THE morning of 26 May marked the beginning of the Division's rapid pursuit of the enemy after German defenses around Cisterna had crumbled. Following the night of May 25-26, spent in assembly areas in the vicinity of Cori, the Division headed northward with 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, in the lead. Because there was practically no enemy opposition, the battalion moved on foot on the Cori-Giuglianello road with patrols protecting the flanks. Shortly after noon, while rounding a sharp curve at the outskirts of Cori, the battalion column was bombed and strafed by five United States P-40 fighter- bombers. The first three planes of the flight dropped their bombs, scoring direct hits on the highway. More than a hundred men were killed or wounded, including seventy from the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, and the Adjutant and S-2 of the 30th Infantry. A number of jeeps loaded with ammunition were hit, and additional casualties were caused by exploding 37mm antitank and small-arms ammunition.
A considerable number of individual acts of heroism took place during this incident by soldiers who braved the fires and exploding shells to assist wounded comrades. Several jeeps were hit alongside abandoned German tanks in a narrow defile about 300 yards from the curve, tying up traffic for five or six hours.
Following the bombing the battalion reorganized and moved on foot toward Giuglianello, arriving there about 1800 hours.
Three large by-passes were constructed by the engineers between Cori and Giuglianello to replace bridges demolished by the enemy. The bridges were sighted by artillery liaison planes, reported to the engineers, and work was under way shortly after elements of the 2d Battalion reached the river. The gap was fifty feet deep and sixty feet wide. Bulldozers were put across the gap shortly after work began and two other by-passes were finished a half hour after the first was completed.
Later a supply road from Cisterna to Cori was built for the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry.
The engineers also cleared the road of abandoned enemy vehicles and inspected for boobytraps. Four boobytrapped 88mm guns between Cisterna and Giuglianello were made harmless and 150 vehicles were cleared from the road.
The other two battalions of the 15th Infantry followed the 2d Battalion to Giuglianello, with the bombing incident at Cori the only obstacle. The three battalions assembled around Giuglianello at 1800 hours and about an hour and a half later entrucked for Artena. The truck column moved with 3d, 1st and 2d Battalions in that order, and had traveled only three or four miles when it came under intense German artillery fire. The 3d and 1st Battalions halted in that position for the night while the 2d Battalion, led personally by Brig. Gen. Whitfield P. Shepard, Assistant Division- Commander, continued on wheels toward Artena, with the belief that Artena was in friendly hands, a false report by an adjoining unit commander.
Night had fallen when General Shepard halted the column about 700 yards west of Artena and went forward to seek a truck "turnaround." The General was fired on by enemy small arms and his aide slightly wounded, so he ordered the battalion to organize a defense west of the town. Meanwhile rear elements of the motor column had become separated from the forward units, so Major Potter, Battalion Executive Officer halted the rear vehicles and sent out a contact patrol to find the forward part of the column. At that time enemy aircraft came over the column and the men hastily detrucked to escape the bombing and strafing. In detrucking, the men ran headlong into three German machine-gun positions covering that sector of the road. The enemy could have caused more confusion among the already frightened men by opening fire, but apparently taken completely by surprise by the headlong rush from the trucks, they gave up without firing a shot.
I The remainder of the battalion was contacted shortly thereafter and a defense organized along the road facing north and east, with Company G on the right, Company F. on the west and Company E behind F on the south side of the road. That position was held until morning.
The 30th Infantry followed the 15th on May 26, with the Ist Battalion protecting the Division's right flank. Shortly after noon the 1st Battalion with Company A leading, marched up the mountain trail leading due north from Cori, passing through the 1st Special Service Force, which was assembled in the northern outskirts of Cori. The SSF then followed the 1st Battalion toward Roccamassima, a small town sitting atop a high peak overlooking the Division's main route of advance. About 1500 yards south of Roccamassima, two enemy were seen in the woods down the mountainside to the west. A squad from Company A was sent down to investigate, and heavy machine-gun fire was placed on the vicinity where the enemy had been seen. The fire brought several Germans running out, and the remainder of the 1st Battalion platoon was sent down to assist the squad in attacking them. The enemy showed no disposition to fight however, and the platoon took about ninety-four prisoners, who stated their mission was to go to Cisterna, reinforce the garrison there, and fight to the last. Three enemy were killed in this action. The battalion reached Roccamassima. at about 1600 hours May 26 and organized a defensive position there before dark, covering the Division's right flank. During this period the Special Service Force started passing through to the north, all three regiments marching in column over the mountain trail.
The 2d Battalion moved to a position north and east of Cori the morning of May 26, where it spent the day regrouping and recovering from the losses it suffered around Cisterna. The 3d Battalion was ordered at 0700 hours to proceed north to Giuglianello and establish a defensive position west of that town. The battalion moved into position along a north-south ridge, extending to the main road about a mile west of Giuglianello. This was accomplished by 1400 hours and the rest of the day was spent organizing the position for allaround defense and laying wire on the final protective line.
The 7th Infantry, held up while it cleaned out Cisterna , followed the Division to the north. It moved in column along the railroad bed west of Cisterna in advance-guard formation, with 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions in that order, The regiment was held up by a fire fight between the enemy and 6th Armored Infantry Regiment along the Colli Rotundo, about two miles from Artena. At dusk the 3d Battalion moved cross-country and took up a position on the regimental right flank west of Artena, on the forward slope of a large hill mass south of the town. During the move, with Company K in the lead, about thirty-five Germans were encountered in a meeting engagement. A 30-minute fight resulted, with four enemy killed, three wounded and three captured. The battalion then moved into position on the slope, picking up straggler enemy prisoners during the night.
Shortly after daylight of May 27, the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, began its attack against Artena. At about the same time a roadblock held by Company G west of town captured an enemy amphibious jeep containing two staff officers from the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. They were on reconnaissance prior to bringing their unit into combat, and provided the 3d Division its first contact with the Panzer-Fallschirmijaer since the Anzio beachhead days of March.
Still under command of General Shepard, the 2d Battalion attacked toward Artena with G and F Companies abreast and Company E following F.
Both Companies G and F were halted outside Artena by fire from enemy Flakwagons, heavy artillery and small- arms fire, although Company G was able to cut the Artena-Valmontone road north of Artena. The enemy was well established in the town and it wasn't until Company E was sent through Company G on the right that the battalion was able to break into the town. It took nearly seven hours to cover the 500-600 yards distance. Casualties were relatively high, with more than seventy men killed or wounded.
While the 2d Battalion fought for Artena, the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, marched toward the town and went into an assembly area in a 30-foot ditch at 1800 hours. A lucky enemy artillery shell landed in the ditch and caused thirteen casualties in Company M, wiping out an entire machine-gun section. Before dark the battalion was to have moved to Artena while the 2d Battalion regrouped. Company K got its forward elements into town but most of the company was under perfect enemy observation and was held up. At nightfall the company fell back to its assembly area in the ditch, then later the night of May 27-28 moved back into the town, which had previously been cleared of enemy. The 1st Battalion went into position west of the town, at daylight May 27, where it remained to protect the regiment's left flank during the attack.
The 30th Infantry moved but little during the 27th. The 3d Battalion moved its defensive position 1000 yards further west to close a gap between the 3d Division and elements on the left, and a new defensive position was organized. Wire was laid and a patrol sent along a road toward Velletri for about a mile, then swung south around the lower end of the small lake.
The patrol returned and reported contact with a patrol from the 36th Division. The battalion commander, Major R. H. Neddersen, and S-3, Capt. James L. Osgard, then went to contact units of the 36th personally to determine the exact location of the latter's forward elements.
The 2d Battalion ran into considerable fire from enemy retreating north and other enemy units moving south to reinforce their retreating comrades. This resulted in a number of meeting engagements, with neither side able to use prepared positions. Instead both the 2d Battalion and enemy relied on available terrain features.
At about 1000 hours the 1st Battalion (minus Company A, which was left on the mountain as security), moved to a position northwest of Giuglianello, reaching positions there during the afternoon without opposition. The battalion was placed in regimental reserve and remained in the one location during the 28th.
In the morning of May 27th the 7th Infantry moved toward Artena and in the afternoon took up a position southwest of the town. The regiment had three battalions on a line, with the 1st Battalion in the center, 3d Battalion on the right and 2d Battalion on the left. The position was organized for all-around defense, wire was laid, some mines were laid, and automatic weapons were sited to cover the rolling terrain. The 3d Battalion was ordered to contact the SSF on top of a hill mass south of Artena. The SSF arrived about dusk and the battalion (less Company L) went into position on the northern slope of the mass. Company L was detached to help Task Force Howze's tanks in their establishment of road blocks on the Division's left flank.
During the morning of the 28th, 7th Infantry received orders to oust the enemy from his positions along the railroad tracks between Artena and Valmontone. The Ist and 3d Battalions spearheaded the attack. Lt. Col. Frank M. Izenour started his 1st Battalion with A Company on the right and Company B on the left, Company C in reserve and Company D supporting the attack. Company A ran into extremely heavy opposition, for the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, fresh from the north, had had two days in which to get set for our battle-weary soldiers.
The enemy was dug-in on the reverse slope of the rolling hills and was getting a great deal of assistance from self-propelled guns and artillery. From noon until 2000 hours Company A fought without letup, at which time it reached its objective 2,000 yards from the line of departure. Enemy automatic weapons refused to move from their positions until blasted out by supporting tank fire, hand grenades or point-blank small-arms fire. The only concealment provided our attacking forces was the two-foot high wheat. In the words of Colonel Izenour, "Company A was able to reach its objective only because my boys wanted that ground worse than Goering's did."
The position taken by Company A was at a junction of the highway and railroad tracks. Immediately after reaching its objective Company A dug in. Company B, on the left, had a great deal less trouble during its attack. Its main trouble was caused when the right platoon wandered too far to the north and encountered a column of enemy troops marching down the road. A fire fight resulted. Company B's platoon suffered a few casualties and captured ten prisoners. After the brief skirmish the company moved without opposition into position near the railroad to the left of Company A. Although it had little trouble moving forward, Company B was prevented from giving more than a small amount of assistance to Company A because the rolling hills obscured vision.
Meanwhile the 3d Battalion was meeting the same kind of resistance as Company A. With Company I on the right and Company K on the left (Company L was still with Task Force Howze's tanks) the battalion crossed the road west of Artena and moved out without too much opposition at first. At a point 200 yards south of the east- west railroad north of Artena the enemy opened up with all he had. Heavy machine-gun fire, from German positions on the high ground north of the railroad, stopped I Company. The company reorganized early in the afternoon and without additional help started out again. Meanwhile Company E had been able to move about 400 yards beyond the battalion objective, which was a hill mass nearly 1500 yards wide extending from a road junction east to a large knoll. However, the company was forced to pull back to the objective because of intense fire received from the same enemy that was firing on Company 1. Company 1, advancing by fire and movement, contacted Company K on the objective early in the evening and the two companies set up a defense on the objective.
At this time Company L rejoined the battalion, under the command of 1st Lt. Ralph Yates, who had taken over when Capt. Blaikie was wounded on the 24th. Lieutenant Yates personally led a patrol from his company three miles to the west along the railroad without contacting the Special Service Force or the enemy. Contact with friendly units was finally made the morning of the 29th when Company C came up on the left and the SSF on the right.
Except for the 3d Battalion which reverted to Division control behind the 30th Infantry, the 15th Infantry remained in its original positions during the 28th. Company I was detached and established road blocks in the mountains east of the Giuglianello-Artena road preparatory to the attack on Valmontone of June 1.
The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, remained on the high ground west of Giuglianello the 28th to protect the north- south highway from Giuglianello to Artena against enemy attack from the west. The 3d Battalion received orders to attack toward Lariano and to go as far as the ridge 500 yards east of the VelletriArtena railroad and set up a defense. Patrols had already reported that no enemy was short of the objective, and when the battalion reached the ridge without opposition, the commanding officer, Major Nedderson, obtained permission to move forward to the railroad track and organize a defense there. This was done without incident. Company I put an outpost on the south flank, tied in with the 36th Division and Company L established a platoon outpost just south of Lariano.
During the night of May 28-29 enemy patrols and larger units began moving down into Lariano and attempting to infiltrate our forward positions.
The Division received badly-needed replacements during the night of May 28-29, each battalion getting from 150 to 200 new men. These men Were needed to replace the losses suffered by all the battalions at Cisterna, by the 15th Infantry at Artena and the 7th Infantry in its push north of Artena.
The 30th Infantry moved toward Lariano the morning of the 29th with the mission of covering the VelletriArtena road and protecting the Division's main supply route (the Cori-Giuglianello-Artena road). The regiment attacked to the northwest with the 1st Battalion, now commanded by Lt. Col. Allen F. Bacon, in the center, 3d Battalion on the left and the 2d on the right. The 1st Battalion reached and occupied positions between the Velletri-Artena road and the railroad which paralleled the road to the east.
Other units had preceded the 1st Battalion into Lariano, and reported no enemy there. However, when 1st Battalion sent its patrols into the town they were severely shelled from the direction of Velletri, and began meeting aggressive German patrols well equipped with automatic weapons and camouflaged uniforms. Enemy tanks and armored cars also came into Lariano in small numbers, but did not remain there. A period of weird, difficult fighting in the vineyards and terraces around Lariano followed. The 1st Battalion had succeeded in passing through, without resistance, a complete system of previously prepared enemy field works, dug by Italian labor and carefully camouflaged, forming part of the enemy's Velletri-Valmontone line. Enemy patrols first encountered were the advance elements of the Hermann Goering Division, which had come down from the north to man this defense line. The Goering troops never assaulted our positions east of Lariano, but made continuous efforts to infiltrate our lines and reach their own prepared defenses. There was a great deal of sniping and fighting by individuals and small groups; in one case, one of our 37mm antitank guns in a forward position "picked off " an enemy sniper. First Battalion patrols went into Lariano, as the enemy did also; sometimes these patrols would meet and exchange fire there. Neither side made an initial effort to occupy the town, however.
The Germans, unable to occupy their prepared positions, were forced to dig in hastily west of Lariano. Our patrols reported many of these locations, and our continuous mortar fire was later learned to have produced heavy enemy casualties.
The 2d Battalion attacked in a column of companies E, F, G and 3d Battalion's Company I, which was attached to 2d Battalion for the mission. The terrain was rolling and wheat fields provided little cover, especially since the battalion's right flank was open. Tanks were not used in force but were committed piecemeal and in the opinion of the battalion's commanding officer, Lt. Col. Woodrow W. Stromberg, were not far enough forward to support the infantry satisfactorily. In many cases hostile machine-gun nests could have been more easily eliminated if tank support had been closer. Two tanks were put out of action by enemy artillery.
The 3d Battalion experienced little trouble moving into position, but was bothered by the enemy's infiltration tactics after the regiment's objective had been reached. Fifty enemy attacked Company L's outpost the evening of May 29 but were driven off with the aid of artillery and mortar fire. Several small patrol skirmishes took place in the area between the battalion's outposts.
The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 7th Infantry remained in place the night of May 28-29 after their attack, but the 2d Battalion moved northeast to establish a roadblock at a point where the road and railroad cross. Companies E and G moved abreast and ran into enemy opposition at the objective. After an hour's battle, the infantry fire supported by mortars and artillery, the enemy withdrew and the battalion went into position with G on the left, E on the right, F in reserve.
All during the day the 3d Battalion could see German tanks moving into position on the high ground to the north. The battalion located its heavy machine guns and antitank guns on high ground south of the main line and fired long- range, harassing fire at the enemy. More than 2,000 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition were fired during the day at enemy moving into position, plus additional artillery. Four enemy Nebelwerfers were silenced by our artillery fire. Two platoons of Company L moved to the right to fill in the gap between the 3d Battalion and the SSF on the right. This continual exchange of fire between our artillery and mortars and the enemy's artillery and SP guns continued through the night of 29-30 May.
The entire 15th Infantry remained in position north of Artena during this period to prevent the loss of the town in case of an enemy counterattack from the northwest.
Only action during the night of 29-30 May was an enemy counterattack along the axis of the Artena- Valmontone road. The bulk of this attack hit the SSF and did not affect the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, was also hit, but received assistance from 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, and the enemy's attempt to break through our line was repulsed all along the front.
The next morning the 2d Battalion of the 15th attacked northward astride the Artena-Valmontone road to push its defensive line farther north from Artena and pull up even with the rest of the Division's front. The tank-infantry team was at its best in this attack. Tanks moved abreast of the infantry, blasting enemy positions with 75mm and small-arms fire while the infantry mopped up stragglers. The attack halted short of a woods, about halfway between Artena and Valmontone, facing the enemy who was well dug-in along the wood line.
The rest of the Division remained in position from the 29th to the 31st, improving its defensive positions, laying wire and mines and improving all installations. Aggressive patrolling was carried out to the east, north and west to maintain contact with the enemy and to gain information about his positions. All this time the enemy worked on his own positions, laying a great deal of wire, and hastened to completion construction of positions on the ridge line just south of Highway 7 east and west of Valmontone. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry was relieved by a battalion of the 88th Infantry Division the night of May 30-31 and went into an assembly area well behind the front. It was attached to the 30th Infantry for the forthcoming attack on the 1st of June.
Shortly after noon of May 31, the 7th Infantry was ordered to push forward in an effort to maintain contact with the 88th Division on the left, which was attacking to the north. At 1406 hours the 1st Battalion commander sent C Company ahead to occupy Hill 331 against scattered but strong enemy resistance. A platoon of Company C reached the hill and outposted the position while the remainder of the battalion moved up.
At the same time a platoon of Company L was ordered to move out about 400 yards beyond the main line of resistance to occupy a piece of high ground. The platoon reached its objective in less than fifteen minutes, but twenty minutes later was subjected to a terrific enemy artillery barrage followed by a German counterattack down the nose of the high ground. In addition the platoon had both flanks exposed and received fire from both sides. The platoon leader was killed shortly after the counterattack got started, when an enemy artillery shell landed in his hole. The same shell also killed the officer's radio operator and left the platoon out of communication with the rest of the battalion. At 1600 hours four tanks were sent out to screen the platoon's withdrawal, and one was almost immediately destroyed by enemy antitank fire. Company K was alerted to help the stranded platoon but shortly thereafter, a change of orders sent it to cover an objective of the 1st Battalion. A second tank was destroyed and the platoon was forced to withdraw with the supporting fire of only two tanks. Of the forty-two men and one officer sent out only nineteen men returned. Five were captured and the rest killed. One of the remaining two tanks was lost just after dark when attempting to withdraw.
The successes of the attacks of both the main forces of the US Fifth Army in the South and the Allied Beachhead Forces driving out of Anzio threatened the rout and almost complete destruction of the German Army in the south of Italy. In-order to permit the orderly disengagement of their Beachhead forces and to prevent the Allied Beachhead Force from advancing to the northeast in an attempt to arrive at the rear of the forces retreating in front of the main US Fifth Army force coming up from the South, the Germans had moved the Herman Goering Panzer Division from the vicinity of the port Civitavecchia south into the Artena Gap. It was the apparent intention of the enemy to occupy a position on the eastern slopes of Colli Laziali, that followed across the Artena Gap and anchored its eastern flank on the western side of the Artena hill mass. Fortunately the enemy was heavily attacked before he was able to establish and organize his desired position. However, before the enemy was ejected and driven back from the positions he finally occupied, it was necessary for the 3d Infantry Division to make a coordinated major attack, which attack should be considered a very definite phase in the elimination of the Anzio Beachhead.
The Division was detached from VI Corps and attached to II Corps for the attack of June 1st and remained with II Corps until relieved from the line after Rome had fallen. All elements of the Division were relieved by the 85th Division prior to the night of May 31 and June 1, except the 1st and 3d Battalions, 7th Infantry. Those two battalions held their portion of the line while the 15th and 30th passed through.
The 15th attacked along the axis of the Artena- Valmontone road, 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions on line left to right and the 30th Infantry on the left. The Ist Battalion of the 15th Infantry moved almost directly north with the road on its left. Included in its sector was the Artena railroad station, which had been turned into a strongpoint by the enemy. Five Mark IV tanks were located at the railroad and made the battalion's advance exceedingly difficult. Company A led the attack, and though suffering a large number of casualties, succeeded in reaching the high ground beyond the station. A mist hampered visibility, making it difficult to observe artillery fire. Nonetheless two enemy tanks were destroyed-one while right in the middle of Company A. Medium tanks, supporting the attack, moved down the road. The lead tank was hit by enemy tank fire from the station and three enemy tanks retreated with the enemy infantry.
Company B passed through Company A, but shortly after moved forward under intense enemy fire from the left flank. This resulted from the unit on the left being held up about 2000 yards to the rear. A considerable amount of Nebelwerfer fire from the vicinity of Labico was received, but Company B reached its objective-about halfway between the railroad station and Valmontone-at 1700 hours.
Shortly thereafter eight enemy machine guns and one tank began firing at the battalion and enemy infantry formed for a counterattack from the north. Major Paulick called for Division artillery, 81mm mortar and 4.2 chemical mortar fire, and for the next forty-five minutes dropped fifty-five rounds of high explosive per minute on the enemy. The tank was destroyed and two captured Germans said all their comrades who were alive after the concentration got up and ran. Company C had no trouble moving on to the objective. Company A went to the left flank and held the high ground there.
The 2d Battalion jumped off in the attack with its direction of attack east of the Artena railroad station. Company G led and moved in the cover of a ditch. It was stopped when almost due east of the station by enemy fire from the west. The enemy was well dug-in and had supporting fire from SP guns and tanks. Further advance during daylight hours was impossible because the already- inhabited ditch provided the only cover in the battalion's zone of advance. Company F maneuvered to the left during the night of June 1-2 and drew an additional hail of 20mm Flakwagon and artillery fire as well as small-arms fire. Companies G and F continued to battle during the night, moving into enemy positions by infiltration, and by daylight had cracked the German defenses. In spite of the heavy fighting, control and communications were handled expertly. On the morning of June 3 the battalion captured the ridge line south of Highway 6, cut the road and moved into position to defend against any enemy efforts to break back across the highway. Following the original breakthrough the enemy withdrew rapidly and failed to muster anything more than token resistance.
The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, remained in an assembly area at a junction of five roads northeast of Artena and sent a patrol out to the initial objective, on the western nose of a slight hill, during the night prior to the jump-off hour. Therefore the battalion was bothered only by sniper fire until the next morning when it moved out. From the first objective, Company K led across the railroad tracks north of Artena. Company I followed K and both met considerable resistance from high ground north of the tracks while crossing the tracks. Both companies had to move across the ridge line of the tracks in small-group rushes.
Serious enemy resistance ceased once the railroad had been crossed and the 3d Battalion moved against only harassing sniper and SP-gun fire to cut Highway 6 by midafternoon. A defensive position was set up on the ridge overlooking the road from the south before dark and the antitank guns of the battalion were sited to stop any enemy vehicles moving into Valmontone from the east. This position was held until 1300, June 3. During this time no enemy was encountered; the battalion contacted the SSF and later the French.
On the left flank of the 15th Infantry was the 30th Infantry,. making the Division main effort, with the Artena-Valmontone road serving as the right boundary for the 30th's 1st Battalion. The battalion moved up to attack with Company A on the left, Company B on the right and Company C behind the two in reserve. A machine-gun platoon from Company D was with each assaulting company; heavy mortars were placed in the railroad bed. Casualties were suffered by forward elements as they descended the slope into the railroad bed before reaching the line of departure, from enemy artillery and mortar fire. The enemy at the time held the second ridge north of the railroad track. In the 1st Battalion sector this ridge was divided into two hills, a small hill just west of the Artena-Valmontone road, and a long hill extending to the west, forming part of the same ridge. There was a six-foot bank just at the crest of the long hill, and heavy woods commenced a short distance north of this bank. The enemy main line of resistance was in the woods, but within view of the open terrain over which our troops had to attack.
The enemy was heavily supplied with automatic weapons, and had mortars in defilade directly behind the ridge; besides, the period of four days required for us to bring in the 85th and 88th Divisions, and regroup for the attack, had enabled the enemy to do considerable digging and to improve his excellent position.
The attack did not begin auspiciously. Company B managed to get a platoon onto the small hill near the Artena-Valmontone road, but Company A, moving across exposed terrain on a forward slope facing the enemy position, had soon lost all but one of its officers. Ist Lt. Randolph Bracey, leading a platoon of Company A to the northwest in order to attack the long ridge from its west flank, was killed and the platoon was wiped out. Enemy machine guns located farther west placed enfilade fire on all elements of Company A to add to its difficulties. Ist Lt. James Packman, commanding officer of Company D, was placed in command of Company A; Ist Lt. Ray Young took command of Company D.
All of our available artillery was placed on the long ridge. Enemy positions were so well concealed in the woods that at times the effect of artillery fire had to be sensed by its success in reducing the activity of automatic weapons. Our infantry creeping down the north slope of the hill on the line of departure. received bursts whenever they moved.
The only factor which made a continuation of the attack possible was the arrival of a platoon of tanks and a few tank destroyers, some of which moved up on the left of the battalion and some through a saddle in the ridge from which the battalion was attacking. In conjunction with the attack, Company C, having lost both its commander and executive, led by 1st Lt. Rex Metcalf, passed through Company A, while the latter returned to the reverse slope of the friendly ridge to reorganize. Enemy artillery, machine-gun and mortar fire was the most severe in the experience of any of the officers taking part. Enemy snipers were also active.
Our tanks finally gained the top of the enemy-held ridge and cruised among the enemy positions, while Company C's men succeeded in storming the bank and shooting and grenading the enemy, who took to their holes when our tanks appeared. Lack of enemy mines and barbed wire was a great factor in the final success of our attack; otherwise the enemy was well dug-in, and naturally was very strong. The 1st Battalion suffered about 150 casualties during the day.
The battalion continued to move north against sporadic resistance during the night of the 1st and 2d of June and finally attained its objective-high ground southwest of Valmontone, although our own artillery twice prevented them from occupying the hill.
The 2d Battalion was faced with steep hills more than enemy infantry in its advance, and received terrific artillery fire all during its attack. Although the progress was slow, it was mostly because of the terrain and the battalion's casualties were not excessive. Company I, commanded by Capt. Lloyd K. Jensen, had been attached to the battalion and was committed at about 1330 hours on the 1st, passing through the 2d Battalion and seizing several objectives about 2000 yards west, and 1000 yards south, of Valmontone. Fourteen prisoners were taken, including a company commander whose defense was wiped out. The 3d Battalion was then ordered to continue the attack, with objectives north of Highway 6 and east of Labico. Company, I rejoined the 3d Battalion on the march to the new objectives.
On the way north to Highway 6 the battalion encountered two serious obstacles-the first was a sunken road with high banks, the second a cliff which bordered Highway 6 on the south. These features did not show up on the map and the cliff cost the battalion three hours of hard work in making the descent. Formation for the advance was Companies L and K abreast, with a platoon of heavy machine guns from Company M attached to each, sweeping the area, and Company I in reserve with Company M's mortars.
After reaching the bottom of the cliff, one platoon was sent north across the highway to the high ground north of the road to see if the objective was clear. The platoon was starting up the slopes of the hill when a Corps Artillery "Time on Target" concentration fell on the objective. Fortunately the platoon was clear of friendly artillery and no damage was done. This objective was occupied by 0600 hours June 2, with one enemy straggler captured. The other objectives to the north were taken shortly thereafter. Almost immediately orders were received to proceed to new objectives north and west of Valmontone. The only opposition encountered en route to these objectives was occasional sniper fire and machine-gun fire from a roadblock formed by a squad of enemy. The machine guns fired on Company I, which returned the fire, and the enemy evacuated the roadblock by using three combat vehicles marked with red crosses. There were three enemy wounded and one captured in this action.
The battalion had just reached and organized the west end of the two objectives when an enemy SP gun, located to the east where a power line crossed the highway, opened up with damaging fire. Our troops tried to get artillery fire on it, but it moved in under a cliff, still firing too close to our positions. The 3d Battalion sent bazooka men after the SP gun but they were confronted by about a hundred yards of clear ground, and machine guns mounted in the SP chassis kept them away. Meanwhile friendly tanks and tank destroyers were being held up in Valmontone by mines. The 3d Battalion was never able to 'neutralize the gun, but it was forced out of the area by the 2d Battalion, which relieved the 3d Battalion about nightfall. The gun caused fifteen casualties in the 3d Battalion. The battalion remained on the west end of the two objectives during the night and all day of the 2d.
The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, attached to the 30th Infantry for the attack, was committed at 0800 hours and told to cross the line of departure at the railroad west of the Artena-Valmontone road and take two pieces of high ground located just east of a three-way road crossing. Company F suffered eighteen casualties during an artillery concentration before reaching -the line of departure. The attack was made with Company E on the left, Company F on the right and Company G in reserve, and the two hills were taken by 1800 hours. Opposition consisted mainly of enemy rear-guard action; that is, SP guns and Flakwagons.
The hills northwest of Valmontone were the next objective and the battalion started out after dark with E on the right and G on the left. The only opposition came from I enemy aircraft dropping antipersonnel bombs, but the battalion had difficulty keeping contact and maintaining control due to the nature of the terrain and the darkness. The railroad west of Valmontone and Highway 6 were reached at 0500 hours June 2 and cut in the face of some scattered small arms fir( and heavy Nebelwerfer fire. Company F went through to take high ground west of Valmontone, and the battalion commander then sent a nine-man patrol from the battalion intelligence section into the town. It was found cleared of enemy but the patrol ran into Flak wagon fire at the northeast edge and suffered seven casualties. Immediately after ascertaining that Valmon tone was cleared, the battalion headed north to high ground about 5000 yards north of Valmontone on the road to Palestrina. There were some enemy with automatic weapons on this high ground but they withdrew as the battalion advanced.
Here the battalion was resupplied, and at 1800 hours Company G jumped off to take the crossroads south of Palestrina. This crossroads was located about 700 yards southwest of the town, which sat on high ground. Companies E and F followed Company G up the road. Some Flakwagon, SP and small-arms fire was met, but not a great deal and by 2000 hours Company G was at a cemetery about 1000 yards south of the crossroads. On reaching this point Company G was subjected to heavy tank and SP fire from the crossroads, so Company F went into a firing position west of the road and Company E deployed astride the road between Companies F and G. The battalion remained in this position during the night and the morning of June 3, sending patrols to the east and west.
The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, did not take part in the attack until 0230 hours on June 2, at which time it moved toward Valmontone in advance guard formation, and by daylight had reached a position on the flat ground southwest of the town. At 1045 hours it moved farther north to a new objective, where it halted for a brief rest and at 1615 started for a cross road to the south and east of the 2d Battalion's objective. Company I led the attack, supported by tanks and followed by Company K. Company L was attached to Task Force Ellis. Company I received a great deal of artillery fire and tank fire while still about 2000 yards short of the objective and the battalion went into attack formation with Company I on the right and Company K on the left. The battalion received fire from hostile machine guns and Mark VI tanks from south of the crossroads. At 0500 hours on June 3, Companies I and K were still 700 yards short of their objective, held up by a couple of Mark VI tanks which couldn't be hit by supporting tanks because they were well hidden behind a small ridge.
While the 2d and 3d Battalions were moving north of Valmontone to prevent enemy from counterattacking against Highway 6, the 1st Battalion was attached to Task Force Howze. The remainder of the Task Force consisted of the 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Infantry, one troop of the 1st Armored Division Recon Squadron, and a company of tank destroyers. It was joined June 3 by a battalion of the 88th Division and by the 751st Tank Battalion. The Ist Battalion's mission was to protect the tanks from enemy infantry and wipe out infantry pockets by-passed by the tanks. Task Force Howze was organized to provide a large, mobile striking force and to protect the gap between the 3d Division and the 88th Division during the attack to Highway 6.
The Task Force jumped off with two tank companies abreast. A Company of Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, followed behind the right tank company and had little trouble reaching its part of the battalion objective. It advanced straight north toward Labico then swerved over to the left as it neared the highway.
Company B ran into considerably more trouble. In the first place one platoon was detached and given the mission of contacting the 88th Division on the left. The remainder of Company B failed to contact its company of tanks and ran into a fight alone in a group of low hills. It was hit by snipers from a house on the left, received intermittent machine-gun fire from a knoll to the right and then ran into a line of enemy riflemen armed with rifle grenades. Company C was committed at 1500 hours to gain contact with the left company of tanks and help Company B. By flanking the resistance which was holding up Company B, Company C forced the enemy to withdraw and Company B was able to advance. Resistance slackened and during the early morning of June 2 Companies B and C were assigned to front-line tank companies. By noon, meeting only scattered sniper, mortar and artillery fire, the Task Force reached the railroad tracks west of Labico. During the afternoon the battalion crossed the highway to an assembly area, where it remained until the morning of the 3d.
While the 2nd and 3d Battalions of the 7th Infantry were protecting the Division against a possible enemy thrust from the north, it was imperative that enemy units withdrawing in the face of the French push from the east not be allowed to hit the Division from the east. Hence, the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry was sent toward Cave, a small town located about four miles east of Palestrina. Moving under cover of darkness the night of June 2-3, the battalions took a position on high ground to the southwest of Cave overlooking the town and the road to Palestrina. The battalion had to move almost noiselessly, as it was deep in enemy territory without flank protection.
During the night the battalion was hit by smallarms fire, antipersonnel bombs, SP guns, Flakwagons and mortars, but casualties were surprisingly light considering the amount of fire received.
The battalion formed in a huge semicircle, with a perimeter of about 2000 yards. Company E faced north and east, Company F faced north and west and Com-pany G protected against an enemy move from the south. All day the battalion was subjected to enemy fire, Company E receiving direct fire from enemy tanks to the north. The battalion was too far to the north to get support from our artillery, but did receive some aid from two tanks and two tank destroyers that ar-rived shortly after daylight on the 3d. The battalion's roadblock destroyed an enemy tank and two other vehicles. Tanks fired into Cave most of the day, and a 14-man group of Germans was sighted near the town. The group was the advance part of a German unit that was to have moved into the area. They were taken without a fight.
The Ist Battalion, 30th Infantry, took over for the 2d Battalion when the latter went to Cave, and remained in an assembly area north and west of Valmontone until June 4.
June 3 was the date of one of the most stirring tales of courage and self-sacrifice in the annals of United States military history. The way it came into being was a minute incident of the push to Rome, which otherwise would now be lost in the larger picture. Sgt. Raymond Bunning begins the epic story:
"On 2 June my patrol, an element of Battle Patrol, 15th Infantry, was ordered to cross Highway 6 . . . and proceed 1500 yards north, scouring the area for enemy dispositions. We moved out at about 2300 hours and proceeded on our mission. By 0100, June 3, we had covered the greatest part of our assignment without making contact with the enemy.
"We made our way through a lightly-wooded area and had started to cross a large clearing when we came under severe fire from our front, both flanks, and slightly to the rear. Three tanks raked us with 20mm slugs and machine-gun fire. Three machine guns traversed across our position and approximately sixty enemy riflemen fired directly on us. The patrol leader was killed almost instantly; a burst of machine-gun fire caught him squarely. The rest of us hit the. dirt. The enemy had prepared an ambush and had sprung the trap, catching us entirely by surprise.
"The only way out was to the rear. Inasmuch as I was the second in command, I took over and ordered that everyone lie low until I could figure the lay of the land. While we were lying there, I saw two of my men jump up and walk toward the enemy. Pvt. Elden Johnson, my BAR man, and Pfc. Herbert Christian, a tommy gunner, had elected to sacrifice themselves in order that the rest of us could withdraw from the trap. They motioned to me, indicating that I was to take the remainder of the patrol to the rear."
"Almost at once," continued T/5 Douglas Bragg, "Pfc. Christian was hit just above the right knee by a 20mm slug which completely severed his right leg. The flares made it as bright as day and I was almost sickened by the sight. Blood was gushing from the stump. Shreds of flesh dangled from his leg. The pain must have been intense. This man Christian was like a wounded animal; instead of calling for aid he took his Thompson submachine gun and made his way forward on one knee and the bloody stump, firing his weapon as rapidly as possible. He was raking the kraut and succeeding in killing or wounding at least three.
"These two men, determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible, attracted all of the fire of the entrenched enemy group. So audacious was their attack that the kraut forgot about the rest of us for the moment. The sight of these two men out there, each one heading for a machine gun, not seeking cover as any normal human would do, almost hypnotized the enemy.
Said Pvt. Robert Wriston: "Private Johnson advanced a total of about twenty yards, reaching a point within five yards of the enemy. He killed the crew of the machine gun which had killed our patrol leader, with one burst of fire from his BAR. Reloading his weapon, he turned on the riflemen to the left and fired directly into their position, either killing or wounding four of the enemy. A burst of machine-gun fire struck Private Johnson, causing him to slump forward; however he caught himself and balanced on his knees long enough to kill another German before he fell forward, dead.
"Meanwhile, Pfc. Christian had continued forward, despite obvious pain, to a point within ten yards of the enemy. He traveled about twenty yards in all. Intent on covering us to the last, Pfc. Christian emptied his tommy gun into a German machine-pistol man, hastily reloaded his weapon, and sprayed one last burst of fire. About this time the enemy seemed to have completely recovered from his initial surprise and concentrated his fire on Pfc. Christian. Machine-gun, 20mm, machine-pistol and rifle fire was concentrated on him as the enemy vented his anger over the now-obvious ruse. Pfc. Christian fell forward, dead.
"The courage and self-sacrifice displayed by Pfc. Christian and Private Johnson was all that saved our lives. That's something that none of the rest of us will ever forget."
Both men were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.