Organization for Combat

1. Hq and Hq Co, 3d Inf Div
2. 7th Inf Regt
3. 15th Inf Regt
4. 30th Inf Rcgt
5. 3d Inf Div Artillery
9th FA Bn
10th FA Bn
39th FA Bn
41st FA Bn
24th Armd Field Regt (105H) (Br)
6. 441st AAA A W Bn
7. 3d Ron Trp
8. 3d QM Co
9. 3d Signal Co
10. 3d Med Bn
11. 10th Engr Bn
12. 84th Chem Bn
13. 601st TD Bn
14. 751st Tk Bn
15. 703d Ord Co

At about dusk May 25, 1944, a rather slack-appearing German officer, wearing a lieutenant colonel's uniform, appeared in the interrogation room at the 3d Infantry Division's cage just, south of Borgo Montello, on what had been the Anzio beachhead. He was the commanding officer of the 955th Infantry Regiment, which had been charged with the defense of the city of Cisterna di Littoria and its immediate environs.

At this moment, his regiment no longer existed as a fighting force; Cisterna was in United States hands, and only small, disorganized groups and individual soldiers were falling back in front of our forces, or fleeing in an effort to reach previously selected areas and reorganize.

The presence of the German lieutenant colonel in our cage was symbolic of the two salient facts of the Second Battle of Cisterna: first, the tactics of the German defenders, which were to defend in place and face the alternatives of success or destruction; second, the total triumph of the Division's attack, which in three days had fulfilled that portion of the familiar directive contained in the field order for the operation which read: "To destroy the enemy in the Division's zone of action."

Next morning's headlines carried the news that the southern Fifth Army and the beachhead forces had met on the swampy flat-lands of the Pontine marshes; less attention was given to the fact that Cisterna, after nearly four months of intermittent siege, was at last firmly in United States hands. Yet this latter item contained the story of one of the greatest attacks ever delivered by an infantry division, without which the advance on Rome might well have been delayed for days or even weeks.

It was one of the strange coincidences of war that the victors of the Second Battle of Cisterna had been the losers of the First Battle of Cisterna nearly four months before. On January 30, 1944, the 3d Infantry Division, reinforced by Ranger and Parachute units, fought a gallant, heartbreaking and unsuccessful battle to capture Cisterna. The Division staff learned on that day, from prisoners of war, what it could not have learned previously from any normal intelligence source: that Hitler had ordered the beachhead destroyed, and that enemy reinforcements were streaming toward Anzio from northern Italy, southern France and the Balkans. Enemy numbers plus the flat, coverless terrain defeated the 3d Division that day and foreshadowed the long, near- stalemate that followed. The destruction of two Ranger battalions in the space of eight hours at Cisterna was a somber detail in a dark picture.

The situation was vastly different in May. Not the: smallest difference was the fact that our forces had the enemy completely "cased" for the latter attack, almost down to each machine-gun nest and firepit. Long and careful interrogation of prisoners, detailed study of air photos, and constant patrol activity gave our staff an intimate knowledge of where the enemy was located. and how he defended his positions.

The enemy, likewise, enjoyed many advantages. He still had perfect observation of the entire beachhead area from many vantage points. He had three and a half months in which to dig in, lay wire and mines, sandbag his positions, erect tank obstacles and coordinate his fields of fire. His artillery was registered on every worthwhile target and road junction in the battle area. His troops knew every wrinkle in the ground, and knew that a major Allied attack was coming.

Yet this position was broken in three days, and every living German killed or chased from the battle area.

Terrain, in the battle of Cisterna, played a largely negative role. In many small sectors, the battle might as well have been fought on a billiard table, the ground was so flat and devoid of cover. There were, however, certain interesting irregularities worth a brief review.

Several ditches (Italian "fosso") cut the battle area into compartments, running generally north to south, with anywhere from a few hundred to several thousand yards between ditches. These "ditches" are actually small canyons in many cases, sometimes reaching a depth of sixty feet or more, representing absolute barriers to vehicle movement and serious obstacles to infantry movement. South of Cisterna they are not so important, the ground being flatter and the ditches shallower; north of the town, however, the ground rises and the ditches become deeper and their banks steeper. In addition, there are many minor drainage ditches which intersect the fields and prevent cross-country vehicle movement.

The area around Cisterna was well settled and there were numerous farm buildings of concrete or masonry construction. Most of these buildings had been totally or partially destroyed by artillery fire, and were very useful to the enemy as strongpoints or gun emplacements, as the walls and rubble offered considerable protection against small-arms fire and shell fragments.

By the time of the attack in late May, field grasses and grain had grown to a considerable height in places, affording some concealment to creeping men. Scattered patches of woods, well chewed up by artillery fire, still concealed enemy strongpoints, supply distributing points or tank-assembly areas. Nowhere did the vegetation offer any particular barrier to movement.

The ground itself, muddy and covered with patches of standing water during the early spring, had dried out sufficiently at the time of the attack to permit the passage of tanks almost anywhere.

Back of the battlefield itself, to the north and northeast, was the real high ground which gave the enemy his observation and defilade. North beyond Velletri were the Colli Laziali, or Alban Hills; northeast were the Monti Lepini, whose nearest peak, Monte Arrestino, was obviously the key terrain feature in the entire sector and actually was the first hill captured by the beachhead forces.

The road network in the battle area was fairly good, but it was discovered after the breakthrough that German road maintenance was, far worse than ours, due to our air superiority and the greater intensity of our shelling. Highway 7, the only first-class road in the area, ran diagonally across the battlefield from southeast to northwest, passing through Cisterna.

The Rome-Cisterna-Naples rail line, which also passed through Cisterna itself, was a feature of some importance. In January the Germans had begun to prepare this line as their MLR, but when the front solidified two or three thousand yards south of the railroad, nothing further was done to improve the positions which had been begun along it. The physical barrier of the railroad embankments and cuts, remained, however, as well as the weapon pits and dugouts which already had been prepared.

Division headquarters as well as higher headquarters had been hard at work for many weeks on a series of plans to resume the offensive and break out of the beachhead. Everyone recognized that our defensive attitude was purely temporary, and that as soon. as sufficient strength in troops and supplies had been built up, the big attack would be unleashed. Earlier hopes had depended on the first two abortive efforts to break through the southern front at Cassino, but when these attempts failed, the Allies raised their sights to a grand offensive in which every unit which could be spared would be hurled into the Italian drive.

The beachhead forces had three principal lines of action in mind, each dependent on the speed with which the southern campaign proceeded. They were:

First, in the event of a slow, grinding advance from the south, beachhead troops planned to drive due east to high ground south of Cori, in the Monti Lepini, and then push southeast to effect a union with our units in the south.

Second, in the event of a steady, assured advance on the southern front, beachhead forces would smash enemy defenses at Cisterna and push due north toward Valmontone in order to cut Highway 6 and contribute to the defeat of Kesselring's southern forces.

Third, in the event of a German debacle and hasty withdrawal to the north, beachhead troops would hasten the push on Rome by cracking through the factory area at Carroceto and attacking northwest along the Albano- Rome axis. In all these plans, 3d Infantry Division played a key part in the assault.

The second of these alternatives was ultimately adopted, as the Germans in late May were being steadily forced back but had not yet been knocked off their feet.

In this attack, the 3d Infantry Division's assignment was to assault Cisterna frontally with one regiment and to by-pass it with a regiment on each side, continuing the advance northeast to Cori and anchoring the VI Corps right flank on high ground behind Cori. Special Service Force, operating independently, was on the Division's right flank, and Ist Armored Division on the left. Early capture and reduction of Cisterna was the key to success, as the main roads to Cori and Velletri passed through it. Once Cori was captured, the attack was to turn north toward Valmontone, and eventually toward Rome.

Responsibility for the defense of the Cisterna sector was divided between two German infantry divisions, the 362d and 715th. Neither was up to full strength; heavy casualties and the gradual shriveling of the German divisional organization (each division had only six battalions of infantry) left them with a probable frontline combat strength of about 2500-3000 men apiece. However-and this is important-the enemy was well supplied with automatic weapons and mortars., and had enough ammunition stacked on his positions to keep shooting as long he could hold out, barring a long siege. By the time we attacked, our artillery superiority was marked, and in this department the enemy suffered possibly his greatest disadvantage.

The 362d Infantry Division was responsible generally for the sector west of the Borgo Montello-Cisterna road (Borgo Montello is called Conca on some maps), and the 715th Infantry Division, reinforced by 1028th PGR, for the sector between the road and the coast to the southeast. Battalion sectors normally covered a frontage of about 2,000 yards; our Division, attacking on a 7,000- yard front, therefore found about four enemy battalions in its path, with the equivalent of two or three battalions in reserve.

The enemy defense consisted of a series of platoon strongpoints based on clusters of buildings or terrain features such as clumps of woods, knolls, ravines, etc.

These were backed up by similar strongpoints organized to a depth of about 3,000 yards)- these positions were of such density that they presented a continuously occupled zone across the front of the Division, with hardly a spot in the entire zone that could not be brought under the fire of automatic weapons from at least two directions, if not from all sides at once. The enemy had virtually completed a belt of double-apron or concertina wire across his entire front, using the wire chiefly to prevent the approach of foot troops to his strongpoints. Antipersonnel and antitank mines were thickly sown along all avenues of approach, both in front of and between his positions.

Each strongpoint was organized for all-around defense, utilizing three to six machine guns and outlying rifle pits to hold off our threats from any direction. Automatic weapons were generally sited close to the ground in order to get maximum effect against crawling or crouching troops. Overhead cover was provided for many, but not all of the positions.

Firing positions had been prepared for, and employed by, the tanks and SP guns, which the Germans had in fair quantity. The enemy was very clever in staking out these positions so that the weapons could deliver effective harassing fire, even at night, then pull out and return to a safe spot before our counter-battery could attack them. The enemy was not especially strong, however, in towed antitank weapons, which would have been of great advantage to him in well dug-in forward positions.

It was known that enemy strategy called for a defense on his positions, even at the expense of annihilation, because the successful extrication of his troops on the southern front depended absolutely upon his ability to contain the beachhead. It was upon this basis that our plans for attack were made.

Promptly at 0545 May 23 the artillery preparation for the attack began. For the next forty-five minutes, ten battalions of light, medium and heavy artillery poured high explosives into enemy fortifications and gun positions. Dive-bombers, hampered by low clouds, began a counter-battery program which was frequently interrupted by poor visibility.

At 0630 the doughboys attacked. Their movements were covered locally by smoke and seconded by fire of tanks and TDs which initially occupied static firing positions.

For the preceding two nights, troops, trucks, tanks, guns and supplies had been moved into assembly areas in ditches and draws on the flat ground south of Isola Bella, and along the Mussolini Canal. The slightest movement in daylight would have aroused enemy suspicion and drawn a hail of artillery fire-yet these large-scale preparations were carried out without a flaw, and a very real element of surprise was gained.

30TH INFANTRY

The 30th Infantry commanded by Col. Lionel C. McGarr, making the Division main effort on the left, attacked north from a line of departure along the road running west from Isola Bella, thence northwest across the Fosso Feminamorta and the road southwest of Ponte Rotto. The regiment advanced with 2d Battalion west of Fosso Feminamorta, and 3d Battalion (with Company A attached) was astride the ditch and east of it. Ist Battalion (less Company A) was in regimental reserve, occupying an assembly area in Fosso Feminamorta about two miles south of Ponte Rotto.

Enemy reaction to the attack was immediate and violent. The 2d Battalion met strong fire from small arms, SP and artillery before it hit the line of departure. The battalion was in column of companies in the order G, E and F. Company G fought its way about 300 yards north of the Ponte Rotto road, at a point 500 yards west of that settlement, where it received fire from both flanks as well as the front, since friendly units on the flanks had not caught up. At this point a hundred Germans in a quarry were surrounded but could not be routed out as it was impossible to place fire on them. They surrendered the following afternoon. Wardlaw's Wadi (named after Capt. Hugh E. Wardlaw, G Company's commander), a small creek running parallel to Company G's axis of advance proved difficult to clean out; during the process, heavy fire was received from Ponte Rotto.

Company E passed through Company G and continued to meet strong opposition as it fought its way about 800 yards farther north. The company then turned east and wiped out an enemy strongpoint in a group of buildings just west of Fosso Feminamorta. In these buildings, concealed in the rubble, the enemy had placed automatic weapons, SP guns and dispersed riflemen.

The extent of the enemy defense in depth was revealed when Company F passed through Company E and headed for the next objective about 1000 yards due north. Strong fire was received all along the front from well-entrenched enemy. The company moved up a series of small ditches, wiping out enemy opposition, and by nightfall it was attached to Ist Battalion for an attack on enemy positions along the railroad track.

A brief consideration of this attack will make clear the reasons for 2d Battalion's difficulty in maintaining control during the night. Each company ran into strong and continuing opposition; even while Company F was preparing to cross the railroad tracks from its lately-won position, Company E and Company G to the rear were still engaged by scattered groups of enemy in fossi, cellars, dugouts and isolated sniper posts. The battalion was thus strung out in a depth of about 2500 yards, and was fighting bitter, small scale engagements over the entire area. Elements of 6th Armored Infantry, attacking on the Division's left, made slow initial progress but later arrived at the railroad track prior to the 2d Battalion; some of the armored infantry personnel who accidentally crossed into 2d Battalion's sector assisted in the reduction of some enemy positions.

Company L, the left company of 3d Battalion, assigned to clean out Fosso Feminamorta as far north as Ponte Rotto, had one of the most bitter experiences of the entire attack. About 700 yards southwest of Ponte Rotto, at a point where Fosso Feminamorta swings sharply south, the enemy had installed a company strongpoint based on machine-gun positions dug into the shoulders of the ravine, outlying rifle pits, concertina and double-apron wire, and similar positions stretching northwest across the road. Company L moved rapidly up the stream until reaching the bend, where withering fire was received from the enemy weapons. A light tank, which was to have accompanied Company L up the ditch and to have attacked the enemy positions with 37mm canister, entered the ditch too far south and got bogged down in about five feet of water. Two M-4 medium tanks were also to assist in the attack, one going up each side of the creek. One of these tanks never showed up; the other hit a mine before reaching the line of departure and was of no value in the attack. The company finally moved into the position by sending one platoon up the creek and one platoon along the crest of each bank, and was later reinforced by a platoon of riflemen from the battle-sled group, whose tow- tanks had been immobilized by mines. After a struggle lasting nearly twenty-four hours, during which five separate attacks were made, Company L finally cracked the position and took the last remaining enemy prisoners although the bulk of the defenders had been killed or wounded. An enemy battalion CP, well dug-in and equipped, was found in the ditch just northeast of the strong point, and was later occupied by 3d Battalion as its CP.

Company A, attached to 3d Battalion for the attack, enjoyed the most rapid initial success of any unit of the division. Attacking north along the east side of the road running south from Ponte Rotto, the company rapidly overcame resistance in the houses on its side of the road, killing 16 enemy and capturing 6 in the open fields, besides taking 15 prisoners in the first house, 17 in the second and 13 in the third. It was not until after the company had passed through this zone that the enemy laid down his defensive artillery fire, which fell well behind the company as it advanced. Attacking the strongpoint in the house southeast of the Ponte Rotto road junction, the company captured two officers and 13 soldiers, as well as two 75 mm antitank guns. This objective was captured and organized for defense shortly after 0730, only one hour after moving out; success was due chiefly to following friendly artillery fire very closely, at an interval of 50 to 100 yards.

Company I had reached its objective at Ponte Rotto road junction seven hours ahead of time with its radio out of order. Friendly artillery was falling, since higher headquarters had no way of knowing that the company was so far ahead of schedule. In addition to this the enemy was firing direct fire with an 88mm mobile gun and three machine guns, and a large group of enemy riflemen about 300 yards distant were also adding their fire.

"We had been sitting there about 30 minutes, helpless, unable to do a thing about the situation, when the BAR man in my squad, Pfc. John Dutko, shouted to me, 'Toothman, I'm going to get that 88 with my heater!"' related S/Sgt Cleo A. Toothman, adding, "He always called his BAR a 'heater.'

"Before I could say a word he took off like a ruptured duck. He made the first hundred yards in a dead run. Machine-gun bullets were striking the ground only a foot or two behind him but he was running faster than the krauts could traverse. The kraut 88 crew let a couple of fast shells go at him also, but they exploded about thirty yards from him, and he dived into a shell hole which one of our own big guns had conveniently made a split second before he got there. I told myself that he would never make it. The enemy fire, coupled with our own artillery, was the heaviest that I had ever seen in such a small area. The enemy machine gunners converged their fire on the shellhole occupied by Pfc. Dutko, making it, in my opinion, impossible for him to advance farther."

This was not the case. After a short rest Dutko jumped from his hole and ran in a wide circle toward the 88mm gun, followed by Pvt. Charles R. Kelley. By flanking the gun Dutko had succeeded in aligning the machine guns so that only one could fire at him, which it continued to do in long, murderous bursts. After running about 175 yards Dutko hit the dirt and threw a hand grenade into the machine-gun position, killing the two-man crew.

Kelley speaking: "Pfc. Dutko was a madman now. He jumped to his feet and walked toward the 88mm firing his BAR from his hip. He had apparently forgotten the other two machine guns; at least he was ignoring them. When he had gone about halfway to the 88mm he reached a point within ten yards of the weapon and wiped out the five-man crew with one long burst of fire. Pfc. Dutko then wheeled on the second German machine gun and killed its two-man crew with his BAR.

"The third German machine gun opened fire on Pfc. Dutko. This gun was only twenty yards away and its first burst of fire wounded him, making him stagger, but like a wounded lion he charged this gun in a half run. Pfc. Dutko killed both the gunner and the assistant gunner of the enemy weapon with a single burst from his BAR and, staggering forward, fell across the dead German machine gunner. When I reached him he was dead."

Pfc. Dutko's heroism won him a posthumous Congressional Medal of Honor.

The enemy launched three counterattacks against the company's defenses. The first was repulsed by small- arms fire, the second by artillery, and the third by small- arms and mortar fire.

After reaching this objective, the company was subjected to all types of fire from the front and both flanks during most of the day, but was well dug in and did not suffer unduly.

Company K suffered many casualties, possibly fifty, before crossing the line of departure, as the enemy had opened up with artillery and mortars as soon as our artillery preparation started; the company was also under machine-gun fire coming from the left and left rear. The company commander, Is t Lt. Arnold Spillman, and executive, 2d Lt. Ben Seward, were among those hit.

Company K's mission was to attack up the West Side of the road running south of Ponte Rotto, keeping abreast of Company A on the east side of the road. Upon the loss of the two ranking officers, Lieutenant Ethridge took over the company and led his men over 600 yards of flat terrain, exposed to searing machinegun fire, by crawling through small ditches in the field. The company reached its initial objective at the Ponte Rotto crossroad in this manner, then attacked north, across the road to seize high ground immediately above Ponte Rotto. The platoon of tanks towing battle sleds, as indicated previously, was committed in this attack, but the tanks were immobilized by mines at the dog-leg in the road south of Ponte Rotto, and the personnel were attached to Company L for its attack on the strong point in Fosso Feminamorta. The battalion was never able to employ the sleds.

Company I, in reserve, was committed about 1400 to move around the right flank of Company A and attack objective F, a short distance northeast of Ponte Rotto. The company, commanded by Ist Lt. Norbert B. Sauer, accomplished this mission by crawling across open ground around Company A's flank. By late evening K, I and A Companies occupied a bulge north of the Ponte Rotto- Cisterna road, just east of Ponte Rotto. This position was organized by Capt. Kenneth A. Noseck, A Company commander. The battalion suffered about 300 casualties during the day's fighting.

About mid-afternoon May 23, Ist Battalion was ordered to move north, pass through 2d Battalion (which was fighting for objectives between the Ponte Rotto road and the railroad track) and seize high ground on both sides of the railroad just west of Fosso Feminamorta.

Artillery and mortar fire began falling on Ist Battalion after it crossed the road west of Ponte Rotto, and shortly after passing through 2d Battalion, Company E which was leading, began meeting heavy resistance from enemy dug in around ruined masonry houses on two small hills south of the railroad track. Large numbers of automatic weapons were employed against our troops, and artillery and mortar fire was continuous.

As Company E, 30th Infantry came abreast of Ponte Rotto, an enemy machine gun opened fire on the company's left flank from a position about a hundred yards away. Four men were killed almost instantly, and the rest took cover.

"Pfc. Patrick L. Kessler, an antitank grenadier in my platoon," related Pfc. Nicholas Rusinko, "ran fifty yards through a hail of machine-gun fire to a point where three of us were huddled in a ditch and suggested that we form an assault team to knock out the gun, which we instantly agreed to. Using us as a base of fire, Pfc. Kessler climbed out of the ditch and began to crawl toward the machine-gun position. He succeeded in making his way about 50 yards forward before the krauts spotted him and fired directly at him. Bullets struck so close to him that Kessler was almost obscured by the dust. Later I learned that he had been lightly wounded."

Charging forward, side-stepping like a broken field runner in a football game Kessler got to within two yards of the enemy emplacement. Here he kneeled and shot both the enemy gunner and assistant gunner with his '03 rifle. He then jumped into the gun position, overpowered one more soldier, and wounded a fourth attempting to make a getaway.

No sooner had he accomplished this deed than two machine guns and a group of enemy riflemen opened fire from a position about 175 yards to the rear. Ten men who had left covered positions when the first machine gun was eliminated were killed. Mortar and artillery concentrations began to fall in the 'area. The picture looked black. Two men attempting to assault the machine guns were also killed.

Kessler, who had been escorting his prisoner to the rear, turned him over to a nearby soldier and crawled thirty-five yards to the side of a BAR man to secure the BAR and ammunition belt. Then, under shellfire, the concussion of which rolled him over several times, Kessler kept up his steady crawl, passing through the length of an antipersonnel minefield. The enemy, who had spotted Kessler shortly after he had left the BAR man, converged the fire of both guns on him, yet he kept going for seventy-five yards.

Said Pvt. Alan C. Smith: "Just as he crawled out of the minefield, Pfc. Kessler occupied a position in a ditch about fifty yards from the kraut strongpoint and engaged in a duel with the two machine guns. Throughout this action, the German artillery and mortar fire kept coming in. Pfc. Kessler had fired about four magazines into the krauts when an artillery shell landed almost directly on top of him. For a moment we all thought that his number was up yet, when the smoke had cleared away, Pfc. Kessler had risen to his feet and was walking toward the machine guns, firing his BAR from his hip as he advanced."

Reaching the enemy strongpoint under continuous fire directed at him, Kessler killed the gunner of each of the two machine guns and took thirteen enemy prisoners. But he was not quite through.

"Pfc. Kessler had not traveled more than 25 to 30 yards to the rear with his prisoners before he was fired on by two snipers, who had infiltrated to positions to the rear of the company and about 100 yards away from him," said Pvt. Richard J. Alexander. "When this happened, several of the prisoners made a break for it; however, Pfc. Kessler fell to the ground and placed a burst of fire to either side of the prisoners, forcing them to hit the ground. Then he fired at each of the two snipers, causing them to surrender."

This heroic deed was later recognized by award of the Congressional Medal of Honor. ,

Both sides employed flares during the night, the enemy to illuminate our attacking troops, our units to light up enemy fortifications and to facilitate control. The night was very black, and during the attack parts of Company F, as well as one company of the 6th Armored Infantry, were fighting in the Ist Battalion zone.

Company B, led by Capt. Samuel B. Seetin, attacked frontally against the eastern of the two hills, which was immediately south of the railroad and west of Fosso Feminamorta. Upon receiving fire from the other hill to the west, one platoon of Company B was sent to attack the hill and reduce the machine-gun position that was causing the trouble. Enemy resistance on both hills was overcome at about 0200 or 0300 May 24.

Company C, following Company B, swung to the right before reaching the Company B objectives and attacked east across Fosso Feminamorta, which was a deep gorge at this point, presenting a considerable obstacle to movement. The company successfully crossed the gorge and succeeded in taking its objective with the assistance of direct fire support from tanks and TDs at about daylight May 24. The objective was high ground southeast of the railroad bridge over Fosso Feminamorta. Some casualties were suffered from the company's own direct-fire support weapons.

On the preceding day, the battalion had had a brief fight for Objective C, about 1200 yards north of the Ponte Rotto road, which had already been partially occupied by elements of 2d Battalion. Constant enemy artillery and mortar fire failed to cause disproportionate casualties, as the advance was conducted with men well dispersed. Ditches were used for movement whenever possible. Enemy positions on the final objective were reduced by direct assault, with tommy guns, BARs, rifle grenades and hand grenades the principal weapons used. Rifle grenades were particularly effective; the grenadier would normally crawl within twenty-five to forty yards of a position before firing. NCOs equipped with carbines did good work, shooting rapid-fire at troublesome spots from wherever they happened to be. Coordination of fire support weapons, tanks, TDs and cannon company weapons-was a big factor in the success of the attack. A battalion staff officer was normally forward with each company, his chief duty being to see that these weapons were properly and effectively employed.

Artillery fire supporting 30th Infantry was delivered chiefly by the 41st FA Battalion. Infantry officers normally adjusted fire over infantry radios to battalion CP, from where the artillery liaison officer relayed adjustments to the fire direction center. Most of the fire was observed, insofar as this was possible at night. Artillery was used to a greater extent than mortars in smothering enemy fire while the infantry was closing in on enemy positions.

Control was excellent, and no important element of the battalion was out of touch with battalion headquarters, or with its own company, for any length of time.

7TH INFANTRY

The 7th Infantry had the mission of attacking Cisterna di Littoria frontally, with the Borgo, Montello-Cisterna road as the main axis of advance. The 2d Battalion was designated to attack northeast astride the road with 3d Battalion on its left, adjacent to 30th Infantry. Ist Battalion was in reserve.

The 3d Battalion attacked in column of companies, in the order L, I and K, with machine guns from Company M sited to deliver fire from both flanks.

In order to escape the enemy's retaliatory shelling in answer to our preparation preceding H hour, Company L crossed the line of departure two hours before H-hour and waited at a 34th Division outpost for the time of attack. The line of departure was the lateral road running northwest from Isola Bella; the ground rose gradually north of the road and provided no cover and little concealment.

The initial objective was the crest of the slope, about 1800 yards due north of Isola Bella; however, the first resistance was encountered at a strongpoint located in a stream junction about 500 yards north of the line of departure. In addition the company received fire from houses on the right flank, in the 2d Battalion sector. The company was unable to advance until these houses had been captured by 2d Battalion troops. One platoon then worked its way to the objective, by-passing the strong point under cover of a smokescreen and an early morning fog. Unfortunately the fog and smoke cleared before the rest of the company moved up, and the enemy strongpoint had to be attacked and reduced before the company could continue. The company joined its leading platoon on the objective by crawling up the streambed. Heavy enemy fire from the north caused several casualties and forced the company to dig in on the south slope of the objective for the remainder of the day.

After Company L reached its objective, Company I was sent around its left flank with the mission of advancing up a nose due north of Company L. Company 1, however, advanced about 300 yards too far west, entering a draw to the left of its objective. Here it ran into a hornet's nest of opposition, getting fire from both flanks and the front. Company K was committed between Companies I and L but was likewise stopped by enemy fire, most of it coming from the railroad track. The commanding officer of Company K was killed, and the officer who replaced him was killed later. The battalion remained generally in this position during the night, fighting a continuous action against enemy who were attempting to infiltrate. The night was extremely dark, adding to the difficulty of reorganizing and supplying the battalion. This was accomplished, however, and the battalion was prepared to continue the fight the following morning.

The 2d Battalion attacked on the right of the 3d Battalion from a line of departure along the first small stream northwest of Isola Bella, and the road running east from Isola Bella. Company E was designated to attack along the west side of the Isola Bella-Cisterna road and Company F along the east side, with Company G in a reserve position along the ditch running south from Isola Bella. The battalion was supported by a platoon of medium tanks.

Before the attack the battalion suffered casualties from enemy artillery, which opened up before our own preparation was completed. As soon as our troops rose up out of their ditches and foxholes to attack, they began to receive intense automatic weapon and tank fire from two enemy strongpoints. One was in a group of three buildings west of the road and 500 yards beyond the line of departure; the other was organized around a single house east of the road and 700 yards beyond the line of departure. Both had excellent fields of fire toward our lines, across flat terrain. The strongpoints were surrounded with barbed wire and Italian box mines; both had numerous automatic weapons and outlying rifle protection, besides the support of tanks. As the attack started, the fire of all our supporting weapons-five tanks, 37mm guns, heavy and light mortars, heavy and light machine guns and individual weapons, was placed on the two strongpoints.

Company E, attacking the strongpoint west of the road, sent one platoon around to the west in a flanking maneuver. This platoon had difficult going, advancing over absolutely flat terrain, and reached the objective two hours after moving out with only eighteen men left of its original thirty-four. The five tanks supporting the action were all immobilized by antitank mines shortly after moving out.

Company F attacked the strongpoint east of the road in a frontal assault with troops widely deployed; and reached its objective in forty minutes. After consolidating on the objective Company F organized a task force consisting of a rifle platoon reinforced, one tank destroyer, one medium tank and one light tank, with the mission of assaulting two further points of resistance. The first was on the Fosso di Fantano about 1200 yards northeast of Isola Bella; the second was 300 yards farther up the creek, where it was bridged by the Isola Bella-Cisterna road. The medium tank became mired in several feet of mud and water in the creek and the TD was destroyed by enemy SP fire, hence only the light tank aided in the attack. However, both points were overcome, and the enemy withdrew along the creek to the north. Meanwhile Company E advancing from its first objective, attacked enemy positions on a slight knoll just across the road from Company F, and occupied the knoll by 1130.

Company F had suffered severe casualties, so Company G was committed east of Company IT to clean out resistance on the right flank among some houses about 700 yards east of Company F's last positions.

Resistance was heavy, and fighting lasted through the afternoon and into the night. During hours of darkness several groups of enemy attempted to infiltrate the battalion's positions and intermittent fighting resulted; however, the battalion was able to supply itself in preparation for the next day's fighting.

The Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, was not committed in the attack during the first day's action, but was employed in mopping up pockets of resistance which had been by-passed by the other two battalions. Very light casualties were suffered by 1st Battalion in this action.