and Marsala wine as the main course.

From the perspective of time, what were the visible results of the whirlwind campaign?

First, the Division played an outstanding role in clearing the island of enemy and making it usable as a base for further operations.

Second, the Division demonstrated conclusively that a well-planned operation placed in rapid and smooth execution, coordinated with naval and air forces, can overwhelm the enemy by not giving him a chance to get set. Once he is on the run he can be kept on the run if sufficient pressure is continually exerted.

Third, the Division demonstrated that small-scale amphibious operations in the enemy's rear can disrupt his entire defensive setup and force him to withdraw, sometimes more rapidly than if he were subjected to land or air attack only.

Fourth, the Division helped materially to eliminate Italy from the war. The Italian was not a good soldier, had no stake in the war, and no interest in continuing to fight it. Only the dyed-in-the-wool Fascists, as a rule, made a serious effort to provide determined resistance. The remainder surrendered in large numbers on the slightest pretext. The vast numbers who did give up with little or no struggle proved conclusively that Germany could depend little on her junior partner when the going got tough, and revealed upon what a foundation of sand the "Sawdust Caesar," Mussolini, had erected his grand castles in the air.

The campaign over, the 3d Infantry Division moved to western Sicily, near Marsala and Trapani, for a rest. Some portentous event, unnamable, indefinable was even then rushing toward its bloody, hairbreadth fulfillment-the Battle of Salerno.

There were small hints dropped here and there from the airmen. "There was a funny thing happened over on one of the eastern fields yesterday. A big black Italian plane came in, and none of the ack-ack opened up on it. They say Eisenhower himself was there to meet it. . . ." From the paratroopers: "This is. strictly on the Q.T., of course, but we got a big deal on, and its coming up pretty damn quick . . ." From the higher-ups: "Tonight we expect a lot of planes over. Unless they commit a hostile act, instruct your men not to fire on them. . . ."

The Gethsemane of Mussolini and his Mediterranean Empire was rapidly approaching. The chickens of unwarranted invasion, rapacious seizure, and cruel domination had come home to roost. The crumbling of empire was about to shift the entire role of Italy in World War II from that of an opportunist aggressor to that of a bewildered, internally-torn bystander. The mountainous, narrow peninsula, infrequently studded with low, rolling plains-famed in song and legend as a land of sparkling wines, sunshine, flashing signorinas, gay and colorful opera, was about to turn into the bitterest, most heartbreaking, most cursed battlefield of the longest- fought campaign in Europe in the Second World War.

The 3d Infantry Division was even then destined to play a prominent part in the coming ill-starred struggle. Now, men of the Division rested, took light training, and absorbed. at a more leisurely pace the sights and sounds of Sicily, which before they had had time only to observe in passing. But Italy loomed as visibly from Trapani and Marsala almost as plainly as it had to those soldiers of the 3d who shortly before gazed at it across the turbulent waters of the Straits of Messina.

*These figures were provided by the A C of S, G-1, 3d Infantry Division.
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