Chapter 8
(Part 1)
From the Riviera to the Vosges in Thirty Days

TROOP LIST-Operation "Anvil" Third Infantry Division (Reinf)

Organization for Combat

1. Hq & Hq Co, 3d Inf DivNaval Combat Int Team Air Support Control Party Order of Battle Personnel CIC Personnel Securite' Militaire OSS Personnel Photo Interpreters Civil Affairs Personnel IPW Det

2. 7th Infantry Co A, 756th Tk Bn Co A, 601st TD Bn Co A, 3d Chem Bn Co A, 10th Engr Bn (Initially) Co A, 3d Med Bn 10th FA Bn (Initially)

3. 15th Infantry

4133d QM Sv Co

4134th QM Sv Co

4135th QM Sv Co,

4136th QM Sv Co

3277th QM Sv Co

3634th QM Trk Co

Det 6690th Regulating Co

Hq & Hq Det, 52d QM Bn (Mbl)

3333d QM Trk Co (DUKW)

3334th QM Trk Co (DUKW)

3335th QM Trk Co (DUKW)

3336th QM Trk Co (DUKW)

3353d QM Trk Co (DUKW) (Personnel Only)

3355th QM Trk Co (DUKW) (Personnel Only)

1 Sec 3856th QM Gas Sup Co

Plat 93d QM Rhd Co

332d Air Force Sv Gp (Beach Detail)

111th RAF Beach Sec (Beach Unit)

69th Ord Ammo Co

3407th Ord M Auto Maint Co (DUKW)

Det 77th Ord Dep Co,

Det 977th Ord Dep Co

16 Combat Demolition Units

The end of the tortuous trail was not yet in sight, but the beginning of the end was.

Men of the 3d Infantry Division, doubly heartened by the victorious conclusion of the push on Rome and the successful amphibious invasion Of France's Normandy coast, began to see where that trail had been leading all this time.

Sometimes it had seemed there was no pattern to its crazy wanderings. There was no end-not even a remembered beginning, lost in too many endless days and sleepless nights-just the awful, eternal middle. Shells, mountain peaks, destroyed villages, and mud were the only milestones to mark the journey.

Men of the 3d, and its brother divisions in the Mediterranean Theater, for a long time bore most of the United States' ground effort in the European war. Sometimes they took staggering casualties. They froze, sweated, and cursed, by turn. They fought, died, and wept without tears. for dead comrades. They looked for hope when often there seemed nothing for which to hope. About the only thing left to them was faith, which was equally divided-faith in God and faith in the fighting qualities of the men on either flank.

The men who lived like rats in the ruins of Cassino and dodged death day and night were hard put to it to see the grand scale of a strategical map. The soldiers who smashed across the Rapido River, to get smashed right back, could not with a casual wave of the hand say, "Well, we took a bit of a reverse today." The men who carefully kept even the tops of their helmets from showing over the parapets of Anzio foxholes were in no position to predict the end of the war by "Oh, say, Christmas."

But the beginning of the end suddenly materialized. The tentative start, gradually evolved into full-scale warfare, now fitted neatly into a single picture which could be viewed from one perspective. That France, and eventually Germany, had been the ultimate objectives, everyone had known. It was the method of getting to those objectives that had sometime been obscured for the fighting soldiers.

When, with the invasion convoy in mid-journey, it was announced that the destination was Southern France, the pattern was now complete.

Africa, Sicily, Southern Italy, Anzio . it had taken the 3d Infantry Division a long time to get there.

It is interesting to note how strongly events in the Mediterranean Theater exercised influence over the planned invasion of Southern France.

In Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt's report as Naval Commander, Western Task Force, on the Invasion of Southern France, there is to be found the following:

The preliminary directive* received from Commander- in-Chief, Mediterranean, on December 28, 1943, embodied the following mission:

The date December 28,1943, is especially important to members of the 3d Infantry Division. It clearly indicates how far ahead Allied leaders had laid definite plans. At a time when the 3d was nearly ready to jump off on the Anzio operation, plans were being formulated for an operation which was to place United States troops on the shores of Southern France, a program actually not put into effect until August 15, 1944, nearly eight months later.

In line with this, the selection of Army forces for the operations is discussed in Admiral Hewitt's report:

The question of the identity of the military forces to be made available for the operations was of great concern to the naval planners inasmuch as three major problems depended on the final assignments. In the first place, it was desired that the assault divisions each be thoroughly trained in amphibious assault with the naval attack forces until the army and navy elements were firmly welded into a finished amphibious attack unit. Secondly, the broad problem of mounting and transporting the assault and follow-up forces required considerable planning, assignment of ships, and construction in the many mounting ports. This problem was jointly considered by the Movements and Transportation Section of AFHQ, Service of Supply, North African Theater of Operations (SOS NATOUSA), the G-4 section of the Seventh Army, and the Eighth Fleet planning and logistics sections. Lastly, after having the assault divisions assigned, it was necessary for these commands to work out their tactical assault plans with respect to definite assault beaches.

During the early period of planning, since the two or possibly three US infantry divisions having the necessary qualifications were found only in the US Fifth Army, it was necessary to remove them from the Italian front. This withdrawal from the Allied Armies in Italy. (AAI) raised the problem of where the divisions should be moved for training, refitting and mounting. Originally, it was proposed to train the two US infantry divisions, the 3rd and the 45th, in the Salerno area, beginning as soon as the Pisa-Rimini line was established. In order to meet the original invasion date, May 1944, promulgated in the preliminary directive issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, on 28 December, it was imperative that these two infantry divisions be withdrawn from combat sometime in April. At the same time, the 85th US Infantry Division was training in North Africa in the Oran area.

French divisions at this time had not yet been nominated, but they also would have to be withdrawn from the front, trained, refitted, and mounted. It was considered that training in the Salerno area might congest the port of Naples. Therefore Sicily and the "heel" ports were considered as suitable places for refitting some of the French divisions.

Because of the distance the 85th Division would have to travel from Oran to the assault area, it was determined that that movement should be a ship-to-shore assault from combat- loaded personnel and cargo, ships. The 3d and 45th Divisions would then 'Make the assault on a shore-to-shore basis in craft, probably staging in Ajaccio.

Army operations in Italy, south of the Pisa-Rimini line, were not stabilized in time to' meet the requirements for an operation in May. Consequently, craft and ships assigned for the invasion of Southern France were withdrawn for the invasion of Northern France. By the middle of June, the 3d and 45th Divisions were released from the Italian front and, instead of the 85th Division, the 36th US Infantry Division was withdrawn from the Italian front for participation in the invasion of Southern France.

While the amphibious operation against the Riviera coast was to be the fourth major landing against a hostile shore by the 3d Infantry Division, and the sixth for 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, the operation was by no means a purely routine performance. There were several important ways in which it differed from past operations.

In the past, certain elements of surprise had been major features of the success of our landings. In this case, the Normandy landing had been carried out two months previously, giving the enemy access to information on all our latest techniques and equipment. The enemy could reasonably assume that we had employed all our major new tricks in the all-important Normandy landing and had no surprises in store. In that event we had to depend solely on the surprises of time and place.

For the first time in its experience, the Division was faced with a daylight landing. This called for changes in many of the plans which had previously been successfully employed in night landings.

There was clear evidence that the enemy had constructed offshore obstacles along the Division's beaches, which had never been encountered on any previous operation.

The tremendous concentration of shipping in the Naples area preceding our attack, and the shifting of the bulk of our air strength to Corsica, combined with the limited area of coast upon which we were likely to land, minimized our chance for obtaining surprise. Added to this problem was the tremendous difficulty of maintaining security on the Italian mainland, where the majority of the planning and mounting was done.

(Practice landings had been made in Nisida harbor, within full view of hundreds of Italian bathers. Fullscale assaults had been mounted at Mondragone and Formia. For days on end quantities of material had flowed into the holds and onto decks of ships through the docks at Naples, Nisida, Pozzuoli, and Baia.)

All these factors, weighed together, meant only one thing-that we could not depend on surprising the enemy with small, scattered landings, but would have to plan on stunning him with all the firepower and concentrated mass of men and material that we could direct against a small number of closely grouped beaches. The naval gunfire and air support plans were coordinated with the Division's own attack plan to achieve this effect, and this in turn fitted into the Corps scheme of maneuver, which contemplated putting more infantry battalions ashore at H- hour than were put ashore in the Normandy landing.

Stated simply, the Division's mission in Southern France was to land on beaches in the vicinity of St. Tropez and Cavalaire, some 30 miles east of Toulon, clear the enemy from the beaches and from adjacent high ground, and advance rapidly inland, preparatory to assisting in Seventh Army's attack to the west against the ports of Toulon and Marseille. Clearing of St. Tropez peninsula, maintaining contact, with the 45th Infantry Division on the right and with French troops on the left, were among subsidiary initial missions.

Since it was part of the Division's mission to advance inland and seize high ground in the vicinity of Cogolin at the head of the gulf of St-Tropez, it was decided to land two battalions of the 15th Infantry initially on Yellow Beach (lying between Cap de St. Tropez and Cap Camarat, on the east side of the St. Tropez peninsula) and two battalions of the 7th Infantry on Red Beach (Gulf of Cavalaire), using the 30th Infantry to land on Red Beach after it had been cleared, with a mission of exploiting to the north and seizing objectives deep in the enemy's rear to the west, north and northeast of Cogolin. The 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments were organized as combat teams, with artillery battalions, TD, tank, chemical and medical companies, mine-gapping and signal detachments attached, while the 30th Infantry had only chemical and medical companies and a signal detachment with it.

"A soldier named Patelli stood up on the crowded deck. 'Take it from me,' he said, 'the first wave onto the beach is the best one to be in. Why, you gotta choice on the first wave! If you don't like the pillbox on the right you just move over and take the pillbox on the left. But if you gotta come in later you get no choice. You gotta take the pillbox that the first wave passed!'

"The soldiers around him grinned and kept on playing cards. A little later when someone said, 'Okay, you jokers, take your last look at Italy!', only a few of the men looked up. Even when a small radio was tuned in to 'Axis Sally,' the Nazi propagandist, and she boasted that the Germans knew all about the coming invasion of Southern France, the soldiers kept on playing cards or talking quietly. Finally, the ship's chaplain couldn't stand it any longer. 'This bunch of men is awfully unexcited,' he complained. 'I just had a normal crowd at services this morning. On the way across the Channel from England almost everybody turned out.'

"These men were different. They were 3d Division men."

On the evening of August 12, a long convoy of LSTs stretched almost as far as the eye could see over a choppy sea, off the port of Naples. The sky, darkening from its midday brightness, was faultlessly blue.

A few soldiers, lining the afterdecks of each LST, stared toward the last ship in the convoy. A small speck, distinguishable as some sort of craft, was rapidly approaching. It drew closer and the soldiers could make it out to be a speedy launch. One figure was prominent in the forepart. He stood erect, disdaining to maintain his balance by a handhold.

As the boat approached to within a few hundred yards of each LST, a few soldiers stared unbelievingly. Then the cry went up: "It's Churchill!" The cry was taken up and echoed throughout the ship. Soldiers and sailors crowded to that side of the vessel.

The short, stubby figure stood straight. His thinning white hair blew awry. As the launch drew nearly abreast, he waved. Then the doughty little warrior raised his right hand to form with two fingers the V-for Victory sign-the symbol of hope and determination which, two years and more before, he had raised and flaunted at the power of the then mighty German war machine. The United States soldiers cheered and waved back.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in Italy to confer with Italian Minister Bonomi, had been unable to resist seeing off the invasion convoy, and to wish God-speed and a quick, successful victory to the United States troops. It was a favorable omen.

Admiral Hewitt on August 9 had promulgated D-Day as August 15, and H-hour as 0800. The assault troops of the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments debarked at Ajaccio, Corsica, for the planned staging, then once again embarked. By the morning of August 15, all the units of the 3d Infantry Division flotilla were in place off the coast of Cavalaire and St. Tropez.

D-Day, as do all such days, began early. In the wheelhouse of each LST a naval rating kept his attention fixed on a fascinating pattern of concentric light circles. His particular LST was the constant, the hub of his own universe, the pole around which revolved the blobs of dim light which were the other ships and craft. As the vessels slowly maneuvered through the darkness into their final positions, the magic of radar kept them safe from collision.

The captain stood on the bridge with the officer of the watch, and now and then spoke a few words to him, some of which the officer relayed through the speaking tube to the engine room.

Under dim blue lights in the crowded troop compartments men lay warm under a single thickness of blanket, and slept-most of them. Some, unable to overcome wakefulness, pondered at what the day might bring, tossed restlessly, and countless thoughts coursed through their minds: thoughts of the sound of bursting shells . . . letters from home . . . buddies they had known ... last minute briefings: beaches, objectives, routes of advance. But most of them still slept.

In wardrooms sleepy Navy fliers cupped their hands around mugs of hot "jamoke" and pondered the coming day, their part in it, and the imminence of their return to friendlier* waters and more hospitable anchorage's.

At airfields on nearby Corsica, fliers were crawling from their bunks and shivering in the predawn chill. Outside, on the airstrips, ground crews already were busily warming up the motors of the bombers. The man- made thunder spoke the promise of a busy day, and of coming hell for the enemy beach defenders.

Commanders aboard the ships, awakened early, ate without much interest, and speedily turned to last-minute discussion of plans. Details settled long before, once again cropped up for attention and reminder. Broad outlines of maneuver were reviewed. Mental estimates of time, space, and distance were checked against the opinions of others.

Soon the queues of half-asleep soldiers would move past the cans of coffee and pans of food, the men holding out messgear as they went. The jolt of a portion of food dropped into a meat can would signal the individual to move along to the next pan and waiting mess attendant, and then down the slippery, food-splattered iron steps to the messroom In the supporting naval warships, gunnery officers checked the fire plans. Elsewhere, last-minute inspections of guns, ammunition, and fire tables were in process.

And in dugouts and fire emplacements ashore, a weird conglomeration of Russians, Turcomans, Poles and Slavs, their numbers spiked with a few German officers and NCOs effected reliefs, walked patrols, and turned their eyes to a still-darkned sea. There was an attitude of expectation among them. There had been stepped-up air assaults over the previous week. Many civilians had left the coastal regions between August 12-14, stating frankly that they expected an Allied landing at any hour. German radio announcements had been broadcast to the effect that an Allied invasion fleet had left Corsica for France on August 14. A rumor circulated among German soldiers and French civilians to the effect that Allied leaflets had been dropped over the St. Tropez area warning the civilian population to leave the coastal regions.

"Let the Americans come," many of the defenders probably thought. "We are foreigners to the German army. If we escape with our lives, we have nothing to lose-perhaps much to gain." But at the same time they fingered the triggers of the German machine guns and rifles, and made ready to shoot if today should prove to be the day of invasion.

It can be stated unequivocally that the D-day landings on the shores of southern France by the 3d Infantry Division were the most successful ever undertaken by the Division in its entire history in the Mediterranean Theater. Even the landings at Nettuno, smooth as they were, did not compare with those of August 15 in smoothness of execution.

Scattered resistance on the beaches was quickly overcome. The specially-trained, reinforced, Battle Patrols which landed on the flanks of both beaches speedily smashed enemy resistance with only one of them, that of the 7th Infantry, encountering strong opposition. Mission of this Battle Patrol was: to proceed about 2000 yards west from its landing point to the town of Cavalaire-sur-Mer and to clean out the town and the entire peninsula on which it is situated. The peninsula overlooks the entire beach where a major portion of the landings were scheduled to be made. It was the enemy's only available position for interfering with landing operations by flanking fire; it also furnished an excellent position for directing observed artillery fire, for which the enemy was utilizing it.

"As we started inland from the water ... I suddenly noticed a wire just above my head," said S/Sgt. Herman F. Nevers, leader of the 1st squad. "I looked back and ... saw ... a hanging mine explode and tear the platoon leader into small pieces. The force of the explosion blew S/Sgt. James P. Connor about ten feet and knocked him flat to the ground. Sergeant Connor received a fragmentation wound on the left side of the neck ... The commanding officer of the battle patrol told him to go back for aid, but Sergeant Connor refused to go."

As the squad neared a bridge a German jumped up. Connor shot him. The patrol came under a severe mortar barrage. Connor urged them forward and the group became disorganized, some of the men following another platoon, leaving only about twenty men.

At about this time a sniper shot Sergeant Connor, wounding him in the left shoulder, the bullet penetrating to his back.

Said Nevers, "I said to him, For Christ's sake, Connor, stop and get medical attention for yourself!'

"He replied, saying, 'No, they can hit me but they can't stop me. I'll go until I can't go any farther.' Then he said, 'Nevers, get out there on the right flank and get those men rolling! We've got to clean out these snipers before we can advance farther!'

"Sergeant Connor told the men, 'If there's only one of us left, we've got to get to that point (the objective) and clean it up, so the guys coming in after us can get in safely with no fire on them."'

The platoon started forward again. Connor was in the lead again. A German rose from a hole not more than thirty feet to Sergeant Connor's front and shot him in the leg. Nevers fired over Connor as he fell, killing the German.

"Sergeant Connor called me over and told me to give him a hand to help him on his feet so he could go on with the fight. I helped him up but he couldn't stand on his leg and fell down again. I wanted to give him first aid, but he wouldn't even let me look at the wound, saying there wasn't time. He told me to take the rest of the men, about fifteen now, and to carry on, and that he hoped he would see me sometime. Sergeant Connor told me that even if I had to get down and dig the bastards out with my bare hands to go ahead and dig them out . .

Then, according to Sgt. Edward G. Collins, the group started out to carry out Connor's instructions. Too many men started around the right flank and Connor called some of them back and sent them around to the left. In carrying out his orders the platoon cleaned out the entire area, killing three or four of the enemy and capturing approximately forty more.

Said 1st Lt. William K. Dieleman, Battle Patrol commander, But for the outstanding example set by Sergeant Connor in the face of tremendous odds in fire power and men, the critically important mission of the whole Battle Patrol might have been delayed for a considerable time, or might even have failed entirely."

Major John R. Darrah, Special Troops surgeon, examined the area of wounds received by Sergeant Connor, two months later, and testified that the second wound must have caused him excruciating pain at the slightest movement.

Sergeant Connor received the Congressional Medal of Honor.

The 3d Reconnaissance Troop Battle Patrol, upon landing, found twenty prisoners awaiting the pleasure of their captors. The fire delivered by BARs and rifles of the Battle Patrol, shooting from their landing craft, had converted them to the Allied cause before any United States soldier set' foot in Southern France. Within a short time 115 more were added and by 1030 the Battle Patrol had returned to 3d Reconnaissance Troop control, having completely accomplished its mission.

The 7th Infantry landed with 3d Battalion on the left, 2d Battalion on the right. There were concrete tetrahedra offshore, and mines and wire on the beach and inland for distances up to 500 yards, yet little resistance was encountered. The naval rocket barrage which had immediately preceded the assault had apparently had good effect, as a dense, even, pattern of bursts was observed inshore, and the first prisoners taken were well shaken up. Shortly after landing, 2d Battalion, moving up the road toward La Croix, received mortar and small-arms fire from the right, and this fire continued sporadically for about two hours with little effect. By 1045, 2d Battalion had passed through La Croix and was on its way north to its objective on the high ground astride the road west of Gassin, and by 1430 had reached the objective and contacted 30th Infantry.

The 3d Battalion had very light opposition also, and reached its first two objectives by 1345.

Both assault battalions of the 15th' Infantry-3d on the right and Ist on the left-hit Yellow Beach at 0800, reduced all beach defenses within forty minutes, and moved inland to their objectives on high ground 3000 to 5000 yards back from the beach. These objectives were occupied about noon against little enemy opposition.

Leading elements of the 30th Infantry landed behind 7th Infantry on Red Beach at H-plus-80 minutes and struck rapidly inland. Overtaking a battalion of the 7th Infantry, the 30th moved through and took objective W, and proceeded to objective D. By 1400 2d Battalion was east of the road north of La Croix, and 3d Battalion was moving toward Cogolin, which Company K reached and entered at 1415.

Landing at H-hour in support of each assault regiment were a smoke detail from the 3d Chemical Battalion (attached), four DD tanks (tanks made amphious by canvas flotation aprons) from the 756th Ta Battalion, and on Yellow Beach four tank destroy from the 601st TD Battalion.

By noon almost all units were on the Division's initial beachhead line.

During the afternoon 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, passed through 3d Battalion on its objective and advanced to Highway 98 east of La Mole and turned west on the highway. The 2d Battalion, relieved by 30th Infantry on its objective, followed 1st Battalion. 1st Battalion was assembled, and moved west along the coast road, meeting no resistance until about 2300 when it encountered a strongpoint of six or eight machine guns, three AT guns, and several riflemen, covering a wire-and- mine roadblock. This strongpoint was still under attack at noon of the following day.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, swung north through 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, and attacked St. Tropez, reducing the last resistance there and taking nearly 100 PWs by 1945. The entire regiment then assembled and moved west through Cogolin behind the 30th Infantry.

The Ist Battalion, 30th Infantry, followed 3d Battalion, 30th, through Cogolin. Company G contacted 15th Infantry at 1500 and at 1640 the regimental Battle Patrol contacted 15th Infantry Battle Patrol on the peninsula between Red and Yellow Beaches. The Ist, Battalion, 30th Infantry, entered Grimaud at 1710 against little but sniper resistance, with a reinforced platoon protecting its flank. The 3d Battalion rode on tanks west from Cogolin to Grimaud at 1755. The first enemy contacted by 3d Battalion was about one and one-half miles east of Collobrieres at 2240.

This resistance was overcome and 3d Battalion had closed in Collobrieres by 0300 August 16.

By 0435 Ist Battalion had passed through La Garde Freinet and was in Les Mayons reducing resistance, and taking twenty-two prisoners.

An hour after that time the reinforced platoon from Ist Battalion, on flank-protection duty, was relieved by elements of the 45th Division.By noon of August 16, D-plus-one, leading elements of the 3d Infantry Division were twenty miles inland.

Its gains were surprising, and gratifying, in comparison with its former landing operations below Nettuno.

In retrospect, here is what had happened:

A harassed German High Command was even then stretching its forces nearly to the breaking point between the long Russian front and the fluid battlefield which all of France from the Seine River to the Brittany Peninsula had become on the west. It was like a man trying to keep two determined intruders from entering a stolen house which he had taken for his home, and running back and forth alternately attempting to hold two doors shut. Suddenly he hears noises which sound like a third party about to come in through the cellar. He is powerless to do anything about this new threat.

From subsequent interrogation it was learned that the enemy had expected the main landing effort to be made in the vicinity of Toulon and Marseille. He knew that we must have in short order at least one good port through which to pour supplies to keep the advance continuous. The bulk of the enemy's force, therefore, was disposed farther west, and was in no position to intervene until after we were well ashore. But even then it was too late. The provisional airborne division, under Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick, which landed in the vicinity of Le Muy; the rapid advances inland of all three United States divisions; the harassment of naval gunfire along the coast; the disrupting of the enemy's lines of communications and movement of enemy reserves by well-organized and well- armed French resistance groups; the bombing "strangle"-- all these prevented the enemy from making the ghost of a showing of countermeasure or even offering effective resistance.

The enemy high command issued one amazing statement about three days following the landings. "No counterattack will be launched against the invasion forces," said the enemy in an intercepted radio broadcast, "until they have driven inland far enough so as to be out of effective range of the support of their own naval gunfire." In effect, this was equivalent to a flat admission of German impotence.

"We broke a very thin crust," said one high-ranking United States officer "and behind the crust there was nothing that could stop us."

So. with scarcely a pause, the 3d Infantry Division prepared to make its longest advance in the shortest length of time that it had ever made-or ever would make- in -Europe. There was no warning such as, "I want you to be in Palermo in five days." Movement and attack orders were, for the most part, to be issued verbally by the VI Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, to General O'Daniel; General O'Daniel's orders were usually issued the same way to his regimental commanders. The confirming orders, on paper, would be sent along later, but right now it was "to hell with written orders, let's get going." The enemy had been maneuvered back on his heels, and every man in VI Corps, weary though he might be, could not help but sense that keeping the enemy offbalance was a sure way to keep casualties to the bare minimum. The Division moved west against only scattered, unorganized resistance.

Improvisation paid dividends. It was found that an entire infantry battalion could be completely loaded on transportation within a regiment, including tanks, TDs, jeeps, and other assorted vehicles without having recourse to non-organic vehicles.

It was a common sight to see a whole rifle battalion moving down a road-doughboys draped over the 3-inch guns of tank destroyers, clinging to the slippery- sided tanks of the 756th, or loaded sixes-and-sevens to trailer-hauling jeeps.

Of the 1627 prisoners taken on D-day, the overwhelming majority were from the 242nd Infantry Division, with a few hundred more from fortress and coast defense battalions, and miscellaneous numbers of them from labor, naval, air and signal organizations.

Company G, 30th Infantry, with armor, occupied Carnoules, southeast of Gonfaron, by 0530 August 16 while 2d Battalion attacked and occupied Gonfaron by 1400. Company K, 30th Infantry, captured Pierrefeu by 1819, August 16, against self-propelled and small-arms fire-the westernmost advance of the 30th. The company took thirty-five prisoners.

The leading battalions, 1st and 3d, of the 7th Infantry, overcame enemy strongpoints. By noon of August 17 our front lines ran generally from Cuers-Carnoules Gonfaron- Le Luc, inclusive. Tanks and tank destroyers were being used with infantry to patrol and clear roads linking battalion sectors. Towns captured in twenty-four. hours included Le Lavandou, Bormes, Leoube, Pierrefeu, Pignans, Carnoules, Puget Ville, Rocbaron, and Flassans.

At 1350 August 17, 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry forward elements received small-arms fire from a road junction on the approaches to La Londe. Intense artillery and machine-gun fire also delayed the battalion's advance. The battalion engaged the enemy in an allnight fire fight, during which forty to fifty Germans were killed. Patrols into La Londe during the morning of August 18 reported the town clear.

It was in this fight that S/Sgt. Stanley Bender of Company E particularly distinguished himself. The three bridges which spanned the Maravennes River just beyond the town had to be taken intact, otherwise the advance would have been slowed for hours, when every minute counted in pursuing the retreating Germans.

Said 1st Lt. George H. Franklin, "At about 1400 hours, just as we were about to round the last bend in the road ... We were stopped by a Frenchman who advised us that there was a roadblock about 200 yards beyond us and that the town was full of enemy troops. We instantly dismounted from four M-10 TDs and three M-4 tanks and went into a squad column on either side of the road and then went cross-country in an effort to surprise the enemy."

After going only a short distance the company was fired upon by machine guns and small arms from wellconcealed positions to the left. At the same time an enemy antitank gun opened fire and destroyed one of the tanks which had left the road and was advancing with the infantry. All remaining TDs and tanks moved into firing position from where they attempted to engage the antitank guns.

"We all took cover as rapidly as possible," said S/Sgt. Edward C. Havrila. ". . . I saw that ... Sergeant Bender ... hadn't taken cover with the rest of us. The crazy guy was standing up on top of the knocked-out tank, in full view of the kraut, shading his eyes and looking around trying to pick out the source of the enemy fire. Bullets were bouncing off that tank right beside him, but he nevertheless stayed right there until he found the kraut position . .

When Bender located the position he jumped to the ground and ran to a ditch in which two squads had taken cover. He ordered them to engage the enemy while he took his squad forward in an effort to destroy the strongpoint. Then, without waiting for instructions or orders, Sergeant Bender ran forward, motioning for his squad to follow. The intrepid squad leader reached the ditch under machine-gun fire which wounded four of his men. The enemy tried to throw grenades into the ditch, but Bender did not move until his squad had joined him. Said Sgt. Forest M. Law: "The next time I saw Sergeant Bender he was in the act of crawling from the ditch at a point between seventy-five and one hundred and fifty yards beyond the Kraut, strongpoint. He was all alone and was making no effort to conceal himself. Walking erect ... he made a fine target and one of the kraut machine gunners picked up his gun and turned it around in an effort to get him. However Sergeant Bender continued his wide end sweep in a rapid walk. He was too far away for me to see his facial expression, but his manner looked as calm and unperturbed as a soldier on pass."

Bender walked the entire forty to fifty yards, directly up to a gunner who, during Bender's entire "stroll," had had a clear field of fire. Bender shot the man with his Tommy gun.

Following this, he walked another twenty-five yards to the second machine-gun emplacement and killed the gunner and his assistant. He called his squad out of the ditch and walked another thirty-five yards to kill an enemy rifleman who was in the act of firing. The squad joined him in the slaughter.

As a result of Sergeant Bender's actions, and the inspiration they caused, all bridges over the Maravennes were taken intact, a roadblock was destroyed, and the dominating high ground was seized. Sergeant Bender was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

The 15th Infantry regrouped during the period of 2d Battalion, 7th's action, and pushed west along the Besse- Forcalqueiret road, clearing out the hills south of the road. Opposition was light for the most part and the regiment moved swiftly. At 1900 3d Battalion pushed through St. Anastasie and across the high ground west of Besse. At the same time, 2d Battalion began a truck shuttle movement toward the regimental zone of advance after being relieved by 7th Infantry at Pierrefeu. The 3d Battalion was held up for a short period at Anastasie by. about fifty enemy, but these were soon forced to withdraw. At 2100 Ist Battalion was south of Forcalqueiret and 2d Battalion was east of the same town.

The 30th Infantry, led by 2d Battalion, under the command of Maj. Frederick R. Armstrong, reached the vicinity of Brignoles, where it was delayed by enemy opposition from 1840 August 17, until the morning of the 18th. The enemy brought up his Ist Company, 757th Regiment, 338th Infantry Division, and other units totalling two battalions in strength, to hold the town. The forces occupied a position west of the town, covering a 300-meter front, protected by sharp terrain on both sides. At 1825 a patrol from the 3d Reconnaissance Troop was stopped by the enemy on Highway 7 with 3d Battalion about 1000 yards behind.

The 2d Battalion, which had taken Flassans by 1200, August 17, was on its way to Brignoles two hours later. Although the 30th did not know it, the capture of Brignoles was to be the regiment's first big fight in southern France.

Plan of the attack was to move astride the Flassan- Brignoles road with 1st Battalion on the right on a flanking mission, and 2d Battalion on the left. H-hour was set for 0600 August 18.

The attack got away as planned and Company B swung north to Le Val to protect the regiment's right flank, as Company G moved west from Besse to the high ground dominating Le Celle, protecting the 30th's left flank. The attack moved forward against stubborn resistance. During August 18 Company F got around south of the town and cut the road to the west. Company E drove to the center of Brignoles by 1900. The 1st Battalion ran into heavy resistance just north of the city.

During the night of August 18-19 3d Battalion was, committed in an envelopment to the north to cut the road west of town and continue toward Bras, as 1st Battalion (minus Company B at Le Val) and 2d Battalion (minus Company G at La Celle) worked into the town.

The attack began again at 0600, August 19. Lt. Col. Allen F. Bacon's 1st Battalion, spearheaded by Company A, came in from the north, while Company E drove from the west and Company F from the southwest, to meet in the center of the town. This, coupled with the wide 3d Battalion flanking attack, broke enemy resistance and the town was completely cleared by 1030. The 3d Battalion continued toward Bras.

Elements of the 338th Infantry Division were now being counted through the cages, although the bulk of opposition, such as it was, was still being provided by 242nd Infantry Division, in addition to dozens of "spare parts" organizations, such as handfuls from the 189th Reserve Division and 244th Infantry Division.

Between noon of August 19 and noon August 20 the Division advanced nearly thirty miles, moving both on foot and by motor. Towns liberated during the 24-hour period were, besides Brignoles: Meounes, Gareoult, Neoules, La Roquebrussane, Camps, La Celle, and Le Val.

A Task Force consisting of Company C, 15th Infantry, plus four tanks, two TDs, and three trucks moved from Mazauges. The Ist Battalion followed the Task Force; then on August 20, continued the advance toward Auriel. No resistance was encountered. From Tourves, 2d Battalion, 15th, continued the advance toward Trets, which was found clear, and on the morning of the 20th. the battalion continued the advance toward Gardanne. The 3d Battalion had taken Tourves early in the afternoon of the l9th after a 45minute attack, and Company L pushed on toward St. Maximin. The battalion occupied La Defenos and terrain in the vicinity. On the morning of the 20th 3d Battalion moved by truck to Trets, thence southwest toward Peynier.

The 30th Infantry reorganized in the vicinity of Brignoles following its fight there and moved out with Ist Battalion in the lead. By 1430, August 19 Ist Battalion had gone beyond La Censies. The 2d Battalion was on high ground to the south of 1st Battalion and 3d Battalion was on high ground to the south of Bras. At 1900 3d Battalion left St. Maximin for Ollieres on foot and arrived there prior to midnight. Shortly thereafter it moved out for Pourcieux. The 2d Battalion remained in reserve near Brignoles until 0400, when it moved out along Highway 7. At noon 30th Infantry had still encountered no opposition.

During the same period (August 19-20) '1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, remained in defensive positions near Pierrefeu, except for Company B, which outposted Cuers. Company A was relieved by units of the 1st French Division at 1405. By 0800 Ist Battalion had begun shuttling toward La Celle, and upon arriving there prepared to move by vehicle to the regimental assembly area. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved to a defensive position in the vicinity of Meounes and Forcalqueiret during the night of August 19-20. By noon, August 20, French troops were relieving the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion was completely relieved by French troops by 1405 August 19 and moved first to assembly near St. Honore, then by vehicle to the vicinity of La Celle.

Summary of localities liberated again read like a Michelin guidebook to the area: Masaugnes, Tourves, Rougiers, Seillons, Ollieres, Pourcieux, St. Zacharie, Pourrierers, Trets, Peynier, Rousset, and Puyloubier.

The move against the most important town in the vicinity, Aix-en-Provence, began on the afternoon of August 20.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, met opposition as it moved into position east of Aix. At 2215 Company G was astride Highway 7 leading into town while the entire 2d Battalion was engaged in a firefight with the enemy until 0130, when the fire died down. During the night the regiment established blocks to the west and south of town. The 3d Battalion, meanwhile, was driving west north of Highway 7, and reached the outskirts of Aix before being fired on about dark of August 20. From this position, 1st Battalion swung north, then west, cutting across four to five "hub" roads leading into Aix, fifteen kilometers to the north of the city, in the dark, fighting bicycle-mounted Germans who came in from the north. The Ist Battalion then established blocks on roads, placing themselves to the northwest of Aix. The 3d Battalion established blocks to the north of their zone of attack.

By dawn Ist Battalion, which had moved farthest., so as to be on 3d Battalion's right as it faced south, was ready to attack, and had a strong block at Celoney, astride Highway 7 (7th and 15th were not far enough west to establish these blocks as planned).

By daylight 3d Battalion, too, was poised to attack, having swung northwest inside 1st Battalion.

The coordinated attack got away at 0600. The 2d Battalion provided a base of fire as 1st Battalion attacked from the northwest and 3d Battalion pushed in from the north. Bulk of the attached armor was with 3d Battalion.

just as the attack commenced 1st Battalion was attacked by enemy infantry with strong armor support down Highway 7 from vicinity of Celoney. The entire battalion was ordered to block to the northwest and deal with this threat while 3d Battalion continued with its mission of clearing the city. Aix-en-Provence was completely free of enemy by 1000, August 21.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, began a shuttling movement toward Chateauneuf following the fall of Aix- en-Provence.

The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, had overcome opposition in front of Auriel, and by 0200, August 21, entered and cleared the town. The 2d Battalion, advancing toward Gardanne, met resistance. Company G moved against it and by 1515 had a patrol into the town. The battalion was generally held up, however, by an enemy pocket estimated to be from 400 to 600 men in strength. The battalion moved out at daylight, August 21, attacked approximately 1500 yards, and had the town by 1000.

Towns liberated were Aix-en-Provence, Gardannes, Chateauneuf, Vaubenargues, St. Mare, and Le Lollonet.

Following its capture of Aix and Gardannes, the two most important towns in the area, the Division conducted vigorous patrolling up to ten miles to the west, northwest, and southwest and established a series of roadblocks in the three directions. Reconnaissance elements entered Berre and patrolled to the lake near it.

The broad scheme of maneuver, in which 3d Infantry Division drove to the west, might be explained at this time. Originally, rather than make a direct assault by sea on the highly fortified area of Toulon-Marseille, VI Corps had chosen to land farther to the east. Early seizure of both of them was necessary however, to gain a port before October's unfavorable weather set in, making maintenance over the beaches extremely difficult.

Toulon had to be reduced because the port there, in addition to being strongly fortified with big guns which could seriously interfere with shipping bound for Marseille, was a warship and submarine base whose possession by the enemy would enable him to send out damaging naval units against unprotected convoys; or, tie up and hinder our supply lines by forcing the Navy to convoy every LST and Liberty ship which sailed from Naples to Marseille. Marseille was the needed port since, in peacetime, it had handled the largest amount of tonnage of any harbor city on the Mediterranean.

French units which began landing over Red and Yellow beaches on D-plus-one relieved our elements along the coast-that is, 7th Infantry-narrowing the Division's then 20-mile frontage. The 3d Division then continued the rapid advance to the west, flanking from the north both Toulon and Marseille while French units undertook the task of cleaning them out.

By this time, therefore, all roads leading north and northwest from the city had been blocked.

Over August 22-23 Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, was sent by truck to the vicinity of Lambesc, then moved northwest of the town and set up a defense along the highway. A motorized patrol was sent into Pelissane and found the town clear of enemy. The 3d Battalion left for La Roque and relieved elements of 180th Infantry (45th Division), going into position on the road about 1000 yards east of the town. A roadblock was set up in the town.

The 15th Infantry's 1st Battalion remained in defensive positions around Gardannes and to the south and southwest. The 2d Battalion continued its blocking role also, with the CP at La Fare. At 0910, August 23, the battalion moved to its final phase line, which included Gignac, Marignane, and Martigues. An L Company patrol investigated the airport north of Marignane and found mines on the field marked with flags.

The 30th Infantry sent out a motorized patrol shortly after noon on August 22, to Lancon, which came from the south through La Fare and reported no enemy. The 3d Battalion began a motor movement toward Salon at 2030, and by 0515 had set up roadblocks in that vicinity. The 2d Battalion remained in reserve and 1st Battalion stayed in position with roadblocks covering all approaches.

Towns liberated during the period were Marignane, St. Victoret, Vitrelles, Rognac, Coudoux, La Fare, Cornillon- Confoux, Lancon, St. Cannat, Labarben, Palissanee, Salon, Vernegues, Alleins, Mullemort, and Charleval.

The swing north to parallel the Rhone River was about to begin, together with the most rapid phase of Division's most rapid advance in Europe. The German l9th Army was now almost completely disorganized. Up until noon of August 23 the Division had taken 4165 prisoners. Elsewhere in the VI Corps zone the German commander of the coastal defense area had been captured, along with most of his staff, and this early disruption of enemy communications left the l9th Army with no choice but to begin its rapid backpedalling toward Germany.

A major factor aiding the speed and success of our movement was the activity of the French resistance groups. Four years of Nazi subjugation had left many ardent French patriots with a strong urge to take to the "underground," a word loosely used in connection with resistance activities-that is to say, to go into hiding from the German Gestapo. At the time of our landing there were about seventeen of these groups which had attained a high degree of organization by consolidating, selecting common leaders, and formulating strict rules of conduct. Any man who wished to be a member of the F.F.I. (Forces Francaise D'Interieure-the common, but by no means only, name for the resistance groups) had to renounce completely his ties with home and family and devote his time and energies toward aiding in the liberation of France.Strict rules of conduct did not mean that a man would be put on extra duty in the kitchen for failure to keep his shirt buttoned or his cap straight on his head, but it did mean that his comrades would put him to death if he lost his rifle. Weapons, seized from ambushed German Wehrmacht units, or dropped by parachute from British bombers, were bought with blood, and were too precious to waste through carelessness. Other governing restrictions were equally as severe, although, with typical Gallic logic, applied only to things having mainly to do with life and death.

The motivating spirit was patriotism and a burning desire for freedom. The harsh conditions of service were entirely in keeping with the ascetic singleness of purpose which had dictated the groups' formation.

In certain cities, notably Grenoble, Avignon, and Lyons, and in scores of lesser localities, the F.F.I. swung into decisive action with the landings in southern France. Sometimes under the leadership of United States or British members of the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services), more often led by Frenchmen, whole towns were seized and held to await our coming. In addition to this sabotage activities were coordinated with our movements. If the Air Force failed to destroy a bridge, that bridge might be demolished anyway-from the ground and with hand-laid demolitions. Speeding convoys of enemy reserves ran into mysteriously laid roadblocks, and ambush. Small, isolated German pockets were sometimes wiped out to the last man, and lone enemy soldiers, if they escaped retribution at the hands of the patriots, surrendered to the first United States soldier to present himself, in preference to being the quarry in a relentless manhunt.

It is true there were a few summer patriots in the ranks of the F.F.I. These were the heroes who put on white armbands after the Germans had been cleared out, and some of them were the leading spirits in the head-shaving parties which accompanied each liberation of new territory. But these persons were in a very small minority. Most of the patriots fought behind the lines, and rendered us valuable assistance in our clean sweep from the Riviera coast north up the Rhone Valley.

Beginning on August 23 our reconnaissance elements patrolled up to fifteen miles in front of the Division, reaching Arles on the Rhone River as a move was begun to the northern banks of the Durance River.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, relieved 7th Infantry, which was in position with its 1st Battalion near Aliens and Mallemont, 2d Battalion in Division reserve at St. Cannat, and 3d Battalion located between La Roque and Charleval. The 7th Infantry, in turn began a relief of the 157th Infantry (45th Division) north of the Durance River. Goums began relieving 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, on the Division left flank, and Ist Battalion, 15th Infantry, was assembled in the vicinity of St. Cannat as Division reserve.At 1710, August 23, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, moved north to Lamonen against no resistance, and had reached its objective by 2130.

The move across the Durance River continued. The 15th Infantry moved during the night of August 24-25, following relief by units of the 1st French Armored Division. 30th Infantry commenced its move on the morning of the 25th. The 7th Infantry, meanwhile continued patrolling the terrain to its front and, upon finding it unoccupied, moving forward. By 1000 2d Battalion had a patrol into Cavaillon, and during the morning of August 25 reconnaissance elements passed through the battalion to patrol the road northwest toward Avignon, which was later entered by elements of the 3d Reconnaissance Troop.

Moves of the Division had now begun to resemble the pattern left on an ice rink by the skates of busy hockey players as successive objectives were reached, found unoccupied, and new ones assigned.

7th Infantry sent a motorized patrol on August 25th from Segonce to Montlaux, Cruix, Stetienne, and to Ongles without making contact with the enemy. The 2d Battalion sent a patrol into Caumont and picked up two straggler prisoners. The 3d Battalion sent Company L (less one platoon) to Sault, and from there to Vaison. The platoon set up a roadblock at a road junction 1000 yards north of Montbrun. Remainder of the battalion remained in Division reserve near Apt. The Ist Battalion moved through Pernes and occupied the town of Orange. It remained there until all elements of the 15th Infantry had passed through it, meanwhile contacting the French to the south.

The 15th Infantry moved from its assembly area in the vicinity of Apt by motor to another in the vicinity of Carpentras. At 0500, August 26, the regiment advanced to the northwest with 1st Battalion on the left and 3d Battalion on the right, making no contact with the enemy.

The 30th Infantry, after moving by truck from Salon to Vaison, was given the mission of clearing out the area northwest of Vaison and south of the Aigue River. The regimental I & R platoon had occupied Valson before dark of August 25 after reconnoitering north out of Sault. The 1st Battalion trucked from Salon to an assembly area near Apt. The 2d Battalion followed the 1st, then moved by motor to Carpentras, from which point it moved to clear the area south of the Aigue River and northwest of Vaison. The 1st Battalion moved abreast, clearing between the river and the Mirabel-Vaison road.

The Ist platoon of the 3d Reconnaissance Troop contacted elements of the 36th Infantry Division in Nyons at 1350, August 25. The 2d Platoon had entered Carpentras unopposed at 1715. The 3d platoon capcured sixty-one prisoners in the vicinity of Orange at 1035, August 26. The Division was now moving into positions preparatory to launching an attack northwest toward Montelimar.The 7th Infantry advanced north along Highway 7, paralleling the Rhone, to Bourg St. Andeol, 1st and 2d Battalions abreast. At Bourg the regiment was passed through by 15th Infantry, which reached Donzere after a terrific battle at a bridge 1000 yards south' of the town. Several AT guns and a strong force of infantry with artillery support had- to be overcome at this point. The battle lasted seven hours. On the morning of the 27th the regiment continued along Highway 7 toward Montelimar. Company L encountered enemy resistance from approximately thirty enemy on the regiment's right, armed with one machine gun and some rifles, besides an antitank gun. The enemy withdrew after a short fight. The 30th Infantry finished the job of clearing south of the Aigue River, and from Vaison to Mirabel, and continued the attack on the morning of the 27th between 15th Infantry and the 36th Infantry Division. Toward noon screening reconnaissance elements encountered an enemy strongpoint in the vicinity of Grignan. The 1st Battalion, between 1400 and 1430 of the previous day, had been bombed and strafed by four planes identified as P-47s. The 2d Battalion started at 0700, August 27, reached Valreas at 0900 and continued along its zone of advance. The 3d Platoon, 3d Reconnaissance Troop, after engaging in a fight which netted eighty-five PWs, entered Bollene.

During this period one of Mauldin's characters ruefully remarked something to the effect that, "We try like hell to catch the enemy and when we catch him we try like hell to get him on the run." It was at Montelimar that the 3d Division once more caught him. By the time the brief battle was over, a considerable weight of enemy materiel and more than a thousand prisoners were prevented from making any further progress in their headlong rush backward.The 15th Infantry continued to advance north along Highway 7 on the approaches to the town. On August 27, the 1st Battalion, moving on the regimental left flank, had first encountered enemy resistance in the vincinity of Donzere. The 3d Battalion advanced on the right flank, with Company L first meeting enemy opposition. The 2d Battalion, in reserve, followed 3d Battalion.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, had moved to the 30th Infantry sector at 1915, August 27, passing through Begude-de-Mazenc en route, which placed it east of Montelimar.

The 30th Infantry on August 27 had cleared the enemy out of strongpoints and rear-guard localities along the Nyons-Montelimar road and west to Grignan. The 2d Battalion, after cleaning out Grignan, moved to Salles-en- Bois during the night. At 0800 the battalion moved out in two columns to rejoin at Rochefort, where it ran into some small-arms opposition.

A coordinated attack at 0800 found 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the right side of the road leading west into Montelimar, with 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, on the left, and 1st Battalion, 30th, echeloned to the left rear. The 3d Battalion, 7th, encountered continuous rearguard resistance, but 3d Battalion, 30th, met none until 1030, when it was fired on from the vicinity of La Batie Rollande. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, advanced behind 3d Battalion, while 2d Battalion remained in Division reserve near Grillon.

The 1st Battalion 15th Infantry drove relentlessly forward into the enemy resistance. The enemy force now trapped in the Montelimar area resorted to violent and. incessant counterattacks to break out of the cordon. The 1st Battalion drove forward and smashed every German counterattack against it, repulsing at one time the attack of an entire regiment of infantry. It pounded the enemy force with concentrations of artillery and mortar fire.

The 15th Infantry pressed its attack during the afternoon of the 28th. The 1st Battalion encircled the town and attacked with Company A from the east, Company C from the northeast, and Company B from the north. The 2d Battalion attacked from the southeast, squeezing out 3d Battalion, which then reverted to regimental reserve. The town was entered at 1430 by Company F, supported by Company G. During the afternoon and night the 1st and 2d Battalions continued to clear the town of enemy snipers, drawing enemy small-arms., sniper, and artillery fire-the last from an enemy gun located right in town. All roads leading into the city were blocked, and the area between it and the Rhone River cleared. Elements of the 3d Battalion screened to the southeast. Company C repulsed an enemy counterattack of estimated company strength from the north at 2030. The job of cleaning out Montelimar was finally completed by 1145, August 29.

During this three-day action, the 1st Battalion took 804 prisoners, killed and wounded 485 enemy, captured or destroyed at least 500 vehicles and an estimated 1000 horses. For this action the 1st Battalion was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation.

The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, had. continued its attack along the south side of the east-west road into Montelimar. At 1255, August 28, the battalion moved southwest through Portes-en-Valdane, then proceeded to La Touche, where it engaged the enemy in a firefight at Hill 304. Here, forty-one prisoners were taken after a fifteen to twenty minute fight. At 1255 3d Battalion was located on the outskirts of Puygeron and 2d Battalion was advancing toward Rochefort, which was entered by Company G by 1415.

The 7th Infantry continued attacking west and northwest, and entered Montelimar shortly before noon, August 29, as well as contacting elements of the 36th Division and occupying the important hill mass generally northeast of the town. The 3d Battalion was the unit which took La Batie Rollande; the 2d Battalion moved during the night of August 28-29 to Cardineau from which it launched its attack to the west and northwest at 0600.

The small river east of Montelimar was crossed during the morning of August 29 by 3d and 1st Battalions, 7th Infantry, and 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry.

Following clearance of the town itself, 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments took up the advance north along Highway 7, with 30th Infantry on the right.

Attacking on the left of the Division zone, 7th Infantry assaulted north along Highway 7 and the high ground to the immediate east of the highway. There was no organized resistance, but 2d Battalion met considerable sniper fire while clearing the hills, and Flakwagon, mortar, and small-arms fire from a column of enemy vehicles which was halted along the road. The 2d Battalion relieved 3d Battalion, 143d Infantry on high ground north of the town at 1300, August 29. At the same time 3d Battalion was moving north of the 2d, with 1st Battalion following to the right rear.A Division Artillery forward observer with 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, Ist Lt. Robert W. Metz, first spotted a huge enemy convoy moving up Highway 7 north of Montelimar. What he saw made him call for all the artillery that could be brought to bear. This was practically all of the Division's organic gunfire, plus gunsof the attached 69th Armored FA Battalion. The 2d Battalion observed fire on the enemy convoy; then directed additional artillery fire on a train pulling a railroad gun, stopping the train and wrecking three or four boxcars. 2d Battalion occupied the west slope of a ridge; 3d Battalion was in position directly south, and Ist Battalion put a platoon on a hill to the east to prevent enemy from infiltrating to the rear of the regiment's leading elements.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, then started to move to the right of 2d Battalion, with its objective to cut the enemy column. This move commenced at 1700, and the battalion advanced without opposition to be on its objective by 2100. The 1st and 2d Battalions contacted each other on the highway at 0330, August 30, and at 0600 continued the attack to the north with 1st Battalion on the right and 2d Battalion on the left. All objectives were reached at 1130.

The 30th Infantry, meanwhile, had advanced abreast of 7th Infantry, over the hills north to make contact with elements of the 36th Infantry Division. Task Force Butler (Elements of VI Corps) was contacted at 1130, August 29. Then, under orders to send a battalion to protect the left flank of the 7th Infantry from infiltration, 2d Battalion was moved by motor from Sauzet to Marsanne, then advanced by foot and was on its objective before dawn of August 30. Before noon Company G had occupied Mirmande.

In 7th Infantry's initial advance the enemy, under the mistaken impression that the road had been cut north of Montelimar by the 36th Infantry Division, surrendered in large numbers, although many of them organized small pockets which had to be cleaned out.

Outstanding feature about the area north of Montelimar, however, was the enemy motor convoy. It stretched from the northern outskirts of town for approximately 14 kilometers. It was composed of all sorts of vehicles, from German heavy cargo trucks to numerous requisitioned French sedans-about 2000 vehicles in all. For the most part traffic had been double- banked in some places triple-banked-with vehicles facing both north and south.

The drivers and personnel had, for the most part, abandoned their vehicles and made for the Rhone River.

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