Allied Headquarters, Naples, March 3-A strong German drive into the center of the Anzio beachhead this week was described officially today as a "costly failure." Allied Headquarters said defense positions remained intact with all lost ground regained.

The enemy offensive, the third large-scale attempt to drive the American and British forces into the sea, had now collapsed. Two final German assaults with tanks and infantry late Wednesday were repulsed, it was announced, and no new attacks came yesterday.

U. S. Troops of the 3d Infantry Division bore the brunt of the attack and scored "a complete defensive success," a headquarters spokesman said. Less than a week ago, the 3d, originally composed chiefly of troops from the Pacific Coast, was officially commended for previous exploits on the beachhead.

"Rock of the Marne"

(Graham Hovey in a dispatch from the beachhead today, said the 3d's stand was a brilliant repetition of the performance which won it the title of "The Rock of the Marne" in July, 1918, when it played a major part in repulsing the last great German offensive of the last war.)

(A Regular Army unit, the Fighting 3d landed in French Morocco on November 8, 1942, and played an important role in the quick success of the American Expeditionary Force. Later the division paced Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's march through Sicily and has carried a big share of the Fifth Army's fighting in Italy since shortly after Salerno.)

The German 14th Army has abandoned its third major attempt to crush the Allied beachhead below Rome, it was disclosed officially today, after taking a savage, 36-hour beating from the veteran American 3d Infantry Division and a record concentration of Allied planes and cannon.

Counting their dead in the hundreds, the ... (Germans) ... fell back to their initial jumping-off place yesterday as the Americans completed the liquidation of the 1500-yard salient won and lost by the Germans at a staggering cost. . . . (Lt. Gen. Mark W.) Clark paid tribute to the American 3d Division-the Rock of the Marne-whose doughboys smashed the last Hindenburg offensive in France in July, 1918.

The 3d, supported by a number of other units, took on the full weight of the German attack and broke it in embittered, hand-to-hand fighting. . . ."

Truly, the 3d Infantry Division had earned its niche in military history. From the ashes of this great defeat, the Wehrmacht could not, or at any rate did not, mount another attack of the same proportions against the Anzio Beachhead. The terrible losses inflicted against the enemy were sufficient to make him realize that we were on Anzio to stay. As the months wore on in their monotonous bitterness, the area became a supply dump bristling with munitions and materiel, and before the German hold was broken in May around the edge of the beachhead line, two more United States divisions came to swell our strength sufficiently to be of major value in the drive on Rome.

Said the Commanding General, lst British Division: "Congratulations on your work out there today. Our lads have been bucked up quite a bit,"

The ill-fated German attack proved to be the last kick of a do-or-die German effort to push the Anzio Beachhead back into the sea-Kesselring's hopes for destroying our beachhead had vanished forever.

Breathing heavily, the enemy retired to the security of his prepared positions, which he immediately began to strengthen.

Brig. Gen. John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, the new Division Commander, well aware of the enemy impotency at this time, ordered that all front-line men be given a two-day rest beginning March 8, and a rest camp under the supervision of Maj. Robert E. Mitchell, Division Special Service Officer, was set up in a clump of woods about five miles south of the "hot" zone. The rest period was also devoted to unit reorganization. Infantry units took advantage of the opportunity to rest a company at a time.

The camp was not in a quiet zone by any means but the men were given new uniforms to wear (and no forms to fill out), they had hot showers, they went to the movies (even during blackout hours), they had barber service (including shaves) and, most important of all, they had two nights of uninterrupted sleep, for many the first in seven weeks.

Although the usual lull that follows all storms prevailed, there was no let-down in patrolling, consolidation of position and the laying of harassing and interdictory fires.

For the first time in its combat experience in this war, the Division had been required to hold a defensive sector after seizing an objective and the assignment was made doubly difficult by the tremendous importance which the enemy attached to the destruction of our beachhead.

Even in the wake of his setback, the enemy continued to move his outposts nearer our lines. Our combat patrols, always active, seldom failed to find resistance somewhere, as on March 8 when a patrol of the 15th Infantry, working along the canal near the Cisterna-Sessano road, was engaged in two fire fights. On the same day an enemy patrol of platoon size tried to in- filtrate our positions and was brought under artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire southwest of Ponte Rotto and forced to withdraw.

A German wire-laying detail was surprised while operating near our front line the following day and two prisoners were taken by members of Company B, 7th Infantry. The 30th Infantry captured the pilot of an enemy plane that crashed in its sector the same day.

Many attempts to probe our defenses and infiltrate our positions added to the population of the Division PW cage, where interrogaters obtained much information during the somewhat quiet days that marked the month of March.

The stone houses of standard design that lined the few roads to our front were fortified centers of resistance and generally contained bunkers dug into floors. When the houses were destroyed, the debris fell on top of the bunkers and served to increase camouflage and protection.

Ovens, built in every yard, were used as machine-gun nests while manure piles and straw stacks frequently served as positions for automatic weapons.

The situation became such a see-saw affair that every house in the Division sector was pin-pointed on the War Room map, with each dwelling designated by number, i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, etc.

The houses numbered 5 and 6, northwest of Carano, became objects of special attention. Houses 1, 2, and 3, or what remained of them, were in our hands, House No. 3 being on the rim of the Division outpost line. House No. 4 was in "no man's land." Beyond lay Houses 5 and 6.

On March 10 a strong combat patrol of the 30th Infantry made a sneak attack on the houses and ran into terrific fire from both inside the houses and from concealed positions around them. A tank also came out of hiding to take part in the melee.

The battle raged for two hours but the odds were too great against the patrol, whose members were caught in cross-fires of machine guns and automatic weapons. The patrol fought until its ammunition ran out and withdrew.

On the same morning 15th Infantry sent out a patrol from Company L, commanded by lst Lt. James W. Coles, to attack House No. 7, about 300 yards from House No. 6. Again, well-protected machine guns and automatic weapons were met in abundance. This patrol also fought to the end of its ammunition and caused one German to emerge from the house with upraised hands. One of his own machine guns cut him down as he advanced toward the patrol to surrender.

Fights similar to these were frequent.

In the early hours of March 12, Ist Lt. Richard B. Peckinpaugh, commanding Company K, 30th Infantry, led a combat patrol into a draw and headed northeast into enemy territory.

The men encountered an enemy machine gun guarding a road junction and destroyed it with an AP rifle grenade, killing three men. They continued up the road a few hundred yards and destroyed another enemy machine gun with the same tactics, this time killing two. Machine-gun and rifle fire from nearby houses drove the patrol to cover and Lieutenant Peckinpaugh and his men were making their way back through another draw when they caught an enemy position by surprise, killing six and capturing twelve. The patrol's record for the day: eleven enemy killed, twelve captured, two machine-gun nests destroyed.

Houses 5 and 6 were still operating when the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion received orders to silence the inhabitants who for weeks had resisted attempt after attempt to evict them. Once before the 509th had tried to take House No. 5 but didn't succeed. This time it would be different. The plan for attack was arranged, the 'chutists fully briefed on their mission.

On the night of March 13-14 the battalion's mortar and machine-gun crews moved out under cover of darkness and stole into positions within range of Houses 5 and 6. All night long they dug with muffled sound, placed their guns, built up a supply of ammunition. They spent the following day in concealment near their guns, studying the targets, ranging in.

Company L, 30th Infantry, sent an outpost to the vicinity of House No. 6 to assist in securing a line of departure for the 509th's attack.

The attack had been minutely planned before Company C moved out to the attack at 0100, March 15, followed by Company A in reserve. The inevitable occurred when the attackers neared their objective. Machine guns, pistols and small arms spat from the houses with a spontaneity that turned the night's darkness into a sieve of white and black.

Tracers screamed across the marshes from House No. 7. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was brought into play and the horizon blazed as two Nebelwerfer batteries opened up from positions along a railroad track 5,000 yards to our front. Four German 81mm mortars that had been spilling death in our area of attack fell into silence when Corps Artillery answered a call-for counterbattery with perfect accuracy. Even the Long Toms (155mm. gun) couldn't reach the Nebelwerfers, however.

A bake oven in the back yard of House No. 6 suddenly came to life, but it wilted quickly when two fragmentation grenades hit their mark. White phosphorus smoke from grenades sent over to shield our positions added to the stench, which was made somewhat more unbearable by the light drizzle that had started when the attack began. House No. 6 fell at 0430, ending a terrific two-hour struggle that brought death and injury to many paratroopers, but which reflected much credit on the entire battalion. House No. 5 still hung by a thread.

At 0530 the enemy started a counterattack at our left flank with an estimated two platoons. This was smashed in its infancy by a terrific barrage from our 105s.

All during the night a 4.2 mortar company of the 84th Chemical Battalion and the 60mm mortars of the parachute battlion kept surrounding houses under fire, notably House No. 7, which later was the starting point, for another counterattack that was stopped at its inception, mainly by BARs employed at close range.

The Germans in House No. 5 surrendered late in the afternoon, just as the 'chutists were preparing to level the house with pole charges and bangalore torpedoes.

The 509th had avenged a previous setback, and moved the 3d Division front line 500 yards nearer Rome by taking Houses 5 and 6.

The night of March 15 saw 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, relieving 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion completely. Company L, under Capt. Robert B. Pridgen, was ordered to take over the two houses. Relieving the parachutists in House 6, the company moved to take over 5 and found that the enemy, in the process of counterattacking both houses, had again seized number 5. This counterattack was repulsed after vicious nightlong fighting, in which Company L sustained eighteen casualties, including two officers wounded.

After Company L had secured House 5 and occupied House 6, it and the remainder of 3d Battalion began outposting all houses to prevent enemy infiltration from the north; improved the positions with barbed wire and hasty minefields, and placed guns at strategic points to defend against another counterattack. The rears of the houses were broken out to enable tanks to take up positions inside. The houses had been a tough objective to take and the doughboys of the 3d did not intend to lose them-and they didn't, although the Germans made several futile attempts to regain them.

The strong defenses set up around Houses 5 and 6 demonstrated the value of ground on the beachhead. The situation was best described by Colonel Yarborough when he briefed the 'chutists prior to their attack.

"The price of ground here is skyrocketing like the price of Scotch whiskey-high as hell and just as hard to get," he said.

The miserly affection with which the ground was coveted is shown by the fact that during March the Division Engineers, assisted by infantrymen, erected no less than 17,400 yards of double-apron fence and laid some 7,000 antitank mines in the Division area. Triple- concertina and barbed wire entanglements enmeshed all infantry positions while bridges within our control were kept prepared for demolition at all times. Road craters were used extensively as antitank measures and on one occasion an enemy SP gun, stopped at a crater, was knocked out by AT fire and a Mark IV tank which tried to by-pass it suffered the same fate. Varied antiparachutist defenses dotted our rear areas.

Daylight movements were held to a minimum, due to excellent enemy observation. Messenger runs, except in emergency, were invariably made under cover of darkness. Despite this handicap more than 22,000 runs were made during the month by the operations platoon of the 3d Signal Company. More than 400 miles of wire circuits were maintained, and much of the wire was placed under ground, especially in the forward areas. Lt. Col. Jesse F. Thomas was the Division Signal Officer.

The 3d Division learned that to seize a beachhead was one thing-to hold it indefinitely was another.

As the end of March drew near the conquered ground was well nigh impregnable. In fact, it was so secure that activities took on the appearance of garrison life right under the nose of Kesselring's forces.

A naturalization ceremony in which thirty-seven members of the Division became citizens of the United States, was held on the beachhead. Thomas S. Estes, United States vice-consul at Algiers and special representative of the United States Department of justice, conferred the citizenship upon men whose residences were listed from fifteen states.

A romance which began in Sicily ended in a sandbagged hospital tent in the battle zone when 2d Lt. Genevieve Clark, an Army nurse, was married to Ist Lt. Thomas G. Rose of the 3d Signal Company. A pair of improvised candelabra, stained red with iodine, added dignity to the setting as some 300 nurses, officers and enlisted men sat on cartridge cases and cots to witness the nuptials. There was a reception after the wedding and the bride cut the 25-pound cake with a trench knife.

The Division started relinquishing its portion of the beachhead line March 22 and units withdrew piecemeal from their positions as units of the 34th Infantry Division moved in to replace them.

The final week in this area also marked the dissolution of the pack trains commanded by Capt. Raymond E. Baker. The departure of the animals recalled many outstanding deeds performed by the mounted reconnaissance and pack troops in the long trek through mountains in Sicily and Southern Italy.

In the Avellino area of southern Italy, Ist Lt. Jack Hallett had led a reconnaissance detachment on a 30mile scouting trip which took his men fifteen miles behind the German lines seeking demolished bridges, pillboxes and strongly fortified enemy positions. Their radio stopped functioning far up in the mountains and each bit of information was sent back to headquarters by runner. When the detachment returned, two men had been lost to enemy action and sixteen had been sent back as individual messengers.

Their main mission, however, was to harass the enemy, screen the Division movement and protect our flanks. How well they did this job was reflected by the sadness that marked the passing of the 3d Provisional Reconnaissance Troop, 3d Provisional Pack Train, 3d Provisional Pack Battery and the Provisional Mortar Platoon from the 3d Infantry Division.

The men who had comprised these outfits, all volunteers for the duty, were returned to their former status in the Division.

At 0900 March 28 the Division was officially relieved of command of the sector, ending sixty-seven consecutive days in the line from 0200 January 22, 1944.

The units enjoyed a two-day breathing spell at the rest camp which was interrupted by an air attack March 29. Men of the 441 st AAA AW Bn hit six enemy ME 109s and FW 190s during the fight. From D-day to the rest period, the 441st, under command of Lt. Col. Thomas H. Leary, downed twenty-three enemy planes, damaged three and had three probables.

The Division, after its rest, moved into the Torre Astura area where it trained intensively for the next two weeks on defense and limited-objective attacks.

On April 7, the following message was received by General O'Daniel from the Commanding General of VI Corps :

To the Officers and Men of the Third Infantry Division:

Upon the relief of the Third Infantry Division from front-line duty, where it has been since D-day, I desire to express my appreciation for the complete and loyal cooperation of every officer and man. The outstanding accomplishments of the Division during the entire battle since 22 January and, particularly, the outstanding work in connection with stopping the final German attack on 29 February and succeeding days, will be a bright page in our future history.

(Signed) L. K. Truscott, JR.,

Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

While enemy harassing tactics continued throughout the training period, reports from adjacent units indicated the Germans were continuing a defensive attitude throughout the sector.

On April 9 the 34th Division reported that four remote- controlled tanks (Goliaths) had exploded close to their front lines and that a rifle grenade had destroyed a fifth one.

The British, on the left flank of the 34th, reported that a "rocket-like projectile with a 3,000-foot-long streak" had been observed but unidentified.

After a two-week layoff from combat, the 3d began to move into position to relieve the 45th Division on April 11. By 0600 April 16, the Division had completed the relief and was in command, with a mission to straighten out its lines, relieve enemy pressure on vital strong points and improve its defensive positions.

The 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments occupied the new front-line positions, with the 15th in reserve. The 7th's sector, on the left, was wooded and cut with draws, affording the enemy good opportunity for infiltration into our positions. The 30th's front was more open, although it was cut with one unusually deep draw, the Spaccasassi Creek, down which the enemy was to attempt several attacks.

The regiments spent the first day locating sniper posts, improving their defensive works, and establishing outposts and listening posts. The 7th sent out a combat patrol to find approach routes for infiltrating troops to more favorable positions.

On the following day, the 2d Battalion of the 30th celebrated its return to combat by firing all its organic weapons on known enemy positions in a five-minute barrage that shook the lethargic beachhead. That night, the 191st Tank Battalion, attached, fired 120 rounds in a single shoot and started a large fire in the enemy area. The Division had returned to action, blazing away.

The Germans were intent on containing the 3d in its present position and the 3d was determined to straighten the weaving front that offered opportunities for enemy flank attack.

Our combat patrols annoyed the enemy for several days but with no noticeable effect-the scalloped front still remained. On April 21, three combat patrols tried in vain to oust four enemy machine guns that created a bulge in the 7th's sector between Companies K and L. A limited objective attack, the kind the Division had been training for at Torre Astura, was launched against the positions at 2200 April 22 with Company G, supported by four tanks, assaulting. Companies K and L were in support. It was an allnight fight but by daybreak the enemy positions had been destroyed and twenty-seven prisoners had been taken.

Two other plans for raids into enemy territory had been completed and were ready for execution-the operations known as "Mr. Black" and "Mr. Green."

The enemy had made three attacks down the Spaccasassi Creek bed against Company B, 30th Infantry on April 22, so General O'Daniel decided to forestall future pushes by taking the ground to the immediate front of the lst Battalion of the 30th, in the initial operation.

The "Mr. Black" operation was an attack by Company A of the 30th that developed into one of the bloodiest small encounters that the Division had ever known.

The assault, which began at midnight April 23, was preceded by artillery and mortar fire and introduced the "scorpion" as an advance road-clearer for foot troops. The scorpion, a medium tank with a rotating flailing device made of chains and designed to detonate land mines, led the attack across "no man's land" and up the road that led into the enemy lair. The scorpion, as well as the radio-equipped light tank which followed it as a guide, was quickly put out of action by enemy antitank rocket launchers and two T-2 recovery vehicles were disabled trying to retrieve them and clear the advance route.

Following closely behind the scorpion the company attacked in column of platoons, each platoon supported by a medium tank from the 191st Tank Battalion.

Two houses located about 400 yards apart on alternate sides of the road, were objectives of two of the platoons. The third platoon was to cross the open fields, drive the enemy from the banks of Spaccasassi Creek and establish an outpost near the bend in the river.

The attack was to be "fast, aggressive and ruthless," but the medium tank with the leading 3d platoon struck a mine and the advance was temporarily halted. Enemy mortar and artillery fire caused numerous casualties among our bunched-up infantry, mostly members of the Ist platoon, which was following the 3d.

With their platoon leader, two squad leaders, the platoon guide and radio operator wounded and out of action, the remaining members of the lst platoon joined with the 2d platoon, which by now had bypassed the 3d platoon and was crossing the open fields toward the Spaccasassi.

Fire from machine guns and small arms was turned on the men from all directions as they headed for the creek- from houses far up the road, from ruins of battered dwellings in the vicinity, from the irrigation ditches and from the numerous shell holes that pocked the area. These hideouts, unoccupied in daylight, had become centers of destruction at night.

One squad reached the river bank and plunged down the 25-foot slope that led to the bed, screaming, shouting, and shooting. Several Germans were killed and a number were captured by this audacious act. Other members of the raiding force who had lived through the withering fire in the open field slid down the river bank. The group was being reassembled when pointblank fire from enemy guns placed in the river bend drove them back with more casualties. The 3d Division men stood toe-to-toe and slugged until the enemy withdrew to a point of safety beyond the bend.

The enemy had converted the high river banks into a system of foxholes and dugouts that were interconnected by narrow footpaths which afforded convenient avenues of approach and exit. Facing an emplaced enemy, the platoon came under heavy artillery fire at this point and was forced to move north up the gully out of range.

This "battle of the river bed" continued all night but fire gradually subsided because neither force could see the enemy positions on account of the intervening river bend. During the night a platoon from Company K, 15th Infantry, arrived and one squad took positions in the river bed while two evacuated the wounded.

The first light of day revealed an unoccupied ditch with a clear field of fire into the enemy's foxholes and dugouts. It was here that Pfc. John C. Squires particularly distinguished himself. Squires, at the time 18 years old and engaged in his first combat, had been performing far above and beyond the normal call of duty all through the night's hellish activity. When Company A's Ist platoon was badly hit during the night, Squires volunteered to go forward and see what had become of it, returning to report that its platoon leader and platoon sergeant were wounded, and that his platoon could go around and carry on the fight.

"Not many of us thought very much of the idea," said Radioman Pfc. James T. Simmons. "There was nothing ahead except high explosive and lead all the way to the creek. Nevertheless, our platoon leader gave the order to move out."

The platoon moved forward under a terrific concentration of fire, suffering along the way. When it reached Spaccasassi Creek the situation became nearly intolerable. In addition to heavy fire which converged on the creek the enemy was within hand-grenade range.

One after another each NCO became wounded. Squires thereupon took charge and coolly placed the remaining men of the platoon in firing positions as though it were a tactical exercise and the battlefield miles away. Following this he volunteered to return to the company CP for reinforcements, which he did, returning about an hour later with his trousers ripped to shreds from enemy fire, but bringing with him Company A's 2d platoon, a light machine gun, and a bazooka squad from Company K, 15th Infantry.

" . . . The Germans counter-attacked our outpost three times in the early morning of April 24," said Pvt. Cleo A. Toothman, "from our front, both flanks, and our rear, using every weapon at their command ... I should like to express the opinion that Pfc. Squires was in great part responsible for our successful defense. In the first attack he operated a German Spandau machine gun until it jammed, then used both a rifle and BAR just as effectively. In the second, he used the borrowed BAR. Before the third attack he obtained information concerning the operation, assembly, and disassembly of his Spandau machine gun from a captured German officer, reduced the stoppage in his weapon, and surrounded himself with ammunition. When the counterattack developed Pfc. Squires fired three full belts of ammunition (750 rounds) into the oncoming enemy, inflicting heavy casualties. He was, in every sense of the word, an inspiration to all of us.

"After the third counterattack Pfc. Squires went down the Spaccasassi Creek bed alone in a personal manhunt for Germans who still remained in their holes. One by one he silenced enemy machine pistols which opened up on him, setting up his Spandau in the midst of the enemy fire which missed him by only a few inches each time, and firing his weapon until the Germans were forced to surrender. Alone, Pfc. Squires captured twenty-one prisoners in this unique manner, and collected thirteen more Spandau machine guns. These he distributed among the men in the outpost, placed them in firing position, and instructed his comrades in their cleaning and operation."

Said Rifleman Pvt. Aubra Smith, "The desire to close with and eliminate the Jerries whenever and wherever he could find them inspired confidence in me as this was my first taste of real offensive fighting and I was not overly confident. Although it was Pfc. Squires' first fighting, too, he couldn't wait to get at the Jerries and clean them out of their holes.

"Pfc. Squires was an inspiration to all of us. His fearlessness showed us what a determined man could do to the so-called Nazi superman."

Pfc. Squires was killed in a subsequent action. He was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

The "battle of the river bed" successfully completed the Division's first limited-objective, infantry-tank attack, since the 3d platoon had seized its objective early, capturing a number of prisoners, an 88mm antitank rocket launcher, and fourteen machine guns in the process.

Operation "Mr. Black" extended our outpost line, resulted in penetration of the strongly fortified Spaccasassi Creek banks, brought in forty-seven PWs and marked the decimation of two companies of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division.

While the Division prepared to execute Operation "Mr. Green" another small, but 'important, objective was seized; an objective that had become a symbol of German resistance and a stubborn target for our troops.

It was an ordinary country windmill of the type that dots the rural areas all over the United States and it was located in a farmyard only a few hundred yards to our front. The enemy had used it for weeks as an outpost and we had tried many times to take it without success. Few Daily Operations Reports were issued that didn't mention the windmill in some manner.

". . . windmill at (906299) attacked by our combat patrol which withdrew under heavy S/A and MG fire." This was a common notation in our records for more than a week.

The doughboys wanted this picturesque, but lethal, windmill; so, on April 24 a heavily armed combat patrol of the 7th Infantry stormed it, killed four Germans in the ensuing fire fight, captured two machine guns and took possession.

The enemy tried desperately to retake it the next day and several times thereafter but we posted it with one officer, eight men and a section of machine guns and flanked it on both sides by protective outposts manned in strength. A serious enemy hotbed had been eliminated and we had added a picturesque outpost to our line.

"Mr. Green" operation was awaited with anxiety since details about it had been circulated among the men in advance. It was to be something new and different.

It was to be the first "psychological attack" ever conducted by United States forces since the war began and it was the first time that words instead of bullets were to be used by the 3d Division against the enemy, although the verbal barrage made up only a small part of the attack. Several loud speakers' directed toward the enemy lines were to be used in urging the Germans to surrender at a psychological moment during the attack.

Like "Mr. Black," it was a small-scale offensive, directed against the 362d Fusilier Battalion, which occupied a defensive position west of Cisterna.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Woodrow W. Stromberg, made the assault, with Company F, under Capt. Paul W. Stanley, actually staging the attack. The remainder of the battalion was in support.

At 0300 April 25, the usual sporadic night fighting which was common to the beachhead was sharply punctured when our 155s awakened the enemy with a thirty-five-minute concentration designed to set his nerves on edge.

This harassing fire suddenly stopped at 0405 and the beachhead seemed to start rocking as nine battalions of field artillery, reinforced with fire from tanks and self- propelled guns, cut loose. For nearly five minutes the projectiles from all these guns hit their target simultaneously. The roar was terrific. Designed to impress the enemy with the amount of artillery at our disposal, it also impressed the inhabitants of Anzio, some seven miles away.

Instantly, at 0407, all firing ceased.

A voice that could be heard 1,000 yards away blasted forth from the loud-speakers hidden in the weeds along the front lines. In their own language, the Germans heard that more and heavier artillery was to come. They were told about the impending attack that faced them. And they were urged to lay down their arms and enter our lines at once, or "else." Over and over they heard the words repeated. Then the loudspeakers became silent- and the artillery again took up the 14 appeal" with a deafening roar.

The fire of our artillery placed the enemy positions in a "box." The sides of the box remained stationary as our shells fell continuously and precisely along the edges, 1,000 yards apart. The rear wall moved forward like the lid of a roll-topped desk, to force the enemy out of their holes and toward our lines. This barrage lasted twenty minutes and finally gave way to harassing fire placed on known enemy positions to soften them further and provide noise to cover the movement of our tanks into position.

Again our guns were silenced, at 0445, and the loudspeakers blared forth a final chance for surrender. With monotonous repetition came the "Surrender! Surrender!" as German NCOs raced from hole to hole threatening death to any Landser who heeded the words. The last words died in the renewed thunder of artillery as Company F, with tank reinforcement, moved out of the area in the vicinity of Campo Morto and went into attack at 0500.

Advancing by rushes, our men dropped to their knees to fire tommy guns into German positions at close range, stuck M-1s into dark foxholes and pulled the triggers, and took and generally overran their objective by 0520, the time set in advance plans for the attack to cease. Captain Stanley and his men stayed five minutes overtime "just in case," but they were ordered to withdraw according to plan.

The withdrawal of the company, which ordinarily would have been a difficult operation under the circumstances, was made easy by the close support given by the remainder of 2d Battalion.

Company E, commanded by Capt. James H. Greene, operated the smoke pots that created a covering screen which enveloped the area and hid the men from enemy view as they withdrew. The company also placed smallarms fire on the enemy during the withdrawal.

Members of Company G, under Capt. Hugh E. Wardlaw, Jr., guided the attacking troops and tanks in and out of the zone of action, pointing out the openings in our own and enemy wire and minefields which had been gapped by Division Engineers the night before the attack. The engineers also marked the clear lane with luminous buttons.

As the attack came to a close, Company H, commanded by Capt. Eric W. Tatlock, laid 81mm smoke shells on predesignated points and the Cannon Company, under lst Lt. Norwood L. Snowden, maintained continuous fire as the company withdrew down Fosso delle Bove.

The attackers were happy and proud of their achievement-they captured nine PWs and killed some fifty Germans.

"Mr. Green" is perhaps the most unforgettable character that Company F and the remainder of 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, ever met.

The stabilized situation which existed in the 3d Division sector was a perfect setting for such limitedobjective operations as "Mr. Black" and "Mr. Green" and the Division learned to employ them effectively.

Late April found the Division still attacking in small groups while the enemy continued to probe our defenses, looking for the opening that never appeared.

Enemy aircraft became especially active just when we were being relieved by the 45th Division.

During the night of April 28 about forty planes dropped high-explosives, antipersonnel and rocket bombs on our front lines and in the beach area. Nine planes were shot down. Some fifteen enemy craft bombed and strafed the area the following night, our last in the line, and four of them were brought down.

On the following day, at D600 May 1, 1944, the Division passed control of the sector to the 45th and moved back into the dune area near Torre Astura to prepare for an offensive that would break the beachhead stalemate.

The period of fighting that came to a close with the relief of the 3d Infantry Division by the 45th Infantry Division is known as the "Big War of Little Battles." When the "little" battles were over, however, and the stage was being set for the big battle that was about to be fought, it was known in high staff and command circles that this "Big War of Little Battles" carried on chiefly by the 3d Infantry Division from March 4 until May 1, had accomplished much more than a straightening of the lines, than killing, wounding and capturing enemy and destroying enemy equipment. It had made for one of the chief factors that was to attain its full importance and recognition in the great battle pending. It had raised the morale of all troops on the beachhead and had changed the attitude of the Allied soldiers from one of defense to one of offense.

For nearly four months the beachhead forces had served as a poised dagger, ever threatening to stab into the right flank of the German army that was slowly being pushed north up the Italian boot by other elements of the United States Fifth Army.

The 3d Division was to be the daggers point. It was the instrument that would penetrate the enemy's defenses and cut rapier-like through his fixed positions. In anticipation of the stab, the first three weeks of May were devoted to sharpening the dagger.

All phases of training centered on the attack with emphasis placed on storming of pillboxes and other infantry emplacements, use of battle-sleds, street fighting, coordination of the infantry-tank team, defense against tanks, attack over open country and attack against protected "fossi."

The training of all three regiments of the Division was similar, excepting the 7th Infantry, which spent a short period in Nettuno, where live ammunition and explosives were used in training for street fighting. Two battalions of the regiment were employed in this phase, which stressed the use of rifle grenades, maintenance of control and use of supporting weapons. The 7th had the mission of assaulting Cisterna di Littoria and no stone was left unturned in preparing for the task.

Infantry-tank cooperation similar to that involved in the operations "Mr. Black" and "Mr. Green" received the special attention of all regiments and additional hardening exercises were given members of the battle patrols which previously had been organized in each regiment, and the Division Reconnaissance Troop. The patrols comprised forty-five to sixty men and were heavily armed for special assault missions.

A battle-sled team of sixty men was organized in each regiment and the innovation created much interest in the Division. The sleds, invented by Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, were narrow steel tubes mounted on flat runners and were wide enough to carry one armed infantryman lying down. One* medium tank towed twelve of them, which meant that a regimental team comprised one platoon of tanks and sixty sleds. They were used to transport personnel through enemy barrages to the front, the armored tubes serving as protection against shell fragments and small-arms fire.

The artillery units reconnoitered all the area available for gun positions so that when D-day arrived, gun pits had been dug, surveys completed, camouflage erected and communication lines laid.

A nightly "cover preparation" program, fired by all artillery on the beachhead, started May 12 and was highly successful in inducing the enemy to expend much protective fire which could have been used later when the real preparation was fired.

Another innovation created for the breakthrough was the organization of a provisional machine-gun battalion, using all the .50-caliber machine guns in the Division. Applying artillery methods, the battalion was trained to place interdictory and harassing fire on known enemy assembly points and routes of advance during the early stages of the attack.

The 10th Engineer Battalion built wooden bases for the machine guns that provided stable supports for the tripods.

In fact, the engineers made many nonroutine contributions to the advance preparations.

They built a splinterproof Division CP in a quarry just south of Borgo Montello, where they also erected a predesigned PW cage for reception, segregation, interrogation and evacuation. It had a capacity of 5,000.

Each regimental sector was provided with two addi-tional footbridges across the Mussolini Canal, safe from interdictory fire, while great stores of "fascines" (com-pact bundles for improving traction on soft ground) were placed at appropriate spots for use by armored vehicles.

Personal reconnaissance, study of air photographs and the knowledge of all the surrounding terrain gained after four months on the beachhead, led to experiments in running vehicles along creek bottoms.

Mines no longer needed for defense of the Mussolini Canal were removed and methods devised for breaching enemy minefields quickly and safely. One of these devices comprised twelve connected 100-foot lengths of primacord with one attached to a 60mm mortar and the other end held stationary at the gun position. The cord was detonated after being propelled to its destination by the mortar shell. The cord would detonate antipersonnel mines that lay along its path and clear a way into enemy territory. Another contrivance, called the "M-2 Snake," was a steel trough filled with bangalore torpedoes laid end to end along its 200-foot length, which could be shoved into an enemy antitank field by a tank.

These mechanical aids, however, did not reduce the amount of training that the Engineers received in breeching minefields by hand, the method which proved highly successful during the Cisterna attack.

Six tank crossings were made at the Fosso Feminamorta and Fosso di Battagone, draws that criss- crossed our area and averaged sixty-five feet in width and thirty-five feet in depth.

A new road, to supplement the two main arteries that were used by adjacent units, was built between Borgo Montello and the rear beachhead area, a distance of five miles.

The first warning order to move up came during the day of May 20, but by evening it had proved to be a false alarm. The day of attack, however, was imminent. At night it was now possible to see gun flashes from the southern front in the clear Italian skies. The push north from Cassino started May 12, and was destined for clear- cut success from the beginning. Sure enough, the next day the order came out "The regiments will move up tonight."

The coincidence of dates was unintended. It was now May 21. On January 22 units of the 3d Infantry Division had first touched ground below Nettuno. It was the eve of the first landings which touched off the ill- starred campaign.

That evening, May 21, 3d Infantry Division moved out from the pine forest in full marching order.

It was a balmy evening. As if to justify, finally, the cognomen "Sunny Italy" after so many months of nothing but rain, wind, and snow, all the days had been warm lately, even hot. There were few clouds in the sky this evening and it was still full daylight when the leading Division elements were to be seen emerging from the protective concealment of the wooded bivouac. The smoke-fog machines were going full blast, and the sickly- sweet streams of man-made mist merged into a low- hanging blanket which screened the telltale rear areas of the beachhead.

The 15th Infantry, from its encampment on the sandy wastes north of the pine forest, took its route through the forest, then struck out up the road for the front. The 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments followed.

In the green fields which fronted the wooded area, a few sheep were grazing. Their Italian herders looked at the troop-filled roads with interest.

Along the main road which skirted the forest's edge the 3d Division Band under the leadership of Chief Warrant Officer Eugene Kusmiak had taken a vantage point. As the doughboys moved past, the band played "Dogface Soldier," and a selection of marches.

As judged from the attitudes and remarks of the passing columns, never had the men been in finer fettle; never had the morale been higher.

They joked with the bystanders, the bandsmen, the MPs along the route and themselves. They sang or whistled. They held their heads high.

To those persons who had been at Bizerte the soldiers' attitude was reminiscent of the condition and mental attitude of the same Division just prior to embarkation for Sicily. Of those men then it has been said that, "never, anywhere, was a division of any army better equipped, mentally or physically, for combat."

Ahead but a short distance were the front lines, which for four months had been braced and strengthened to a point almost unparalleled in the war of movement which prevailed from 1939-1945. There were thousands of antitank and antipersonnel mines laid by both sides. The enemy had sited his weapons in order to cover most favorably all routes of approach. The ground was flat, with few folds and a scarcity of ditches.

Added to all these disadvantages for the attacker was the fact that the southern front was rapidly moving north. Kesselring's intelligence knew that the Anzio front was soon to move into action. If ever it was to be of value, now was the time. Surprise, therefore, could only be the limited surprise of exact date and exact place.

The steadily marching men of the 3d Infantry Division advanced toward one of the bloodiest single encounters fought by any Division in one day in World War 11 and what might well be classed as the greatest victory of its total combat career. The sky darkened, and still the columns lined the roads. The artillery commenced its nightly serenade and the gun flashes merged their fire, like chain lightning.