On the 3d of June the 15th Infantry started a dash West on Highway 6 toward Rome. The 1st Battalion had relieved the SSF on June 2 to protect the Division's right flank, then on the morning of the 3d it moved by motor to the west. The battalion detrucked at Colonna and from there patrolled on foot to the north of Highway 6. No enemy was met and the battalion contacted the French coming south from Highway 6 on the latter's drive into Rome. The battalion continued on to the Aniene River, reaching there about 2200 hours.

At 0400 hours on the 4th, Ist Battalion resumed its march, this time heading for the Tiber River. By 0600 hours it was along a small north-south creek when it received tank fire from a road about 1000 yards to the northwest. At this time the battalion was north of Monte Sacro, which is located at the northeastern outskirts of Rome. One of our tank destroyers was lost in the ensuing fight and the rest of the day was spent trying to overcome enemy rear-guard action. The enemy was putting up fierce rear-guard action in this sector in an effort to get his troops out of Rome and to the north. The battalion moved west slowly, cutting Highway 4 at Castel Giubbile, about four and a half miles due north of Rome at a point where the Tiber swings away from the highway. A platoon of the 3d Recon Troop was contacted at this point. The enemy was firmly entrenched in the bluffs across the river, making it impossible for the battalion to cross, but fire was placed on Highway 3 and the enemy was unable to withdraw along that route.

The French reported at 1300 hours to take over the sector but battalion patrols had reported enemy coming out of Rome along Highway 4 so Major Paulick retained control for an additional four hours. His battalion ambushed three tanks and six trucks and scattered enemy infantry on the trucks. Eighty prisoners were rounded up and command of the sector was turned over to the French.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, followed closely behind the 1st Battalion in the move by motor the 3d of June, but stopped for reorganization in a flat open field near Colonna, a small town about half way between Valmontone and Rome, remained there during the night and continued toward the Italian capital the next day. The 3d Battalion' stopped at San Cesarso, another small town on the way to Rome. The battalion then split, Company I moving to Monte Massino, Company L to a road block on high ground farther east and Company K with the battalion CP in a central position. The CP was about fourteen miles from Rome.

At daylight of the 4th the 3d Battalion returned to San Cesarso, remained there an hour and started on foot to Rome. It reached a vineyard four miles out of Rome due east of the city shortly after dark, then later walked to the Aniene River, where it was sup-posed to establish a bridgehead across the river. Here it ran into considerable artillery fire, the first enemy fire of any concentration it had received in two days. The 1st and 2d Battalions passed through the 3d Bat-talion and went into positions north of Rome. The 2d Battalion was bombed on the road, and suffered some casualties in Companies F and H. Following the bomb-ing Company E got in a small fire fight after which the battalion established roadblocks for the night in conjunction with the rest of the regiment. Except for occasional sniping there was no opposition on the 5th and in the afternoon the entire regiment assembled in Rome after all three battalions had been relieved by the French. Throughout the regiment's pursuit along Highway 6 there was little or no opposition. Only when the 1st and 2d Battalions cut off the enemy's escape route to the north of the city did it meet any kind of resistance and then it was mainly rear-guard action of SP guns and a few snipers.

While the 15th Infantry was heading for Rome, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Infantry continued their battle south of Palestrina. Their tactics were really an aggressive defense, for the Division did not want Palestrina other than to prevent the enemy from counterattacking against Highway 6 and cutting off our forward elements from their supplies. Because the main road leading to 3d Battalion positions were under perfect enemy observation, engineers constructed a crosscountry tank road and tanks and tank destroyers were brought into position. At 1030 hours on the 3d the platoon of tanks was sent around to the left while the platoon of tank destroyers made a base of fire south of the enemy and German tanks were forced to withdraw. Because of the hilly terrain it took the tanks several hours to get into position, but once the enemy armor was endangered it withdrew immediately. Company I moved on to the crossroads at 1700 hours. Company K, receiving fire from the enemy in front of the 2d Battalion, was disorganized and unable to move forward. Its company commander was killed during an enemy artillery barrage. Lt. Col. Toffey,* regimental executive officer, was killed and Lt. Col. Snyder, tank battalion commander, was wounded by the same enemy shell during the tank action. After dark Company K was reorganized and put into position south of Company I in a defense in depth.

The 2d Battalion didn't get its attack started until 1300 hours, but once it got started it made short work of the enemy and reached its crossroads in an hour and a half. Supported by fire from two tanks, three tank destroyers and two battalions of artillery, Company G stormed the position. One Flakwagon and one Mk IV tank were destroyed, six enemy were killed, five taken prisoner and the rest forced to withdraw into Palestrina. During the night the remainder of the enemy that had withdrawn, estimated at a platoon, counterattacked but were driven off by artillery and mortar fire before they reached our front lines.

Both battalions of the 7th were relieved by units of the French by 0800 hours on the 4th; they assembled during the morning and entrucked for Rome. The 3d Battalion spent the night at Tor Sapienza, a small settlement at the outskirts of Rome and the 2d Battalion established a company at each of three roadblocks a short distance north of Highway 6. The morning of the 5th both battalions moved by truck into Rome without further enemy contact.

As a part of Task Force Howze, the 1st Battalion of the 7th was the first full combat unit of the Allied armies to enter Rome, moving into the city during the afternoon of June 4. On June 3, preceding other II Corps units, the Task Force attacked to the left of Highway 6, guiding on the road, cleaning out pockets of enemy resistance. Armor from the 751st Tank Battalion moved out in the lead, followed by Lt. Col. Frank M. Izenour's battalion on foot. The enemy had set up a series of automatic weapon emplacements which were neutralized, and a large number of prisoners were taken at little cost to the Ist Battalion.

At 1700 hours the battalion was ordered to set up three roadblocks, a company of tanks and a company of infantry at each, between Highways 6 and 5. Company B, riding on the tanks, moved to its block without trouble and went into position. Shortly thereafter Company A, also mounted on tanks, was ambushed by an enemy roadblock. The first two tanks got past the enemy block, but the third was hit by antitank fire and thirteen infantrymen were wounded. The tanks and infantry halted, deployed in the field and drove off the enemy, then set up a roadblock at this point instead of going to its original position. Company G followed with fourteen tanks and set up the third roadblock. Shortly before dark it ambushed an enemy convoy of nearly thirty vehicles, captured all the vehicles-including two mobile 88mm guns- and 130 prisoners, including an antiaircraft battalion commander. Four of the enemy were killed. Company G had no casualties.

The battalion moved on foot to Tor Sapienza and at 1400 was ordered to move into Rome with SSF on its left. The SSF was held up at the outskirts of the city, so Ist Battalion moved ahead into Rome, outflanking the enemy in front of the SSF and forcing him to withdraw. The battalion reached the San Lorenzo railroad yards about 1700 hours without any opposition, remained there the night after setting up a defense in the streets around the station, and joined the remainder of the regiment in a Rome bivouac the next day. From June 3 until June 5 the battalion met only light enemy resistance and suffered few casualties.

All three battalions of the 30th Infantry were relieved from their defensive positions the morning of June 4, and immediately entrucked toward Rome. A number of likely points of enemy resistance-crossroads and railroad stations-were investigated, but only scattered enemy snipers were encountered. The regiment detrucked a few kilometers outside Rome and moved west to the outskirts of the city expecting resistance but meeting none. Tanks, tank destroyers and cannon company M-8 self-propelled howitzers were attached to each battalion and plans made to move into Rome during the night of June 4-5. However the plan was cancelled in order to forestall any heavy fighting in the streets at night.

Jumping off from the railroad tracks, which ran north and south on the outskirts of the city, the regiment attacked toward the Tiber River at dawn of the 5th with the 1st Battalion on the right, 3d on the left and 2d in reserve. All the regiment's companies had been split up into separate task forces, with objectives, the bridges across the Tiber. Except for Companies A and G, the regiment had no trouble.

Company A, advancing to the Aniene River on Highway 4, met resistance from an estimated platoon of enemy north of the river, reinforced by two tanks. Fire of M-8's, machine guns and mortars was placed on the enemy, and when communications were established with artillery, enabling us to shell him, the enemy withdrew. Company G got into a fire fight near the Villa Savoia, between Highway 4 and the Tiber at the north edge of town. The enemy used tank and small-arms fire, but Company G was limited to the use of small arms so as not to destroy the city wantonly. The fight lasted until mid- afternoon, when the enemy withdrew because of pressure from elements of the 15th Infantry to the north. Twenty-two prisoners were picked up and Company G continued to its bridge objectives.

Soon after our rifle companies reached the bridges, to prevent the enemy from destroying them, engineers were brought up to check all bridges and later all public buildings for mines, boobytraps, and other demolitions. Not a single mine was found, so rapid had been, the enemy's retreat and so disorganized his forces.

The entire Division was relieved from the line by the afternoon of the 5th, after having taken the longest route to Rome.

On 7 June, General O'Daniel received a Teletype that read:

Please give to my old Division, the Third, my thanks, and to my first regiment in the Army, the Thirtieth ' and the Seventh of my Vancouver days and especially to my old China regiment, the Fifteenth, for cutting Highway Six

GEORGE C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff
U. S. Army

THIRD RECON TROOP IN CISTERNA-ROME OPERATION

Nothing has been said in the foregoing account of the operations of the Division's principal Reconnaissance Troop, and its attached Battle Patrol. This omission was intentional, since the operations of the troop were of an independent nature and could not easily be described concurrently with the infantry action, as could the operations of the artillery, engineers and armor, without causing unnecessary confusion. However, the work of the troop was of such importance to the successful accomplishment of the Division's mission that it is described here in detail.

During most of the Anzio beachhead operation, in fact since the first week in February, the 3d Recon Troop did little but patrol Division rear areas and man three Division observation posts. The operation at Cisterna, however, brought forth a need for motorized reconnaissance and from May 26, when the enemy's defensive ring around Cisterna was broken, until June 5 the three platoons of the Recon Troop plus the Division Battle Patrol were in almost constant use.

The Battle Patrol was an organization formed during the stagnant days of the beachhead to give the Division an extra- "company," especially trained in scouting and patrolling, to work either with the Recon Troop or independently. It consisted of two officers and fifty-six men, all volunteers, armed with the following weapons: eight Browning Automatic Rifles, eight '03 rifles for grenade launching, twenty-eight Thompson submachine guns, two bazookas, eight M-1 semi-automatic rifles and a demolition crew.

It was sent into action the second day of the attack, filling a gap between the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry and the Special Service Force. When the 15th Infantry cut the railroad south of Cisterna the second day of the attack, the Battle Patrol pushed ahead and were the first United States troops into Cori. A platoon of the Recon Troop was sent through the breach in the enemy's lines on May 25, initially to clear a road junction north of Cisterna and immediately thereafter to proceed directly to Cori. The platoon was held up on high ground short of Cori by a barrage from our own artillery, then moved into Cori shortly after the Battle Patrol had cleared the town.

On the move into Cori the first platoon met an enemy strongpoint, destroyed a 105mm assault-gun howitzer, took twenty-six prisoners and captured two 88mm guns. Meanwhile the third platoon reconnoitered for another route into Cori. It too got into a fire fight and killed eight enemy and took ten prisoners. The third platoon continued on toward Giuglianello and ran into an enemy position beyond the town where it killed nineteen, and took fifty-eight prisoners.

On the 27th all three platoons of the Recon Troop moved out to the west and north of Giuglianello. The 2d platoon went into action for the first time and cut the Velletri-Artena road, engaged in a short fire fight west of Artena, then later in the day retired behind the 30th Infantry's antitank gun positions. The Battle Patrol conducted dismounted reconnaissance toward Artena for the 15th Infantry. The 1st platoon moved toward Velletri in the morning, remained there during the night, and met an enemy force the next morning. As the platoon dismounted and moved through the underbrush to deploy, the platoon leader and one enlisted man, on foot reconnaissance, were captured by the enemy. Their jeep was hit by enemy antitank fire and was destroyed by 37mm fire from the platoon's armored car to prevent its falling into German hands. The platoon remained in that position during the day, pulled back to a night position at dark and was relieved by the 2d platoon. The 3d platoon, with a platoon of tank destroyers, put in a roadblock northeast of Velletri.

The Ist platoon relieved the 3d platoon at the roadblock shortly before dark on the 29th, then pulled off the block at 2200 hours. The troop located and operated a Division OP from the 29th until the 1st of June, when the Division's attack toward Highway 6 began.

While the Division remained north of Artena, the Battle Patrol worked in front of and on both flanks of the Division to maintain contact with the enemy and friendly units. During the night of the 31st patrols went east of Roccamassima, and the next day discovered enemy along a ridge west of Segni.

With the 30th Infantry on the left and 15th Infantry on the right, the Battle Patrol was given the mission of clearing Valmontone the morning of June 2. The town was cleared by 0600 hours and six hours later the Patrol was 8000 yards north of town. The troop's 3d platoon started north of the town toward Palestrina but was held up for an hour and a half until the streets could be cleared of debris. At noon it encountered an enemy roadblock consisting of an antitank gun, two machine guns and ten riflemen. The platoon killed twelve enemy enlisted men and one officer.

The 2d platoon covered the road net south of Highway 6 west of Valmontone, and suffered six casualties from heavy enemy Nebelwerfer and artillery fire.

Mission of the 1st platoon was to move west on Highway 6 to the road junction 3000 yards west of Labico. As the platoon reached Valmontone its armored car was fired on by an enemy antitank gun but was not hit. It turned west on Highway 6 at Valmontone and started for Labico. The highway between the two towns is in deep defilade, with steep, wooded banks rising in height to seventy-five feet on either side of the road, necessitating careful attention to flank protection in order to avoid the typical "mouse trap" frequently employed by the Germans.

The platoon reached the eastern edge of Labico by 1100 hours' without incident, then noted ten Germans moving through the undergrowth 150 yards short of the city limits and within fifty yards of the platoon's point. The platoon leader brought his armored car into position thirty yards from the enemy and opened fire. Two Germans were taken prisoner, seven were killed and one escaped into town.

Immediately following this action the platoon received fire from. two enemy machine guns and several rifles from the rear, and five minutes later received additional enemy fire from the left flank. The fire fight lasted for an hour; eleven prisoners were taken and an undetermined number killed. The platoon suffered no casualties. The prisoners said they had been withdrawing from positions to the south when they struck the rear of the Recon platoon.

During the early afternoon the platoon received aerial- burst fire from an enemy 20mm Flakwagon located in Labico, and Nebelwerfer fire from the north. At 1800 hours a mixed platoon of tanks and tank destroyers arrived and began an assault of the town in conjunction with the Recon platoon. However immediately after the attack got under way the Recon platoon was ordered to return to Valmontone and reconnoiter to a point approximately 4500 yards northeast of town.

The Battle Patrol was given the mission of clearing out Labico and had wiped out enemy resistance by 0500 hours of the 3d. The 1st platoon, which hadbeen held up five hours on its mission northeast of Valmontone, returned to Labico, contacted the Battle Patrol and continued to the road junction 3000 yards west of the town-the same road junction it had been ordered to take the day before.

It was thought best to continue until contact with the enemy was made, so the platoon moved without delay to San Cesarso, reaching that point in the morning. Here it received harassing enemy artillery fire. After a short reconnaissance west along Highway 6, the platoon established a roadblock at San Cesarso until late in the afternoon when it was relieved by the 2d platoon. The 3d platoon meanwhile continued its reconnaissance from Valmontone to Palestrina.

The 4th of June was a busy day for the Troop. Two platoons and the battle patrol cut Highways 5 and 4 physically and Highway 3 by fire and the 1st platoon moved into Rome. The 2d platoon, on reaching Highway 5, was fired on by an enemy Flakwagon. This Flakwagon was destroyed by the coordinated work of the mounted platoon and foot Battle Patrol, and a roadblock was set up on the highway. Several enemy vehicles were fired on by the platoon. These vehicles turned tail and sped east into the area of the advancing French troops.

While the 2d platoon remained at the roadblock, the 3d platoon moved to Highway 4, cut it, and continued to a small knoll overlooking the Tiber River. Here it contacted a tank destroyer that had become lost from its unit. This tank destroyer was employed in firing on Highway 3-it was impossible to cut the road because the enemy was too well entrenched on high bluffs west of the river. Suddenly six enemy tanks and several personnel carriers loaded with troops counterattacked from the east, the platoon's rear. All fire, including that of the tank destroyer, was brought to bear on this counterattack and the enemy was quickly stopped. The Germans lost two tanks and at least two tracked personnel carriers.

Attention was returned to the west. Four machine guns were spotted and neutralized with four shots from the armored car's 37mm gun. The platoon was relieved that afternoon by elements of the 15th Infantry.

While the 2d and 3d platoons cut the three highways, the Ist platoon started early in the morning of June 4 west on Highway 6 to Rome. Several members of the platoon, including the platoon leader, got into the city limits of Rome, dismounted, at 0839 hours. In doing so they had passed a number of snipers-actually stragglers using up their last ammunition, but at the point where Highway 6 entered the city at the crest of a hill, very real opposition was met in the form of a roadblock placed on the reverse slope of the hill.

The block consisted of a Mk IV tank, placed squarely in the middle of the road 150 yards below the crest of the hill, and adequately protected by machine guns and riflemen; and 500 yards beyond this was a 40mm antitank gun perfectly camouflaged. This block was reinforced by four self-propelled 150mm howitzers mounted on Mk IV chassis (Grizzly Bears). Mines were concealed beneath the pavement in front of the tank.

Two Sherman tanks were destroyed attempting to force the roadblock, one by the enemy tank and one by mines. Finally, in the late afternoon, this point was outflanked by infantrymen, the roadblock was neutralized and Task Force Howze rolled into the city. The Recon's 1st platoon, after reporting the roadblock to higher headquarters, watched the tank-infantry action against the block from a ridge just outside the city limits.

On June 5 units of the Recon Troop raced into Rome to secure bridges across the Tiber River before they could be destroyed by the enemy. All bridges were found unharmed, including a 75-foot railroad span. When foot troops arrived to take over the bridge guard the Recon Troop was relieved.

By the time the 3d Division entered Rome, approximately 3000 German prisoners of war had passed through the Division cage. Added to the 1800 prisoners previously captured on the Anzio beachhead, this made a total of nearly 5000 prisoners taken by the Division in four and one-half months of operation. During the last stages of the campaign the prisoners were from a weird variety of units-corps headquarters, base section dumps, Flak- units, assault-gun battalions, and scatterings from more than a dozen divisional formations. This spoke eloquently of the enemy's complete disorganization and the complete success of our attack.

These facts stood out following the operation:

The Division's frontal assault and breakthrough at Cisterna, against fortified and strongly-manned positions, was a monument not only to the excellence of planning and coordination at every level, but also to the indomitable spirit and sheer fighting ability of the troops. These story- book situations-bayonet assaults, daring patrol ambushes, deep reconnaissance missions, perfectly-coordinated infantry-tank-artillery attacksactually occurred during this operation.

The rapid advance to Artena upset the enemy's timetable for withdrawal up Highway 6, and greatly hastened the fall of Rome.

The breakthrough at Valmontone, accomplished against fresh German troops by the 3d Division after having suffered so heavily at Cisterna, was overshadowed by the earlier attack only in scope and duration.

The shrewd development of the situation around Lariano, denying the enemy the benefit of an excellent and long-prepared defensive position, aided in the outflanking of Velletri by the 36th Division and the subsequent advance to the west across the Colli Laziali.

Knowing the enemy to be virtually without reserves, boldness in pushing attacks even with troops tired to the point of bogging down paid rich dividends and set up a clean breakthrough both at Cisterna and Valmontone.

The 3d Infantry Division settled down and prepared to garrison Rome.

TABLE OF CASUALTIES*
Breakthrough to Rome
(May 23, 1944 through Aug. 14, 1944)

KIA511 WIA2575 MIA235 Total Battle Casualties3321 Non-Battle' Casualties6783

Reinforcements and Hospital return-to-unit personnel

Reinf Hosp RTUs
Off
90 EM
1430 Off
98 EM
6612

KNOWN ENEMY CASUALTIES

Killed
1034 Wounded
245 Captured
2903

'These figures were provided by the .4 C of S, G-1, 3d Infantry Division.
3-Interlude---Rome

Rome---civilization. The two words were synonymous. Rome, one of the most beautiful cities on the European Continent (or anywhere for that matter) was like a haven to tired, sweat-soaked, sorefooted infantrymen of several divisions. The 3d was no exception.

Late the afternoon of June 4, electrifying news reached the large tent which housed the Division War Room about five miles from the city's outskirts. It was from Fifth Army Headquarters and read: "Third Infantry Division will garrison Rome!" (Exclamation ours.) It was the most welcome news since the fall of Messina. It seemed to herald a long rest in one of Europe's most scenic capitals.

The morning of June 6 found the CP comfortably ensconced in the spacious buildings of Rome University, with most regimental, battalion, and even company headquarters equally well-housed throughout the city. It was then that the flash announcement for which all the world had been waiting first came over millions of radios in dozens of tongues: "The Allies have landed in Normandy!" That was all, but it was enough. Added to the liberation of the Eternal City, it was enough to justify a double celebration among men of the Allied Armies in Italy, but it was also a very sobering announcement. Now, shortly, we would know whether the so-called Atlantic Wall, the strength and impregnability of which the Germans had been trumpeting for years, was reality or something less. At the 3d's most triumphant moment to date, probably the entire fate of Western civilization rested with the men, arms, and machinery then struggling for the victory on France's Channel coast.

The tremendous fact of invasion, The Invasion, all but overshadowed Fifth Army's barely won conquest; the magnificent battle fought north from Cassino and the Beachhead. In countless newspapers everywhere, printers had hurried to tear out front pages telling of the capture of Rome, and to replace the already huge headline type with even larger letters announcing the long-awaited invasion of France.

From that moment on, Italy became the Forgotten Front.

There was a lot to be seen in Rome. The opinion among fighting men was unanimous that it had almost everything needed to qualify for a place among United States cities except United States civilians. The quality and quantity of the women were especially impressive to doughs who, for the previous four and one-half months, had seen nothing but mud, blood and death. "Gawdamighty, they even got redheads!" was a common exclamation.

There was a definite task awaiting. The city needed to be policed. It was the seat of Fascism but a few months before, and if trouble was to be expected anywhere in Italy, it seemed commonsense reasoning to suppose that it would pop up in liberated Rome.

With this in view the 3d's task was to establish guard over every important installation that might be considered worthy of sabotage by disgruntled Fascists. Bridges, aqueducts, electric power installations, and communications centers were priority "targets" (as a later code word described centers to be guarded). The streets themselves had to be policed. It was necessary for armed guards to patrol regular beats, working in conjunction with the Italian carabinieri. Riot squad's roamed the city in jeeps, tanks, and halftracks. The city was divided into zones, each of which was allotted to a regiment of the 3d Division. Unit operations officers made preparation to deal immediately with any contingency arising in the form of Fascist-hoodlum uprisings, German-inspired hysteria, or acts of sabotage.

Amazingly, despite a few small "incidents" occurring among a suddenly-liberated populace during the first few days, nothing arose which might have been termed "untoward." The same situation with respect to Fascism that had been encountered throughout Sicily and Italy was found to prevail at Fascism's seat. The word and the political movement had suddenly become unpopular, terminating a gradual swing away from it which had begun with the entry of Italy into the war in June 1940, and the subsequent military reverses, coupled with an increase in food and clothing rationing, and the everincreasing presence of numbers of German troops in and around the city. Since the country's surrender some atrocities had turned most Italians even further from the occupying enemy.

The United States soldier has never had much trouble making friends among either civilians or women of any nationality, and Rome provided a heretofore- unparalleled opportunity to test that sanguine ability. Men of Italian descent suddenly found themselves popular among their comrades beyond all explanation of personal charm; many soldiers, undyed deceivers that they were, discovered that an interpreter in the crowd is always a welcome asset.

There were those rugged individualists, however, who scorned such underhanded methods, preferring a combination of "pidgin" Italian, Basic English, and universal language to sell the desirability of their companionship. The more practical among them even went to the extent of assisting budding friendships by the judicious use of such small tidbits as chocolate, C Rations, and chewing gum, to mention nothing of the more solid rations, originally destined for United States Army consumption, which circuitously went to cement Italo- United States cobelligerency.

Along with the policing and relaxation was the resymption of a limited amount of training. This consisted largely of close-order drill, calisthenics, organized athletics, and orientation lectures. Although operations officers are notoriously never in doubt as to improvisation of training, it was not known immediately what the Division's next active participation in the war would be.

The German retreat, which actually began in the hills north of Cassino, and received a tremendous boost with the successful breaking of the Anzio "iron ring," was still in progress. With breath-taking rapidity, Allied units of several nationalities, among them United States, British, Indian, Canadian, and French divisions, had continued to force the issue with the hastily-withdrawing Germans. Rome, which but a few days before had been ahead of, then directly on, the front lines, became rear-echelon with a speed that was no less breath taking to the frontline combat troops. Almost before skinned feet had recovered from the devastating effect of practically continuous marching, the Base Section had moved in lock, stock, and barrel.

The first day of entry into the city had seen a hastily improvised Stars & Stripes with crude, black letters advertising the fact that "WE'RE IN ROME." This special edition featured the services of such highcaliber correspondents as Milton Bracker and Herbert Matthews of New York Times, Will Lang of Time-Life, Ken Dixon and Edward Kennedy of Associated Press, and Reynolds and Eleanor Packard of United Press. The combination covered every angle from the breakthrough at Velletri to a husband-wife reaction upon returning to a city which they had left just slightly more than two years before.

"A bearded, dust-grimed U. S. infantryman, holding his helmet in his hand, stepped inside the vast, vaulted coolness of St. Peter's Cathedral at 3:15 this morning, only a few hours after Allied troops had entered Rome," began one Stars & Stripes story.

"He stood looking straight ahead and then up and he gulped and blinked his eyes and said in a quiet, shaky voice: 'I never thought there was a place in the world as wonderful as this. I didn't know there was anything so beautiful.'

"He would not give his name, his organization or anything else. 'I'm just here,' he said, 'and I know what I'm seeing is too big to talk about.' And he walked out, down under the great high ceiling toward the tomb of St. Peter I, at the far end of the great entrance way. . . ."

Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark took time out to pay brief, oral tribute to "the men and women of the Fifth Army who made the supreme sacrifice so that we could keep going to Rome and beyond."

"This great day for the Fifth Army was made possible by the combined efforts of French, British and American troops," he said.

And, keynoting a small, but ironic (though hardly unfamiliar) twist was the Italian carabiniere's words as quoted in the Stars & Stripes: "I watched the American bravely kill five Tedeschi in an old stone house. The Germans stole my oil and typewriter. The Americans are good and kind. Do you have a cigarette?"

General Clark attended a party given in the ballroom of the Grand Hotel a few nights after the Rome entry and pinned the second star of a Major General on the shoulders of Commanding General John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, at the same time congratulating him and his command for the outstanding part played by both in the big push.

Notable among the sights to be seen were, of course, St. Peter's Cathedral (including mass audiences with Pope Pius XII), the Vatican, the Coliseum, Castel Sant' Angelo, the ruins of the Roman Forum, Mussolini's monument and balcony, Victor Emmanuel's monument, any one of several Christian catacombs, and many of the lesser-known, but no less beautiful, basilicas and churches throughout the city.

The Normandy invasion, meanwhile, had proved successful. Emerging from the flood of statements about "strategic reserves," "breakthroughs," and "build-up period" was the solid fact, undisputed even by the enemy, that the Allies had got ashore and were in a position to hold. The beachhead was secure, and a wave of optimism had set in in the allied camp which was not entirely confined to civilians.

Although few officers or men in the 3d Division knew it, our future part in the war had long been scheduled. Rome was merely a breathing period.

The seeming lap of luxury into which the 3d had been suddenly dumped was to prove only a resting place between campaigns-and a very short one at that. The doubts that it was too good to be true shortly materialized. Orders were received on June 13 that the Division would move south of Castel Prezinano, near the Lido di Roma on the Tyrhennian Coast about twenty miles from Rome, preparatory to returning to Naples. The order crystallized in most minds as having but one significance-amphibious training. What else? The Division had never failed to commence practicing for landing operations in its several withdrawals from combat, and battle-wise veterans of Casablanca, Sicily, and Southern Italy summarized the prevalent feeling in very few words: "Where the hell's it going to be this time?"

The move commenced June 14 and was completed June 16.

Upon arrival in the new bivouac area, all units established and improved their areas and commenced a training program covering close-order drill, military courtesy, calisthenics, hardening marches, scouting and patrolling and small-unit problems.

Also included were athletics, ceremonies, and the care and cleaning of equipment.

Plans were immediately formulated by the various headquarters for the move to the Naples area. Some organizations were scheduled to move by motor, some by boat.

The move was undertaken commencing June 19. All wheeled Vehicles and all personnel, except infantry foot elements moved overland to the 'vicinity of Pozzuoli (which is about five miles from the heart of Naples). Ninety-six tracked vehicles of the 756th Tank Battalion and sixty-six "ducks" of the 52nd QM Battalion were loaded aboard six LSTs at Civitavecchia, north of Rome, for shipment to Pozzuoli.

In addition to organic personnel and equipment, and attachments besides the ones enumerated above, the following were attached to 3d Infantry Division for the move: 601st TD Battalion, 441st AAA AW Battalion (two of the three "regular" attachments): 39th Engineer Combat Regiment; 235th QM Truck Company; 3334th QM Truck Company; Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 56th Medical Battalion; 885th, 886th, 887th , and 891st Medical Collecting Companies; 14th Ordnance MM Company; one-half of each of 3353d and 3355th QM Truck Companies; and one platoon of the 94th QM Railhead Company.

The move was carried to completion by June 24. Upon arrival at its new bivouac area near Pozzuoli the Division began preparations for intensive training for large-scale amphibious operations. Training was divided into three periods of five days each, followed by a day of rest. The first five-day period got under way on June 28.

As in past operations, a Planning Board was immediately set up. This functioned at VI Corps Headquarters at the "blockhouse" in downtown Naples. The board consisted of Lt. Col. Albert 0. Connor, G-3; Lt. Col. Grover Wilson and Capt. Frederick 6. Spreyer, G-2; Maj. Robert Shaw, G-4; Lt. Col. Walter T. Kerwin, S-3, Division Artillery; Maj. Robert L. Petherick, Division Engineer; and representatives from the Signal, Ordnance ' QM sections, and Beach Group. Later the S-3's of infantry regiments were added and shortly prior to loading each large unit of the Division set up its own planning room in its bivouac area in order to complete unit orders and to brief staff personnel and unit commanders.

An AG Detachment at the Planning Board Headquarters handled incoming and outgoing documents, and reproduced all operational publications. A rigid system of passes was maintained at the Headquarters, and all planning rooms were guarded by MP's.

Unit training was generally similar to that which had become familiar to all 3d Division veterans, with one important difference. Departing from the former practice of having one battalion per regiment trained as a beach- assault battalion, all infantry personnel were given training in the assault of beach defenses. In addition two of the Division's four special battle patrols were allotted to 7th Infantry and two to 15th Infantry for the purpose of assaulting and destroying enemy gun emplacements on the flanks of both beaches. These patrols were increased to a strength of five officers and 150 men each for the assignment.

The scheduled naval gunfire support for the Division was: one battleship in general support of both the Division's beaches, and six light cruisers and five destroyers assigned to support individual beaches. Smaller craft carrying guns or rockets were also given missions of firing on beach defenses. Primary mission of the warships was to neutralize enemy land-based artillery. No important enemy interference from the sea was expected.

A prearranged bombardment of known battery positions was to begin at H-minus-90 and continue until H-plus-15 minutes, when the warships were to take over certain sectors of responsibility in support of the landing, and fire on targets observed by spotting planes and shore fire-control parties. There were nine of these parties, tied in not only with their respective ships but also with the Naval liaison officer at Division Artillery Headquarters. This arrangement in effect gave the Division a naval fire- direction center, by which the fire of all supporting warships could be massed on suitable targets.

The Corps air plan provided for a detailed schedule of attack for ten days preceding the operations by a powerful force of planes, as well as strong general support on D-Day by counterbattery missions, pre-H- hour bombardment of enemy beach defenses, and attack of nearby enemy airdromes.

To a few, carefully-considered individuals-top commanders-the word by now had gone out that the landings were to be conducted over the beaches of southern France. Companion divisions were the 45th on the immediate right and 36th on VI Corps right flank.

July wore on. The training program carried on and approached its conclusion. Physical conditioning was attained primarily through speed marches and night marches. Training, following the procedure which had paid such rich dividends on previous landings, included attack of pillboxes and fixed fortifications, gapping and crossing wire, mine removal, use of flamethrowers, bangalore torpedoes, rifle' grenades, bazookas and similar specialized equipment, and infantry-tank cooperation. Assault troops were drilled in loading and disembarking from landing craft. Several landing exercises were conducted over beaches of Mondragone, about thirty miles north of Pozzuoli.

The 10th Engineer Battalion drew the nastiest assignment of the period. Previous experience dictated the necessity of a full-scale "dress rehearsal," omitting nothing but the presence of enemy troops. There was only one area within practical distance which closely resembled the actual landing area-the Formia-Gaeta sector north of the mouth of the Garigliano.

This area was directly behind the German lines all during the previous winter's campaign, having been back of the "Winter Line." German engineers had mined everything so completely that it was one of the most fortified areas in all of Italy. Friendly troops who eventually overcame enemy I resistance in the push north took time only to demine the immediate roadside areas. The remainder bristled with every fiendish design of explosive and boobytrap known to the mineconscious German Army. It fell to the 10th Engineers to clear the beaches and hills between the road and shoreline, in order for 3d Infantry Division to hold its exercise.

The battalion, in completing this mission, suffered a total of eighteen men killed and forty-three wounded; ironical to a unit at that time "out of combat." From one small knoll on the right flank of the left beach-"Beach Yellow"-alone, 750 "S"-mines were cleared before the area was given up as being hopelessly covered. When the landing operation-the final rehearsal-was conducted toward the end of July, the Formia-Gaeta area had still much hidden death in wait for the Division, and a few casualties were suffered in order that many more lives might be saved later. The last "bugs" were ironed out of landing plans on this exercise, and the Division was again at the peak of condition ... ready for anything.

Security as to exact time and place of the coming operation was excellent, but the fact could not be disguised from German agents and sympathizers among the Italians that a large-scale amphibious expedition was shortly to set sail. There were still too many proNazis and unconverted Fascists in order for our largescale preparations to remain a secret. Consequently, the mission coming up was probably "sweated out" by the men who were to accomplish it, more than any other since the initial landings in Africa. For several days, in the latter part of July and early August, the Axis radio trumpeted nervously that a new invasion was ready to strike at southern France. Only the fact that such shots had been apparently "called" by the enemy on previous occasions, and then subsequently carried successfully to completion anyway, prevented our forces from a too overbearing concern over the enemy's feigned knowledge of coming events. Southern France was a logical target, and it was much more so now that the beachhead forces in Normandy had broken loose and were in the process of overrunning the Brittany Peninsula.

The "Bomb Plot" against Hitler broke during the latter part of July. So much elation was evidenced in the Division that it was necessary for General O'Daniel to issue a memorandum reminding all personnel of the danger of over-optimism. Salerno's eve had brought news of the Italian surrender, he cautioned, but did not alter the course of the bloody battle there, except possibly to make it even worse.

The final combat landing got under way toward the end of July. The 3d Infantry Division was the first of three divisions to load, and practically all vehicles were aboard the ships and craft before the Formia exercise. There were four ports out of which to load: Baia for LCTs, Pozzuoli for LCIs, Nisida for LSTs, and Naples for naval transports and cargo ships, Merchant Marine Liberty Ships, and British Indian Ocean passenger vessels (AP, AK, MT, & LSI, respectively).

Because of the priority on landing the Division had more time for loading adjustments, with the consequence that instead of the originally scheduled 3,337 vehicles estimated by higher headquarters as the maximum load, over 4,500 vehicles were loaded on the assault convoy.

A final briefing of all commanders of battalions and higher units took place on August 7. All naval commanders were present, all commanding generals. General Truscott opened the meeting with a brief summary of amphibious warfare: Determined men can get ashore anywhere." Division commanders then outlined their respective Task Forces' plans of assault.

Sitting quietly in the bottom row of seats was a medium- sized, trim man in Naval uniform-summer khakis, black tie, black shoes-minus insignia of rank. He was practically unnoticed until the briefing was over. Then he stood up at the invitation of Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt.

For a moment there was puzzlement among the assembled officers. Then recognition dawned, with the speaker's words. It was Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal. He spoke briefly and appreciatively of the parts played by all arms in the fight against the Axis. He mentioned the coming operation with confidence. As he talked his unassuming manner and calm poise completely won the group. His speech was short and to the point. When he sat down the meeting was at an end.

Final loading of troops was completed on August 8, and various units of the convoy began getting under way, to rendezvous later.

As yet only a few of the troops knew their final destination.