TROOP LIST
Operation "Shingle" Third Infantry Division (Reinf)
Organization for Combat
1. Hq & Hq CO, 3d Inf DIV.
2. 7th Inf Regt (Reinf) 10th FA Bn Plat Co A, 751st Tk Bn Plat Co A, 601st TD Bn. Co A, 3d Med Bn (Coll) Det 10th Engr Bn Det 3d Sig Co. 15th Inf Regt (Reinf) 39th FA Bn Plat Co A, 751st Tk Bn Plat Co B, 601st TD Bn Co B, 3d Med Bn (Coll) Det 10th Engr Bn Det 3d Sig Co.
4. 30th Inf Regt (Reinf)
41st FA Bn
Plat Co A, 751st Tk Bn
Plat Co C, 601st TD Bn Co C, 3d Med Bn (Coll) Det 10th Engr Bn Det 3d Sig Co.
5. Division Artillery
10th, 39th & 41st FA Bns) 69th Armd FA Bn (105 SP) Btry B, 36th FA Bn (155 G) Det, Btry B, 15th Obsn Bn (Sound)
6. 3d Rcn Troop Prov Mtd Troop Prov Pack Btry Dets, 10th Engr Bn.
7. 441st AAA AW Bn
8. 84th Chemical Bn
9. 504th Parachute Inf Regt. 10. 3d QM Co
CASABLANCA was the baptism and the proof that the 3d Infantry Division could and would measure up to the most rigid standards of modern combat. Sicily was the gratifying fruition of an idea that held that a good United States division could move fast, and strike hard bewildering blows to confound the enemy and help to bring about his quick capitulation. Lower Italy, until the crossing of the Volturno River, was almost a continuation of the Sicilian campaign. Fording the Volturno to carry the bitter fight into the mountain fastness of an essentially mountainous country, over peaks whose sides were sown with thousands of deadly antipersonnel mines, in the teeth of lethal crossfires from an enemy imbedded in rock, minor fortresses carved into the very mountain sides.
Twenty four hours a day in rain and snow, proved something again that needed proof only for the layman: When every other weapon bogs down the infantryman can still move and fight, although it costs him terribly..
The ultimate test, and the battle from which the 3d Infantry Division was to emerge as one of the great divisions of World War II, however, had yet to be fought. The name of a rather obscure hamlet; a former watering spot where Nero once had come to soak his tyrannical bones and where a latter day, would be Nero had come to pitch hay, bare chested, for the benefit of the newsreels, was destined to be brought prom inently into the consciousness of the world. This small port on the Tyrrhenian coast, about twenty miles below the Lido di Roma, where the Tiber River empties its waters, was to have its name written in letters of fire: Anzio.
The bitter series of battles for the mountain passes around Cassino, and for the town itself, had been going on for about two months; since the 3d Division spearheaded the crossing of the Volturno River the fighting had become fiercer and progress slower for United States troops than at any time since the first landings were made in the Mediterranean Theater. When the Division was withdrawn from the lines after the bitter fights for Mount Lungo and Mount Rotundo, and almost immediately commenced training in amphibious warfare, everyone concerned suspected that an "end run" was about to take place in an attempt to break the stalemate.
On December 28, the Commanding General, Fifth Army, Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, informed the Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, that the Division would take part in an amphibious operation to be known by the code name of "Shingle," scheduled for about January 20, 1944. This operation had already been under consideration for several weeks and had been postponed or discarded on previous occasions because the troops and shipping believed necessary to success had not been available'.
The broad purpose of the landing, which was initially to be made by this Division and the 1st British Division, was to debark on beaches north and south of the towns of Nettuno and Anzio, about twenty five miles in a direct line south of Rome, with the intention of quickly driving inland, cutting Highway 7, by which the enemy supplied his forces on the Garigliano Minturno front, and with the eventual purpose of cutting Highway 6 at Valmontone, trapping the German forces who opposed the bulk of Fifth Army on the front at and around, Cassino.
Few foresaw a bitter, four month struggle, in which our stalemated beachhead was to battle for its life on three separate occasions against fanatically attacking Germans who had orders from Hitler himself to eliminate this threat completely, destroying or capturing its defenders. Few contemplated the fruitless, holding warfare of World War I type; doughboys standing for hours and days at a time in water up to their ankles; crouching in the foxholes in the daytime because of the almost complete lack of defilade; front lines that faced each other at distances no greater than fifty yards; above all, the devastating artillery barrages from weapons up to and including 280mm pieces that were apt to land at any time on any part of the beachhead.
Within the lifetime of surviving veterans of the beachhead there will be endless arguments as to "What did Anzio accomplish?" and in military textbooks and service schools the discussions will probably outlast the lifetime of any of the soldiers who engaged in the fighting there. The military student may ponder every aspect of it in the future. The why and wherefore of the situation are not such a major matter of interest to us now, however; the fact remains that when the explanations, accusations, and fulminations of the people and newspapers of the United States and Great Britain died down we still had the beachhead, and we had to live there, and give lives in order that it remain a beachhead. In short, we had a bear by the tall and could not let go.
Against this is to be held the undoubted fact that many German divisions, badly needed to stem the Allied effort on the southern front, were tied down; several divisions were brought into Italy at a time when Germany was scraping the bottom of the barrel for enough strength to counter the impending invasion which finally took place on the Normandy coast on June 6; and also the fact that the beachhead, as long, as it remained intact, was in the nature of a cocked and loaded pistol pointed at the back of Field Marshal Kesselring's forces at Cassino. It represented a staging area for the major assist in the Allied drive that eventually carried to Rome and beyond.
Together with its companion divisions, the Ist, 5th, and 56th British, and the United States 45th, 34th Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions; Special Service Force; 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, the 3d Infantry Division was to add a brilliant chapter in defensive warfare to its already bright record of achievements. This new featrarely equalled by a United States division engaged in defensive warfare occurred when, on two occasions, the 3d bore the brunt of attack across its entire front, and not only did it give no ground, but each time cost the enemy extremely serious losses in men and materiel. As in 1918, when it had been the "Rock of the Marne," it became the "Rock of Anzio" in 1944. It was once mentioned in official dispatches as stemming the main force of the enemy's most determined attempt to eliminate the beachhead.
It is interesting to note the short time allowed for the planning, training, and mounting of Operation "Shingle" an amphibious landing, the most complex of all military operations. The same phase of the Sicilian operation had taken a full three months. Only past experience and an expeditious and enthusiastic approach to all problems enabled the Division to accomplish its assigned task in the three weeks allotted. The landing itself was the proof of the pudding. Never before in amphibious warfare had carefully laid plans been executed so letter perfect by the Army Ground Force Army Service Force team that mounts every operation of this type. As it developed, men and equipment were to pour ashore with almost monotonous regularity and strictly on schedule in the fulfillment of a logician's favorite dream.
The plan called for landing of the 3d Infantry Division (reinforced) and one brigade of the Ist Division (British) on the beaches north and south of Nettuno, with remaining elements of 1st Division as floating reserve; 3d Division landing on beaches south of Nettuno and 1st Division landing on beaches north of Anzio. As soon as the beachhead was established, U. S. 1st Armored and 45th Infantry Divisions were to follow ashore, prepared to move quickly in continuation of the attack.
The 3d Infantry Division's mission was to land, destroy enemy beach defenses, and capture an initial beachhead line extending generally to the line of Mussolini Canal and its northwest branch. The Division's left boundary was the main highway between Anzio and Albano. The assault plan called for landing assault battalions of all three regiments of the Division simultaneously, as well as a battalion of Rangers just east of Anzio. The Rangers were to be tactically attached to the Division as soon as contact was physically established ashore.
Order of landing was 7th, 30th, and 15th Infantry Regiments from left to right. The assault battalions were 1st Battalion, 7th; 2d Battalion, 30th; and 3d Battalion, 15th. These battalions were organized and trained as units and subunits or teams specifically designed and trained to attack and destroy pillboxes, fortifications and coast defense weapons and to cross beach wire and minefields.
Following the assault battalions, the other two battalions of each regiment were to be landed in column from LCIs. These battalions of the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments were to be advanced to the north, northwest, and northeast sectors and clear and occupy the beachhead in the Division sector; 15th Infantry, on the 30th Infantry's right, was to relieve elements of the 3d Reconnaissance Troop on crossings over the Mussolini Canal, protect the right flank of the Division, and be prepared to pass to the west with remaining forces behind the 30th Infantry and 7th Infantry.
Elements of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 751st Tank Battalion were attached to regiments, to be loaded on LCTs and landed before daylight. The 441st Antiaircraft Battalion was likewise to land prior to daylight and protect the beaches until Corps antiaircraft could be debarked and set up. Naval gunfire preparation, once scheduled, was cancelled at the last minute in favor of surprise, although two rocket boats accompanied the convoy to fire barrages on the Division's beaches at H-Hour minus ten minutes. Actually there were no enemy targets ashore which suffered from these barrages.
The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, whose previously scheduled drop on a flat rise north of Anzio had been cancelled, was to be landed from LCIs on Division beaches as Corps troops.
Late in the afternoon, January 21, 1944, the invasion convoy set sail from Naples. H
Hour had been finally set for 0200 on the following day.
The following, though fragmentary, gives some idea of the ease with which the actual landing was accomplished. It is an extract from the Division staff (War Room) journal as of January 22:
0145: Rocket Ships fired.
0220: 2d wave hit Red Beach. Landed dry.
0229: No opposition met by 1st or 2d waves.
0245: From 15th Infantry: Landed on Green Beach. Left company advancing rapidly. Right company fair. 4th wave has hit the beach.
0300: LCIs are using LCVPs. (Unloading onto LCVPs: Ed.)
0330: Message from Liaison Officer, 30th Infantry: "Our leading elements are at . . . (Location in code: Ed). No opposition.
0335: 15th Infantry reports: Initial operation believed successful. Now regrouping.
0335: 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry Reports: All companies now fairly well together. No opposition. Five boat waves have landed.
0350: Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry reorganizing on road directly behind Red Beach.
0405: 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, advancing from coordination line to objective "E."
0410: Intercept from 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry: "Sabotage the transportation and put the krauts under guard."
0430: 30th Infantry; No MG, mines, or artillery encountered.
04,30: All six waves landed on Green Beach.
0450: Congratulatory message from Commanding General, VI Corps.
0515: 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry now fording stream at . . . (Gave location in code: Ed.). Bridge OK.
0548: Message from 15th Infantry: Our progress satisfactory. We are not yet hull down (not yet dug in. Ed.).
0550: From Assistant Commanding General: Prisoners report one battalion extending 25 miles north of this point.
0600: Tanks, TDs, artillery landed successfully on Red 1.
0615: 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry moving toward objective.
0625: 30th Infantry reports companies in positions between 3d parallel road and . . . (Code location name: Ed.).
0915: Division command post opened.
Except for a few mines and elements of an understrength enemy battalion on beach watching duty, the operation went off like a well executed maneuver. The enemy had been entirely surprised, indicating that the secret of the operation was well kept beforehand. (It was subsequently discovered that the area around the Lido di Roma to the north, at the mouth of the Tiber, and the shores of the Golfo di Gaeta to the south, were heavily mined and fortified. It is probable that the enemy had expected a landing but did not accurately determine where it was to strike.)
By daylight main elements of the infantry regiments, artillery, and some armored units were ashore. By noon of D-Day the infantry regiments had consolidated on initial objectives and were reconnoitering to the front and flanks. The 3d Reconnaissance Troop and 3d Provisional Reconnaissance Troop had reached and prepared for demolition all bridges on the Mussolini Canal from the sea to Bridge 7. Bridges 1, 3, 4, and 5 were demolished. Guards were placed on all bridges.
In order to understand the series of attacks and counterattacks, patrol actions and defensive measures undertaken during the 3d Infantry Division's nightmarish stay on Anzio Beachhead, it is necessary to become acquainted with the natural setting, and to learn the names of a few places which figured prominently in all these actions.
The beachhead, in the form it was finally to assume following the main German counterattack of February 16-19, comprised an area of little more than a hundred square miles, being about ten miles deep and fifteen miles wide in its greatest dimensions. The twin towns of Anzio and Nettuno lay in the southwestern corner, about two miles apart, Nettuno being farther east along a curving bay.
The eastern boundary of the beachhead lay generally along the Mussolini Canal, which was a wide , shallow man made trough about 120 feet across at the top but with only a six foot water gap in its bed. It had originally been dug to drain the area and reclaim the marshy ground for farm land. The result was a series of model farms. Just south of the beachhead line lay the Pontine Marshes.
About six miles inland the canal branched. One fork ran northeast toward the mountains back of Cisterna di Littoria. The other ran west and slightly north for another six or seven miles, where it finally petered out into a small, natural stream. This western fork was a natural defensive line inasmuch as it provided defilade against ground observation, and a small wet gap which was impassable to tanks and vehicles.
There was no true high ground on the beachhead, the only significant elevation being a gentle rise just south of the. town of Le Ferriere which reached a maximum height of 220 feet above sea level. Elsewhere the terrain was flat or very gently rolling, except for small ravines formed by the streams. North of the western fork of the Mussolini Canal, where the terrain sloped gradually upward toward the foothills of the Colli Laziali, these ravines assumed greater proportions, being forty to sixty feet in places and very steepsided, but generally carrying a trickle of water in the bottom.
The perfectly flat terrain immediately north of the canal was further crisscrossed by a series of drainage ditches, which varied from small scratches in the ground to a twenty or thirty foot width, and fifteen or twenty foot depth.
Aside from Anzio and Nettuno, there were no real towns, as such, on the beachhead. In the 3d Infantry Division sector there were clusters of buildings at Acciarella, Conca (Borgo Montello on some maps), consisting of an old castle, a church, and two or three houses and sheds, Le Ferriere (a group of large buildings clustered around a woolen mill with a prominent, high smokestack), Campo Morto, Carano, and Feminamorta "Dead Woman" (Isola Bella on some maps). For a time in the early part of February, the British held the little settlement of Aprilia, famous in news stories as the "factory area," which lay due north of Anzio at the western edge of an absolutely flat plain, and the railway station at Campoleone, still farther north.
Immediately back of the beachhead line were several larger towns: Littoria, on the eastern flank; Cisterna di Littoria, usually called simply Cisterna, an important road junction on Highway 7 (Appian Way) just northeast of Feminamorta; Cori, a few miles northeast of Cisterna, which nestles low on the western slopes of the Monti Lepini, and Velletri, on the slopes of the Colli Laziali mountains. Both could be plainly seen on a clear day (of which there were all too many) from almost any part of the beachhead.
There must be kept in mind also, in order to understand the development of the situation at Anzio, the following points. The knowledge that the build up of friendly forces on the beachhead would of necessity be slow, together with the lack of knowledge of the enemy's ability to counteract our action, cautioned the Division not to overextend itself and thereby lose its ability to defend itself against counterattack from any direction. At the same time it was necessary that the Division advance and seize the terrain most favorable both to its defensive position and to its ability to continue the attack forward. Therefore the Division rushed inland boldly to secure its objectives within the initial beachhead line and thereafter consolidated its won positions and continued the advance only in consideration of the above mentioned factors. The enemy was surprised but was quick to become aware of the threat, occasioned by the landing, to his forces in the south. His immediate concern was to dispatch as rapidly as possible to the threatened area all available units in an effort to contain the beachhead in as small a space as possible, until such time as he could arrive there with forces in strength capable of effecting a counterattack that would destroy the invader. Thus there took place initially a series of meeting engagements which gained in intensity as the forces increased in strength.
On the morning of January 23, just twenty four hours after the landing, enemy elements began efforts to establish themselves on bridgeheads over the Mussolini Canal. It is likely that these were the Hermann Goering Division, an old "friend" of the 3d Division, which had engaged it twice before. This was in an area which had been almost entirely free of enemy troops the day before. It gives some indication of the speed with which the enemy reacted. The Ist Battalion, 30th, engaged infantry and tanks during the night and morning. During the afternoon the enemy crossed the canal at Bridges 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 with strong combat patrols. Tanks supported most of these patrols. During the evening our units began counterattacking these enemy bridgeheads with the mission of destroying them and clearing the area South and west of the canal. It was an ominous harbinger of the trial of strength that was shortly to take place.
The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment began moving into an area adjacent to the Mussolini Canal between the sea and Bridge 5, to relieve the 3d Reconnaissance Troop and to retake some bridge sites. The 4th Ranger Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, from the position it had reached the day before. The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 7th Infantry, were assembled in Division reserve in the vicinity of a road junction on the Nettuno Le Ferriere road.
January 24 the attacks against the enemy bridgeheads were continued and by 1010 the last bridge site was cleared. Two infantry companies of the 15th Infantry, with tank reinforcements, were ordered north across the canal at Bridges 6 and 8, and similar forces from the 30th Infantry were to cross at Bridges 12 and 13 with instructions to advance as far as possible without taking excessive casualties, and to take and hold the ground so gained.
The companies of the 15th Infantry did not move out in time to accomplish their mission prior to an attack by the 2d Battalion the following morning. The companies of the 30th Infantry moved north and became involved in fire fights at key road junctions north of the Mussolini Canal. One of these became famous as "Britt's Corner," so named in honor of Capt. Maurice L. Britt, commanding Company L, winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor for gallantry in southern Italy.
After the 3d Division had driven the enemy from his small defensive bridgeheads across the Mussolini Canal, and had established strong forces north of the canal, the enemy undertook a vigorous program of defensive works, with the object of halting our advance on flat ground and eventually building up reserves behind these defenses for a counterattack which was to drive us into the sea.
To accomplish this, we learned from later information, the enemy began to organize an MLR (main line of resistance) along the railroad line running northwest from Cisterna. This line crossed several low, rolling rises in the ground by means of alternating cuts and embankments, leaving few good level crossings for tanks and vehicles. This MLR terminated at the town of Cisterna as the enemy did not then dispose enough troops to attempt the extension southeast of Cisterna.
Having got this work started, the enemy began pushing his outposts down toward the canal in an effort to stop us and hold us as far south of his MLR as possible. With one or two companies he dug in along the road which looped down from Cisterna through Ponte Rotto and Carano, while other units were pushed down along the roads running south from Ponte Rotto and Cisterna. The German early realized the value of the masonry farmhouses, barns, silos and outdoor ovens for defensive purposes. He dug fire trenches around the outside foundations of the houses and put his machine guns inside the houses and the ovens (invariably located fifteen to twenty yards from the house), where they had blast protection and overhead cover against artillery time and percussion fire, and protection against small arms fire. Only tanks, TDs and heavy artillery proved effective against these positions.
On January 25 the 4th Ranger Battalion and 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved north and occupied a line, keeping contact with the British on their left. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment moved across the Mussolini Canal to the east in several groups, the 2d Battalion reaching Borgo Piave without much resistance prior to dark. The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, attacked northeast at 0500. Heavy resistance was encountered by both battalions about a mile and a half north of the canal. Plans were made for 1st Battalion, 15th, to attack up the Conca Cisterna road on the left of the 2d Battalion, which was ordered to hold an outpost position. The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, had a vicious fight to capture an important road junction on the Ponte Rotto road. After Company F, 30th Infantry had driven to within 300 yards of the junction on the 24th, the Ist Battalion next day drove through and captured the junction, losing two tanks in the attack. The enemy was able to look down the throats of the attackers as the junction was open. The attack flanked enemy positions to the east. Having reached this junction (thereafter known throughout the 30th as "Kinney's Corner" after Maj. Oliver G. Kinney, 1st Battalion CO) the battalion was ordered to outpost the position astride the road.
On January 26, the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, held and improved their positions. A road junction was captured by Company L, 30th Infantry, and Company K, 7th Infantry. The 504th Regiment withdrew its battalion from Borgo Piave, where it had withstood a counterattack during the night. The Ist Battalion, 15th Infantry, was to attack northeast. The battalion attacked at 1400 and met heavy resistance. It reached a line and held there during the night. Some enemy was driven out by enfilade fire from the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry. The 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments remained in position and began to prepare to dig defensive positions along the canal.
January 27 the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, and the Ranger Force advanced. Infantry elements of the Division south of the Mussolini Canal line were instructed to begin work on the defensive positions along the canal in order to provide a firm base for further operations as well as to provide security against a counterattack. The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, attacked through the 2d Battalion with the mission of cutting the Conca Cisterna road north of the 2d Battalion which it relieved. The 2d Battalion moved south of the canal in regimental reserve. The Ist Battalion, 15th Infantry, demonstrated with fire to assist the attack of the 3d Battalion. The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, relieved 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry. Patrols which reached the line of the railroad track west of Cisterna reported enemy digging in.
This maneuvering and displacing small, stiff fights and small. patrol actions were the prelude to the bloody January 30 -31, February 1 full scale Division attack. The first zephyrs did not indicate the full fury of the coming storm.
By the morning of January 28, it was apparent that our front was too wide. If further advances toward Cisterna were to be made, the now strong enemy resistance dictated a narrower zone of advance in order that maximum force should be concentrated for the attack. This was discussed with the Corps Commander, who agreed, and accordingly the Division boundary was moved to the stream north and south through Carano, and the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was relieved as far north as Bridge 5 by elements of the 179th Infantry of the 45th Division.
The 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion relieved the Ranger Force and 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the left.
This still left the Division (reinforced) front at nearly ten kilometers, which had to be held even during the attack.
Company A, 15th Infantry, repelled an enemy counterattack of platoon or company strength at daylight, January 28, destroying two armored vehicles.
On the right flank of the 30th Infantry there was an enemy pocket which would have to be eliminated prior to the Division attack against Cisterna. At 1100, January 28, Company 1, 30th Infantry, moved out toward the line of departure to destroy the enemy pocket. Under a heavy concentration of friendly artillery fire the infantry penetrated the enemy position. Enemy reaction was quick and determined, a dense concentration of heavy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire being called down upon our advancing infantry, which caused them to take cover after having suffered many casualties. Captain Boddy, the company commander, rallied his men quickly and assaulted the enemy position through a hail of deadly fire. His attack destroyed six enemy machine gun positions, killed at least 23 enemy, captured 19 and wounded an estimated 35 more. While this attack was progressing, the 2d Squad, 2d Platoon, protecting the company's left flank, was engaged in ejecting the enemy from the Fossa Feminamorta.
In previous campaigns T/5 Eric G. Gibson, a company cook, had often volunteered for combat assignments.
In Sicily Gibson had voluntarily led a pack train several miles across rugged mountainous terrain. His mission accomplished, he acted as number one scout, locating several enemy positions. The following day he had killed one and wounded another enemy. At Acerno, Formicola, and Mt. Rotundo, Gibson had likewise distinguished himself.
Said Rifleman Pvt. Joseph E. Chilcoat: "The attack (of January 28) began at 1200. By 1215 our squad had moved forward 400 yards and we had just entered the ditch, T/5 Gibson leading.... One of the men said Fossa Feminamorta meant the 'Ditch of Dead Women! We were afraid it would be the 'Ditch of the Dead Men' before we got out of it. T/5 Gibson told us to stay fifty yards behind him, while he went ahead and found the Germans for us . . ."
The squad had proceeded only a few steps when a blast of machine pistol fire opened up from a clump of brush along the ditch bank. Gibson did not even take cover, but ran twenty yards up the ditch firing his tommy gun from the hip as he went. He poked the gun muzzle into the brush and finished the German hidden there.
Under a heavy artillery concentration the squad again moved out. Knocked flat under the concussion of one close shell, Gibson had no sooner risen than he was fired upon by a machine pistol and rifle. Again he charged down the ditch, to fire his submachine gun into another pile of brush.
"When we came up to T/5 Gibson this time he had killed one German in the hole and another just climbing out with his hands up," related Pfc. John J. Slattery. "I wondered if we would have to do any fighting at all while T/5 Gibson was leading us."
Once again the squad took up the trek down the ditch. Instead of ordering his squad to assault the next machine gun which opened fire, Gibson ordered the men to build a base of fire while he crawled along the top of the ditch and flanked the position. Over the protestations of his squad he climbed the ditch bank and crawled 125 yards across the corner of an open field under the fire of artillery and two machine guns. When he reached a point within thirty five yards of the machine gun positions in the ditch he threw two hand grenades, arising before the second went off to charge the position. Here he killed two more Germans and captured another.
Down the ditch again, until the bend was reached. Gibson told his men to stay behind until he found if there were any Germans around the bend. The tensely waiting squad heard a machine pistol, followed by Gibson's tommy gun. When they ran around the bend they found two bodies Gibson and that of the enemy soldier who had opened fire. Gibson lay fallen in a firing position.
"T/5 Gibson brought his squad through its first combat safely," said BAR
man Pfc. Joseph W. Fiebelkern, cc though he died doing it. . . . There isn't very much you can say about T/5 Gibson except that there are very, very few like him."
In less than an hour he had eliminated four German emplacements killed five of the enemy and captured two more.
For this action T/5 Gibson was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
For its action on January 28-29, Company I, 30th Infantry was later cited. During its overwhelming attack Company I destroyed six enemy machine gun emplacements and killed 23 and wounded at least 35 enemy soldiers. Elements on the flank eliminated four enemy outpost positions. After attacking continuously for one and a half hours, Company I reached a point within 50 yards of its objective and was met with intense machine gun fire from enemy positions in a house on the right flank which enfiladed the ranks.
Elements of the company assaulted this enemy strongpoint, killing six and capturing 27 enemy, and enabling the company to reach its objective.
Patrols over the night of January 28-29 met enemy dug in positions, especially along a line south of the railroad tracks west of Cisterna, and along the 15th Infantry front. On January 29, preparations were begun for the attack on Cisterna.
Plans for our attack on Cisterna were carefully worked out and discussed at a meeting of all unit commanders the afternoon of January 29. The 7th Infantry was assigned objectives astride Highway 7 northeast of town; 15th Infantry was assigned similar objectives southeast of the town on the highway. The Ranger Force was. to capture and clean out the town it self by infiltration of two battalions one hour before H- hour. The 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments were to start one battalion each moving by infiltration at H-hour, following up with armor and more infantry prior to daylight, at an hour selected by each regimental commander. H-hour was 0200. The 30th Infantry was to hold the line between 7th and 15th Regiments, act as Division reserve, and assist the other regiments by fire.
Corps order directed the attack and capture of the town, cutting of the highway, and preparation for resumption of the attack toward Velletri.
At 0100, January 30, the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions advanced from their line of departure, infiltrated through the enemy strongpoints and met virtually no resistance. It was a paradoxical beginning of a day that was to witness their complete destruction before noon.
At daylight they were 800 yards south of Cisterna.
Here a wave of fire from tanks and self propelled guns hit them and they were immediately pinned down in ditches. They were attacked by tanks and Flakwagons which debouched from Cisterna infantry of an enemy parachute battalion which also emerged from the town, and by enemy machine gun fire from every one of the houses that lined the roads into town. Almost immediately they were surrounded and the capture of two battalions of some of the finest troops in the United States Army began.
Behind them the Commanding Officer of the Ranger Force was trying to shove his 4th Battalion through to them.
Part of what happened to all three battalions may be found in the pages of the War Room journal, with its record of telephone conversations:
0415: No news from 1st and 3d Battalions. Apparently OK. 4th Battalion is getting fire from all houses along the road.
0450: Still out of contact with two battalions. Things are going well. 4th Battalion is definitely held up on road. Commanding Officer of Rangers says he will send up tanks and TDs if things don't break soon.
0610: Hasn't heard from 1st and 3d Battalions. Artillery trying through forward observer. 4th Battalion having a tough time. 3d Reconnaissance Troop platoon attached to Rangers passed through them in jeeps, came back, were fired upon (a survivor reported that "a solid sheet of machine gun fire and hand grenades struck them!") and hit truck driven onto road by enemy; most of personnel killed or captured. (There were approximately forty men and officers in this group)
0820: Halftracks and TDs being sent up by Rangers hit artillery and mines south of roadblock.
0835: Call received from 1st and 3d Battalions, in south edge of Cisterna completely surrounded. Both battalion COs out, one killed, one wounded. Can't adjust fire; enemy in buildings; town strongly held.
1030: 4th Battalion well shaken up.
1210: Commanding Officer, Rangers, informs party with radio near Cisterna that a company of American PWs have been seen marching north toward town, instructed Rangers to try and rescue them.
1210: 504th Parachute Regiment, on right flank of Division, told to get its attached tanks down to rescue PWs if possible.
Sometimes a fragmentary conversation composed of jerky sentences and half sentences can tell more than fifty thousand words. There is on record such a conversation, mostly onesided, in the journal. It is the Commanding Officer, Colonel William 0. Darby, Ranger Force, talking by radio to his old Sergeant Major who was with a small group that had the only radio left in operation. It is a poignant conversation.
1215: Sgt: Nobody is giving up. Shoot them if they come any closer.
Darby: Issue some orders but don't let the boys give up! . . who's walking in with their hands up.? Don't let them do it! Get the officers to shoot! . . . Don't let them do it! . . . Do that before you give up! ... Get the old men together and lam for it. . _ We're coming through. Hang onto this radio until the last minute. How many men are still with you? Stick together. . . . Who's with the 1st Battalion? Use your head and do what is best.... You're there, and I'm here, unfortunately, and I can't help you, but whatever happens, God bless you!
1215: From Commanding Officer, Rangers: They came and got them at the last minute. My old sergeant major stayed with the last ten men. It was apparently too much for them.
The prosaic journal closes its account on the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions, Ranger Force, United States Army. They were then,, to all intents and purposes, written off by the War Department as "destroyed."
The plight of the 4th Ranger Battalion, meanwhile, was almost as desperate. It is also best revealed by a telephone conversation:
0820: 1 am afraid we have had some, bad luck. They (tanks and TDs) got up past 4th Battalion's position and down the road to the roadblock, tried to outflank the roadblock and ran into artillery fire and minefields. One halftrack and M10 knocked out. We got the men out of the M 10. The machine gun fire is terrific from both flanks. The shells are landing all over the place. Look like 170s. 4th Battalion is the boy that is in the jam. All of his communications are out. An officer just came in and apparently he is pinned down badly. He is trying to work them out by fours.
Meanwhile, every effort was also being made by the 1st and 3d Battalions, 15th Infantry, to push north and contact the surrounded battalions. An attempted breakthrough by halftracks and M10s was halted south of Feminamorta and our infantry was held to a slow rate of advance by enemy well entrenched in and around all the houses along the roads.
The flat, coverless nature of the terrain was ideal for infantry defense and our troops advanced through dense bands of fire. The enemy had to be cleaned out house by house; even so, small enemy detachments were unintentionally by-passed and held their positions and fired on our troops from the rear.
By noon, 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, was about 2000 yards from the last reported position of the illfated Ranger battalions.
The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved out on schedule but gained not more than 3000 yards that day, and the 2d Battalion, committed on the right of the Ist Battalion, was stopped with even less gain. The 3d Battalion was committed the night of January 30-31, to advance along the axis of the Ponte Rotto Cisterna road, and succeeded in reaching the stream west of Ponte Rotto the morning of January 31.
The Ist Battalion, 15th Infantry, also made slow progress the same day in the face of heavy resistance almost from the line of departure, and by nightfall had done well to gain 2000 yards. The 3d Battalion was attacking, by passing this resistance on the right, toward a road junction from the east; this mission was accomplished successfully and the battalion had seized the crossroad before dark of January 30.
The 1st Battalion, 30th, battling against the most intense Flak, tank, artillery, mortar, Nebelwerfer, and small arms fire encountered to that point, gained 1500 yards after having had to fight 500 yards to secure its own line of departure. The battalion drove to within 1500 yards of Cisterna, the closest any battalion of the 3d Division was to get until the breakthrough in May. When ordered slightly later to withdraw from his exposed and most forward position, Major Oliver G. Kinney, commanding, said, "Hell, no! We can hold!"
The Commanding General could afford to take no chances, however, and Major Kinney was ordered to withdraw to protect his exposed flanks and come within range of supporting artillery.
It was on January 30 at 1500 that Pfc. Lloyd C. Hawks, Medical Detachment, 30th Infantry, brought great glory to himself and to the combat medical man. He braved an enemy counterattack to rescue two wounded soldiers near Carano, who were lying helpless in an exposed position within thirty yards of the enemy. Two riflemen had previously attempted to reach their wounded comrades but had been driven back by the fierce fire of the enemy. An aid man had been critically wounded in a similar attempt. The citation of War Department General Orders No. 5, dated January 15, 1945, awarding Pfc. Hawks the Medal of Honor, best describes his deed of heroism and is quoted here in part:
". . . Private Hawks nevertheless crawled fifty yards through a veritable hail of machine gun bullets and flying mortar fragments to a small ditch, administered first aid to his fellow aid man who had sought cover therein, and continued toward the two wounded men fifty yards distant. An enemy machine gun bullet penetrated his helmet, knocked it from his head and momentarily stunned him. Thirteen bullets passed through his helmet as it lay on the ground within six inches of his body. Private Hawks crawled to the casualties, administered first aid to the more seriously wounded man, and dragged him to a covered position 25 yards distant. Despite continuous automatic fire from positions only 30 yards away and shells which exploded within 25 yards, Private Hawks returned to the second man and administered first aid to him. As he raised himself to obtain bandages from his medical kit his right hip was shattered by a burst of machine
gun fire and a second burst splintered his left forearm. Displaying dogged determination and extreme self-control despite severe pain and his dangling left arm, Private Hawks completed the task of bandaging the remaining casualty and with superhuman effort dragged him to the same depression to which he had brought the first man. Finding insufficient cover for three men at this point, Private Hawks crawled 75 yards in an effort to regain his company, reaching the ditch in which his fellow aid man was lying."
The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment captured crossings over the Mussolini Canal, both bridges having been demolished by the Germans before they could be seized and destroyed by our troops.
A member of 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, particularly distinguished himself during the night of January 30-31. By the evening of January 30, all assault battalions had suffered heavily, and the 1st of the 7th was no exception.
Said 1st Lt. Jan Capron, CO of Company B "The battalion took up a defensive position behind the crest of a small ground rise, in a horseshoe formation. Company B was occupying the center sector, with the battalion command post about 100 yards behind it.
". . . Automatic weapons were at a premium . . . Company B had only one machine gun for its sector. This weapon was in position about twenty five yards in front of our riflemen, overlooking about 600 yards of clear area between us and the enemy, who was occupying another section of the high ground to our front.
"Sgt. Truman C. Olson . . . was in charge of the six man crew manning this . . . one machine gun."
The enemy counterattacked continually throughout the night. Sergeant Olson's machine gun crew bore the brunt of the counterattacks and fired intermittently all night. When morning came five of Sergeant Olson's six men were casualties. At daybreak the enemy launched another counterattack. For two hours Sergeant Olson beat off the enemy almost single handedly, operating his weapon without assistance. He was the sole barrier between Company B and the enemy. There the Germans concentrated all types of fire in an effort to eliminate him.
After the fight, it was learned by Lieutenant Capron that Sergeant Olson had received severe mortar shell fragment wounds in his back and leg. Though suffering terrible pain and losing blood constantly he continued to man his machine gun and to beat off the enemy for an hour and a half, until the counterattack was broken and the enemy repulsed.
Said T/Sgt. John H. Earl: ". . . I brought the medics to Sergeant Olson. He had serious shell fragment wounds in his back and left leg and was just about done for when we arrived to evacuate him. His wounds were so severe that he died while being carried to the rear.
". . . It is only because he carried on when he knew his life was slowly ebbing away from his grievous wounds that others of us are alive today."
Sergeant Olson was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
On January 31, the attack was continued by 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, attacking through 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the Ponte Rotto Cisterna axis and by 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, on the Conca Cisterna axis. The attack was launched at 1400 and both battalions encountered strong opposition. The 1st Battalion, 30th, made about 1500 yards, and 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, made about 2500 yards.
The storm, having spent most of its full fury, began to die away in rapidly diminishing smaller actions. January 30 was the day its vortex fully swept over the 3d Division.
An attack by 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, on February 1, toward a vital road junction was stopped before dark without attaining its objective. Two counterattacks, one against 3d Battalion, 15th, and one against lst Battalion, 30th Infantry, were both repulsed with heavy casualties to the enemy.
Pfc. Alton W., Knappenberger of Company C almost singlehandedly repulsed the latter attack. During the attack all officers in the area were killed or captured and every noncommissioned officer either killed, wounded, captured, or dispersed. Eight men remained on the company's right flank, which was on the battalion left. One man had a bazooka, and the other, Knappenberger, had a BAR.
"During the counterattack, Pfc. Knappenberger took up a firing position on a small exposed knoll," said Pfc. Charles McGregor. "At about 0900 his position was rushed by a German platoon in strength, all of them armed with automatic weapons, fire from which struck all around his knoll."
A German machine gun crew moved into position about sixty five yards to Knappenberger's flank. He took his BAR and rose to a kneeling position, placing several well aimed bursts into the crew of four, which killed two, wounded a third, and forced another of the enemy to flee. "As Pfc. Knappenberger was firing his BAR at the machine gun, two Germans attempted to kill him with potato masher grenades, which burst but a few feet away," said S/Sgt. Ralph W. Moody. "A Flak gun, also, was covering the area with 20mm shells, Flak from which flew right over his knoll. As soon as he had destroyed the machine gun crew, Pfc. Knappenberger fired at the two grenade throwing Germans and killed them. . . ."
A grenade went off, killing the third. Said Pfc. Daniel P. Vasien: "A little later a Flakwagon opened fire on Pfc. Knappenberger and just missed him by inches. His position was attacked at about 0900 by a platoon. He kept a continual stream of lead pouring out of his BAR. He killed and wounded several of the enemy and stopped the platoon attack."
... But for the determined resistance against overwhelming odds of the small group of which Pfc. Knappenberger was most outstanding," stated Lt. Col. Edgar C. Doleman, much more serious losses would prob ably have been suffered. Had the enemy attack not been disrupted by these men for approximately two and one half hours its continuation could have had a serious effect on later operations by forcing occupation of less advanced and less favorable defensive positions.
For his action Pfc. Knappenberger was awarded the Medal of Honor.
The 7th Infantry's 2d Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, which was considerably reduced in strength, and the regiment repulsed a counterattack on the morning of February 2. Aggressive patrolling and continuation of defensive preparations were the main activity of February 2. About fifty PWs were taken in cleaning out small pockets of resistance behind the lines. A counterattack against 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, at 1600 was stopped without any loss of ground. Engineers took over the guarding of bridges across the northwest branch of the Mussolini Canal.
The Division prepared on February 3 to hold forward positions with outposts and to construct and occupy a main line of resistance along the northwest branch of the Mussolini Canal.
We now know that the enemy Order of Battle on the 3d Infantry Division front on February 1, when our attack on Cisterna had been definitely stopped included:
1st Battalion, 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 15 PG Division
1st Battalion, 1st Parachute Regiment, 1st Parachute Division
171st Reconnaissance Battalion, 71st Infantry Division
356th Reconnaissance Battalion, 356th Infantry Division
Parachute Machine Gun Battalion
114th Reconnaissance Battalion, 114th Infantry Division
2d Battalion, 1st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, Hermann Goering Division.
Luftwaffe Jaeger Battalion zbV 7
Assumed reserves: 67th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 26th Panzer Division. Schutzstaffel Brigade Reichsfuehrer
Hermann Goering Engineer Battalion
Thus the enemy had seven divisions represented by eleven battalions with which to oppose our attack, and roughly half of this total had not even been identified in our sector at the time our attack started. It will be noted that five of these battalions were reconnaissance units, which were speeded into action because of their ,mobility and comparatively heavy fire power. All but the Hermann Goering Reconnaissance Battalion were far away when we landed on January 22. The enemy had indeed moved swiftly.
Nor should one overlook the enemy artillery, which was brought up rapidly and was already present in strength at the time of the first attack on Cisterna. This consisted of 105mm howitzers and rifles, 150mm howitzers, 170mm rifles, 88mm antiaircraft, Antitank self-propelled and towed rifles, and six barrelled Nebelwerfers.
But what happened on January 30? Overwhelming opposition was not the only explanation.
Perhaps the lessons learned that day, bitter as they were, help best to explain the halting of our attack.
To begin with, infiltration tactics were chosen in the hope of establishing strong infantry forces in the enemy rear, isolating his forward defenses, and avoiding the necessity of attacking by daylight through interlocking machine gun and observed artillery fire. Great emphasis was placed on moving up supporting armor and antitank weapons prior to daylight.
The tactics used were not those best adapted to the attack on a numerous enemy, well dug in on a more or less continuous line. Later beachhead operations showed that these defenses could be penetrated only by overwhelming them from the front in a series of violent, carefully coordinated attacks against forward positions. Elements which infiltrate the forward positions are apt to find themselves cut off without succor, because, to reach them, other troops have to attack and eliminate the intervening defenses anyhow.
Second: Flat, treeless terrain is tough on the daylight attacker unless he has overwhelming artillery and air superiority, a carefully devised smoke plan, and a pin point knowledge of enemy positions and weaknesses.
These elements were simply not present in sufficient degree on January 30, 1944.
Third: The enemy house oven defenses were virtually new to the Division and proved tremendously effective. Later when we learned about them more fully we learned how to cope with them successfully.
Fourth: For the first time in the Division's World War Il history, the enemy was employing everything he had in defense, and not merely delaying. Thus, a battalion of parachutists not known to be in Cisterna provided one nasty surprise; counterattacking enemy who became more numerous in spite of heavy casualties another, copious and expertly handled artillery still a third.
In spite of all these adverse factors, the Division's attack was delivered with great violence, and gained a good deal of important ground, while inflicting enormous casualties on the enemy, probably more than the Division took itself. Actions of our magnificent infantry battalions during that two day period will remain long in the memory of the Division.
There was the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Frank B. Izenour. This battalion had been chosen to infiltrate to Highway 7 northwest Of Cisterna starting at H hour. Almost from the line of departure it ran into strong, stubborn resistance, so that its "infiltration" movement rapidly became a sticky infantry fire fight with all companies heavily engaged. Late in the morning the battalion had made only 1000 yards and was being fired at from the front and the two flanks. It was decided to commit the 2d Battalion on the right to clear the flank and enable it to keep rolling.
The afternoon witnessed the near destruction of the 1st Battalion but it also witnessed the killing of an estimated 200 enemy at the very least and the wounding or capture of many more. Colonel Izenour was himself wounded in the shoulder by machine pistol bullets.
In an orchard the battalion over-ran two enemy 105s.
Led by Capt. William Athis, commander of Company D, about twenty men turned the weapon around and used it to good effect on the enemy. Shortly before dusk it was reported that the battalion's leading elements had crossed the railroad track, a feat that was not repeated until the breakthrough of May 23. Maj.Frank C. Sinsel, who assumed command following Colonel Izenour's wound, received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions during this engagement.
A witness (a fighting soldier of the 1st Battalion) described the kind of an afternoon all the battalions had:
"Hollywood would have paid five million dollars to have had that on film. Here we were, walking in on the enemy and he had every weapon from machine guns on up zeroed in on us. Small arms and artillery were intense. Men were dropping all around. It made you wonder when you were going to get it. The rest of the men never even hesitated, just kept walking forward, only stopping to shoot. The tanks and TDs were moving right along with us, shooting hell out of houses and haystacks. When we got in on the Jerry positions they couldn't take it. They poured out of those foxholes. So then it was our turn. The fellows with their rifles and BARs and the TDs and tanks with their .30 and .50 caliber machine guns went to work on them. We knocked off a hell of a lot of kraut. In the orchard they were practically piled one on top of each other. The Marines at Tarawa had nothing on the 3d Division at Cisterna that day."
The battalion had gained about 3000 yards since H- hour against violent opposition. Unfortunately, it was reduced to 150 effectives, and the battalion commander was compelled to withdraw about 400 yards south of the track and set up a defensive position for the night. Later he was ordered to fall back even farther, approximately to the 2d Battalion position because of the exposed salient he occupied.
Patrols which visited this area later told of the carnage and loss of equipment on both sides in the area covered by this battalion. It was, an example outstanding among examples of fighting quality, ferocity in the attack and will to achieve an objective.
There was the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry. Ordered to attack north across country, east of the Cisterna Conca road in an effort to relieve the surrounded Rangers, this battalion organized in an area occupied by the 4th Ranger Battalion (which was to have followed the infiltration of the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions) and, under heavy fire from the start, moved 2000 yards across flat terrain and succeeded in capturing Feminamorta by nightfall, although this crossroad settlement was held in strength by enemy well equipped with antitank weapons. This attack might never have succeeded but for the heroic work of our armor, especially TDs which closed in on the built up area, destroyed three enemy antitank guns with pointblank fire and neutralized many of the most strongly held houses by pumping high velocity projectiles right through them.
There were the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, which made a gallant bid to smash their way into Cisterna the afternoon of January 31. Each battalion got to within about 2000 yards of the city in slashing attacks. The 2d Battalion of the 15th approaching from Feminamorta, got within 2000 yards of Cisterna, and the 1st Battalion of the 30th, tacking from Ponte Rotto, got within 1500 yards. Both battalions were rolling forward when halted by Division because the stiffness of the opposition, coupled with the advanced positions reached by these battalions, made it questionable whether their forward elements could be supported or reinforced. Some of their gains had to be sacrificed in order to hold a stable line later on, but this does not detract from the brilliant work they performed that day.
There was the 1st Battalion of the 15th which emerged from the three day battle with an average of eighteen to twenty men per company remaining.
These battalions are mentioned, not because their conduct was the exception, but rather the rule, of all the battalions and attached units during that period.
No newspaper accounts have ever been given a reasonable explanation of what happened to the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions in the first Battle of Cisterna. But in light of what was later learned about the enemy, and in light of the Division's most determined efforts to relieve the Rangers, it is possible to view their tragic isolation and destruction as a sober military fact rather than only as a gallant but unsuccessful struggle against overwhelming odds.
First: A prisoner from the 356th Reconnaissance Battalion, defending the Feminamorta sector, later said his unit had been orderd to allow our leading elements to pass through unmolested, in the expectation that they would be cut off and destroyed by enemy troops further back. This may explain why the Rangers' infiltration succeeded initially, as they reached the outskirts of Cisterna without having to fire a shot.
Secondly: The Rangers, having been originally organized for fast moving individual operations on foot, were not strong in automatic weapons, mortars, and communications equipment as the ordinary infantry battalion. They were actually primed for house
House fighting in Cisterna rather than for a defense against enemy tanks south of the city.
Thirdly: The tanks and TDs which were to have reached the Rangers by daylight scarcely got started before one M10 and one halftrack hit mines and were immobilized, and the others were unable to move forward until they had reached Feminamorta with the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, later in the day. The 4th Ranger Battalion, which was to attack north with the armor , was disorganized by intense enemy shelling and machine gun fire at the line of departure and was unable to progress beyond this point.
Fourth: Enemy armor and Flakwagons which debouched from Cisterna and attacked the Rangers on flat country shortly after daylight, succeeded in cutting them up into small uncoordinated groups which were later mopped up piecemeal. Success of our venture actually depended on the Rangers getting into Cisterna before daylight, as it was known that the Hermann Goering Division had tanks available for the town's defenses and could easily stand off the Rangers outside the build up area. Presence of the enemy parachute battalion was an additional reinforcement over and above the tanks.
Commendations later awarded individuals and units of the 3d Infantry Division reflect the spirit of these tremendous battles more truly than any prose.
That was the first battle of Cisterna. It was the most savage and disappointing action the Division had fought up to that time, and the first time the 3d had ceased to move forward in 100 days of action. But in accepting that setback, and withstanding the most terrible assaults the Germans could hurl against it in the months that followed, the Division took its place beside the greatest fighting units in our country's history.
The beachhead siege, which was to last four months to the day from the first landing on January 22, had set in.