NOT eagerly, not with the curiosity of tyros, but rather with the almost detached and very comprehensive first glance of an engraver at a difficult photograph on which he will shortly begin work, men of the 3d Division, lined at the rails looked forward. Ahead lay the beaches of Salerno.

Where the layman would discern only flat sandy beaches, backed by a low, almost imperceptible dirt ridge beyond which the terrain lay almost as flat as a billiard table; tall trees lining the main roads; some olive groves, some farmhouses; in the distance foothills and back of them the blue of mountains the doughboy visualized, almost as though he had been here a few days before, enemy fire whipping in red slashes or invisibly across the hot fields ... the terrain offering little or no natural cover; sparse foliage, lightly wooded hills and rugged mountains.

Naval officers made mental reconnaissance of the shifting line where sand, disappeared beneath water, and of the color of the sea near shore; studied their hydrographic charts and scanned the blue skies for enemy planes which might come out of the sun in screaming, death-dealing power dives. The sailors' main concern was with how far inshore the craft and ships could get and still be able to retract after unloading. The doughboys thought in terms of, "How close can these things go here? Maybe we won't have to get our feet wet, for once."

A few correspondents thought in terms of the recently opened front, this time on the mainland of Italy: "At the point to which Seventh Army has carried the battle against the Nazis the newly-committed Fifth Army now enters the fray, and a new phase in the Mediterranean War at this point begins to unfold before our eyes."

To the doughboys the thought occurred and sometimes found articulation that something was now starting of which no one, not even the most optimistic nor belligerent could see the finish. "Where will it end? When will it end? Will I be there when it does end?"

The last week of August and the first week of September 1943, was an extremely tense period. A large juggling of government, conducted on a high diplomatic level, with strong military overtones, was taking place, and lives and the outcome of battles hung in the balance.

The Badoglio government, which on July 25 had taken over the reins of Italian government from Mussolini, was dickering with the Allied governments through General Eisenhower for peace. Neither side, however, held the trump card, militarily speaking. This belonged to the Germans, and how much it meant was yet to be disclosed. The major questions of the moment were, how firmly were the Germans entrenched in Italy, technically still an Axis ally; and from the positions they held, how quickly could they move once their partners' defection became known? A lot depended on the answers to these two questions.

It has since been uncovered that Badoglio was possessed of an optimism which almost resulted in a catastrophe for the Allies. It was the belief of the aged Marshal (the man who won the war in Ethiopia for Mussolini) that there was enough Italian strength in and around Rome to seize and hold the capital city following the announcement of Italian surrender, until Allied troops could land amphibiously somewhere in the vicinity of Lido di Roma, or elsewhere near, and push on to the Eternal City. Badoglio underestimated both Wehrmacht intelligence and German sagacity.

The enemy knew that Italy had been ruled by a strong man and strong party. Once that man had been overthrown the fall of the party could not be long delayed, and with the collapse of Fascism in Italy any power the military had once possessed must certainly collapse under the Allied weight. The Germans, therefore, were prepared for just such a contingency, and were fully willing and able to take up the fight alone at the first hint that the Italian army was through.

A parachute drop on, first, Naples, then the main airfield at Rome, were called off at the last moment on the advice of a United States delegation headed by a brigadier general which was secretly in Rome in early September, when it was discovered that the Wehrmacht was almost completely in control of Rome and environs, and already had taken measures toward disarming the two or three Italian divisions stationed in and around the city. Military disaster for the Allies was thus avoided only by the narrowest of margins.

The Badoglio government signed final, unconditional surrender terms on September 3, the day which the Allied High Command had selected for the initial landings by the British 8th Army on the toe of the boot; at Calabria opposite Messina.

The main United States invasion effort, however, came on September 9, at Salerno. The story of Salerno has been told time and again, in other places. It is sufficient to say that Salerno was deemed the only practical place for the Fifth Army to land and that the Germans knew it; that some of the landing troops (which included a strong force of British troops) were deceived by the news of the Italian surrender; and that the enemy was fully prepared for the invasion convoy when it reached the beaches. Outstanding also, are the facts that Allied courage and tenacity went ahead to win the battle anyway, and that by September 18, when the first elements of the 3d Infantry Division went ashore, the battle of Salerno was finished. It remained for the 3d Division to help exploit the initial victory.

To backtrack: On September 5, Major General Truscott; his Chief of Staff, Col. Don E. Carleton; G-2, Lt. Col. Walter C. Mercer; Col. Richard L. Creed; Maj. Frederick Boye, Assistant G-3; Lt. Col. Charles E. Johnson, G-4; Division Signal Officer, Maj. Jesse F. Thomas; and Division Artillery S-3, Lt. Col. Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.; flew to Algiers for a conference with Fifth Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark. The party was given details of the pending landing operation at Salerno and informed that 3d Infantry Division would probably be under Fifth Army control for the operation. The party returned to the CP at Trapani on September 7.

When news of the Italian surrender reached the Headquarters, 7th Infantry and 1st and 2d Battalions of the 30th Infantry were immediately dispatched to guard several airports in the vicinity of Trapani. Part of the Division already had been stationed at these fields, but since word had been received that major units of the Italian air force might fly in to surrender that night, the additional units were employed and the guard doubled. Nothing materialized, however.

The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Edgar C. Doleman, established, maintained, and guarded a staging area in the vicinity of Castellamare del Golfo, midway between Trapani and Palermo, where elements of the British 10 Corps were staged prior to the assault landing at Salerno September 9.

The Salerno landing on the 9th found the U. S. 36th Infantry Division on the right, and British 10 Corps on the left. The situation there quickly became critical, and at 2115, September 13, a message was received by General Truscott from General Patton for the 3d's CG to take a small staff to Salerno for a conference with General Clark. Hard on the heels of this message, at 2356, came word from the 15th Army Group: 3d Division was to be "lifted" and moved to Salerno as soon as possible to meet the urgent situation there.

On September 14 General Truscott and Colonel Carleton took a plane to Palermo, and a PT boat from there to Salerno, where they conferred with General Clark. The 30th Infantry, meanwhile, left Trapani about 1330 the same day, and arrived at a newly-constructed staging area just outside Palermo around 2000. The Division CP was established in a former Italian schoolhouse.

Wholesale movement of the Division was continued and completed on September 15. As time permitted, equipment was obtained and issued. Two thousand replacements were received from 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions and assigned to units. General Truscott and the Chief of Staff returned at 2300 with some reassuring news. The situation at Salerno had improved considerably; 36th Division had reorganized and was now holding. Shipping was to be available the following day. Key personnel worked feverishly the rest of the night to complete loading arrangements.

The 30th Infantry, Division Headquarters, Division Artillery, and parts of service units loaded on LSTs at Palermo on September 16. The ships commenced pulling out at midnight and shortly thereafter rendezvoused. General Truscott, with a small staff, left again for Salerno by PT boat.

The following day, as loading of the remainder of the Division continued, the first convoy sailed at 0700. At 1500 a BBC broadcast gave the news that patrols of the 8th Army, advancing from the south, had made contact with 5th Army patrols. The Battle of Salerno had ended victoriously.

The LSTs which contained the first elements of the 3d Division began beaching at about 0900 September 18 south of the Sele River. It was planned for the 3d to go in on the left of the 45th Division, which had broken the beachhead stalemate a day or two earlier in a drive to the east. At that time, the area north between the beach and Battipaglia was held by the British 10 Corps while U. S. Rangers and British Commandos held the high ground west of Salerno. The 45th Division was on the right flank.

Battipaglia, an important rail and highway center some fifteen miles north of the beach, had fallen to the British that afternoon.

After officer patrols of the 30th Infantry had reconnoitered assembly areas and approach routes in the vicinity of Battipaglia, the 30th Infantry and Division Artillery units moved into positions near the beaches for the night.

By the morning of September 19 it was learned that the enemy had withdrawn north toward Acerno and the bivouac areas that night were established just south and southwest of Battipaglia, with patrols out toward Olevano.

About midnight, the I & R Platoon of the 30th, with Capt. Richard M. Savaresy, serving as Division advance guard, passed through the ruins of Battipaglia and moved north on the road toward Acerno-the first elements of the 3d Infantry Division to enter the treacherous range of the Apennine Mountains.

Three hours later, at a road fork that led to Montecorvino Rovella on the left and to Acerno on the right, the platoon engaged and defeated a small enemy infantry detachment.

The next opposition led to the Division's first real engagement in Italy.

On a reverse curve northeast of Salitto and some two miles southwest of Acerno, the platoon approached a blown bridge which spanned a 60-foot gorge where the Isca della Serra plunges from a narrow canyon into the Tusciano far below in the valley.

German machine gunners and riflemen, later identified as members of the Ist Battalion, 9th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, commanded the curve of the road from almost impregnable positions on' a hilltop across the valley to the east.

It was clear that the enemy intended to defend Acerno.

Captain Savaresy established an observation post, obtained all available information and returned to headquarters with his men to report on his mission. The fight for Acerno was in the mold.

At 0730, September 20, the Division received its mission, boundaries and objectives. The left boundary ran north and northwest from Battipaglia to a point just west of Montecorvino Rovella and Avellino. The right comprised the high ground east of the Acerno-Montello road.

The order to advance came at 1100.

The 30th Infantry, commanded by Col. Arthur H. Rogers, with Company A, 601st TD, Battalion; Company B, 751st Tank Battalion; Company B, 84th Chemical Battalion; and Company C, 10th Engineer Battalion, attached, moved north in the Division zone of advance.

The 30th's 3d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Edgar C. Doleman, was the first to leave Battipaglia, followed by the 2d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard, which was to reconnoiter the west flank of the advance route. The 1st Battalion took the right flank under command of Maj. Oliver W. Kinney.

Only minor skirmishes marked the advance of the regiment, which halted for the night with 3d Battalion occupying the most northern position, a saddle just west of Tusciano. The march continued at daybreak September 21, just before enemy artillery shells began falling in 3d Battalion's bivouac area.

General Truscott had ordered the 30th to advance on Acerno at once.

Company I, under 1st Lt. Robert M. Boddy, started up the Acerno road but harassing fire from enemy artillery positions just north of the village, coupled with German command of the curve south of the demolished bridge, made this route impracticable and the company soon joined Company L, whose men were clambering over the wild mountains west of the road. Company L was commanded by Ist Lt. Maurice L. Britt. By 1800 Company I had taken the lead and reached the southern nose of Hill 687, north of the bridge.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the 2d Battalion was moving up past 3d Battalion, with the mission of by-passing Acerno and cutting the German escape route north Of town. Company F, with Capt. Burleigh T. Packwood commanding, veered off to the east side of the road, scaled down the precipitous slopes into the Tusciano Valley and climbed another hill to be in position to drive out any delaying force and attack Acerno from the south.

All through the night these stalwarts of the 3d Division stole toward their objectives and by daybreak Of September 22 the entire 3d Battalion rested on Hill 687, Company F was on high ground east of the Tusciano, one platoon of Company C commanded Hill 606 near the main road north of Acerno and the remainder of 2d Battalion held Hill 634, northwest of the city. Division Artillery occupied positions along the ridge north of Olevano and Ist Battalion was in assembly at a point two miles south of Montecorvino.

Meantime, while the 30th was pushing into enemy territory, the rest of the 3d Division was landing on the beaches at Salerno.

The 7th Infantry, commanded by Col. Harry B. Sherman, had debarked at 2100 on September 19 and had occupied the area south of Battipaglia. With the 7th were the remainder of Division Headquarters, 3d Signal Company, Companies A and B of the 10th Engineer Battalion, Companies A and B, 3d Medical Battalion; 3d Reconnaissance Troop, 703d Ordnance Company, and the remainder of Division Artillery, including the 441st AAA AW Battalion, attached.

On the following day the 7th Infantry moved to high ground north of Montecorvino and the 15th Infantry, under Col. William L. Ritter, landed and moved into the Battipaglia area. The entire 3d Division was now in Italy.

The attack on Acerno by the 30th Infantry began at 0800, September 22. The 3d Battalion proceeded due east toward the village while the 2d, on the 3d's left flank, headed toward the road running north out of the town.

The 3d met stiff opposition in an olive grove infested with enemy light and heavy machine guns just at the town's edge and, after bitter fighting with hand grenades and bayonets, took the grove and continued northeast into a clearing outside the woods. They were stopped by fire from a 75mm battery In position behind a church. Heavy mortar fire was also falling in the area, further retarding their progress and keeping open the enemy escape route to the north. The Germans were pulling back and covering their withdrawal with savage counterattacks, which were habitually beaten off.

All morning, Division Artillery kept enemy mortar position's and traffic north of the town under constant fire while the 2d Battalion was moving up to positions within machine-gun and mortar range of the escape road. Company F occupied high ground south of Acerno.

At noon the regiment ordered a coordinated attacka knockout blow which would start at 1300.

The 3d Battalion, with two companies abreast, one in reserve ' was to attack east through the town. The 2d Battalion, minus one company, would advance east along an intermittent stream and cut the north-south road out of Acerno. Company F, reinforced by one platoon from the 1st Battalion, was to strike due north from its present position.

Came Harbour. The 10th, 39th and 41st Field Artillery Battalions, under Lt. Cols. Kermit L. Davis, John D. Byrne and James R. Wendt, respectively, opened up with a concentration which battered the town and sent Germans streaming out the northern exit in armored vehicles. The Artillery, with Battery C. 36th Field Artillery and 441st AAA AW Battalion attached, fired a total of 1,016 rounds into Acerno from 1252 to 1325 that afternoon.

The 3d Battalion was pinned down for some time by enemy mortar and artillery fire from strong positions in the hills north of the city while the 2d continued to advance slowly over the rugged terrain north west of the city, intent on cutting off the enemy retreat.

At 1525, the 3d Battalion struck dagger-like at the northwest corner of the village and Company F, with the attached platoon, simultaneously stabbed from the south. Opposition faded under this attack and at 1700 the 3d Battalion entered battered Acerno, which yielded thirty- four prisoners.

The main German body had escaped under heavy protective fire but the opening round of the Division's "Boot Campaign" was won.The Volturno River was the next Division objective, and the road that led to it was a series of obstacles designed to tax the ingenuity, vitality and endurance of every man, mule and vehicle in the entire organization.

Nature and the ages had provided impregnable defensive positions for enemy motorized infantry and self- propelled guns. Lone roads that cut through passes, skirted ledges and wrapped the lofty peaks with roughsurfaced ribbon, afforded secure avenues for German escape.

But the Volturno loomed and Acerno was only an other milestone as the Division renewed the enemy chase September 23.

Augmenting the defenses set up by Nature, the Germans strengthened the delaying action which they effected after Acerno with innumerable demolitions that commanded all the resourcefulness of the 10th Engineer Battalion and supporting elements of the 36th Engineer Battalion. The Division Engineers were commanded by Lt. Col. Charles F. Tank.

No less than five bridges in a 2,200-yard stretch of road leading north from Acerno had been demolished by the enemy. Company C of the 10th, under Capt. Stanley E. Larson, rebuilt the demolished bridge on the main road just south of Acerno in two days. It was a two-story; two- bent trestle span eighty feet long, capable of carrying eighteen tons.

The engineers also swept the roads for mines, Operated supply dumps, maintained water points, repaired road craters and even constructed a landing strip for Divisional artillery planes at Acerno.

At one point during their retreat, the Germans not only destroyed the bridge that spanned a canyon, but also blew away a cliffside, completely eliminating the road for about a hundred feet. In two days, Company A, 10th Engineers, with Capt. Edwin H. Swift commanding, reopened the road with a 40-foot steel treadway bridge and joined it to a stretch of roadway that had to be cut out of the sheer cliffside.

Fall rains, which frequently turned into mountain cloudbursts, added more difficulty to the transportation problems and made the route of the foot-weary doughboys more boggy and miserable.

The roads were so bad that units on many occasions could be supplied only by mule trains which had been brought from Sicily, and on one occasion even mules were unequal to the task and supplies were carried by human pack trains provided from personnel of reserve companies.

Despite these obstacles, the Division advanced twenty-eight miles, from Battipaglia to Highway No. 7, in eight days. The detoured route made the actual distance even greater.

Leaving Acerno, the movement was generally north and northwest) with the 45th Division on the right flank and the British 10 Corps on the left. The 30th Infantry was to lead the Division, followed in order by the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments.

Little resistance was encountered until the 1st Battalion of the 30th reached Le Croci de Acerno, a village situated in a saddle along the main axis of advance. The 30th, with Division Artillery support and assisted by the 1st Battalion of the 7th, under command of Lt. Col. Frank M. Izenour, attacked at 1530. Within three hours, the enemy had been cleaned out and the push resumed.

The 7th passed through the 30th and assumed the lead on the following. morning. The 3d Battalion, under Lt. Col. John A. Heintges, overcame, resistance in the difficult terrain near Mt. Sovero that afternoon and by dark the battalion had secured the high ground and had sent night patrols into Bagnoli. A detachment of sixty American parachutists was contacted shortly after dark. Members of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, they had been fighting behind enemy lines for nearly two weeks. They stated that the Germans were methodically withdrawing to the north bank of the Volturno.

The Division met additional light resistance in the vicinity of Salza and Nusco, but the principal enemy contact was maintained by the 15th Infantry in the advance up the Sabato Valley, which they had entered after crossing the mountains north of Curticello.

The 7th Infantry took Volturrara with little trouble as it continued westward through the hills from the Acerno road.

On September 27, the 30th on the right flank of the 7th, occupied Montemarano on Highway No. 7, thus completing an arc around Avellino, an important road junction and the next objective.

Elements of the 34th Division, which had begun landing on the beaches at Paestum September 21, had moved up parallel with the 30th, with the mission of cutting the main road that ran north from Avellino to Benevento. The 45th Division, meanwhile, guarded the 3d's right flank.

The swoop on Avellino began at 2200 September 29, when the arc comprising the 7th, 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments suddenly contracted, squeezing the Germans out of another mountain position, which was occupied the next morning with only light casualties.

The partial envelopment of Avellino, and the night marches that preceded it and Acerno, were models for future night operations by the Division. The tendency to string out and lose control, with an overestimation of speed obtainable in cross-country marches after dark, was conquered. Enemy resistance was by-passed in the Avellino encirclement under cover of darkness and the German positions so completely infiltrated that at day break, small fights were in progress over a considerable area.

Truly the 3d was learning lessons as the advance into "Fortress Europe" progressed. New battle tricks were being introduced every day. Short-cuts of all kinds appeared in every echelon and Division Headquarters launched one of the first right after the landings at Salerno, when a War Room was organized to meet the need for a simplified, more streamlined command post.

In the War Room was gathered all information concerning the Division, adjacent units and the enemy as well as the G-2 and G-3 operations maps, G-4 situation map concerning ammunition and ration supply, Engineer road situation map and G-1 information relative to losses and replacements. Here was centered, for the use of the Commanding General, all necessary information on which to base prospective plans and orders for the Division. It was an innovation which was later widely copied by other divisions.

And while the Division was literally "learning to walk" in new surroundings, the enemy was rapidly losing ground. The great but badly damaged port of Naples had fallen to the British October I without opposition. Although Naples, some thirty miles northwest of Salerno, was the prime objective of the Allied invasion scheme, its occupation did not alter the original plans to push the Germans back across the mouth of the Volturno, which is within about twenty miles of the Neapolitan metropolis.

After Avellino, the 3d branched off into two directions toward the Volturno. The 30th Infantry, moving north, subdued light enemy resistance as it took San Angelo, continued the march through San Martino and reached the high ground north of Airola. The 3d Battalion of the 7th had moved up along the right flank of the 30th and aided in the capture of another village, Montesarchio.

The 15th Infantry, advancing northwest from Avellino, met weak opposition on a ridge east of Cancello and pressed on through Baiano and Maddaloni to mountainous positions north of Caserta.

This thrust-by-thrust advance ended October 6-the 3d Division had reached the banks of the Volturno.

In falling back from Avellino to the river, the Germans had employed their usual delaying tactics but their retreat had been considerably hastened by the excellent work of the 3d Reconnaissance Troop under Capt. Alvin T. Netterblad, Jr., and the ability of the 10th Engineer Battalion to keep roads open through quick construction of by-passes and bridges.

So close was the chase that many structures prepared for demolition by the enemy lacked explosive charges. However, elaborately prepared roadblocks and the continued appearance of boobytraps, coupled with almost daily downpours of rain, made the final steps to the Volturno both difficult and dreary.

Established in high ground overlooking the river, the Division immediately initiated continuous and extensive 'reconnaissance and patrolling and the few remaining Germans were eliminated after light engagements. By the morning of October 8 the entire Division sector south of the river was clear.

The Volturno crossing came next.

The Volturno is not 'a formidable looking stream. Rising high in the Apennines, it follows a devious ninety- five mile course through steep mountains and pleasant valleys to its terminus at Castel Volturno, where it empties into the Tyrrhenian Sea. It runs generally south and southwest from its headwaters to a point just below Amerosi where it joins the Calore and meanders the rest of the way in a southwesterly direction through the Campanian Plain.

The river ran due east west along the 3d Division front, was about 150 feet wide and varied in depth from three and a half to six feet. The banks ranged from two to fourteen feet in height while the terrain back of the banks was flat and unusually soft due to recent heavy rains.

The Germans had blown two bridges, which formerly spanned the river. Thus the crossing would have to be made by equipment and plans conceived, manufactured and executed by 3d Division officers and men, and they dedicated themselves to this objective.

Intelligence patrols cautiously selected crossing points, then waded and swam the river at night, probed enemy defenses, felt out the terrain, located strongpoints and marked logical spots for fordings that were to come later. These hazardous missions were accomplished in the face of an alert, dug-in enemy and not without casualties.

It was soon determined that a sufficient number of assault boats would not be available. So units improvised boats from life rafts obtained from the Navy, used rubber pontoons from treadway bridges and made rafts with gasoline tins and water cans as floats. A supply of Italian life jackets found in a warehouse was appropriated.

The 3d Division was to bear the brunt of the main effort of VI Corps in the crossing of the Volturno, the second phase of the Allied campaign in Italy. This was indeed an important assignment. And it was common knowledge among the men that the defenders were the Mauke Battle Group of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, one of Germany's proudest.

It was a great moment for General Truscott and the 3d Division when the mission was announced-to attack across the Volturno River between Triflisco and a point south of Caiazzo, secure a bridgehead and assist in the advance of the British 10 Corps.

A certain tenseness prevailed as preparations for the crossing were carried on around the clock.

All units were in concealed bivouac-the 7th just east of Caserta, the 30th in the vicinity of Casagiove and the 15th hidden behind a slope looking over the river.

Each unit conducted vigorous patrolling missions every night. The daily report of October 11 revealed the intense efforts that were being exerted to obtain all the details concerning enemy strength, positions and the nature of terrain that confronted the Division. Nothing was overlooked:

The 7th Infantry report of that date said: "Patrol crossed N261823; good crossing waist deep, seventy- five yards wide. Patrol crossed at N259829, waist deep., heavily defended on north side. Patrol crossed at N255817, four feet deep, bottom firm, no mines."

The 15th Infantry report stated: "Patrol crossed on debris of bridge at N267820, received MG fire from house on north bank, also hand grenades thrown at them. Another patrol crossed 500 yards east of that point and received MG fire. Patrol at N213810 received MG fire. Other patrols went to river vicinity 287-290 grids."

The 30th Infantry reported: "Guard patrol went down sunken road at N209991, received harassing long-range MG fire. Patrol went to N196805 opposite sand bar in river. Reconnaissance patrol reconnoitered upstream to power line, heard MG and mortar fire east of position, saw three lights across river."

By the next day, all Division Artillery except the 10th Field Artillery Battalion had been brought up to the vicinity of Balzi-Grottole and was in concealed positions behind a hill just south of the river.

The Engineers had completed construction of a tank road that led to the river's edge and had assembled and loaded all bridging material, including a prefabricated cableway built with material salvaged from a railroad yard and torpedo-assembly plant.

An improvised jeep bridge was constructed by using six regular floats supporting treads made of two strips of narrow gauge railroad track overlaid with Irving matting.

Nearly five miles of guide rope was ready for use by foot troops who were to ford the river.

Most vehicles of the 751st Tank Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Louis A. Hammack, had been waterproofed, as had those of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, under Maj. Walter R. Tardy. A number of wire-laying jeeps had also been made "seaworthy."

The 84th Chemical Battalion, supervised by the Division Chemical Officer, Capt. Albert L. Safine, was prepared to employ smoke pots and mortars in order to hinder enemy observation of the crossing, while artillery units were to lay down additional smokescreens.

General Truscott had decided that the crossings, all enemy-held high ground, and our tentative bridge sites were to be completely enveloped in smoke at H-Hour.

And H-Hour was at hand-0200 October 13, 1943.

Aware that the Germans anticipated a plunge at Triflisco Gap, the Division Commander staged a fake attack on the left flank, which faced the gap.

At midnight, two hours before jump-off time, the fireworks began. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, commanded by Maj. Thomas R. Davis, and the heavy weapons companies of the 30th Infantry, opened up with all their available fire, directed at enemy positions across the gap. The weapons companies, which fired throughout the night, were commanded by: Capt. Claude R. Streb; Company D; 1st Lt. William G. Stucky, Company H; and 1st Lt. James L. Osgard, Company M.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, stood ready for a dash across the river in event the Germans weakened under this fire and showed signs of withdrawing. However, failure of the British to effect a crossing at Capua on the preceding night, which would have weakened the enemy position if successful, made this crossing impracticable.

One hour after this diversion fire began, Division Artillery, commanded by Brig. Gen. William A. Campbell, let loose with a terrific bombardment of all enemy positions across the river.

Bedlam reigned until five minutes before H-Hour, when smoke shells were mixed with high explosives and began bursting all over the area, laying a thick pall over the Volturno and enemy positions beyond it. It was a fitting prelude to events that quickly followed.

The night was clear and cool and the smoke-filled darkness, splotched with myriad flashes from artillery bursts, provided a protective cloak that covered the three battalions of the 7th Infantry Regiment as they moved down the valley between Mount Tifata and Mount Castellone. The main assault of the 3d Division was under way.

The feint on the left flank was being coordinated with the 7th Infantry's drive at the center and the 15th Infantry's simultaneous effort on the right.

The 7th headed for the river at a hairpin loop southwest of Piana di Caiazzo and the 15th was assigned a point directly 'South of the city.

At 0200 the 1st Battalion of the 7th, commanded by Lt. Col. Frank M. Izenour, crossed just west of the loop; 2d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Everett Duvall, crossed east of the turn and the 3d Battalion, with Lt. Col. John A. Heingtes commanding, followed in the traces of the 2d.

The Volturno was literally filled with assault boats, rafts and soldiers, some of whom crossed with life preservers and others who forded the stream clinging to guide ropes.

The Germans opposed the crossing with everything they had. Enemy machine-gun, artillery and mortar fire continually blazed away, but in less than two hours the 2d Battalion was across and by 0640 the entire 7th Infantry was anchored on the north bank of the river.

The regiment's attached tanks and tank destroyers were unable to make an early crossing because of heavy enemy fire that kept our bulldozers out of action, thus preventing the cutting of approaches in the high river bank. Despite the absence of armor, the 7th expanded its bridgehead and pushed north toward Mount Majulo.

By 0800 forward elements of the Ist Battalion had reached the foot of the mountain and within a short time held the flat ground to the left of it, south of Highway 87. This highway, the best in the 3d Division zone, runs from Naples through Caserta, crosses the Volturno at Triflisco and again at Amerosi and goes northeast to Pontelandolfo.

The 2d Battalion quickly moved across country toward the objective at Mount Majulo. Many enemy machine- gun nests could not be located in the dark and were by- passed. The 3d Battalion, advancing behind the 2d, engaged these positions at daybreak and, after a series of aggressive fire fights, had cleared the river bank and the irrigation ditches leading to Highway 87. After the 3d had crossed Highway 87, the enemy still remaining in these strongpoints. aware that they were cut off, surrendered.

The 2d Battalion was reorganizing on Mount Majulo., when the 3d Battalion arrived on the western slope. At this time K Company reported six enemy tanks approaching its position. Antitank guns were not yet across the river and the majority of the bazooka teams were out of ammunition. The situation appeared critical. Lt. Jenkin R. Jones, forward observer, 10th Field Artillery, set up his radio and called for artillery fire from the 10th and 39th Field Artillery Battalions, which stopped the enemy armored attack only after the lead tank had approached to within 50 yards of the 3d Battalion's left flank. For his gallantry and quick thought in the face of the enemy Lieutenant Jones was credited with having stopped a serious enemy threat and was awarded the Silver Star. He was killed later on the Anzio Beachhead.

By this time our attached armor had crossed the river at a ford which the 10th Engineers had improved under fire with hand tools, giving the 7th added strength to beat off an expected armored counterattack from the northwest. This threat never materialized.

The tremendous success of this vitally important operation by the 7th Infantry was attested to when Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commanding General of the Fifth Army, called Colonel Sherman the following morning and personally congratulated him on the achievement of his regiment.

The 15th Infantry, under temporary command of Brig. Gen. William W. Eagles, Assistant Division Commander, met stubborn resistance as it fought desperately to take the high ground beyond the river at its front.

The 2d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. John J. Toffey, had crossed the river at the West End of Mount Castellone and quickly seized Hill 141, its first objective.

The 3d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Charles F. Frederick, forded the river at a little island at the foot of Mount Castellone after climbing down the steep slopes that almost dipped into the stream. Hill 246 was the objective and it was taken from a determined enemy.

The two battalions, astride the promontories in the valley, came under intense enemy fire from dug-in positions on the north. Colonels Toffey and Frederick reorganized their units and the Germans were shoved back to the slopes beyond Piana di Caiazzo before dark.

With the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments securely on their objectives, the main action focused around the high ridge above Triflisco, where the Germans were firmly entrenched. This ground had to be taken at any cost-and it was taken, by the 30th Infantry, under command of Col. Arthur H. Rogers. The regiment, however, suffered several setbacks before accomplishing the mission.

A number of patrols sent to the river before daybreak were driven back by heavy machine-gun fire but one from Company F succeeded in crossing at about 0440 and returned after capturing five prisoners.

Resistance was so strong and enemy fire so heavy that 2d Battalion, which was making the initial effort to cross the river, was ordered to delay in making the crossing. That night 1st Battalion cut back and crossed a jeep bridge which had been built across the river-near the hairpin loop in the 7th Infantry zone and, under cover of darkness, stormed the hill from the east and drove the Germans out.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, followed by Ist Battalion, 15th Infantry, crossed early next morning. This meant that all the infantry battalions were now on the north side of the Volturno.

The attack had been executed exactly as planned by General Truscott and his staff and in approximately twenty-four hours of hard fighting the 3d Division had won control of the Volturno Valley from Triflisco Gap to Piana di Caiazzo.

Amidst the heroism during that time the actions of Capt. Arlo L. Olson, commanding Company F, 15th Infantry, especially stand out. Company F crossed near Scaffa di Caiazzo at approximately 0200 October 13. When nearly across the river a machine gun opened fire, killing the scout who had gone forward of Captain Olson to locate a path up the bank. The enemy opened fire on the captain, but he continued on until he reached the base of the bank and threw two hand grenades directly into the gun position, killing the crew.

"The enemy had placed a machine gun to cover the trail and laid a continuous band of grazing fire which temporarily prevented us from advancing toward our objective," T/Sgt. Robert F. Witham said later. "Captain Olson ... divided the company into two parts and personally led one group in an envelopment from the left. At this point five Germans came toward us, and commenced throwing hand grenades at him. In the brief scrap which ensued the enemy were either all killed or wounded, and Captain Olson got a machine pistol from one of the casualties.

"This obstacle out of the way, Captain Olson advanced on the enemy position, crossing the intervening 150 yards in a slow, deliberate walk, in spite of aimed machine-gun fire which was striking the ground within two feet of him. When he got to a point about twenty five yards from the enemy, he took aim with the German machine pistol and killed the machine-gun crew. He then turned his attention to the riflemen occupying foxholes nearby and killed six of them. Although Captain Olson had half a rifle company at his immediate disposal, he effected the destruction of this enemy strongpoint single-handed. . . ."

The advance up the 'Valley now awaited bringing up supplies and artillery.

The 10th Engineers had built the jeep span and an 8-ton bridge over the river during the first day of the assault and had suffered many casualties as they worked under constant enemy fire and observation at sites that afforded no natural cover.

Their work on the heavy bridge was slowed considerably by enemy machine-gun, rifle and direct artillery fire. Much of the equipment was damaged by shell fragments and many rubber floats had to be repaired during the construction. The bridge and a detail of maintenance men were bombed and strafed the following day but damaged parts were quickly replaced and the bridge was kept open for two weeks. Seven of the attacking planes were shot down by the attached 441st AAA AW Battalion.

At daybreak October 14, the 39th FA Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. John D. Byrne, displaced across the river and a section of Battery A, under Capt. Fred P. Stevens, immediately captured two German 150mm guns and six men and set up their own gun in the enemy's former position.

This capture was but one of many outstanding feats performed by Division Artillery at the Volturno as is attested to by the fact that 12,000 rounds of ammo were fired by the light batteries during the 24-hour period starting with H-Hour.

Upon completion of a 30-ton bridge by Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion, the problem of moving heavy transport across the river was solved and consolidation of the Division bridgehead, which was now virtually secure, rested on the success attained in pushing the Germans further north.

This push was to continue relentlessly.

At noon October 14, the 15th Infantry was on the heights northeast of Piana di Caiazzo, the 7th was in the hills east of Pontelatone and the 30th was on the left flank driving along the ridges from Triflisco toward Formicola.

The 7th was planning an attack on Pontelatone when orders were received changing the direction of the Division advance. The altered route sent the 7th northeast through Liberi and Majorano to Dragoni, with the latter the main objective.

The sun was sinking when the 3d Battalion, with attached tanks and tank destroyers, began to advance over the hills toward Mount Fallano with the view of capturing Liberi before dark. These plans were upset when an all-night fight was encountered at Cisterna (not Cisterna di Littoria) a little village which the enemy stubbornly yielded early next morning.

While the 3d was engaged at Cisterna, the 2d Battalion pushed through the darkness along the slopes of Mount Friento where German tanks, committed as roving artillery, caused some delay. By daybreak, the 2d had reached the high ground above Prea and was headed toward Liberi.

In detail, the account of the action is as follows:

The 2d Battalion had moved around the 7th's left flank and captured Mount Friento. Company F's bazooka teams destroyed an enemy antitank gun and two armored halftracks, which were firing on the 3d Battalion. The maneuver of the 2d Battalion had surprised the enemy on Mount Friento and made him give ground. Further advance was stopped by heavy enemy fires from machine guns, mortars and a 20mm Flakwagon located in Villa and on the northern slopes of Hill 561.

Meanwhile the 3d Battalion had resumed its attack astride the road to capture the crossroads at Villa and to assist the Ist Battalion in its advance toward Liberi. Hill 561 was captured but the enemy counterattacked immediately. Five enemy attacks inflicted severe losses on the 3d Battalion and particularly Company K, in which company one platoon had a strength of four men. Yet the 3d Battalion yielded no ground. Late in the afternoon the enemy broke off the fight and withdrew his battered infantry under the protection of a tremendous mortar concentration.

The 1st Battalion moved up through Strangolagalli, by- passed Cisterna on the right and encountered some stiff opposition at Hill 581, a ridge running northwest from Sasso through Villa.

The scrub-covered ridges around Sasso afforded good ground for resistance and the 1st Battalion fought all night before the enemy was finally subdued.

The 2d Battalion, meantime, moved steadily forward on the 7th's left flank but was stopped shortly after midnight by strong resistance at a point southwest of Villa, which lay between Hill 561 and Hill 524. The battalion suffered many casualties in driving the enemy out of this area.

On the morning of October 16, the 7th was engaged in sharp fighting around Liberi. The Division intelligence section (G-2), under Maj. Grover Wilson, had learned that the 29th and 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiments were established on the far slopes of Hill 524 and were determined to wreck the plans to take Liberi or, at least, any hope of taking it without maximum cost. The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, had come from the Pontelatone area to join the 7th in the mission.

Liberi was the target for thrusts from all sides. All day long these thrusts were met with fierce counter attacks. Continuously the Germans charged back. Firs; at Hill 524, then Hill 561. It was a bloody engagement and it continued far into the night. When dawn cam(, the 7th attacked with renewed vigor and entered the town but found that the bulk of the Germans had retreated under cover of darkness.

Dragoni was the next objective and to reach it required covering the roughest terrain encountered since the march from the Volturno began. Even the Provisional Reconnaissance and Pack Train and the Provisional Pack Battery attached to the infantry units had difficulty in negotiating the slopes and steep hills that were encountered. The natural obstacles, with demolitions and mines that the enemy employed in his withdrawal, made it difficult to maintain contact at times.

By the night of October 17, the 2d Battalion had pushed its way to Mount Lungo, just west of Dragoni, and the 3d Battalion was on Hill 371, just south of the city. At this point, General Truscott ordered the 7th to stop its advance in order to rest the men and pack animals.

The 15th Infantry, joined by its 3d Battalion, moving on the left of the 7th, also negotiated a long stretch of tiresome hill-climbing to reach the ridges east of Pietramelara. The 1st Battalion made its way to Hill 446, above Roccaromana, that night and the following morning swooped down the hillside to capture the town, after having overrun enemy resistance-pockets on the slopes and in the valley where the town was situated. The occupation of Roccaromana was, however, only partial and temporary.

The 2d Battalion moved over Hill 446 and drove on to the Roccaromana-Statigliano-Latina road.

The 3d Battalion moved north across the Roccaromana-Statigliano-Latina road to seize the Mount della Costa and prevent the enemy from using the Latina-Baja-Latina-Pietramelara road farther north. The 3d Battalion succeeded in occupying the mountain mass, chiefly through the efforts of Company L. Company L, alone on the northern edge of Mount della Costa, overlooking the strategic enemy supply route to Baja-e- Latina, held its position for eight days, despite severe enemy shellings and counterattacks by numerically superior forces. The attrition of the battle on the slopes of Mount della Costa reduced Company L's strength to a handful of men. For three days and two nights the Company was without food land water. Yet the Company doggedly held the position and directed artillery fire upon the German line of supply to Baja-e-Latina. The enemy was, because of his inability to drive Company L from Mount della Costa, forced to withdraw from the Baja-e- Latina area. For this action, Company L, 15th Infantry was later awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation.

The 30th Infantry, meanwhile, had a hard tussle with the Germans in the vicinity of Formicola.

Monte Grande, a high ridge southeast of Formicola, lay in a gap that separated the 3d Division from the British 10 Corps and it was under alternate attacks by the 30th Infantry and British 56th Division when the 30th disengaged and moved to a position in Division reserve northeast of Villa.

The 7th, after a rest, struck at Dragoni on the morning of October 19 but the 34th Division, on the right flank, stabbed sharply at dawn in a surprise attack from the south and entered the city a few minutes before the first troops of the 7th Infantry Regiment arrived.

The 7th then turned north from Dragoni toward Mount degli Angeli and Mount Monaco, two high formations that rise northwest of Baja e Latina.

The 15th, headed toward high ground beyond Pietramelara, was delayed several days at Roccaromana, which the enemy finally relinquished October 22, the same day that the 7th reached Mount degli Angeli. Baja e Latina had been occupied by the 7th in its march from Dragoni after Co. L, 15th Infantry's position on Mount della Costa had forced the enemy to withdraw from the town.

After three days of tough fighting, the 7th drove the enemy from the slopes of Mount Monaco, the last natural point of resistance that was available to the Germans in this area. On the morning of October 25, the 30th moved up to an assembly area near Baja e Latina, thus completing occupation of high ground that gave the 3d Division command of everything overlooking its bridgehead at the Volturno.

Hill by hill the Hermann Goering Panzer Division fell back-with the 3d always at its heels. Mignano Gap beckoned from the north.

Taking up the pursuit October 26, the Division veered to the northwest with the mission of sweeping its sector and securing the left flank of 10 Corps. The British were still on our left, with the 34th Division on the right flank. Monte San Nicola was attacked by elements of 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments.

Under command of Lt. Col. Lionel C. McGarr (who had assumed his new post on hospitalization of Colonel Rogers October 21), 30th Infantry jumped off in an attack on Mt. Nicola and Pietravairano at 0900 October 26, following a four-hour artillery concentration.

All three battalions of the 30th were committed, with 3d Battalion on the left, 2d Battalion on the right, and 1st Battalion echeloned to the right rear. The 7th Infantry supported the initial attack by fire.

As the three battalions crossed the flats of the valley leading up to Mount Nicola from the east, all troops came under heavy enemy mortar fire. Approaching the great hill mass 30th Infantry found the Germans had made intensive preparations and had dug in along the crest and not along the forward slopes. Throughout the entire day of October 26 the battalions battled enemy, infantry, encountering "S" mines, demolition tripwire boobytraps, thick brush that had to be cut to make paths, and enemy Nebelwerfer fire. By nightfall 3d Battalion had captured the first of the three highest knolls along the crest of the ridge.

That night the front lines were but five yards apart in places, heavy brush and rain making visibility nil. All the next day grenade and tommy-gun battles raged as 3d Battalion, encountering the brunt of the enemy opposition, along with one company of 2d Battalion, forged forward to capture the two other high points which the Germans had made into almost impregnable' machine-gun positions. By 2100 the evening of October 27 Company L and the 3d Battalion command group entered the city of Pietravairano to find it filled with Teller-mine boobytraps and "S" mines. The battalion had killed at least twenty-six Germans, wounded scores more, and captured thirty. In addition it had suffered numerous casualties, including six killed, in the two-day fight. Throughout the entire action, the battalion went practically without food and water as the 1200-meter climb over rugged, mountainous, brush- covered, slippery, and boobytrapped terrain made movement, supply, and evacuation almost man-killing. The 1st Battalion, after being relieved on the northern edge of the ridge by elements of the 7th Infantry, moved behind the 2d Battalion and then, after touching the eastern outskirts of Pietravairano, went north to occupy and hold the town of Vairano. The 15th swept up the valley and drove the Germans from San Felice and Mount Gaievola, meeting little opposition en route. Part of the 7th took the Monticello feature, thus establishing an unbroken front in the Division sector, which had been cleared in avalanche fashion.

October 27 saw the culmination of Capt. Arlo L. Olson's deeds. For thirteen days he had constantly been in the lead of Company F, 15th Infantry, leading combat patrols or acting as number-one scout.

" . . . at about 1200 hours the company was attacking enemy positions north of San Felice," said Radioman Pfc. Lawrence E. Adkins later. a reconnoitering party . . . returned with information that the enemy had a strongpoint about fifty yards from the base of the hill.

"Captain Olson, upon receiving the above information, called for one of his platoons to follow him and moved down the slope in an attack on the enemy. When he reached the base of the hill he crawled to within twenty- five yards of the enemy strongpoint whereupon he charged the enemy machine-gun which was in the center of the enemy position. Despite continuous fire which barely missed him as he ran, Captain Olson reached the enemy machine-gun and dispatched the crew with his pistol. When his men saw the Captain make his head-on charge against the machine-gun they followed him and completely overran the enemy. When the shooting stopped I counted twelve dead Germans and seven prisoners.

"Captain Olson sent for the balance of the company and led the company in an advance on the next objective, a mountain about 2000 yards across the flat. . .

Olson moved across toward the hill and two-thirds of the way up the hill, when strong enemy fire was received. At this point he organized his company into an assault line and moved forward in the lead, disdaining cover. The assault was successful and the hill was taken.

"With the hill completely in our hands," said Sgt. Anthony Trisolini, "Captain Olson posted one platoon as security and began to reorganize the company behind the cover of the crest. At this time we were subjected to a severe concentration of enemy mortar fire which killed one of our officers, our radioman and fatally wounded the Captain.

"Although mortally wounded, Captain Olson kept going and moved about the crest of the hill completely disregarding his wounds in order that the company might be placed in position to withstand successfully any possible future counterattack. After satisfying himself that the objective was properly defended he supervised evacuation of his casualties, refusing medical aid for himself until, all of his men had been cared for. Captain Olson died before he could be evacuated."

Said his battalion commander, Lt. Col. John J. Toffey: "Captain Olson's intrepidity, exemplary conduct, and demonstrated professional skill served as a model for his officers and men and enabled the company to accept casualties without weakening the desire to close with the enemy and destroy him. This spirit, instilled by Captain Olson, has never left the company."

Captain Olson was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for his heroism from 13-27 October.

October 28 marked the first day in weeks that our men were not confronted with hills. Pack animals got a second breath for the first time since the Volturno and as October ended patrols were as far north as Presenzano, where the 3d was to assist the 45th Division in effecting another crossing of the Volturno. The 34th Division, which had been on our right flank, had turned northeast and was moving along Bava Creek on the right of the 45th.

, During this period 2nd Lt. Harold E. Greer, S-2 of the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, volunteered for a hazardous mission. He led a six-man patrol seven miles past his battalion front lines to a preselected Italian farmhouse within the German lines near Presenzano, Italy, the night of October 28-29. After establishing his OP listening post in the upper story of the farm building, Lieutenant Greer reconnoitered the outskirts of Presenzano, coming under the fire of friendly artillery that scored a direct hit on a German ammunition dump seventy-five yards away, scattering debris that narrowly missed him.

Observing the enemy preparing to withdraw, building final defensive positions and roadblocks and destroying bridges, Lieutenant Greer reported this information to his battalion by SCR 284 radio. He narrowly escaped death for a second time when American planes dive-bombed his farmhouse OP the morning of October 29. Bombs burst as close as fifty yards from the building. While this took place, Greer located an enemy field kitchen unit bivouacked along a draw 500 yards from the house and directed artillery fire on the area, inflicting heavy damage. The night of October 29 a 10-man German patrol entered the ground floor of his OP and remained there for forty-five minutes, but failed to discover him. When he saw the patrol lay mines along the roadbed forty yards from his OP, Greer recorded the fact and later informed advance friendly engineers who removed them before friendly tanks reached the city.

He also sighted an enemy convoy evacuating troops and equipment toward the German rear on October 30, .and quickly radioed the information to his battalion CO who in turn notified Division Headquarters.

Early on the morning of November 1, Lieutenant Greer met 15th Infantry troops as they entered Presenzano. His timely information had materially aided in Speeding the advance.

Nearly two months had elapsed since the 3d had .started its drive 'up the Italian boot from Battipaglia. Enemy activity had been characterized throughout the ,advance by deliberate withdrawal, covered by mining .and demolition. He had consistently infiltrated our forward positions with night combat patrols; he came back to reoccupy positions which our patrols previously penetrated; he ambushed our supply trains and boobytrapped trails and bivouac areas; -he employed armor frequently but sparingly, using tanks in twos and threes to work with small groups of infantry; he sited selfpropelled guns in defiladed positions and towns where they were difficult to find. And he took full advantage of the rugged terrain, the greatest asset of defensive warfare.

All the enemy's tricks had been solved by the men of the Marne Division. All his innovations had been countered with improvisations of our own. The difficult access to certain mountain heights was conquered by the use of the Provisional Pack Train and Provisional Mounted Reconnaissance Troop. Divisional Cub planes were used for hitherto unknown purposes, as in the instance where a pack train became lost in the mountains and a plane searched it out and led it to its destination, where it arrived with ammunition just in time to save a battalion. Coordination with air support was so precise that _prisoners of war taken in the Pietravairano area claimed the air bombardment was more accurate and terrifying than any they had ever experienced before.

And the mountain range that now faced us (the German Winter Line of 1943-44, or Gustav Line) presented even higher peaks, more precipitous cliffs, and less passable roads than those which the 3d had just - crossed. The range skirted the Volturno Valley from Isernia, through Venafro to Mignano, which was located in a gap that temporarily broke the string. At places the peaks reached a height of one mile. Increasing rains and colder weather joined hands to make the operations more difficult as November 1 arrived and the drive on Mignano was begun.

With Highway No. 6 as the axis of advance, the - Division moved forward with the 7th Infantry on the left, the 15th Infantry, now under command of Lt. Col. Ashton H. Manhart, in the center and the 30th, commanded by Lt. Col. Lionel C. McGarr, on the right.

The crossing of the Volturno by the 45th Division - during the night of November 3-4 was aided by the 3d during the next three days, when a strong demonstration was conducted toward Terra Corpo in the 7th's sector and a swift seizure of the high ground back of Presenzano was effected.

The 15th met heavy resistance in the Presenzano area but after a bitter struggle drove the enemy out of the valley between Presenzano and Mignano and followed up with the capture of Mount Cesima.

The 7th, in its action near Terra Corpo, succeeded in cutting the road between Roccamonfina and Mignano and took Mount Friello. Mount Friello was a key terrain feature, affording us observation up the Mignano valley. The Camino-Difensa-Maggiore range was still in possession of the enemy. It was here that the 7th encountered an astounding example of German obstacle construction. Mount Friello was hardly large enough to conceal the 3d Battalion. Yet the enemy had laid over 3000 S mines along every trail, ditch or break in the thick underbrush. The hill was to have been taken in a night attack. Interrogation of Italian civilians revealed the presence of the mines and saved the 3d Battalion from a possible disaster. The doughfeet of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, named Mount Friello, "Mine Hill," and rightfully so.

On November 5, the Division was poised to make its attack on Mignano, which is situated in a wide gap, protected from the east and west by lofty peaks. Mount Lungo and Mount Rotundo, formidable barriers in themselves, rise like two camel humps from the level of the gap north of Mignano. Reconnaissance patrols reported that both of these terrain features were covered with gun positions, minefields and tank traps, thus making an attack through the southern opening to the gap impracticable.

General Truscott's strategy was to attack the Mignano gap from the mountains on its flanks.

This operation proved to be the most heart-breaking, nerve-wracking venture that the 3d Division had undertaken since its baptism ' of fire at Casablanca'. It was here that the offensive prowess of every member of the Division crystallized into a shining brilliance. Mignano's tremendous value to the enemy as a communication center and a defensive' hub to the plains beyond had to be destroyed, and with it the defending enemy, who held the peaks that look down upon the gap.

The 30th Infantry, which had been in reserve and blocking to the northeast, moved northwest from Presenzano during the night of November 5-6, passed through elements of the 45th Division en route and opened an attack through Rocca Pippirozzi at 0530 November 6.

The 15th Infantry at that time was moving down the northwestern slope of Mount Cesima and through Mignano toward Mount Rotundo and Mount Lungo.

The 7th Infantry was fighting its way down the northern slope of Mount Camino toward Mount la Difensa.

All three regiments were fighting under the worst of conditions. They were attacking a battle-wise and vicious enemy, who held the commanding terrain features. He was dug in in solid rock and had the entire approach area covered with artillery, mortar, machinegun, automatic- weapon and rifle fire. Mines were sown thickly through the entire area. It was cold and damp. The mist hung low over the mountainside and visibility. was so bad at times that it was impossible to see a man 20 feet to the front. Thus the attack began.

The 30th Infantry attacked westward from Rocca Pippirozzi at 0530, November 6, with the mission of seizing Mount Rotundo. It advanced in a column of battalions, Ist leading, followed by the 2d and 3d. The advance was difficult. Men, physically exhausted by five weeks of continuous campaigning in the Apennines, crawled up steep and slippery "hills" on their hands and knees. Sure-footed mules and burros carrying food and ammunition fell from narrow trails which led up the precipitous and treacherous Apennines, to their death below. The 1st Battalion contacted the enemy at 0920 and engaged him in a small-arms fire fight. The fight continued as the 1st Battalion advanced. By late after noon it had taken its objective, the nose of Mount Cannavinelle, where it was subjected to murderous concentrations of artillery and mortar fire at 1315. At 1530, the 2d Battalion passed through the Ist Battalion which secured its line of departure, and attacked Mount Rotundo. The enemy on Mount Rotundo was quick to take up the challenge. Extremely intense smallarms, machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire poured forth from well dug-in positions, magnificently camouflaged and protected by anti-personnel minefields and barbed wire, on Mount Rotundo. The 2d Battalion was unable to take its objective because of this terrible opposition. ,

The 15th Infantry, during the 30th's advance, moved down the forward slopes of Mount Cesima. The 2d Battalion pushed north to attack Mount Rotundo from the south and the 3d Battalion passed through enemy- deserted Mignano and pressed north up the gap toward Mount Lungo. Here, too, enemy resistance was immediate and intense. Enemy on Mount Lungo, Mount Rotundo and Hill 253, which is directly south of Mount Lungo, brought fire to bear on the attackers with such intensity and accuracy that it was beyond the human ability of the men to advance.

Across the gap, on the Division left flank, the 7th Infantry was wrapped in a terrific struggle to wrest the towering Mount la Difensa from the enemy. The 2d Battalion had attacked on 5 November, through Caspoli and Casale toward the high ridge between the jagged peaks of Mount Camino and the perpendicular cliffs of Mount la Difensa. The 3d Battalion assisted on the right flank by cleaning out the enemy in the 7th's zone of action on the Mignano Valley floor and clearing the southeastern slopes of Mount la Difensa. The 1st Battalion passed around the right flank of the 3d Battalion and attacked the northeastern slope of la Difensa. This maneuver pinched out the 3d Battalion and placed the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast, and in control of the northeastern and southeastern slopes of Mount la Difensa. During the next ten days these battalions tried in vain to scale the heights and secure the top of the mountain. Their every effort was balked by a cliff sixty feet high, following north and south some 1500 yards along the top of the mountain. In the sector of the 2d Battalion, only one path could be found up the cliff and this was commanded by two enemy machine guns, firing from positions blasted out of rock, only the firing apertures visible. Action along-the entire line held by the 7th Infantry was stalemated. Yet the fire fight was continuous and savage. From his positions the enemy laid down deadly fires against our every attempt to move forward. In the sector of the 1st Battalion the enemy paid a heavy price to retain his position. His counterattacks were often costly, too, but he managed to shift his reserves and replace his losses.

Supplying the combat troops in the 7th, 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments' zones was a major problem in this terrain, cut by deep gorges and precipitous ridges. Even the valuable pack mules and burros were useless, and food, ammunition and water had to be carried by carrying parties, equipped with improvised packboards. A man could manage only a small amount, for he needed both hands for climbing. The trip up required a full day and the evacuation of the dead and wounded was accomplished in an average of six-seven hours. The soldiers suffered severely from exposure to rain and cold and from a lack of proper food and clothing. Yet the priceless ammunition was always adequate. No definition of the word "Teamwork" could explain the full significance of the word there in the Apennines. The spirit that was tacitly present, between the hardpressed infantrymen at the crest of the mountain and the carrying parties that labored night and day to sustain them, defies to be set down in words.

On 12 November, Company K, commanded by Lt. Frank Petruzel, reinforced by the 2d (MG) Platoon Of Company M, moved out to relieve the depleted 2d Battalion. On 16 November Company K, after a fifteen minute artillery, Cannon Company and chemical mortar concentration Placed on enemy positions, jumped off to give it one more try. The dense fog and occasional clouds, which, it was hoped, would reduce visibility to our advantage, suddenly cleared, and the enemy stopped the attack ten yards from the line of departure and fifty feet from the top of the mountain. It was the last attempt, for on 17 November, troops of the 36th Infantry Division began the relief of the 3d Infantry Division.

Meanwhile the 30th Infantry was engaged in front of Mount Rotundo. When the advance of the 2d Battalion was stopped on 6 November, it was decided that the 2d and 3d Battalions would make a coordinated attack at 1330 November 7. Due to the great difficulties of reorganizing under continual enemy fire and the trouble caused by the infiltration of a wily and crafty enemy, determined 'to withstand all efforts to seize this vital outpost of the Cassino Line, the attack was postponed. In the interim the 2d Battalion was forced to repulse a counterattack and thwart enemy attempts to cut its line of communication. The 1st Battalion, too, repulsed a bitter enemy counterattack during the night of 7-8 November.

The 15th Infantry, meantime, had pressed its attack strongly but without success. Every attempt to seize the southern slope of Mount Rotundo and Mount Lungo met with bitter, determined resistance. At 0845 November 8 a coordinated attack, by the 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments, was launched after a fifteen-minute preparation, fired by eight battalions of artillery. The 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry advanced around the southwest side of Mount Rotundo to seize Hill 193, which occupies the center of a horseshoe curve in Highway 6. The 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry fought its way to and captured Hill 253, which is the southern nose of Mount Lungo. The 2d Battalion fought up the southern slope of Mount Rotundo.

The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, attacked Mount Rotundo from the east. At 1100 November 8, Companies I and L, less one platoon, had taken the objective. The attack had struck the enemy in the flank and rear and had taken him by surprise, while he was engaged with the 15th Infantry.

Enemy counteraction was immediate. A series of local counterattacks began within an hour of the capture of the hill and continued in mounting intensity for forty-eight hours.

Both the 15th and the 30th dug in on their objectives and were counterattacked by the enemy day and night for a period of five or six days. Attacks were launched by both units to improve their positions, which brought counterattacks by the enemy each time.

On the morning of November 10, 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, was occupying captured Mount Rotundo with two depleted companies on the hill mass and Company L in the pass to the east. The company's right flank extended to the lower nose of Mount Cannavinelle. The main line of resistance ran across the mouth of the gap up the northwest slope of Mount Rotundo through heavy brush and trees, Company L's left flank toward the right flank of Company K. "Company L's combat strength of fifty-five men," stated Battalion CO Lt. Col. Edgar C. Doleman, "made it impossible to maintain contact across the 600 yards of densely wooded slope except by patrols and listening posts. One section of heavy machine guns was attached to Company L and was in position on the left (west) flank protected by four riflemen."

The deeds of two men during the latter part of the drive are particularly deserving of note. One of these men was Ist Lt. Maurice L. Britt, the other Pfc. Floyd K. Lindstrom.

"At 0830 the morning mentioned, the Germans counterattacked over the north nose of Mount Rotundo southeast toward the gap between Company L and Company K, turned down the slope, hit Company L's left flank and captured the machine-gun section and four riflemen by a ruse. The counterattackers, later estimated from PW reports as a company of approximately one hundred men, had as their mission the retaking of Mount Rotundo. When Company L's left-flank men opened fire, the enemy hit them in force and pushed them southeast toward the gap between the mountains. . . ."

Said Cpl. John Syc: The Germans attacked our left flank and captured some Americans whom they placed in front of them as a shield. We couldn't see the Americans, but we could hear them shouting down to us not to shoot. When. they were about fifty yards away, Lieutenant Britt yelled, 'Take off! They can't hurt you! We're going to fire anyway!' All of us then opened fire and the Germans fired back with rifles, machine pistols and machine guns, too. The American prisoners scattered, some later escaping.... During the fire fight, which was intense, a mortar section ammo man near me was wounded and his weapon knocked out. Lieutenant Britt, while firing his carbine, suddenly yelled, 'Ow' and put his hand on his side saying he thought he was hit, but ordering me to fire my machine gun faster. . . ."

"He ran from side to side of our machine gun of which I was assistant gunner," said Pfc. Fred E. Marshall, "firing at every sound and sight of Germans.... Later, I saw Lieutenant Britt, slightly bleeding on the face, having run out of carbine ammo, grab the M-1 rifle from a badly wounded man lying near me, and continue to fire with it. He also grabbed some hand grenades and with the rifle and grenades went ahead into a wooded area ahead of our position looking for Germans. A few minutes later I saw him throwing grenades, disregarding machine-pistol bursts hitting all around him. I marveled that he wasn't hit. Concussion grenades, too, were bursting all about him ....

Said Sgt. James G. Klaes: ". . . All in all ... I saw him throw approximately ten to twelve grenades, German automatic fire and grenades coming back all the time. At times we thought we would be overrun. Always I saw Lieutenant Britt out in front firing his carbine, throwing hand grenades, first from one position, then from another.."

". . . I saw his canteen was pierced with bullet holes and his shirt covered with water; his field glasses case, too, was pierced with bullet holes," said T/5 Eric B. Gibson (Cf. Push to Rome). ". . . I was throwing hand grenades at Germans and Lieutenant Britt asked me for some as he had thrown all he had. During the morning he must have thrown at least thirty-two hand grenades. . . ."

At about 0930 Britt and Gibson went toward the left to find what had become of the two mortars which had been to the left of the attacking Germans. There was another encounter with a machine gun and the lieutenant threw a couple of grenades, saving Gibson's life, according to Gibson's testimony. They returned, then once more Britt went into the woods and had another encounter with an enemy machine gun.

". . . Lieutenant Britt greeted me in my aid station," said 3d Battalion Surgeon Capt. Roy E. Hanford. "I was busy with a couple of casualties at the time . . . about a half hour later I asked Lieutenant Britt if there was anything I could do for him. His reply was 'No, Doc, go ahead and finish with your other casualties. I got a little scratch here that I want you to look at when you get time.'

"…Lieutenant Britt's scratch turned out to be an elliptical avulsion of skin down to the muscle about one inch long and one-half inch wide on his left side. There were a number of other visible small superficial wounds on his face and hands. . . . I asked Lieutenant Britt if he would like to go into the hospital. He replied, 'No,' calmly and determinedly, 'I got to get back up on the hill to help those boys.' . . . There were several remarks from some casualties from his company after he left. 'I'd give anything to be like that guy.' 'That guy is a one man army . . ..’ "

Lieutenant Britt was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor for his action.

For the November 7-12 period 3d Battalion, .30th Infantry, later received the Distinguished Unit Citation, "With fire sweeping its ranks from the rear and from an exposed flank, the battalion launched its attack up the forward slope of the mountain (Rotundo) and doggedly advanced to the crest in the face of stubborn enemy resistance," read the citation, in part. "Although depleted heavily in effective strength and having neither food nor water for a period of two days, the intrepid infantrymen of the 3d Battalion met the onslaught of the enemy (over a six-day period) and repelled each assault with heavy losses to the attackers. . . ."

Later honored with the Medal of Honor for actions during the same period was Pfc. Floyd K. Lindstrom.

On November 12 the. 2d platoon of Company H, 7th Infantry, was attached to Company E. The platoon had been depleted to a total of fourteen men and two serviceable guns. Pfc. Lindstrom was the gunner of one gun.

At about 0900 approximately forty enemy launched a counterattack against the left flank of the company. Lindstrom's machine-gun section received the greater weight of the attack.

". . . The enemy, from his position on the commanding heights," said Pvt. Marvin D. Crone, assistant gunner, "had excellent observation and when he opened fire on us he was deadly accurate. The bulk of the enemy were 200 yards above us when he attacked. E Company withdrew about 150 yards, because there was not enough cover for them at this point, leaving our machine-gun section out in front.

"Even though he saw the rifle company withdraw, Pfc. Lindstrom nevertheless instantly and without orders immediately set up a defensive position and opened fire with his machine gun. The enemy fire became intense as they started dropping a great number of mortar shells in our 'section' area and commenced to rake our positions with machine-gun, machine-pistol, and rifle fire.

". . . Lindstrom insisted on moving forward alone another ten yards for a better field of fire. He picked up the machine gun bodily and moved uphill over the rocky ground with his 112-pound load. In doing this he became the direct target of machine'-gun and smallarms fire from some of the enemy who weren't more than fifteen to twenty yards away ... at least thirty-five hand grenades of the concussion variety were thrown at Pfc. Lindstrom in an attempt to silence his gun.

"Lindstrom was aiming for one German machine gun and crew in particular when he singlehandedly carried his heavy machine gun forward because he saw that it was the chief supporting weapon in the German counterattack. Despite the heavy fire from their mortars and machine pistols, he moved to within about fifteen yards of this machine gun even though it was firing at him and missing him only by inches.

"I could hear the Jerries yelling at him in pidgin English, 'American soldier--you give up-we treat you fine- you no surrender, plenty trouble-we got you surrounded.' This was repeated time and again and each time Lindstrom answered 'Go to Hell!' and gave them another burst of fire from his machine gun. . . .

"When Lindstrom saw that the attack was likely to succeed if the enemy machine guns were not put out of action, he yelled at me to cover him with my rifle, that he was going to 'get that machine gun,' and armed only with the .45-caliber pistol which he always had at his hip, he frontally assaulted the machine gun in a mad uphill dash. The Germans saw him coming and let go a continuous stream of fire which kicked up the dirt inches behind his heels as he ran at them. Somehow he miraculously escaped being hit by the continuous chain of automatic fire from the machine gun, got right on top of the gunners and shot them to death with his pistol. He then returned, dragging the German machine gun behind him, after which he braved more enemy fire to go back to their position and return with two full boxes of ammo which he directed us to emplace and put to use in countering the enemy attack. We received no support from our other machine gun during the counterattack because it was unable to fire on the enemy from its position. . . ."

Said Sgt. Nicholas Alfier: "Lindstrom gave the gun to me telling me to use it on the German infantry, and he immediately went back to his gun and opened fire.

"Lindstrom's spectacular action and withering machine- gun fire completely demoralized the Germans and -their counterattack seemed to disintegrate . . . . )

"The rifle company and the other machine gun of our section attempted to come to our aid while the attack was going on," said Pvt. Sam G. Rohan, "But Pfc. Lindstrom so effectively handled the situation that it was all over before they could get into action. . . ."

The exhausted warriors of the 3d Infantry Division by November 15, deserved the needed rest that was to come when higher headquarters called a halt to the advance that night.

In two days all elements of the Division had been relieved and were en route to San Felice, tired, bearded, and dirty, but flushed with victory and justly proud that they had penetrated the German Winter Line and forced the first approaches to Cassino.

The 3d Infantry Division was holding the trumps when relief by the 36th Division was effected November 17, 1943.

	Reinf		Hosp RTUs
Off 438	EM 8616	Off 241	EM 7295

*These figures were provided by the A C of S, G-1, 3d Infantry Division.

"Throughout this history, statements of enemy casualties as compiled from records of A C of S, G-1, 3d Infantry Division, are those enemy dead actually buried in 3d Division cemeteries and those enemy wounded actually processed through 3d Division medical installations. It is estimated that these figures reflect not more than five per cent of the casualties inflicted on the enemy by the 3d Division and its attached units Statements of enemy captured are those prisoners of war actually processed through 3d Division cages under supervision of the Provost Marshal.