Chapter 6
Anzio
The Tide of Battle Turns
(Part 2)

February 2 to March 3

The people of the United Nations, had they been completely informed on the situation, might 'have realized that between February 2 and March 3, 1944 a basically simple question was being hammered out in terrific strife and mental agony of thousands of men and women, on a ten fifteen mile patch of ground in Italy.

The question was simple because it boiled down to this: Were the British War Office and the United States War Department going to have to write off some of their most experienced combat divisions with the notation . . . "Destroyed" as happened in the case of the 1st and 3d Battalions, Ranger Force?

There were also the Special Service Force, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 4th Ranger Battalion, 36th and 39th Combat Engineer, Regiments, and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, thousands of service troops, doctors, nurses, airmen, and ground crewmen. Were they to be doomed to confinement in German prison camps or consignment to military cemeteries? Was a quantity of material to be lost in a military debacle such as the Allies had not known since the days of Gallipoli? The threat of all this was, unfortunately, all too real and absolutely not to be underestimated in considering our position on the Anzio Beachhead in February and early March, 1944.

Anyone who was on the beachhead had a pretty fair idea of the fate that awaited if the beachhead line had not held. The better part of thirteen German divisions sat in a watchful ring about that little patch of ground and did their best to make it the sort of Inferno such as a native son of Italy had once described as awaiting the souls of those who sinned on earth. Dante's descriptions, however, were imaginary. Anzio unfortunately, was not.

February was the most crucial month the 3d Infantry Division experienced since it began fighting in World War II. We were fighting for our lives and we knew it. There was no place to go if the Germans broke through our lines and no one was in a better position to know it than we. If the Germans made a serious penetration and were able to exploit that penetration quickly, it is hard to say what mercy we would have been shown, but it took no master mind to say accurately what would have been the military fact of the matter. In front of us was the enemy, behind us the Tyhrrenian Sea. It was a long swim back to Naples.

The enemy, who had begun his counteraction against the newly formed beachhead with as unlikely a conglomeration of units as could be formed anywhere, had nevertheless acted with unexpected rapidity in getting units into the line first to stop, then to counterattack the Allied forces.

We were fortunate in having gallant British allies, and worthy comrades in other United States divisions. They contained much of the enemy punch. But the ultimate trial of strength took place between some of the best troops in the German Army and the "Sturm" United States 3d Infantry Division. It ended in a complete defensive victory for the 3d.

While the first enemy units in contact were slowing, then holding the attack toward Cisterna di Littoria and the vital Rome Naples Highway 7, the Germans were pouring reinforcements of men and artillery into the beachhead sector at a very rapid rate. Orders had gone out from the High Command to stop, stop at any cost the threat to the German Army's rear in the south, and at considerable cost to the enemy it was stopped. But by February 3 we had more than evened the score. We had lost two battalions of the United States Ranger Force; one battalion of each of the regiments had taken terrific punishment, and the others in lesser, but still heavy, degree, as had the remaining 4th Ranger Battalion and the attached parachutists of the 504th Regiment and 509th Battalion. But the enemy had absorbed much greater punishment from our combined artillery, bombing, naval artillery, tank and tank destroyer onslaught, combined with the magnificent way in which the doughboys had moved in on enemy positions.

We know now, from completely reliable sources, that Adolf Hitler gave orders to push the beachhead into the sea. Let us see how the enemy went about attempting this:

For more than two weeks in February his attitude was chiefly defensive. He began by reorganizing and replacing his shattered units. Segments of organizations which had been hurled into various gaps in his defensive line were withdrawn or supplemented by more elements of the same organizations, in order better to reform his lines. He perfected his defenses in our sector, his main line of resistance following the line of the railroad track northwest of Cisterna on the line of Fosso di Cistern a Mussolini Canal south of the town. Then he continued to regroup his forces for his first big offensive.

February 3 and 4 found the 3d Infantry Division improving and consolidating its positions. Aggressive patrolling and continuation of defensive preparations was the main activity. On February 4, as the main line of resistance along the Mussolini Canal neared completion, weapons were sited and manned in forward areas, and these positions were stocked with ammunition and rations, in preparation for enlarging the beachhead line by the difference in distance between the canal positions and the forward positions. Erection of wire obstacles and the laying of defensive minefields began. Although their use signified defense rather than attack (attack had characterized the United States Army in the Mediterranean Theater since commencement of operations in French North Africa) a couple of vicious new antipersonnel mines which the Ordnance Department had developed gave us our first chance to strike back at the enemy with one of his own predominantly favorite weapons.

One company each from the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Infantry, remained on forward positions attached to the 30th Infantry. The remainder of the regiment moved to Division reserve in the vicinity of Le Ferriere. The 15th Infantry redisposed its forces, with about one-third of each battalion 'on the forward outpost line of resistance, one-third on the secondary line, and. the remaining one- third on the main line of resistance.

Elements of the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, in the 15th Infantry sector, remained on forward positions attached to the 15th (southwest of Ponte Rotto). The remainder of the Ist Battalion occupied primary and secondary defensive lines in the 30th Infantry sector. The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, moved to the vicinity of Le Ferriere and began working on MLR defenses. The 3d Battalion was released from Division reserve and moved to the vicinity of Campo Morto. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was organized on three defensive lines in its sector.

The reason for the scheme was obvious. We needed a defense in depth, and the only way to secure it was to have three separate lines which could be defended in their turn. If it became necessary to fall back from the first, the second could be defended, and if that had to be abandoned there was always the main line of resistance, behind which there was no retirement. The main line of resistance, if ever reached, would mark the turn of balance in the enemy's favor, and absolutely bad to be defended to the last man. As it turned out it was never necessary to abandon even the first line.

At 1700 February 5 an estimated company of enemy hit our outpost line, preceded by a short, intense artillery preparation, which caused the outpost line of resistance to fall back. The 7th Infantry found enemy Mark III tanks in its sector. This attack broke off shortly after it had started, and the enemy withdrew under cover of his own artillery. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, scheduled for relief by' the 30th Infantry, reassembled south of the Mussolini Canal and rejoined the regiment. Company K, 7th Infantry, counterattacked and restored all positions by 0230, February 6.

February 6 the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved into positions along the canal vacated by the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry. The remainder of the 7th Infantry was in assembly southwest of Le Ferriere.

At 0420 the 15th Infantry repulsed a platoon-size counterattack. Over the night of 6-7 the 3d Reconnaissance Troop and 3d Provisional Reconnaissance Troop patrolled, probing enemy positions.

During that night Divisional units were regrouped. The 15th, 30th and 504th Regiments were to defend forward areas with two battalions each, holding one battalion each in regimental reserve. The 7th Infantry was to organize and occupy a line on the northwest branch of the Mussolini Canal.

Company E, 15th Infantry, attacked on the evening of February 7, with the objective of taking the farm at Ponte Rotto. Strong opposition was encountered, and the fight continued until midnight. The company took four bitterly contested houses but did not reach its objective. Company F also attacked, going east toward Ponte Rotto with the mission of clearing the road junction there. The enemy was driven 1000 yards west of Ponte Rotto and Out of some houses, but this attack also stopped short of its objective.

During the night the enemy attacked the 15th Infantry along the Cisterna-Isola Bella axis, and reached the crossroad at Isola Bella (Feminamorta), but withdrew before daylight. The enemy also attacked down the west bank of Fosso delle Mole, but was driven off. An enemy platoon attacked Company K, 30th Infantry, at midnight and was repulsed.

On February 8 the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion repelled an attack northeast of Carano. In this action, Cpl. Paul B. Huff of Company A particularly distinguished himself. His company came under fire from its right flank which was exposed due to the company's forward position. Huff volunteered to lead a six-man patrol to investigate and determine the strength and location of the enemy forces.

Commencing at 0730, the patrol advanced toward a draw which was covered by fire from three enemy machine guns and a 20mm gun. In addition to being mined it was the only route of approach offering any cover whatsoever, and the patrol was forced to take it.

"As the patrol proceeded toward the objective the men came under small-arms and machine-gun fire and a concentration of mortar fire," said 1st Lt. Joseph J. Winsko. "Moving ahead of his patrol, Cpl. Huff came under the fire of the machine guns and the 20mm gun covering the draw. Realizing the danger to his patrol, he had them wait while he advanced through the minefield along the edge of the draw to within seventyfive yards of the nearest machine-gun position, having traveled 275 yards under fire of these guns."

Said lst Lt. Albert L. Kinderknecht, "Still under fire, which was striking all around him, he crawled the final seventy-five yards to the enemy machine gun and poking his weapon into the emplacement, killed the crew and destroyed the gun. Upon returning to the patrol he was continually under mortar, machine-gun and small-arms fire.

"Cpl. Huff reported back to his company with his entire patrol, suffering no casualties and giving valuable information. . . ."

"At 1300 hours," said Pfc. John E. Pumphrey, "without rest and under sniper fire, Cpl. Huff accompanied a combat patrol, led by Sgt. Kelly C. Bath, into position. The patrol attacked, killed 27 Germans, captured 21 prisoners and forced the remaining enemy to flee in disorder. His leadership of one section of this later patrol was a deciding factor in the success of the mission.

"The terrain was favorable to the enemy. With the exception of one ditch under enemy mortar fire there was no cover or concealment. The enemy had a clear field of observation and fire.

"Enemy sniper and mortar fire was heavy for much of the two patrols; mortar shells were landing within five to ten yards of the men and bullets were striking within two to three feet of them. During the attack enemy machine- gun fire and sniper fire were heavy. Visibility was excellent from 0730 hours to 1630 hours and the enemy were dug in 400 yards from our lines."

Corporal Huff was awarded the Medal of Honor for this action.

At this time an enemy force estimated at two divisions was beginning the first big effort to knock in the left flank of the beachhead in the British sector. Fighting for the "factory" at Aprilia was fierce, and although the line gave at some points the enemy did not succeed in penetrating it seriously enough to cause a major threat to the entire beachhead. Casualties were high on both sides. This attack died down after about three days of furious attacking by the enemy and intensive counterpreparations of the famed "meat grinder" British artillery fire. The lines held.

Between the last attacks early in the month and the time of the first big attack directed at the 3d Division there was somewhat of a lull. No description has yet been given of the more human visual aspects of the beachhead. Perhaps the viewpoint of a replacement who came to join the Division at this time should be included:

Our LST was sitting in the harbor about 3000 yards offshore when most of us came on deck that morning. There were several hundred of us, mostly replacements and return-to-unit men of the Division. Most of us were pretty curious about the beachhead, and scared, because we'd already heard a lot about it in the two and a half weeks since it was first made.

We got a typical greeting. There was a swishing sound, a vicious crack, and a geyser shot up about 400 yards from our ship, sending some of us back into the hold after our helmets. Several of us looked to some of the veterans of lower Italy and Sicily; hell, we didn't know the score.

A young kid of a sailor standing near me, so young he couldn't have found it necessary to shave more than once a week, said: "They got a couple of railroad guns sitting back by those hills that they can't spot. The Air Corps has been trying to get them for two weeks. Mostly the guns shoot into the town. That last one was about as far out into the water they can reach. Boy, I'll be glad when we get turned around and headed back for Naples."

1 looked where he pointed. The hills were large mountains against country that was flat as a sand table-- our territory. The air was clear as a bell and they loomed up there as though they were cut from blue cardboard.

I found out later that it was the Monti Lepini, a foremost tip of the Apennine Mountains. On its side was a cluster of buildings-Cori. To the left-north-was a pass through the "hills" and there was another mass of rugged high ground that ran back toward the sea ending before reaching it to leave another flat space along the water. This was the Colli Laziali, and on the side of it I could see another town, higher up than Cori. I found out later that this was Velletri.

Anzio was a mass of masonry behind which was a small rise and some trees. Even from where we were I could see there was considerable damage done to it. It was of about thirty feet elevation, rising away from the water. It fronted on a narrow sandy beach which seemed to run south for at least a couple of miles. Along that beach the ground away from the beaches rose into a cliff that was about a hundred feet at its greatest height. Farther the ground smoothed out again and. a pine forest hugged the water.

About eleven o'clock we were moving toward shore. There were thirty or so barrage balloons rising over and around the town. The gun had not fired again.

We docked at a paved-over stone jetty sticking out like an, arm into the water. It took about half an hour to get our group off the LST.

The officer in charge led us off in groups of platoon size, taking interval in a single column on either side of the street. I got a good look at Anzio. It was hammered, but as we got into it further I could see there were a lot of buildings which were fairly intact. There was a lot of the usual rubble around, of course, timbers, crumbled plaster and glass. We walked several hundred yards and turned left to follow a road along the sea. There were frequent antiaircraft emplacements sandbagged in. The crews looked us over as we marched by. There were a few British M.P.s and a lot of signs pointing to ration dumps, unit headquarters, different towns, and listing orders on traffic restrictions.

When we had gone about half a mile we came to a large, open field. There were about twenty six-by-six trucks dispersed around the field. An officer met the officer commanding our group and had us deployed over the field.

Finally we got called together again and assigned to regiments. We were packed into the trucks and they got moving. We started down the road back through part of the town. We drove over a blacktop road lined with evergreen trees. We got out into a clear stretch and then went into Nettuno. The trucks barreled right along.

We had no sooner got out of town than a hell of a racket sprung up all around us. It was antiaircraft fire of all calibers. We looked up, and there, streaking through the sky were three planes. There was a flock of black puffs around them. They headed right for the harbor, and when they got near it they went into a shallow dive. You could see the glint of bombs. Then they turned north and streaked away as they'd come, with the guns still shooting at them. Around one of the LSTs in the harbor there were several terrific explosions and huge waterspouts, but when the water had settled back down, the ship was still there and looked undamaged.

A few minutes later and six or seven friendly planes were flying circles over the harbor.

After a couple of miles along a rutted road the trucks turned off into a field. On the right was a large patch of scrub oak. We could see quite a few men and tents scattered through it. We unloaded. It was the regimental service company and rear command-post area.

The men there were all wearing brown overall-like combat suits and jackets of the same color, most of them tucked inside the suits. Most of the suits were mud-stained; everyone wore helmets and most of them carried sidearms or rifles.

We all had overcoats and a two-blanket roll. We were told that we would be assigned to battalions and taken up the next day, after the regimental commander had spoken to us. So we slept in the open that night and damn near froze.

While we were still trying to thaw out the next day, we were lined up by an officer doing his best to sound tough, and pretty soon the regimental commander came up in his jeep. He was rough, and he didn't waste any words.

"Close in so you can hear me," he barked. When we had closed in the Colonel looked around. "You're now part of the - tb Infantry," he said. "You're going up as replacements to the best goddamn regiment in the United States Army. You're joining a crack unit of a crack division. You will be expected to live up to the traditions of that regiment and that division.

"You're going to suffer. You came here to suffer. You're going to suffer everything that the Boche can throw at you and you're going to suffer everything that goes with a miserable goddamn climate. But you're going to take it like men.

"We've quit playing games. This is serious business. The Boche is sitting out there with seven or eight divisions and trying to shove us into the ocean. Upon you men depends the future of every living soul on this beachhead. Don't make any mistake about it. It's men like you that're going up into front-line foxholes and stop the attack that the Boche is going to throw within a week. And you're going to get up there with the idea that you will kill as many of them as possible. That's the only thing that's going to keep us from being shoved into the sea, is killing Boche.

"Listen to what the men up there have got to tell you about how to kill. Boche, but don't listen to any defeatist talk from any of 'em. You're new, but as far as we're concerned you're every bit as good a man, each one of you, as the best man in the division, until or unless you show us otherwise."

There was some more on the same line. Then the colonel saluted and got into his jeep and drove off.

I joined my battalion on the side of a hill. They had dug in there. We got sent out to our companies. The one I was assigned to was on the other side of that hill. They were just out of the lines for a short time, and there weren't many of them. They'd just finished a big attack on Cisterna and a lot of them had been killed and wounded. The men looked tired, and most of them were unshaven.

They didn't say much when we came in, -clean and shiny in our new overcoats, packs, and helmets. They just looked at us. But they came in close to see what we were like.

The company commander, a young second lieutenant, grouped us into a semi-circle and made us a little speech right there on the side of the hill. He said we were welcome and that we were badly needed. He said he was glad we were so well equipped because there was a big supply problem, and while we could get anything we needed it was better to start with it than have to requisition it. He said we only had, a few days before we would probably return to the lines. He said we only had a few combat suits that the hospitals had taken off the casualties and sent back to us, so until we could get us one we had better hang on to our overcoats. He said keep your weapons in good order and pay attention to all the pointers the old men could give us. He said, last, that he hoped we were glad to be joining a first-class fighting outfit and good luck to all of us.

We got assigned to platoons and squads.

We stuck around that area for a week. The weather turned rainy, and the holes we dug filled up with water. We were a miserable bunch. The only thing to be done was bail out, get some straw, and try to get the bottom of the hole dry enough to lay on. The wind was sharp and ice-cold. The old men told us it wasn't so bad here, to wait until we got into the line where we couldn't get out of our holes. It was bad enough already for us.

We moved up into the line starting about six o'clock one evening. It was black as pitch and you had to watch the man ahead. I don't know where the road led, all I know is that we marched for about five or six miles, with a couple of halts.

You could tell when you were getting close to the line. You passed most of the artillery, which was popping away from time to time. You looked off to the front and flank and every once in awhile you could see a squirt of white tracer and it seemed to float its way toward our lines. That was Jerry. Ours answered with bursts that had red tracer in them. They seemed to be steadier. Then, from far off there was the blurt of a machine rifle, or the tacktack-tack of one of our machine guns. It got louder as we got closer.

Once we heard a couple of shells coming in and hit the dirt, but they landed quite a ways away. The old men told us in whispers that it was a pretty quiet night and for us to hope it stayed that way. We were spread out, of course, and keeping a good interval between us.

Pretty soon we got off the road and on to a plowed field. It was rough and muddy and hard going. Pretty soon it was all you could do to keep going. After some time we halted and the word was passed to spread out and get down. After marching we were pretty warm, but when we lay on that wet ground we began to get cold almost right away., After a while the squad leader rounded us up and led us forward. We waded a creek and got told, in whispers, not to make so goddam. much noise. We got to the top of a little rise and we were in the front line.

It was pretty quiet, but that only made us all the more nervous. When a Jerry flare popped about a quarter mile away we all hit the dirt. The squad leaders took two of us to a two- man foxhole. We could just barely see a couple of boys rounding up some equipment. They climbed out and said, "Here it is. You're welcome to it." Then we climbed in.

The bottom was squashy. It wasn't a very big hole, about chest deep. Part of it was boarded over. At the front was a dirt ledge. I felt around this and found a bandolier of ammunition and five hand grenades.

The squad leader came around a few minutes later and said that one of us had to be awake at all times, and for Christ's sake if we heard or saw anything in front of us, not to challenge too loud or hesitate to shoot if we didn't get the right answer.

It was cold as usual the rest of that night, but it was pretty hard staying awake. All through the night there were flares going up from the Jerry lines. Once Jerry threw in a terrific artillery barrage which landed about five hundred yards behind us. I was scared.

We were around for ten days. It was just plain hell all through the day, and the nights were worse. We had five days of rain. The hole got about six inches of water, and you couldn't do anything but try to bail it out with your helmet. We wrapped shelter halves and blankets around us but they didn't do much good. They got soaked with rain and then you sat on a piece of wood or something and shivered and cussed. If you "had to go," you had to, think about it before daylight because you couldn't get out of that hole once the sun came up, or ever show the top of your head.

At night we got canned "C" rations. Toward the last they brought them up warmed up a little, and coffee, only a little warm by the time it got to us, and once in a while a beef sandwich or some doughnuts. Those did more to help our morale than anything else, except mail. But it was pretty fierce.

You had to get out of the hole when it got dark for several reasons, one of which was to get some circulation back into your feet. A lot of the boys went to the medics with bad cases of trench foot, but I wasn't that lucky.

Jerry threw in a lot of artillery and mortars. The best thing to do was pull in your head and pray. Some of that big stuff would cave in the side of a wet foxhole like it was sand, and a couple of the boys got buried right in their hole fifty yards away from me. We had two or three casualties every day, mostly from artillery and mortars. If you got it at night you were lucky, because they could get you out right away. God help you if you got hit in the daytime, because you might have to lay there all day before somebody could get to you. A couple of our medics got Silver Stars for going out in the daytime to help wounded men. One of them got his posthumously.

We stayed there through the first big attack around the middle of February....

The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment repelled an attack northeast of Bridge 5 on February 9. February 10 the attack was resumed with one or two companies, but was repulsed. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved up to the canal to be ready to meet the threat against the 504th. The 4th Ranger Battalion was attached to the 504th.

At 0330 February 12 an enemy company attacked Company C, 15th Infantry. The outposts were temporarily forced back, but positions were restored by 0505.

On February 13, 7th and 30th Regiments reconnoitered each other's positions in preparation for relief of the 30th Infantry by the 7th. Two enemy platoons attacked Company D, 504th Regiment at 0315, but were driven off. A few enemy penetrated the outpost position but were all either killed or captured.

The night of February 14-15 the lst Battalion, 7th Infantry, relieved the lst Battalion, 30th Infantry, and was attached to the 30th. The Ist Battalion, 30th, moved to the other's old position and was attached to the 7th.

The frequency of patrol clashes and small-scale counterattacks had the appearance of probing for weaknesses in our lines. It seemed certain that the enemy was shortly to mount a large-scale attack in our sector, something he had not yet attempted. It is possible that he found the standpat defenses of the British a nut too tough to crack and hoped, by a sudden shift, to catch us off balance and drive through our lines, splitting the beachhead down the middle, following which would be a mere cleaning out of the entire beachhead.

Before going into the description of that day, his method of attack should be briefly examined. As it was to develop, his main effort on February 16 took place along the Albano-Anzio road axis, and the full force of it enveloped the 45th Infantry Division 'on our left flank. At the same time, however, he struck at seven separate places in the sector of the 3d Infantry Division, and any weaknesses displayed in our lines could have been quickly exploited by reserves who were waiting for just that chance. If he had succeeded in his major effort, the beachhead would have been effectively cut in two, the British and the 45th Division on one side, and the 3d Division, its attachments, and the Special Service Force on the other.

Added to our knowledge that the Germans had moved in troops and men to the immediate beachhead area was the fact that now was the time for the enemy to strike. If he waited any longer, we would be stronger in minefields, barbed-wire entanglements, and antitank and machine- gun emplacements. He knew that, and we knew that. Thus an attack was expected by our Intelligence almost hourly, as February 16 approached.

Enemy armor continued to build up in the Cisterna area. For several days during early February the daily Intelligence summary carried, the following warning:

"His (the enemy's) attitude is that of active, aggressive defense, with attacks being launched on any Allied penetration that threatens the security of his main defense position. Active reconnaissance, similar to the attack on our front on 5 February and limited objective counterattacks may be, expected frequently as he I attempts to determine our dispositions, strength, and consequent intentions. Enemy strength in the 3d Division sector is now believed to be such that should he appreciate a change on our part from an offensive to a defensive attitude, he would well be able to contain a large portion of the front with light forces and mass considerable strength for an attack in any chosen sector."

On the eve of the attack the following units had been identified at one time or another in the beach head sector: elements of 71st Infantry Division, Schutzstaffel Reichsfuehrer Division, 26th Panzer Division, 715th Infantry Division, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, 114th Light Division, lst Parachute Division, Hermann Goering Panzer Division, 65th Infantry Division, and 4th Parachute Division. In addition there had, at one time or another, been identified the following, or elements thereof: Luftwaffe Jaeger Battalion, zbV 7 (a special mission group), Parachute Lehr Regiment, 356th Fusilier Battalion, and 1028th Grenadier Regiment.

Naturally, not all of these units were in the line. But their presence at some time in the beachhead sector indicated the mass of men available to the enemy for his major effort.

While the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was relieving the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, information of heavy vehicular traffic toward Cisterna was beginning to sift into the Division Headquarters War Room. This began in the late afternoon, February 15.

At 0735: A report came in from PW interrogaters at VI Corps that a captured German said his officer had told him to "take a good look at the terrain, because something big is coming off February 16." The PW said there was a rumor of a big attack, the object being to reduce the bridgehead and split it down the center.

At 0005, February 16: A radar report received at the War Room told of a big concentration of armor in the vicinity of Cisterna.

0035: Call from 30th Infantry: "A patrol just returned and they said they thought the enemy might be forming for an attack."

An intercepted radio message revealed that a big attack was planned to begin just about daylight. Quickly a VI Corps artillery "shoot" (or "Bingo") was arranged for 0430. The total weight of every piece of artillery on the beachhead would be brought to bear on targets all around the beachhead to last half an hour. Further fires would be on call from observer.

At 0430 the skies split wide open. Cannon roared and argued; it was like a huge eruption, and brought to mind moving pictures of the first World War. It was the greatest artillery concentration that had yet been fired on the Anzio Beachhead. German front lines were pounded. At the same time known routes of supply, enemy artillery emplacements, road junctions, likely assembly areas, and reserve assembly areas were also hit.

About the time the sky grew gray with light the German artillery began to interject its note of returning fire. Intermingled with the solid crack and thunder of " outgoing mail" was the whine and crash of incoming shells. And about the time our barrage began to slacken off the enemy fire reached its vicious peak. Artillery of all calibers fell on our front lines and worked its way back to our secondary line. Greatest caliber was 170mm. From distances as great as a half mile these shells sounded as though they were landing right next to one. Huge geysers of wet earth blossomed and descended on the torn ground. The earth was churned up yard by yard. As this preparation began to lift, the German infantry attack began.

0545: Call from 30th Infantry: "Just received word from F Company, 7th Infantry, that there was approximately a company of enemy moving toward their position and that artillery fire had ceased."

0635: Call from SSF: "Jerries have a little show up here coming toward our lines. They're putting some heavy barrages on our left."

0645: Call from VI Corps: "45th Infantry Division just called that heavy artillery just started on their front and from the way the thing just started, it looks like today should be the day."

0655: Call from 509th: "We have a PW who stated that the general attack was to take place down the draw between 509th and 30th. There has been a large patrol reported in front of us. lst Battalion, 7th, reported an impending attack, but it seems to have slowed down."

0715: Call from 504th: "We need some more artillery help here. Called Divarty (Division Artillery) and they allotted me half a battalion. I need more-they're out in front of E and F company. Using our own artillery."

0730: Call from 30th: "Seem to be having a little activity. Talked to I Company and he said that about one- half hour ago about a hundred Germans came over that hill out of Ponte Rotto and they laid mortar and machine gun on them and about forty of them kept coming. They are in defilade now in that little creek. Another group tried to come over from the northwest above the little tip 83 (Refers to Hill: Ed.) and they've got them under fire and they are pinned down by that. That seems to be fairly well under control. Company K met an attack of approximately a hundred men and they have been taken under artillery fire. Also had a report of an uncounted number of tanks in the K Company area. Have alerted the TDs and ordered the AT defense in that area. In front of F Company the same situation, but no armor. Got a PW taken by the Para who claims that there was a battalion of tanks supposed to come down the draw by the graveyard. They had an 88 SP gun attached to the battalion. Said they had armor, about thirty 'Tigers' and forty 'Panthers.' This man was a private and that is a lot of information for a private. Everything seems to be pretty well under control."

0730: Call from 15th: "Enemy artillery concentra tion along Ist Battalion front. Small infantry action in front of B Company."

0745: Call from SSF: "The actual size of opposition is not fully determined. No penetration as yet."

0810: Call from 30th: "There has been a penetration of K Company's position by approximately a company. L Company, the reserve, is alerted and is going to have to hit it on the point or take it in the flank if possible. K Company forward positions are holding. Tanks are reported to the left of K Company-are being taken under fire by TDs at the present time."

0815: Call from 509th: "The Germans are laying smoke all along the front . . . We have been in contact with the enemy and killed a few and the enemy seemed to withdraw. We are putting mortar on them now."

0825: Call from 601st TD: "I have some information from my people in 30th sector. They fired on some tanks. They said observation was poor and the tanks seem to have gone into a defiladed position. They are keeping close watch for them. I also have some information from a PW. He states that at the graveyard there is a battalion that is going to make an attack. If it is not successful, they have 30 Mark VIs and 40 Mark IVs which will try to make a breakthrough."

0830: Call to Divarty: "The attack seems to have moved up north."

0835: Call from VI Corps: "CO, SSF, says it has died down on his front."

0955: Call from Bridge 5: "There are two ME 109s hedgehopping over the canal keeping spaced and trying to knock down the 3d Division Cub plane."

1050: Call to VI Corps: "Slight penetration between K Company, 30th, and E Company, 7th, that they are restoring with a local counterattack. Still fighting along the front, but it has died down."

1115: Call from 30th: "Element of G Company is moving over to retake that area in E Company. C Company is moving up behind our 3d Battalion and will push in through K Company positions to restore the two front line platoons . . . C Company of the 7th is going to go through L and K Companies and push on the positions held by the two platoons and clear the Germans out of that house . . ."

By noon it was clear that our artillery counterpreparation delivered at daylight had greatly succeeded in breaking the attack before it got into full swing. That will be brought out later. Two slight penetrations had been made. The enemy had succeeded in driving a wedge between Company E, 7th Infantry, and Company K, 30th Infantry. Company C, 7th Infantry was preparing to counterattack to wipe that out. A small part of Company E, 7th Infantry, had been pushed off position. Company G moved over rapidly to retake this ground.

1300: Call to Asst. CG from CG: CG: "What is the score over there?" Asst. CG: "C Company attack is about to jump off. The left of the 3d Battalion is receiving another attack on the left flank of K Company. Estimated to be a company. The other attack is about to go. We are starting from behind K Company and will go through it with concentrations prepared to lay on the objective, which is a house . . ."

1410: "The attack is going off but slowly . .

1605: "This attack is moving along and it looks like we have it straightened out . . ."

1630: Call from CG 45th Division: "We are all set over here. Our lines are pretty well restored over by that factory (Aprilia) now. The Boche had quite a lot of men clear across the area down to the sea and there were some tanks in there. We've had some good shooting today-I believe they've taken quite a few casualties (the enemy)."

1630: Call from SSF: Everything is quiet now

1825: Call from 504th: "As a result of the action in front of D Company this morning, there was a mixup this afternoon. A truce was declared to enable the dead and wounded to be collected and one of our medics who speaks German was out talking with the kraut medics. They told him that the attack was made by one company. He was smart enough to take a count of the bodies, and he counted thirty-eight of them . . . He says they are all very young. The wounded casualties would be in proportion to the dead so they must have taken quite a beating."

1800: Call from 509th: "Small enemy groups have been trying to infiltrate through our left forward position, around A Company, which have been driven oful

2020: Call from Asst. CG: "I've contacted CO 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, and CO 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry . . . 2d Battalion CO states his right flank is in vicinity of where it was this morning ... The whole of companies C and G with two tanks are cleaning it UP."

During the night of February 16 the Division completed cleaning up elements of attacking enemy units remaining on the front and restoring the salient along Fosso delle Mole. Patrols maintained contact with the enemy during the night. Enemy attacks of February 16 were estimated to have involved five battalions on the 3d Infantry Division front and to have cost the enemy 150 dead and 250 wounded.

During the course of the day's action the 15th Infantry's Company "J", a provisional company made up of drivers, cooks, and mechanics of the 15th Infantry, repulsed an attack of about a hundred enemy, inflicting many casualties.

Except for the penetration between the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, and 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, and the other slight salient before mentioned, the enemy had been completely repulsed at all points. The two slight enemy successes were both wiped out before midnight of February 16.

The diary of a captured German officer of the 29th Artillery Regiment revealed that the main drive was along the Anzio-Albano axis, with three objectives: Fosso di Carocetto, a lateral road in that sector, and Bosco di Padiglione. The first wave was to consist of the 114th Jaeger Division on the left, the 153d Infantry Division in the center, and the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division on the right. The second wave was to be formed on the 26th Panzer Division and 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. According to this diary, the method of the attack was to be: first, radio controlled tanks with 450 kilograms of explosives; second, a "break-in"; and third, a tank attack by 20 Mark VI tanks and 80 Mark V tanks supported by self-propelled guns and howitzers.

Second Lieutenant Carl J. Kasper, a FA Battalion forward observer with the 30th Infantry, during the morning's attack adjusted artillery fire on his own position when that position was threatened. His last fire adjustment order came over the radio: "Five Zero Over" (indicating to Fire Direction Center to shorten range by fifty yards).

"Someone in fire direction must have pointed out that he was firing on his own position," said T/5 Jack H. McDurman, "for he came back with, I know-. Fire on me.'

"Lieutenant Kasper set fire to his map and a few personal papers and then told us to destroy the radio. As soon as the radio was put out of commission he told us to leave, if we wanted to.

"The last time I saw Lieutenant Kasper, he was shooting his pistol out the front door at a group of enemy soldiers who had made their way to within fifteen yards of the house. I wasn't wasting any time and ran for the drainage ditch which I knew to be about fifty yards back of the house. Just as I reached the ditch I looked back toward the house; shells were landing all around it. There must have been at least eight direct hits-the house was just one big cloud of smoke and dust . . . When I looked back the last time, there was only one wall left standing; the rest of the house was only rubble."

Lieutenant Kasper was captured. He was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The main attack was a limited success on February 16 against the 45th Infantry Division on our left flank. The enemy succeeded in making a penetration of several hundred yards. The following day, February 17 he continued the attack in this sector and succeeded in enlarging his gains to about 3000 yards. It thus became urgent to commit a strong force in this sector to gain back the lost ground. Any further gains would constitute a serious threat to the security of the entire beachhead. The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, had just been relieved by the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, a relief that had been delayed one night by February 16's attack. The entire 30th Infantry was now in Division reserve south of Le Ferriere. Accordingly, on February 18 the 30th Infantry was attached to the lst Armored Division and instructed to plan for a counterattack in the 45th Division sector for the following day.

Continuation of February 16's attack in the 45th Division sector also brought a small attack between the 7th Infantry and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion on its left, over. the night of February 17, but this was repulsed.

At this time the 3d's Commanding General, Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, was ordered by the Commanding General, Fifth Army, to take command of the VI Corps, which then included the lst and 56th, British Divisions, the United States 45th, and 3d Infantry and lst Armored Divisions, the 36th and 39th Combat Engineer Regiments, United States-Canadian Special Service Force, 4th Ranger Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion. In addition to these combat organizations, VI Corps had thousands of organic and attached special and service troops. General Truscott had commanded the 3d Division since its training period at Port Lyautey, French Morocco, in 1943, eleven months before. Brig. Gen. John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, Assistant Division Commander, was assigned as commander of the Division and Col. (a few days later Brigadier General) Whitfield P. Shepard became the Assistant Division Commander.

In his published farewell order, General Truscott ended by saying "The memory of your fine spirit, your self- confidence, your devotion to duty, and your splendid discipline that brought about your many victories in the last year will be with me always and I will cherish that memory as one of my most priceless possessions.

"Good luck and Godspeed to victory to you all."

Just before daylight on February 19 the 2d Battalion, 30th, crossed the line of departure on the right of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment of the lst Armored Division, to take part in what was to be one of the most smashing successes of all limited-objective counterattacks on the beachhead. The lst Battalion, 30th Infantry, followed at 0700. They were preceded by an intense artillery preparation. Initially only long-range machinegun fire and antitank fire was received, but resistance shortly got very stiff. Company F proceeded against little opposition, but Company E found the going extremely difficult.

Despite this, at 1030 the 2d Battalion was 1200 yards forward of the line of departure and still moving. The regimental plan contemplated passing the lst Battalion through the 2d Battalion in continuation of the attack. The VI Corps Commanding General, however, decided that any further gains would put the 30th Infantry in a dangerously exposed salient into the enemy lines, and at 1645,. as the lst Battalion was preparing to pass through, the attack was called off and the 2d Battalion was ordered to consolidate the ground gained.

During the day, the 2d Battalion had taken about 200 prisoners and killed many more enemy. The regiment was still moving when the attack was called off, and casualties suffered were low in comparison with the ground retaken, with its significance to the security of the beachhead.

The attack also proved costly to the 2d Battalion, for the commanding officer, Lt. Col. Lyle W. Bernard, was wounded one-half hour after the jumpoff and replaced by Lt. Col. Woodrow W. Stromberg, who Was at the time observing from Division Headquarters. Every officer in Company E, as well as the First Sergeant was killed; every officer in Company F, but one, as well as the First Sergeant, was killed or wounded, and the losses among the other enlisted men in these companies was proportionately high.

The outpost line established upon the ordered withdrawal of 2d Battalion was held by Company G, some 1,400 yards ahead. During the two days this company remained on outpost, a line was prepared behind them for occupation by 45th lnfantry Division elements.

Prisoners for several days afterward continued to talk of the intensity of United States artillery fire, losses suffered by their individual units, and the low quality of their own replacements.

At 1210 on the same day (February 19), an estimated enemy battalion hit strongly between the left flank of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, and the right flank of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion. It was immediately taken under a devastating artillery barrage and small-arms fire and the attack was stopped within an hour. The enemy took a breathing space, regrouped, and at 1545 three or four tanks followed by infantry resumed the attack. This was repulsed with no penetration within two hours.

1650: Call from VI Corps: "They did a wonderful job out there today. Took plenty of prisoners and knocked them around a bit."

2100: Call from VI Corps: "Swell work today. Keep after them. General Lucas."

Major General Harmon, lst Armored Division Commanding General, also praised the 30th Infantry for its outstanding role in his successful counterattack, stating that this attack had "saved the beachhead." The same sentiment was echoed on high level at VI Corps.

On the same day the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment also had a fire fight, but no attack developed.

The usual aggressive patrolling marked February 20 and 21. The 30th Infantry was detached from lst Armored Division and placed in Corps reserve, in the vicinity of Campo Morto and Le Ferriere.

On February 22, the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, was released from Corps reserve and attached to the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, moving into positions extending from Carano 1500 yards northward. A forming attack by an enemy battalion in front of the 509th was broken up by artillery.

From February 23-28 the Division continued to hold on to all positions and the usual aggressive patrolling was carried out.

The enemy had by no means exhausted his resources, nor his will to attack with the intention of destroying the beachhead. The Intelligence Summary for February 27 warned:

"The enemy has now had eight days since the attack down the Albano-Anzio axis in which to regroup and reorganize his badly disorganized forces. During this period there has been some indication that he has displaced his artillery, in part, to alternate positions. The bulk of his artillery still, however, remains in the west ern sector of the beachhead, from where it can support a resumption of the attack in the Carrocetto area. Replacements have been received in some of the units-, and sufficient time has elapsed to have permitted the enemy to bring up additional ammunition and other supplies. It is believed that he is now capable of continuing the attacks on the beachhead; and that, when the weather affords him artillery observation and is suit able for the employment of armor, he will resume his offensive action. The increase in activity along the eastern flank of the beachhead makes it seem likely that some diversionary effort may be made at this time, possibly in the vicinity of Bridge No. 5, in conjunction with the main effort, which will, in all probability, be continued on the western flank. It can be logically assumed that the Hermann Goering Panzer Division' the chief elements of which have been out of the line resting for some days past, will spearhead this effort. The offensive capabilities of troops now in contact in the 3d (US) Infantry Division sector are not believed great enough to lend much assistance to this effort."

In reality, the enemy was shifting considerable strength to this sector in preparation for his huge attack of February 29. He was also employing a process of attrition, or infringement on the beachhead line. In the British sector, where he held Carrocetto and the "factory," wherever he could seize a small portion of ground he immediately moved up enough troops to hold it, laying wire and mines. Every salient point he could take he deemed worthy of holding.

He had available for the attack of February 29 the following divisions or elements thereof:

In addition he had a battalion-sized force, called "zbV 7", and the 1028th Grenadier Regiment (Motorized).

That he used strong forces from all of these divisions against the 3d Infantry Division during the period February 29-March 3 we know from identifications of the large numbers of prisoners captured in our sector during that time. Five divisions against one.

The enemy now intended to force a decision.

February 28-1600: Call from Divarty: "Report of three enemy tanks . . . We're firing on them with the 9th Field Artillery ......

1745: Call from VI Corps: PW said there was quite a few tanks coming into Cisterna and the attack would come- very shortly."

2007: Call from VI Corps: "77th Field Artillery reports trains running in and out of Velletri. Smokescreen laid on front and troops moving up ... Company or more observed in this group. Personnel running around there all day. PW said he had heard that tanks were rolling forward for a new attack . . . Another PW . . . said 300 tanks, mostly Tigers, are nearing Cisterna and that an attack will come very shortly" .

Beginning at 2130 the Commanding General called all regiments and informed them to be especially alert, and to be sure that patrols were active and alert. During the night enemy artillery increased noticeably.

0500: Call from 7th Infantry: "Both of our frontline battalions are receiving a hell of an artillery barrage which started fifteen minutes ago. . . ."

At first light the enemy attacked in the area of Fosso Carano, against the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, and south of Cisterna against the 15th Infantry, and in the center of the Division sector against the 7th Infantry. The attacks were supported by a total of forty Mark IV and VI tanks, and the 362d Infantry Division was identified for the first time as spearheading the attack. Elements from Hermann Goering Panzer Division, 26th Panzer Division, and at least a regiment each from the 715th Infantry Division and 114th Jager Division also took part in the assault.

At 0605 the first infantry attack hit between 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Infantry, and an hour later the left flank of the 2d Battalion came under attack. Company F was immediately shifted to back up Company E on the left flank.

0643: Call from 7th Infantry: "There is a 20-man penetration between L and A companies of our outfit. Reported to 300 yards behind L Company, which report is unconfirmed so far."

0650: Call from 7th Infantry: "2d Battalion is being attacked on both flanks but they said situation was in hand. Had report that few enemy got in vicinity of K Company and are being cleaned up."

0735: Call from 7th Infantry: "Just lost contact with 509th. Understood they withdrew a unit. Would like further information. The 2d Battalion CO thinks they have broken through over there but he doesn't know for sure. I've ordered F Company to move on that flank and C Company to back them up."

0745: Call from 7th Infantry: "Received radio message from 509th: 'Breakthrough on our lines-need tanks- urgent! ' "

A great battle lies behind the cryptic lines. In some sectors of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, an old German battle tactic was being used-rush in closely packed, screaming. The machine gunners were having a field day. It was a dirty, bitter fight, however. The morning was miserable, wet, and cold. Shivering soldiers stood in water- filled holes and forced themselves to hold rifles steady enough to shoot. From one artillery OP could be seen figures in gray-green long overcoats, carrying shiny messgear, infiltrating down draws. The observer waited until the draw had filled, then gave orders for a concentration of fire. When the smoke had cleared, green figures lay still, or writhing, on the ground.

Lt. Col. John A. Heintges of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, saw about 200 Germans formed in defilade' about to attack the 2d Battalion on his left, and ordered artillery on them, completely smashing the attack and leaving dozens of dead enemy lying on the ground.

Tank destroyers of the 601st Battalion pulled out from behind sheltering houses and blasted away, almost pointblank, at attacking tanks. Gunners from the regimental antitank companies stood their ground with their comparatively small 37mm and 57mm antitank guns and shot until their targets, or they themselves, were destroyed.

Most serious situation developed in the 509th sector where the lines were stretched extra thin. The enemy had attacked at daylight in battalion strength and penetrated about 700 yards on a 1000-yard front, with a maximum penetration of 1500 yards. The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, was given orders to prepare for a counterattack to regain the lost ground.

A 40-man patrol infiltrated into a 15th Infantry position. The bulk of the patrol was captured, and the remainder killed or driven out. About noon, fourteen enemy tanks supported by a company of infantry attacked Isola Bella and drove a platoon of Company G, 15th Infantry, out of position north of the crossroad, but other positions were held. Company F, 15th Infantry, moved up and relieved Company G at Isola Bella, digging in immediately south of the crossroad, astride the road. Company G moved a short distance south on the Conca-Cisterna road and took up position.

Said Lt. Col. Jack Toffey, CO 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry: " . . . A German company, with machine guns and tank support, assaulted our outposts near Ponte Rotto. Control of this tiny settlement was essential to our operations and the machine gunners and riflemen lodged in the houses around it were ordered although outnumbered, to hold at all costs . . .."

"The brunt of the kraut attack struck at a house some 800 yards beyond the company CP," said MG squad- leader Robert L. Jones, "which was held by Pfc. John B. Silva . . . his machine-gun crew, and about half a dozen riflemen. Through the haze and mist, a whole company of krauts, backed with two machine guns, approached our position and opened up with a terrific volume of fire."

Silva waited until advance enemy elements were within fifty yards then opened fire, mowing down every German who exposed himself.

The enemy continued to advance. Two machine guns laid down intense fire on the barricaded window which Silva was using for a gun position. Rifle-grenadiers opened fire, while others rushed up to within a few yards of the house and hurled hand grenades.

"In spite of the odds and the terrific punishment he was taking," said Sergeant Jones, "Pfc. Silva kept his gun going continuously. As long as we could hear the fire of our machine gun, we were able to forget our fear and keep on sniping at the enemy."

The enemy was stopped for two hours, at the end of which time he brought up a Mark VI tank and placed it in turret defilade in an irrigation ditch about a hundred yards from the house.

The tank fired eight rounds, from its 88mm gun, at point-blank range. The house, seriously weakened by previous artillery concentrations, came tumbling down in a rain of masonry, rafters, and other debris. Silva, in spite of the shaking up and the cuts and bruises he sustained, dug himself out of the mess, and found his machine gun buried beneath the mass of rubble. He commenced cleaning and checking its serviceability.

Said Sergeant Jones, "Picking myself up in the midst of the dust and rubble, I saw Pfc. Silva frantically removing debris which had covered his machine gun. Bleeding and bruised, he rapidly wiped the barrel and slot with a rag and ran a cleaning rod through the dust-covered barrel."

" . . The Germans were advancing," said Sgt. (then Private) Willard Plegge, "believing that the Mark VI had knocked out our machine gun and that all they had to do was mop up. Pfc. Silva quickly disillusioned them. He dragged his machine gun to the opposite corner of what had been the building and set up a new firing position in the mass of rubble. I heard his machine gun go into action a second time; again the kraut was stopped dead."

Silva, in this newly-exposed position, continued to fire his gun until he had exhausted his ammunition. Then, instead of withdrawing, he ran through the wreckage of the house, found four boxes of ammunition, carried them back to the gun and resumed fire.

Said 2d Lt. (then S/Sgt.) William H. Trachimewicz, "All day he operated his machine gun single-handed, holding off the strong enemy force. At twilight, he exhausted his ammunition for the second time. Instead of taking advantage of semidarkness to withdraw, Pfc. Silva seized a carbine and continued to fire at the enemy. In this way he managed to hold off the Germans until fresh supplies of machine-gun ammunition came up from the rear.

"After thirteen hours of virtually single-handed combat, he turned over his gun to a relief crew. Through his gallant action he had thwarted an attack by approximately a hundred Germans, killing about thirty of them. The house was held. We had broken a powerful enemy attack without yielding ground."

Another epic defense that day was put up by Pfc. Frederick Vance and Pfc. Eugene Procaccini of Company 1, 30th Infantry, in which both men lost their lives.

"At about 0530 hours, the enemy attacked in great strength," said Capt. Maurice Rothseid, CO of Company I, "utilizing at least two companies of infantry, supported by artillery, in their first wave. After fighting for about twenty minutes, the left flank and center outposts withdrew to the MLR. However, the right flank outpost, which was manned by Pfc. Vance . . . assistant BAR man and his gunner,. Pfc. Eugene Procaccini, held fast in the face of the enemy onslaught."

About sixty enemy concentrated their efforts in an attempt to eliminate the outpost, using heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery fire 'to "soften it up." When the fire was lifted the enemy began advancing in short rushes and succeeded in reaching to within twenty yards of the position. Meanwhile another wave of Germans struck the left flank, forcing the company to divert most of its firepower to that sector, leaving Vance and Procaccini unassisted. Nevertheless they remained in position and cut down enemy who charged. Suddenly a figure arose from the outpost and began crawling back to the MLR.

"As the figure got closer, I saw that it was Pfc. Vance," related Squad Leader S/Sgt. William C. Beeson. "He was moving as fast as a man can on his belly and elbows, coming right through an artillery concentration. He had left his rifle back in the outpost."

Procaccini, meanwhile, having run out of BAR ammunition, opened fire with Vance's M-1 rifle.

Captain Rothseid told Vance that he had done his job and that it was time for the two men to abandon the outpost, but Vance merely continued stuffing a couple of sandbags with ammunition. When he had filled them he picked up another M-1 from a nearby casualty and commenced crawling back toward the outpost. When he had got about halfway an enemy machine gun opened fire from a range of about seventy-five yards, the bullets tearing through his pack. Vance stopped crawling, worked his M-1 into firing position, and with two shots disposed of the enemy gunner and his assistant. Then he continued his slow crawl until he had reached the emplacement.

During his absence Procaccini had been keeping the Germans at bay with his M-1 by standing up despite withering small-arms fire, and firing at every enemy soldier he saw, but they had continued to infiltrate toward him. With the increased firepower, the two men again began to hold their own.

After about an hour the enemy abandoned hopes of an infantry assault and wheeled a self-propelled gun into position. Said Rifleman Pfc. Herman E. Johnson, ". . . While the gun was getting the range, Pfc. Vance and Pfc. Procaccini turned their attention to the attack on our MLR and directed intense and effective fire on the flank of the attacking krauts, throwing them into confusion. Finally, the SP gun scored a direct hit, which killed them both instantly."

"Their unselfish heroism held back an overpowering enemy attack for over two hours, giving the rest of the company time to adjust artillery fire which completely stopped it," said -Sgt. Beeson. "Later, when we went to the outpost, I saw these two men had fired the M-1 until its rifling had been completely worn out; the weapon was absolutely useless. In all, these men had killed eighteen krauts and wounded at least eighteen more. Five of the krauts they had killed lay within ten feet of their emplacement."

Both Pfc. Procaccini and Pfc. Vance were posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment stopped two attacks, one of small scale against Company A, and one of company size against the 4th Ranger Battalion, attached.

The attacks against the 7th Infantry were heaviest, but nowhere did the enemy gain and hold any ground. In the afternoon the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry,, and Company C, 7th Infantry, both initiated counterattacks, Company C attacking up the Fosso della Crocetta on the right of the 2d Battalion's attack through Carano. The company attack continued until nightfall, and succeeded in clearing out some infiltration down that stream, which was just to the left of 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, jumped off on its second large-scale counterattack within ten days, at 2130, February 29. It was a bloody affair for both sides, but the attack was absolutely essential to the security of the beachhead.

The attack reached its first phase line 1,200 yards beyond the line of departure by 0130, March 1, when the battalion encountered extremely heavy small-arms and automatic-weapons fire in pitch darkness and heavy rain. At 0545, after reorganizing in the dark, and coordinating all three companies under trying weather, the attack resumed. By 0815 the entire enemy penetration attacks had been eliminated, and 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, took over the 509th position.

How dangerous the situation had been prior to the attack was revealed when the regimental commander of the 30th, Lieutenant Colonel McGarr, inspected the ground over which the attack had been made and found German bodies a bare hundred yards north of Carano.

Nothing has yet been said of the artillery in the day's attack. When all the accounts of the day's action were finally compiled, it was clearly evident that the artillery was the instrumental arm in breaking the force of the attack. Principal employment was against enemy reserves. PW`s taken revealed that practically all communications had been cut, reserves scattered and demoralized, attacking units severely cut up and further reduced by accurate small-arms and machine-gun fire. The fire of over 1200 pieces of artillery was employed that day, and several batteries fired a total of shells during the period exceeding any number they had ever before fired.

During the day the enemy lost fourteen tanks, more than 150 prisoners, and several hundred killed and wounded in the 3d Infantry Division sector. By noon of March 1 the PW count had swelled to over 300.

Engineers cratered and mined roads leading into our sector over the night of February 29-March 1. The 3d Battalion, lst Armored Regiment, moved into the 3d Division area in general support.

Three enemy attacks, one supported by tanks, were repulsed during the afternoon of March 1. Artillery fire broke up an attack of 200 men against the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry. An attack of two companies supported by tanks against the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry was repulsed only after six tanks had broken into the platoon positions of Company K and fired pointblank at the men in their foxholes. Artillery fire repulsed an enemy push against the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry. During the night of March 1-2 our positions were consolidated, wire and mines placed, and cratering and mining of roads leading into enemy territory continued. Prisoners continued to stream in, a total of 153 being counted in the 24-hour period between noon of March 1 and noon of March 2. During the same period twenty tanks were destroyed.

On March 2 and 3, several small-scale enemy attacks supported by tanks were repulsed successfully, except southwest of Ponte Rotto where two tanks ran right up the road and got into platoon positions of Company L, 7th Infantry, and behind one of their forward platoon positions. This forced an element of Company I on the right of the road to fall back, and the abandonment of the forward position on the left of the road by L Company.

Companies A and B, 7th Infantry, formed for a counterattack, Company A on the right of the road, and Company B on the left. From the beginning A Company came under terrific Nebelwerfer, artillery self-propelled, and small-arms and machine-gun fire, and Company B likewise received a good deal of artillery and time-fire from self-propelled weapons, but nevertheless pushed as far forward as was practicable. Company A received very heavy casualties, but after nightfall was able to reconsolidate the ground lost by Company I.

The line again rejoined and rested on the Ponte Rotto road, although 300 yards remained in enemy hands, and could not be retaken on account of intense artillery and small-arms and machine-gun fire. That night the road was cratered and mined.

An attack of eight enemy tanks and a company of infantry was repulsed by the 15th Infantry the same day. Two tanks were destroyed. From noon of March 2 to noon of March 3, eight enemy tanks were put out of action.

This day marked the' end of the enemy's offensive effort and his return to the defense.

Prisoners taken from February 29 to March 3 included men from the following units: