The 15th Infantry had an initial mission complementary to that of the 30th Infantry, that of attacking on the right of the 7th Infantry, by-passing Cisterna to the southeast and seizing objectives along Highway 7 and the railroad embankment. The initial plan was to attack with two battalions abreast, 3d Battalion on the left and 2d Battalion on the right, with Ist Battalion in reserve; however, so much resistance was expected on the right flank, in the gap between 3d Infantry Division and Special Service Force, that a special task force built around Company A, 15th Infantry, commanded by the 1st Battalion executive, was constituted to operate in the gap. This task force was called Task Force Paulick, after its commander, Maj. Michael Paulick.
The 3d Battalion attacked at H-hour in column of companies, in the order L, K and 1, with its first objective a road junction 1500 yards east of Isola Bella.
The terrain was perfectly flat but was crossed by a series of drainage ditches, most of which ran north and south. Along the road running east from Isola Bella was a series of houses, usually in pairs facing each other across the road, and located 100 to 200 yards apart. One house, just southwest of the initial objective, was very strongly held with machine guns in the ruins of the house and nearby positions. Oddly, there were no antipersonnel mines south of the junction, although both roads were lined with antitank mines.
Company L, in the lead, started east from an assembly position in a drainage ditch about 1000 yards east of Isola Bella. Almost immediately, the company ran into fire of every description-from small arms, machine guns, mortars, artillery, and SP guns. By a series of rushes Company L took the first two houses, and almost immediately afterward patrols reached the next two, making it impossible for our artillery to fire on the houses. However, supporting TDs delivered fire on the houses and aided in their reduction.
In the first two or three hours of the attack, Company L's strength was cut from 150 men to only thirty or forty effectives, and the company was so badly dis-organized that the attack lagged for the next three hours. The battalion was then redisposed in echelon formation to the right rear, with remnants of Company L guiding on the south edge of the road about 400 yards beyond the junction. Fire was received from "Chateau Woods," 1000 yards east of the junction, in addition to fire from the frontal sector along the road. At this time the battle-sled team was ordered into action. Tanks hauling infantrymen in battle sleds moved up the north-south road to the junction which formed the previous objective, then turned east on the right side of the east-west road. About 200 yards east of the junction the tanks encountered a drainage ditch too wide cross, so the infantry personnel left the sleds and moved on foot against the houses 200 yards away. This move was coordinated with the continuation of the attack by the remainder of the battalion, and the front started moving forward again.
Company L's commander was wounded at this time and the remainder of the company stayed at the first objective to reorganize. It was later attached to I Company.
K Company moved up a ditch running generally parallel to the road and hit a number of antipersonnel mines, suffering about ten casualties. The rest of the day was spent cleaning out "Kraut Woods" and adjacent houses; the enemy was well dug-in with machine guns in mutually supporting positions, and as usual he took full advantage of ruined houses for use as strong points. All positions were wired in, necessitating a separate assault on each one. The battalion Ammunition and Pioneer platoon built a road from near the line of departure to the woods, in order to bring the TDs into position without their traveling over mine-filled roads. The battalion remained in this area during the night.
First objective of 2d Battalion on D-Day was the patch of trees known as "Chateau Woods," just southwest of the first main road junction south of Cisterna on the road to Sessano. The battalion began its attack in column of companies, with E Company leading, followed by F and G in order. Company E advanced slowly across flat terrain and was subjected to powerful ground opposition. The enemy had established his strongest line of defense along the south edge of the woods, and was supported by SP guns, tanks, and registered artillery fire. Company E was halted by fire about 1000 yards beyond the line of departure, and F Company was committed to the west, on E Company's left flank. While Company F was drawing fire from the woods, E Company reorganized rapidly and launched one of the most successful bayonet attacks of the war. The attack was ordered because the company was low on ammunition; in the charge, fifteen Germans were killed in their holes and eighty more were captured. An un-estimated number managed to escape to the northwest.
Company E was well supported by tanks in this charge. Originally the battalion had no allotment of tanks, but one platoon of mediums was made available in the afternoon. The tanks advanced to within a short distance of the woods, where they were halted by mines, but were able to support the attack by fire. When Company E entered the woods, Company F moved forward and assisted Company E in cleaning out the last enemy resistance.
While the other two companies were fighting for the woods, G Company by-passed that fight and moved north to the next objective, the road junction at the northeast corner of the woods. Light resistance was encountered, so the company continued north to clean out Fosso di Cisterna. In this deep ditch G Company found and captured more than a hundred enemy, who were cowering in deep caves and surrendered when approached. The caves were well prepared as living quarters and were immune to air attack or artillery fire, but were useless as fighting positions.
After "Chateau Woods" were cleaned out, F and E Companies followed Company G, with Company E being in reserve. Company G reached the point where Highway 7 crosses Fosso di Cisterna and moved out across the flat ground toward the railroad. Here the opposition increased considerably. The company received direct fire from the vicinity of the railroad track and was able to make little headway during the night. In spite of the intensity of the fighting and the blackness of the night, battalion headquarters was able to maintain contact with Company G with W-130 wire. The fighting was still going on as daylight approached.
Because it was necessary to keep the bulk of the 1st Battalion in regimental reserve, Task Force Paulick was organized to fill the 3000-yard gap on the Division's right flank. The Task Force consisted of Company A, 15th Infantry, a platoon of medium and a platoon of light tanks from 751st Tank Battalion, a section of TDs from 601st TD Battalion, the regimental Battle -Patrol, a platoon of machine guns and a section of heavy mortars from D Company, a platoon of Cannon Company, a medical detachment and a squad of engineers. The Task Force attacked at H-hour and immediately encountered bitter opposition.
Enemy machine guns, antitank guns, and SP guns from the left flank, in vicinity of "Chateau Woods," hit the company and its supporting armor heavily. Other machine guns and an antitank gun fired south into the force's flank from the direction of Cisterna, along the north-south road which the Task Force had to cross. A ditch which ran northwest-southeast across a flat field immediately south of Chateau Woods had been converted into a strongpoint, with excellent fighting holes rendering the enemy virtually immune to artillery fire. Machine guns on the enemy flanks afforded crossfire against our troops, and for about 600 yards along the Cisterna road every house had been converted into a strongpoint protected by rifle, machine-gun and tank fire.
The commander of Company A was killed early on D- Day. German tanks were so skillfully placed to cover antitank mine fields that in the first day the Task Force lost two medium tanks and one light tank from this cause, while one TD and one medium tank were lost on improperly marked friendly mine fields prior to the attack. Company A, however, managed to reach Fosso di Cisterna by dark, and worked its way north to its initial objective, the bridge just southeast of "Chateau Woods."
Although unable to get ammunition or food because of the bitter fighting, the long haul, and lack of personnel, the Task Force continued after dark to clear out the houses along a road running parallel to, and 600 yards east of Fosso di Cisterna. The houses finally fell when two medium tanks were sent across the Fosso di Cisterna over the next bridge to the south, in the Special Service Force sector, thus flanking the strongpoints. Firing down the road into the enemy positions, the tanks forced the enemy infantry to withdraw and A Company occupied the area.
Immediately afterward the Task Force attacked east, against "88 Woods," about 600 yards east of the road just referred to. Little opposition was encountered here, but the Task Force's right flank was endangered when an enemy Mark VI tank counterattack forced the Special Service Force, which had no heavy antitank weapons, to give up a position on Highway 7 and the railroad line to the east. After Company A had cleaned out the woods, the Battle Patrol passed through the woods toward a road junction just 300 yards to the east. There was no opposition between the woods and the road junction, but upon arriving at the latter point, the patrol discovered an estimated reinforced enemy platoon moving down the road in column of twos, apparently to take up a defensive position, unaware that United States troops were so near. A two-minute fire fight followed, during which the Battle Patrol killed approximately twenty enemy and took thirty-seven prisoners. The next day they rounded up six more wounded enemy. An ammunition dump was discovered and set on fire, and an SP gun destroyed by the patrol.
Mission of Battle Patrol, 15th Infantry, was to cut Highway 7 southeast of Cisterna. To reach the highway it was necessary to clear the enemy from a large area, protect the regimental right flank, cross a long wheat field, a road, move through a woods and cover some more open terrain before reaching the objective.
The 53-officer-and-man Patrol encountered its first task when it reached a ditch beside the road it had to cross. Enemy small-arms fire was-already being directed on the men. Suddenly four snipers opened fire from the patrol's rear.
Pfc. Henry Schauer, whom S/Sgt. Joseph M. Brown calls "the best BAR-man I have ever seen, climbed out of the ditch and walked slowly toward the snipers. Two of them were at the base of a house 200 yards to the rear, one on a road near the house, and the fourth concealed in the wheat field to the left of the house. "Pfc. Schauer was made of ice," said Sergeant Brown admiringly. "He stood upright, raised his BAR to his shoulder, and went to work. The snipers 170 yards away alongside the house were low to the ground, blending in with the grass. Two bursts from the BAR killed both snipers. Pfc. Schauer turned his body slightly. The sniper lying on the shaded road was only a dark shadow. One burst, from the BAR finished him. The last sniper, the one in the field, was almost impossible to spot. Pfc. Schauer fired again. One burst was enough.
"As Pfc. Schauer ran to catch up with us he glimpsed another sniper hiding behind the chimney on the roof of a house 150 yards to our front. He stopped, aimed, and his burst of fire tumbled the sniper's body off the roof."
Crossing the tree-lined road, the patrol proceeded up the ditch on the right side of the road. Another smaller patrol moved out to the right in a parallel ditch. Schauer was fourth in line in the latter formation. Two German machineguns opened fire, one, sixty yards to the front, the other, about 500 yards to the right of the road. Everyone took cover except Schauer.
"The man acted as though nothing could kill him," according to 2d Lt. James M. Dorsey, Jr. "He assumed the kneeling position on the bank of a ditch. Bullets from both machine guns swept about him, miraculously missing him by inches. Fragmentation from enemy shells which burst no more than fifteen yards from him, hit the ground all around him. He permitted none of this fire to ruffle his composure. Pfc. Schauer engaged the first machine gun, the one sixty yards away, opening up on it with a full clip of ammunition. In one long burst of fire he killed the gunner and the man alongside him. He put a new magazine in his BAR, fired two short bursts and killed the two remaining Germans who ran to man the weapon."
Schauer jammed another magazine into the BAR, aimed, and with one burst killed the gunner of the second machine gun, plus three other soldiers near the gun.
On May 24, after pushing on to Highway 7 the patrol moved south, paralleling the highway. An enemy machine gun opened fire when the men had proceeded about 800 yards south. At the same time an enemy Mark VI tank began pumping shells at the patrol from a position 600 yards to the left.
Schauer climbed out of the ditch and crawled toward the machine gun. After twenty yards of this, he stood up. The tank fired four rounds directly at him, and the enemy machine gun kept up its vicious rate of fire.
"But looking at Pfc. Schauer," stated 2d Lt. Max R. Hendon, "you would think he was taking aim at target practice on the firing range. He fired a full clip of twenty at the enemy machine gun. The entire crew of four enemy were riddled by his bullets and fell dead.
"Pfc. Schauer's calm courage, his remarkable skill and accuracy, removed three enemy machine guns which hindered our advance, killed the entire crew in each case, and killed five enemy snipers."
For his deeds Pfc. Schauer was later justly awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
The part played by the engineers in the operation was largely completed during the preparational phase; however, their line companies were subattached on the basis of one squad per battalion, with an additional platoon attached to Task Force Paulick. They worked in close support of the infantry, clearing mines from roads and road shoulders, gapping tactical wire and minefields, with advancing troops. Enemy employment of mines and boobytraps was on a far heavier scale than anything previously encountered; there were even instances reported in which the Germans booby-trapped their own dead, in the hope of killing our medical personnel.
As the first twenty-four hours' fighting drew to a close, the shape of victory was already beginning to appear. While there was still contact with fixed enemy defenses all along the front, except in the sector of Task Force Paulick, the main enemy positions were known to have been broken through, with only reserve elements in previously prepared positions trying to keep the back door shut. Remaining resistance was strongest in front of Cisterna, but faded away progressively to the flanks.
Battle casualties on May 23 had been 995, believed to be the largest number suffered by any single United States Army division in one day in World War II, even though the attack was successful. The figure reveals in some measure the wholesale ferocity of fighting on both sides. During the -next two days-May 24 and 25 -the battle for Cisterna unfolded exactly according to plan, as though an invisible power, holding a copy of the field order, were directing the actions of both sides. Yet it must not be forgotten that the actual course of the battle was not the result of the foreordination of fate, but of meticulous planning, objective training, and above all, fiery execution and dogged hammering at objectives in the face of last-ditch opposition.
The role of the 30th Infantry during this period was to implement its breakthrough west of Cisterna by continuing its drive northeast across Highway 7, toward Cori.
The last phase of the breakthrough occurred when Company F, attached to 1st Battalion, succeeded in driving north across the railroad track and overcoming enemy -opposition there, at a point about two miles northwest of Cisterna. The enemy had tanks, SP guns and automatic weapons covering the rail bed with enfilade fire and every possible route for crossing the tracks was zeroed in with artillery and mortars. The Germans were extremely well dug-in (this was the old MLR dating from January and February), and automatic-weapon positions were protected by other weapons. Company F casualties in advancing to the railroad were not heavy, because numerous ditches provided favorable routes of approach.
Coordination between our tanks and infantry during the crossing was poor, and Company F suffered casualties from its supporting armor. The tanks were not informed when the infantry was forced out of its zone of advance, and fired into the foot troops when they changed course to outflank enemy weapons.
However, the attack, carried on entirely during hours of darkness, was finally successful.
During the morning of May 24, Company F was returned to 2d Battalion, which was ordered to follow the Ist and 3d Battalions in their wide flanking drive north and east of Cisterna. While there was virtually no opposition from enemy in position along the route of advance, many enemy falling back from the 7th Infantry's attack retreated into 2d Battalion columns " forcing our troops to deploy locally and deal with them. Enemy in isolated positions around La Villa, which had already been passed through by the 7th Infantry, caused considerable trouble. Fire was also received from the Cisterna cemetery, which the battalion by-passed on the north. During the evening of May 24, fire was received from both front and rear, as the battalion reached and occupied its objectives, but the opposition was overcome during the night.
The morning of May 25 the battalion reverted to regimental reserve, both 1st and 3d Battalions having passed through it and begun the advance on Cori. The 2d Battalion moved out for Cori during the afternoon, following the other two battalions. About 800 yards short of the line of departure, which was a crossroad two miles northeast of Cisterna, the battalion received some casualties from friendly artillery fire. Shortly afterward six Allied planes flew over and bombed and strafed the road, causing casualties. This was blamed on the rapid advance of our forward elements, and the fact that the planes were apparently aiming at a battery of 88mm guns which had been recently abandoned and were still smoking. The planes flew perpendicular to the marching column, instead of parallel to it, which would have been the case had the troops been the target; also, only three planes dropped their bombs. The battalion went into an assembly area short of Cori that night.
During the morning May 24, 3d Battalion was alerted to move north up the Fosso Feminamorta, following 2d Battalion, to pass through 2d Battalion north of Cisterna and capture objectives 1000 yards northeast of the town. The battalion moved out about 1630, following 2d Battalion north to the railroad track, then southeast to La Villa. Along the eastern side of La Villa there was a small ditch, and two or three hundred yards farther east was a larger ditch; 2d Battalion started up this larger ditch, planning to cross Highway 7 and then move east cross- country to its objectives, thus by-passing Cisterna. Company L, following 2d Battalion, ran into a strong concentration of friendly artillery fire just after passing La Villa, and drew back to the protection of the smaller ditch. When the column moved forward again, it crossed Highway 7 just north of the cemetery. At this time, 7th Infantry launched an attack toward Cisterna from the northwest; the German reaction was the general firing of machine guns and mortars from the north edge of town. It was dark by this time, and the enemy had no observation, yet the battalion suffered several casualties. The battalion then drew back west of Highway 7, reorganized, moved several hundred yards north, crossed the highway, and proceeded east toward its objectives on a compass bearing. Company I was then leading.
The battalion reached its objectives (the crossroad two miles northeast of Cisterna, and high ground immediately northwest of the crossroad) and put in a defensive position prior to daylight May 25. The battalion had orders to attack at 0630 that morning toward Cori, with Ist Battalion on its right between it and the Cori-Cisterna road. However, the attack could not be coordinated by that time, due to difficulties of supply, so the battalion remained in position.
The attack got under way at 1600, with no opposition encountered. At 1700, however, the troops were caught in the same air attack that hit 2d Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Bennett, the battalion commander, was injured and evacuated. Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Neddersen assumed command. The battalion had a series of objectives en route to Cori, and moved through the objectives without difficulty. The battalion reached the road junction just west of Cori at 2030, then moved due north to the Cori- Giuglianello road, closing and completing organization for defense by 2300.
By evening of May 24, Company A, which had captured twenty-six Germans in caves while clearing Fosso Feminamorta, had been returned to Ist Battalion, which assembled astride the railroad just east of Fosso Feminamorta. The battalion CP was in the ditch itself. Shortly after midnight the battalion received orders to move to the crossroad two miles northeast of Cisterna,, relieve 3d Battalion there, and prepare for a coordinated attack toward Cori the following morning. The 3d Battalion had already moved out toward the crossroad; Ist Battalion was to follow roughly the same route, by- passing Cisterna on the north, and assemble on the objective, while 3d Battalion was to move a short distance to the north, prepared to attack toward Cori on the left of Ist Battalion. The Cori-Cisterna road was designated as the bound airy between Mtn Infantry on the left and 15th Infantry on the right.
Officers of the 1st Battalion, reaching the crossroad shortly after daylight on reconnaissance, found small elements of 3d Battalion at the crossroad with a squad outpost to the northeast. The battalion itself initiated its march in column of companies, in the order B, C. D (-), Headquarters and A. The battalion passed immediately beyond the northwestern limits of Cisterna, moving east, and received considerable fire (mostly mortar) from enemy in Cisterna prior to daylight. During the morning, Germans made continuous efforts to escape from Cisterna by infiltrating to the north and northeast along draws and ditches, and it was necessary to leave Company A behind to stop this infiltration and cover the battalion's rear. However, the battalion was able to reach the crossroad, relieve 3d Battalion and organize for the attack toward Cori. One company was placed west of the crossroad and patrols were sent to contact the 15th Infantry.
The battalion had not been in position long when it began receiving strong enemy artillery fire from medium and heavy guns to the north and northwest, and other artillery fire from Cori; there was some 88mm fire mixed in, but the bulk of the fire came in battalion concentrations of thirty to forty rounds. A group of friendly tanks in an assembly area just north of 1st Battalion doubtlessly drew the fire. Casualties in the Ist Battalion were light, as the - men were well dispersed and dug-in, but movement and control were difficult.
The enemy artillery apparently began displacing during the afternoon, as the intensity of fire diminished, and at about 1600 the battalion attacked as planned, with 3d Battalion on its left and 15th Infantry on the right. Enemy resistance had faded away during the day as scattered groups of Germans, cut off from their units and driven from their positions, retreated into the hills. There was virtually no resistance as the battalion advanced and after crossing the north-south railway east of Cisterna the battalion was moved out onto the highway, with only a patrol operating on the left flank. High ground immediately north of Cori was reached just before dark. One company was stationed in the mountains one mile north of Cori, but there were no enemy there. All personnel were greatly fatigued, and only minimum security personnel were kept alert while others slept.
During the 1st Battalion advance toward Cori, Company A passed through and continued on to Cori where it took eighteen prisoners. The battalion was then assembled north and east of Cori and outposts established.
The heaviest fighting during May 24 and 25 was done by 7th Infantry, which had the mission of capturing Cisterna itself and cleaning out the city. The 1st Battalion, which had been in reserve all during D-day, was committed to attack at daylight May 24. The battalion took its first objective, a nose north of the Cisterna-Ponte Rotto road about half way between those towns, with little difficulty, and immediately moved north to capture La Villa. Shortly before reaching the railroad track, at about 0930, Company C encountered fierce enemy fire and was halted. The enemy was dug in all along the railroad bed and on the high ground to the rear. The railroad bed itself was crisscrossed by enfilade fire from machine guns, rifles and 88mm guns. The approaches to the railroad were covered with antipersonnel and antitank mines.
By working one platoon across the railroad track at a time, Company C overran German positions and occupied a point north of the railroad shortly before noon. The company was rather disorganized, however, and in order to occupy La Villa, Company A was sent around Company C's right flank to take high ground east of La Villa. It reached its objective with only scattered rifle and machine-gun fire opposing it, and by its occupation of high ground outflanking La Villa on the east, forced the enemy to withdraw. Company C then moved in' and cleaned out the area.
While a platoon of tanks and a platoon of TDs remained at La Villa and assisted by fire, Company B attacked and occupied the Cisterna cemetery 1000 yards northwest of town by 1600. The area, was heavily pounded by our tanks and TDs and by Division Artillery, and the advance of 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, to the north of the cemetery assisted in causing an enemy withdrawal into Cisterna. Company B had little trouble taking the cemetery, where it stopped and reorganized. The battalion organized a defensive position in this area, and repulsed one counterattack during the night, which came from the direction of the city. At 2200, 3d Battalion passed through 1st Battalion to assault Cisterna on the axis of Highway 7.
At 1400 May 25, 1st Battalion began its advance into Cisterna, following 3d Battalion. The battalion moved in column of companies in the order A, C and B. Seven medium tanks assisted the battalion in its move into the town. Many enemy strongpoints were encountered in buildings, in the streets and in Fosso di Cisterna. The enemy had taken full advantage of the four-month lull to build strong positions in the rubble caused by our bombing and shelling. Enemy at the north edge of town provided strong opposition for the tanks but were finally neutralized. Company A met the greatest resistance, but suffered only moderate casualties. Company C, which swung to the right of Company A, cleaned out opposition in its sector and then took up a defensive position in the east edge of town. While 3d Battalion was left in the city to clear out the last remaining enemy, 1st Battalion left town at 1700 May 25 and moved to an assembly area two miles north of Cisterna.
The 2d Battalion, which had advanced 1500 yards up the axis of the Isola Bella-Cisterna road during the first day, continued the attack astride the road on May 25, with Company G on the right of the road and Company E on the left. Enemy strongpoints on the immediate front had been evacuated during the night, and the only initial opposition was in the form of harassing artillery fire. When it was about 600 yards south of Cisterna, however, the enemy opened up with machine- gun, SP-gun, rifle and mortar fire from the railroad, and artillery fire increased greatly. The battalion was unable to advance during the remainder of the day.
At 2100, Companies E and G attacked abreast across the railroad and both got -across after heavy close combat. The enemy was thoroughly dug-in and Company G suffered several casualties from mines around the Cisterna railroad station. In spite of extreme darkness and heavy resistance, the attack progressed well because it had been planned in every particular and previously rehearsed. After the railroad line was breached, Company F was sent into town at 0300 May 25, and by daylight had one-third of the town in its hands. Casualties crossing the railroad line were not excessive, probably because the battalion crossed on a wide front at six different places. German lines were then attacked from the rear and most of the enemy killed.
During the morning of May 25 the battalion was joined by eight light tanks, two medium tanks and two platoons of Cannon Company. Company F was halted by resistance in a large castle at the center of the town, so Company G was sent around the south side of the castle with two platoons of tanks as assault guns. Company G advanced along the Fosso di Cisterna, but it too was held up by fire from the castle. The castle had only one entrance, and it was covered by an antitank gun. Company F placed a machine gun on top of a house across from the castle; while the machine gun fired on the enemy antitank gun and kept the crew away from it, a medium tank roared through the castle entrance and destroyed the gun. Company F closed in and routed 250 prisoners from a cave underneath the castle. Included were the commanding officer of 955th Infantry Regiment and his staff. Company G was then able to push through the town and took sixty more prisoners from caves north of Cisterna. The 1st and 3d Battalions were contacted, and resistance in the town was completely wiped out by dusk May 25.
The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, spent the first night of combat-May 23-24-south of the Cisterna-Ponte Rotto highway, and a few hundred yards east of Ponte Rotto. Next morning, 1st Battalion passed through 3d Battalion, and the latter followed in column of companies in the order L, I, K and M. Upon reaching the CisternaPonte Rotto road, moving north, the battalion headquarters group came under a concentration of twentyfive rounds of enemy 88mm air-burst, wounding two officers and six men. The battalion executive was wounded and evacuated, and the Company M commander took his post. .
The battalion passed through Ist Battalion at La Villa, having suffered few other casualties. During the evening it moved out toward high ground across Highway 7, and northwest of the Cisterna cemetery. Some elements of the battalion became mingled with 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, but no other trouble was encountered as 1st Battalion had cleaned out all enemy resistance.
Upon reaching its objective, the battalion swung southeast to attack Cisterna along the axis of Highway 7. With Company I on the right and Company K on the left, the battalion attacked at 2000 May 24. A half- hour before the attack the battalion commander was wounded, and the former commander of Company M, Capt. Glenn Rathbun, took command of the battalion. Resistance at the cemetery was heavy (although Company B had previously captured it---most probably, enemy retreating from Cisterna had bumped into the 1st Battalion around the cemetery and had gone into tem-porary defensive positions). The enemy still had posi-tions east of the cemetery, and delivered strong mortar and artillery fire. The two leading companies fought all night and into the next day, coordinating a second attack at 1630, when they received excellent support from a platoon of tanks and a platoon of TDs. Between he Fosso Centri di Pantano and the highway the battalion received a small amount of fire, but this was followed by the prompt surrender of 120 prisoners, in-cluding several officers. Cisterna had already been taken but there was considerable by-passed resistance to be cleaned up. The enemy had taken to numerous caves and abandoned dugouts which were prepared against attack from the south or west, but could not hold out against the drive from the northwest.
The battalion moved to the northwest end of town to complete its occupation, then moved to an assembly area about three miles above Cisterna. During the last phase of the attack a platoon of Company L, which was intended to be used in battle sleds following medium tanks, was out of the fight altogether after the tanks were disabled shortly after H-hour. The platoon did not rejoin the company until May 28.
Resistance on the front of the 15th Infantry lasted longer than that against the 30th, possibly because the attack of both the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments passed to the west of the town, although resistance was lighter during the second day than during the first. Early May 24, 3d Battalion reached the road junction two miles south of Cisterna which 2d Battalion had captured the evening before, and immediately attacked up the improved road toward Cisterna. There were about thirty- five houses lining this stretch of road, but none was strongly held. Chief resistance came from SP and artillery fire from pieces located northeast of the railroad. As the battalion approached the intersection with Highway 7, it received fire from an open field to the west, and from Fosso di Cisterna' to the east. This fire was neutralized by mortar and artillery fire, plus mortar fire from 2d Battalion which was fighting in Fosso di Cisterna. The 7th Infantry Battle Patrol was contacted at the road junction, and the Patrol assisted 2d Battalion in cleaning out resistance between Highway 7 and the railroad.
Meanwhile two companies of 3d Battalion advanced north along Highway 7, reaching the railroad overpass at the southern edge of the city. The battalion went into position along the railroad shortly after dark and sent outposts across the railroad. Enemy fire during the night was moderate. TDs took up positions south of the battalion area, and a platoon of tanks, which had joined the battalion during the day, occupied positions in "Kraut Woods."
At 0530 May 25 the battalion left its position, moved southeast about 2,000 yards on Highway 7, then turned northeast and completed the encirclement of Cisterna by occupying an assembly area 2,000 yards northeast of town, 'adjacent to 30th Infantry positions. At 1000, the battalion moved out toward Cori, in an attack coordinated with Ist Battalion and 30th Infantry, 3d Battalion advancing along the southeast side of the Cisterna-Cori highway. There was virtually no resistance at 2000 and the battalion remained in this position during the night, sending patrols into Cori from the south and west.
The 2d Battalion had more trouble May 24 than did 3d Battalion. At first light Company F was sent up Fosso di Cisterna, crossing under the railroad bridge and moving onto open ground north of the railroad. Here, too, the ground was flat, and foot-high wheat provided the only concealment. When the company reached a point about 500 yards north of the railroad the enemy opened up with fire from an estimated three tanks. Enemy infantry was well dug in to the north, immediately east of Cisterna, and occupied several house strongpoints that swept the company with cross fire.
Company F moved out at about 1330 to seize and hold a large strongly fortified house 600 yards beyond our foremost elements. It was situated in the center of a flat open field, and all approaches to it were covered with interlocking bands of grazing machine-gun fire. Prior reconnaissance had indicated the advisability of proceeding along a narrow draw which appeared to lead directly to the objective in order to minimize what seemed must inevitably be numerous casualties.
Pvt. James H. Mills, in his second day of combat, was the leading man of the foremost platoon, as number one scout. After proceeding about 300 yards, he disappeared around a sharp turn in the fosso. A vicious burst of machine-gun fire was heard, followed by a single rifle shot. Second Lieutenant Arthur J. Mueller, foremost man, rushed around the corner. There he saw Mills leaning against the steep bank covering an enemy soldier with his rifle. Crumpled over a machine gun lay another enemy soldier, dead, shot between the eyes.
"I had to do it, sir, he almost got me," said Mills apologetically. Then he turned on his heel and struck out down the ditch once more, with Lieutenant Mueller close behind.
First, Mills captured a German in the act of pulling the pin from a potato masher grenade. As the prisoner was being searched by others, Mills spotted another soldier immediately above the men's position, and killed him as he was in the act of pulling the pin of a grenade. The advance then continued, with Mills still leading.
Once more he rounded a bend, to engage in a duel with six enemy soldiers. He charged.
"The sheer guts displayed by Private Mills must have unnerved the enemy, for when he had reached a point within about ten feet of them they threw their helmets to the ground and chorused 'Kamerad!' as loud as they could shout," narrated S/Sgt. Dewey A. Olsen. "Six heavily-armed Germans had surrendered to one lone United States soldier."
Enemy mortar fire began plastering the edges of the draw. Mills pointed out a shallow drainage ditch which ran from the draw to within fifty yards of the houseobjective. It was pointed out also that although the ditch was too shallow to permit passage without being observed by the enemy, a strong diversion by fire might allow a force to proceed up the ditch while the enemy's attention was centered elsewhere.
So.Mills took it upon himself as a one-man task force to create the diversion. He climbed from the cover of the draw under heavy enemy fire and emptied his M-1 toward the enemy, shouting defiance all the while. Then he sought cover and reloaded. A small group, meanwhile, began working its way toward the house.
Said Pfc. Charles L. Hyson, Jr.: "I do not know how many times Private Mills repeated this process but he was still standing out there firing when we reached the closest point to the house and began our assault.
"The enemy had been completely taken in by Private Mills' plan and we caught the enemy with his 'pants down,' taking the position and forcing his surrender before he knew what was happening. We captured twenty-two enemy soldiers, three machine guns, and three heavy mortars without a single casualty. Private Mills was directly responsible for our success."
Private Mills later received the Congressional Medal of Honor.
Supporting TDs played an important part in the attack. They moved to a point near the railroad south. east of the battalion and fired across the battalion front at strongpoints on the left front. At this time Company E was committed in an effort to outflank the enemy on the right, but flat terrain continued to work against the battalion and little progress was made.
Under cover of darkness, antitank guns were brought up, and just after first light they were brought to bear on enemy strongpoints, neutralizing most of them. The remainder of the enemy withdrew and the battalion advanced to a crossroad about a mile and a half northeast of Cisterna.
The battalion then received orders to move to a U- shaped patch of woods on flat ground two miles due east of Cisterna. The battalion displaced by company, Company C arriving first with no opposition. There reorganization was completed and the battalion marched to Cori, taking a route well to the right of the Cisterna- Cori road, and spent the night in an assembly area on the northern slopes of Monte Arrestino.
As dawn broke May 24, the 15th Infantry Battle Patrol was engaged in front of Task Force Paulick in a successful action against an enemy platoon. Company A reorganized preparatory to continuing the attack, with its objective a road junction 1000 yards north of the woods occupied the previous night. The Battle Patrol reported the location of an extensive minefield 300 yards short of the junction, and extending 300 yards on either side of it. A heavy concentration of artillery and tank fire was laid on enemy positions, and under its protection the squad of engineers cleared three paths through the mines. The artillery fire continued while the infantry went through the left gap and the tanks through the center, reducing the outpost at the road junction and taking five prisoners.
Company A continued to a strongpoint 600 yards farther north, where twelve enemy and two machine guns were captured. One platoon remained at this position and supported by fire another platoon, which moved southeast to a point where Highway 7 contacts the railroad bed. The platoon encountered strong artillery and small-arms fire and was forced to move back south of the railroad embankment. At 1430 the remainder of the battalion joined Task Force Paulick in order to force a crossing of the railroad. Attached armor remained with the battalion. Company A casualties had been high, with one officer and eight enlisted men killed, three officers and fifty-four enlisted men wounded and two enlisted men missing.
The railroad embankment was the enemy's strongest line of defense. It was covered with enfilade fire by automatic weapons and SP guns, and was completely blanketed by prepared artillery and mortar concentrations. All the enemy's fire was brought to bear on Company B, the first to storm the tracks, and although fire was heavy the company got nearly 700 yards north of the tracks before it was stopped. There it drew fire from two enemy tanks, one of which was destroyed by our TDs.
Another heroic action was performed the same day by Sgt. Sylvester Antolak, in which he lost his life. Mission of Company B, 15th Infantry, was to cut the railroad near Cisterna and capture commanding terrain on the far side.
The 1st platoon crossed the railroad bed without encountering enemy fire and it appeared that the Germans had fled. As the lead scouts of the 2d platoon were about to follow, a hail of enemy machine gun, machine pistol and rifle fire burst on them from an enemy strongpoint about 200 yards to the right front. The German plan was evident: to bar the advance of the 2d platoon, then seal off and destroy the 1st platoon.
Antolak saw the impending danger and, ordering a base of fire set up, called on his men to follow him as he charged the German position, fully thirty yards ahead of his squad. As he moved forward in short rushes across the bare, coverless terrain he became a prime target for the enemy's concentrated fire.
After advancing a few dozen yards he was hit by automatic-weapons fire and knocked to the ground. Jumping to his feet he again charged, his shoulder gashed and bleeding. Again he was hit and knocked to the ground, and again he picked himself up to resume the advance.
Said S/Sgt. Audie L. Murphy: "The 200-yard interval was narrowing; the Germans were firing their machine gun, their "spit" pistols, and rifles about as fast as they could squeeze the triggers. They must have sensed that Sergeant Antolak was sparking the charge and that he was the man they had to knock out."
With but fifty yards to go Sergeant Antolak was hit and thrown to the ground a third time, his right arm shattered by the burst of automatic fire. He wedged his submachine gun into his left armpit, staggered to his feet, and continued his grim charge. He advanced to within fifteen yards of the enemy strongpoint and killed both the gunner and assistant gunner with a long burst of fire. The remaining ten Germans surrendered to this man whom their bullets could not stop.
Another German strongpoint 100 yards to the right immediately opened fire. "We urged Sergeant Antolak to take cover in the machine-gun emplacement he had just captured," said Cpl. William H. Harrison, 99 while we arranged to get him medical aid. He looked too weak from his wounds and loss of blood to keep on going."
Antolak refused to consider this proposition. Again he led the attack against this new strongpoint, with the remainder of his men following at an *interval Of several yards. He made sixty yards before being hit by the concentrated firepower. By sheer will power he managed to stagger forward another ten yards before collapsing. The squad pushed forward, assaulted the German position and overran it, taking eight prisoners. When the men returned to Sergeant Antolak he was dead.
"His heroic action had enabled the squad to kill or capture twenty Germans, wipe out the last enemy pockets in the area and prevent the Ist platoon from being cut off," stated Pfc. Marion Ellis.
Sergeant Antolak was awarded posthumously the Congressional Medal of Honor.
Enemy were detected forming on Company F's right flank, apparently for a counterattack, so the Battle Patrol was committed. It met approximately a company of Germans in a small woods north of the tracks, and it was found necessary to commit Company A again. Company A received heavy fire while crossing the tracks and suffered further casualties, so Company C was sent across the tracks to the left of Company B. Company C provided the necessary manpower to overcome the enemy, and after two hours of moderate firing reached a U-shaped patch of woods two miles east of Cisterna, which 2d Battalion was to pass through later. Long-range fire harassed Company C in the woods during the night.
Meanwhile, Company A had eliminated the threatened counterattack, and joined the remainder of the battalion in the woods at 0400 May 23. Tanks had been unable to cross the tracks during the daylight May 24, so during the night the engineers bulldozed two crossings and the armor rejoined the battalion at dawn May 25.
At 0800 the battalion attacked toward Cori with the mission of occupying high ground immediately south of town and protecting the Division's right flank. Company C led the attack and encountered strong machinegun fire from enemy who had withdrawn the previous day. The terrain was rolling at the beginning of the attack but became steeper as the troops moved northeast. One tank was lost in the morning from enemy artillery fire. Both the 3d Division and 15th Infantry Battle Patrols were operating with the battalion, to maintain contact with SSF on the right and provide flank security.
Company C's drive slowed down about half way to the objective, and Company A was passed through. Advance patrols of the battalion were on the objective by 1500, and the battalion had occupied the entire objective by 1900. This position was held during the night.
With the capture of Cisterna and Cori at approximately the same time-late afternoon of May 25-the breakthrough was complete. No organized resistance remained in the Division zone of advance. While the Division had suffered heavily-approximately 1400 killed and wounded in three day's fighting--the enemy had suffered far more heavily, losing nearly 1600 prisoners to the 3d Division alone, and probably an equal number in killed and wounded. The 362d Infantry Division, ordered to defend in place, had been annihilated by the combined attack of the 3d Division and 1st Armored Division, and the 715th Infantry Division had lost at least half its front-line effectives.
In considering the success of this attack, it is noteworthy that there was little straggling. Hospitals reported that wounded 3d Division personnel were anxious to rejoin their units in combat, a not commonlyencountered phenomenon. This not only bespeaks high morale, but explains why companies, although greatly reduced in strength, could continue to attack and move forward in the face of terrific fire. Troops advanced well-deployed, minimizing losses, but every man was imbued with the desire to close with the enemy, and it was unnecessary to drive or push the men forward. This also bespeaks leadership of highest caliber, which was demonstrated time and again by junior officers who suddenly found important commands thrust upon them, and who turned in performances which could not be excelled.
Thus ended the Second Battle of Cisterna.