Dense clouds hang between the mountains of the lower Vosges. The roads glisten with "Drain and the wind sweeps cold over the plains. The soldiers who bathed for a long time in the warming sun of the Riviera coast freeze in the unaccustomed climate. The shelter halves over their shoulders are wet because they had no chance to dry them out at any of the roadside farmhouses. There has hardly been a pause during the arduous march of the last two or three weeks, during those disengaging movements which brought so much grief in its various phases.

"Now the Army which used to stand guard in the sunny south, many hundreds of miles away, stands at the frontier of the Reich and the thunder of the guns already echoes in the peaceful dales and the villages beyond.

"The conversation of the soldiers these days centers around the question: 'When shall we hold a definite line again?' They talk about it frankly without false hopes, without defeatism, with the clear perception and the straight opinion of soldiers who see things as they are and will not be influenced by the black prophets who are present in any situation, who form their own honest opinions which it is their right to do. For whoever has experienced the ordeal of the withdrawal through the Rhone Valley, the withdrawal which often turned into a veritable hell, has proved that he knows no fear and no despair…

Those words were written by the enemy

The 3d Infantry Division, without perceptible pause, found itself in its second winter campaign. There seemed to be no dividing line. One week we were racing through Southern and Central France in the middle of a temperate Autumn; the next, fighting in difficult, wooded terrain in rain and cold. The local inhabitants, as local inhabitants will the world over, said, "This is very unusual weather for this time of year," whatever that means.

During September enemy action passed through three definite phases. First phase was his rapid withdrawal, leaving only small, disorganized forces to attempt delaying action. As this phase reached its climax he turned and attempted the stand at Besanqon. Our troops attacked Besanqon September 6, and two days later all enemy resistance in the city ceased.

From Besanqon to the Moselle River the enemy put up definite resistance, although in the main it was delaying action, and each day's, fighting usually ended with the enemy's falling back to prepared positions in the rear. There was a gradual build-up of enemy artillery during this phase. The first counterattack was launched September 15 at Longevelle, east of Lure. As the enemy fell back toward the Moselle River his daily withdrawals became shorter and his positions gave an indication of considerable work prior to occupation. As artillery fire increased, so did the employment of mines, boobytraps and log roadblocks.

The Division was about to enter this final phase, which was to prevail until the crossing of the Meurthe River. On the high ground east of the Moselle River the enemy finally occupied a definite line of resistance, ceased his withdrawals and held on tenaciously, counterattacking when overrun. He resorted to jungle tactics in the heavily- wooded terrain between the Moselle and Mosellette Rivers and frequently infiltrated behind our lines, ambushing supply trains. When the Moselle River line was taken, the enemy occupied a second, definite, well- organized position northeast of St. Ame' and in the vicinity of Cleurie. Here the enemy resisted fiercely, counterattacking and infiltrating to retake ground lost to our attacks and bringing in both reinforcements and replacements.

The granite massif of the Vosges rises steeply from the Plain of Alsace, lies northeast-southwest, and blocks easy entrance to the Rhine Valley from the west. The Vosges consist of low, generally rounded mountains from 1000 to 4000 feet in height, arranged in parallel ridges which individually tend more to the northeast than does the range as a whole.

This is an area of forested mountains forming the southern part of the Vosges chain which lies along the Franco-German frontier and reaches from Belfort in the south to Kaiserslautern in the north. The Saverne. Gap divides the High Vosges from its northern extension, the Low Vosges. To the south, the High Vosges terminate abruptly in a series of summits towering above the Belfort Gap.

Average height of the Vosges eastern ridge line is about 3000 feet, but many summits rise about 4000 feet, with elevation increasing southward where the highest point is the Grand Ballon (over 4600), lying northeast of Belfort. The Hohneck, the highest point on the main watershed, rises 4400 feet just north of Grand Ballon. The long ridge lines are usually flat topped, fairly level, and carry stretches of moor, coarse pasture, and peat bog, as well as large amounts of rock debris. Many granite tors rise above the level surface. The ground drops sharply to the east but slopes more gradually to the west, falling in a series of plateaus toward the Lorraine Plain.

A feature of the Vosges is its number of valleys. Main valleys stand at right angles to the main ridges and tend to lie northwest on the western side and east or east- northeast on the eastern side. Tributary valleys parallel the ridges, lead far into the range, and terminate in a series of headstreams on the slopes of the main ridges. Valley bottoms within the Vosges itself are sometimes poorly drained and long narrow lakes and swampland areas often result.

In autumn, the evergreens are in sharp contrast with the changing colors of the deciduous trees and the yellow and brown of the stubble fields.

In winter, the reds of the sandstone rocks and some of the granite become more noticeable after the forest leaves have fallen. Forests remain green at higher levels, but on the lower slopes browns and russets predominate.

The road net in the Vosges is somewhat constricted by terrain. Main routes often bottleneck in narrow village streets. Sharp turns and steep gradients are common in the Vosges and very winding roads are found in the lake areas near Belfort. Secondary and local roads tend to be narrow and sometimes muddy. In wet weather, they are generally unsuited to military traffic. They are often bordered by ditches or embankments and the crown on old cobbled roads is often so great that vehicles are required to travel at reduced speeds.

Above moderate heights, winters, particularly in the Vosges, may be long and hard, with drastic and sudden changes in temperatures. At all seasons bad weather is more persistent over the mountains than in areas 300-400 miles north because there is a decided tendency for "fronts" to slow up as they approach the Alps barrier; frequently a "front" becomes stationary along the line of the Alps, creating a broad belt of rain and cloud over the foothills which lasts for a day or two.

The 3d Infantry Division was on the western foothill approaches to the Vosges Mountains when Vesoul fell on September 12.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, which was one element of the forces which took the town, did not pause but continued through, and by 1645 September 12 was on Hill 349, a dominating feature northeast of the town in the direction of Velleminfroy. Movement of the Division at this time was pivoting to the northeast on 30th Infantry, the hub of which was generally at the town of Vallerois le Bois.

Shortly after noon September 12, Ist Battalion, 15th Infantry, moved to Hill 360, with two companies occupying the position at 1325. Company A, leading, encountered enemy machine-gun and small-arms fire at 1446, but outflanked the enemy and was near Quincy at 1640 with roadblocks to the southeast, northeast and northwest. At 1720 1st Battalion was prepared to continue the advance to the north, and at 1930 moved out, shortly to encounter small-arms fire. The 1st Battalion continued to advance during the night and at 0345 reported the town of Calmoultier clear of enemy.

The 30th Infantry, which attacked initially in a north and northeast direction on the Division's right flank, later moved to the southeast toward Esprels, maintaining contact with the 45th Infantry Division. Shortly after noon of September 12, 3d Battalion captured thirty-six enlisted enemy soldiers and one officer, obtaining information on other enemy locations that aided in a successful advance. During the afternoon of September 12, 1st Battalion went to Dampierre, flanked to the left, then began a movement to the southeast against Hill 309. Late in the night of September 12-13, 1st Battalion began encountering enemy opposition, plus log barriers placed at intervals of twenty-five yards along the road to slow 1st Battalion's armor. Despite this, the advance continued.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, moved from Hill 349, which it had captured previously, and continued to advance against scattered enemy opposition through Comberjon to Moncey. Moncey was cleared at 0645 September 13 and the battalion moved on through Colombotte toward Velleminfroy, toward noon meeting about a platoon of enemy armed with small arms and machine guns.

During the same period the 7th Infantry, in the center of the Division sector, occupied high ground past Noroy- le-Bourg, which it cleaned out en route. The 3d Battalion performed this task during the night of September 12-13, taking 100 to 150 prisoners and killing and wounding an unknown number. At 1830 2d Battalion had been ordered into Division reserve, and Ist and 3d Battalion had advanced toward Hill 452 past Noroy-le-Bourg. By 2030 the 1st Battalion had captured the hill, with 3d Battalion almost directly to the north. At 1000 September 13, 3d Battalion attacked toward Hill 410 and Montjustin. Company C attacked from Hill 459 at 1030 and pushed toward Hill 430. There was scattered, unorganized small- arms and machine-gun fire in opposition to the morning attacks of Ist and 3d Battalions.

The enemy was driven out of Maras and Melmay by patrols from 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, while the bulk of the battalion was still three or four kilometers short of Esprels on September 13.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, attacked Presle and by 2115 September 12 was in the corner of the woods near Trevey. At 2300 2d Battalion began its move toward Presle and at 2400 Company F entered the town, with Company E generally to the northeast and Company G to the southeast. There was little resistance at the town, but there were indications that the enemy had just pulled out. Companies F and G remamied in Presle while Company E blocked to the northeast until 0700, when the battalion moved out toward Vallerois-le-Bois. The 3d Battalion's Company 1, which had been on a flank- protection mission at Thieffrans, was relieved by a company of the 180th Infantry and at 0850 attacked to the northeast toward Montbozon. The remainder of the 3d Battalion prepared for an attack on Mt. Jesus, moving in from the west.

During the foregoing period, 1st Platoon, Company B, 601st TD Battalion, scored a notable success by catching a column of enemy foot troops and killing seventyfive to a hundred enemy.

During the afternoon of September 13 the entire Division advance continued against strong enemy opposition, but the Division occupied all immediate objectives before dark. The 3d Battalion 7th Infantry, sent one company on to Hill 410 while the remainder of the battalion moved to the east flank. The 1st Battalion advanced through Cerre-les-Noroy and started up the slopes of Hill 430. The 2d Battalion was released from Division control at 1445 and returned to regimental control. The 3d Battalion's remaining two rifle comparties moved southeast to Autrey-les-Cerre. The 1st Battalion encountered considerable opposition and at 1915 some enemy still held on Hill 430. The 3d Battalion, meanwhile continued pushing until its leading company ran into heavy artillery, small-arms and mortar fire. The 2d Battalion rested during the latter part of darkness and resumed its advance at 0400, toward Borey and Arpenans. The battalion moved against light opposition. The Ist and 3d Battalions moved out at 0830 and by noon 3d Battalion had occupied Montjustin without making contact with the enemy and was sending a company toward Arpenans. The 1st Battalion moved ahead steadily on 3d Battalion's flank.

Company A, 15th Infantry, occupied Lievans during the evening of September 13 and one platoon was left in the town until relieved by the 7th Infantry. On the morning of September 14 Company B, followed by Company A, moved to Mollans without resistance. Company C moved northwest toward Pomoy and Company B moved toward Genevreuville toward noon September 14. The 2d Battalion, Companies F and G leading, entered Velleminfroy at 0920, September 14 and upon occupation of the town went into regimental reserve.

The 3d Battalion's Company L occupied Hill 289 and on the morning of September 14 followed Company I into reserve. Company K attacked Saulx-de-Vesoul, meeting enemy small-arms and machine-gun fire, but had the town cleared at 1855 September 13. Elements Of the 141st Infantry relieved Company K, which then moved to Creveny and Chateney. Toward noon Company K was advancing toward Colombe-le-Bithaine. Company I moved from Chatenois and occupied La Creuse at 0945 September 14 against practically no resistance. Toward noon 3d Battalion was continuing the advance toward Adelans.

The Ist and 2d Battalions, 30th Infantry, began their attack at 1530 September 13, 1st Battalion located about 1000 yards beyond Esprels and 2d Battalion on the left (northeast) flank. The 3d Battalion moved up to Les Patey. Both battalions advanced against small-arms fire. The 3d Battalion sent a platoon to Autrey-le-Vay in conjunction with a platoon from the 45th Division to protect the sector between divisions. At 0630 September 14, 2d Battalion, from its position reached the night before, resumed its attack due east toward Oppenans and advanced without meeting enemy resistance. 1st Battalion fired interdictory machine-gun fire into Marast during the night, and on the morning of September 14 moved into the town against no opposition.

During September 14-15 the Division continued its steady pace toward Lure, swinging to the north and east against enemy resistance that became increasingly stronger during the afternoon of September 14 and which continued strong. The 15th Infantry, on the Division left flank, occupied Pomoy, Genevreuille and Mollans against strong resistance and moved toward Lure from the northwest. The 7th Infantry had contact with the enemy throughout the period, receiving small-arms, machine-gun, and mortar and artillery fire as it advanced to Arpenans, Les Aynans, and headed toward Vy-les-Lure.

Company C, 15th Infantry, entered Pomoy at 1200 September 14, then moved on toward Genevreuille. At 1315 a patrol encountered enemy artillery, mortar, machine-gun and small-arms fire, but the company continued its advance against well-prepared enemy positions and dug-in enemy and at 1830 reached the outskirts of Genevreuille in spite of heavy casualties. The company was pulled back from the town and an artillery barrage laid down. Company B was relieved at Mollans by a company from 30th Infantry at 2245 and moved to rejoin the battalion at Pomoy.

At 1245 3d Battalion was located at Colombe-le- Bithaine, from where it moved to Danbenoit. Company K occupied Citers and patrolled to Quers.

Company A, 30th Infantry, entered the town of Aillevans at 1310 against no opposition, then moved to the east, Company B moving to the northeast. Company A crossed L'Oignan River and reached Hill 324 at 1600. Company C cleared the town of Longeville after overcoming considerable sniper fire. Patrols were sent north of Longeville and to the northeast up to 1000 yards, making negligible contact.

At 2125 the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, was ordered to move to Bithaine and to send a reinforced company to Hill 412. Company F reached the hill at 0925 September 15.

After continuous fighting over September 14 and during the night, Ist and 2d Battalions, 7th Infantry, continued to advance on the morning of September 15. At 0840 2d Battalion was in contact at Les Aynans, our troops on the west side of L'Oignan River, the enemy on the other side. The Ist Battalion by noon had sent patrols toward Vy-les- Lure, ready to attack the town from the northwest.

The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, assembled during the morning in the vicinity of Citers. Company K attacked Quers in the face of considerable enemy fire and occupied the town by 1750 that evening. Remainder of the battalion moved toward Lure from the northwest. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, moved on Genevreuille and at 1210 Company B entered against little opposition. The battalion continued toward Amblans, which was occupied in the face of moderate resistance.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, was assembled at Aillevans. At 0115 September 15 the battalion moved by truck to Lievans, closing in at 0345.

The 3d Battalion moved from Les Patey to Mollans, its last company closing in at 0200, and remained in regimental reserve. The 2d Battalion was in Division reserve.

The Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, entered La Grange du Veau shortly after noon, September 15 and prepared a defensive position around the town. Strong enemy harassing fire was received, and at 2015 the battalion launched an attack toward high ground to the east. Enemy resistance was strong and the Germans had to be routed from their holes with bayonets and grenades. The battalion dug in for the night about halfway between La Grange du Veau and its objective.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, secured two bridges near Les Aynans at 1310. One platoon of Company E, assisted by fire from Company G, attacked Hill 383. Patrols were sent into Gouchenans during the night and reported enemy in the town, which Company G took the next morning.

At 1410 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, attacked Vy-les- Lure and at 1500 Company L was almost in the outskirts with Company I on its right flank. Determined enemy resistance, supported by considerable machinegun, artillery and mortar fire prevented I and K companies from entering the town.

Company L, led by Capt. Ralph J. Yates, advanced through heavy artillery and mortar concentration, to seize a cluster of houses on the outskirts of the town. The company was swiftly surrounded by an enemy which outnumbered the men three to one. For seven hours the company beat off savage counterattacks one after another, as artillery and mortar fire scored eight direct hits on the company CP, tearing down a corner of the house and demolishing an adjacent shed.

At the cost of 37 casualties the company repulsed all counterattacks and inflicted heavy casualties-18 dead, 70 wounded-on the enemy.

At 0150 a patrol from Company K entered Vy-les- Lure and contacted elements of Company L. The 3d Battalion entered the town in strength at 0900, September 16.

For the foregoing action Company L was later awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation.

The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, resumed its attack toward the high ground. east of La Grange du Veau at 0710 and reached its objective at 0945. Toward noon the battalion was moving toward Lure.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, in its attack on Adelans during the afternoon of September 15, met considerable resistance. Patrols were sent into the town during the night and the attack was resumed the morning of September 16. The town fell before noon. Company K, 15th Infantry, moved to Francheville during this time and protected the regiment's left flank while the remainder of 3d Battalion moved toward Lure from the northwest.

The Ist Battalion, 30th Infantry, sent a patrol toward Gouchenans, which engaged approximately forty enemy in a fire fight on the afternoon of September 15. At 0015 four enemy infiltrated into Company B lines, killing one man, but losing one captured, and two killed. The other escaped. Later Company B patrols captured nine enemy who were asleep and at 0804 September 16, patrols captured six more. The 2d and 3d Battalions remained in Division and regimental reserve, respectively.

Lure was entered first by 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry shortly after noon September 16; Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, following shortly after.

The capture of Lure ended the toughest battle that the Division had had for some time and the series of coordinated attacks over a wide front that was required in the operation was an indication that the Germans were stiffening their defense.

The actual occupation of Lure was unopposed insofar as enemy infantry was concerned but considerable artillery fell in the city all day September 16, coming from positions north of the town.

At this point, the Division's right zone was taken over by the 1st French Armored Division and the 3d veered almost straight north in the direction of Faucogney.

The 15th Infantry had just moved out of Lure when the 2d Battalion was hit first by artillery fire and then by five machine guns at a strongly defended roadblock in a dense woods just northeast of the city.

Hand grenades bounced from tree to tree and the clash of bayonets rang through the forests as the two forces met in this eerie setting, shrouded in pitch darkness. Maj. John O'Connell's men never fought more savagely as the enemy fell, one by one, in individual fights. The Germans retreated after about an hour and the battalion moved on toward St. Germain shortly before midnight.

The 30th moved generally in the same direction as the 15th but the advance was slowed by an increasing number of mines along the roads. The 1st Battalion attacked and occupied the villages of Linexert and Lantenot by noon the following day, repulsing a strong enemy counterattack in the vicinity of Lantenot.

The 7th Infantry occupied Lure and the vicinity south and east of the village, and spent the next three days in patrolling and establishing road blocks in that area.

The 1st Battalion of the 15th, attacking east from Francheville, had many fights before it finally gained the next objectives September 18, when St. Germain, Froideterre and Lemont were taken without opposition. The 2d Battalion encountered heavy resistance including Flak, mortar and artillery fire just south of Froideterre but, as in the battle for the roadblock on the previous day, the enemy was decisively defeated, after which the battalion went into regimental reserve near Lure.

The 30th, after taking Lantenot, met a strong defense when the 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Richard H. Neddersen, attempted to take Raddon, a small village about three miles west of Faucogney.

Attacking north, Company L, under Capt. Robert B. Pridgen, reached a ridge and began defensive preparations along a low, rock wall overlooking Raddon. Shortly after noon, heavy enemy tank and 20mm fire swept over the ridge and the concentration was immediately followed by an assault by some 200 frenzied, shouting Germans, many of whom yelled in English that "they wanted to die for Hitler."

Captain Pridgen, later describing the counterattack, said, "They rushed into our fire in an insane manner, as if they had been given liquor or drugs before the assault."

The right flank squad of Company L, led by Sgt. Harold 0. Messerschmidt, bore the brunt of the charge and was subjected to a hail of fire from machine guns, machine pistols, rifles and grenades. Firing his submachine gun as he went (180 rounds in all), Sergeant Messerschmidt passed from man to man, encouraging and instructing them as he went.

Sgt. Bob J. Tucker, one of the squad members, stated that Messerschmidt was struck down by automatic fire early in the battle, shot through the chest and shoulder.

"Although badly wounded, he laid burst after burst of fire on everything moving up that slope," Tucker said, continuing, "I saw him grab his tommy gun by the barrel when he ran out of ammunition and kill a kraut by crashing the stock on his head. He sure killed a lot of Germans that day."

First Lt. Glenn Shuler, who brought a squad to relieve the beleaguered men, said that Messerschmidt was fighting alone when he arrived, all other members of the squad having been killed or wounded.

"I saw the sergeant run to the rescue of a wounded comrade who was being overpowered," the Lieutenant said. "Messerschmidt got the kraut and then I saw him disappear down the slope, flailing his empty gun at another fleeing German. The sergeant's body was later found at the bottom of the hill."

Colonel Neddersen said that the Nazi group which attacked our numerically inferior force was "the most determined and fanatical that we encountered." True, these SS Panzer troops, wearing long black overcoats, gave an excellent account of themselves.

Sergeant Messerschmidt was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor posthumously.

Captain Pridgen's men fought off the enemy for several hours before they received reinforcements from Company 1, commanded by Capt. Thomas A. Dawson.

The Distinguished Unit Citation which was later awarded to Company L for its gallant stand stated: "For six hours, the heavily outnumbered company fought on without respite, repulsing the German assault forces time and again with heavy loss despite the enemy's immense superiority in firepower. . . . When the last wave of counterattack was rolled back, the men of Company L, their ammunition almost entirely expended, their ranks reduced by casualties and their situation apparently hopeless, prepared to assault and break through the German lines, although they had but four rifle squads with which to do it. But the enemy had already withdrawn, battered and beaten, abandonMg his broken line to attempt a new stand at the Moselle."

By 2000, the enemy counterattacking force, which comprised Flakwagons, armor, an antitank gun and several bazooka teams in addition to the large infantry group, was driven from the slopes and at daylight of September 18 Company K, commanded by Capt. M. B. Etheredge, Jr., moved into Raddon, which the badlymauled Germans elected not to defend.

The retreating enemy fell back rapidly after the fight at Raddon and the next two days were spent in setting up a series of roadblocks in the Division zone and in maintaining vigorous patrols.

The 3d was now only a short distance from the headwaters of the Moselle River, which rises on the north face of Ballon d'Alsace. The Moselle is the most important river in this area and it captures all other streams in the vicinity as it courses northeast toward the Lorraine Plain.

While awaiting relief by French units, the Division on September 20 launched an early morning attack northeast toward the Moselle, guided along the main road out of Faucogney, which the Germans had deserted in their flight.

The route of advance was through a semi-valley edged on both sides by hills which the enemy employed to good advantage in slowing our movement. Snipers, defended roadblocks, concealed machine guns, and mortars lined the route.

With the 7th Infantry on the left, the 30th on the right and two battalions of the 15th in reserve, the Division moved steadily forward, overcoming continuous resistance from the hills.

Company I of the 30th felt the brunt of a counterattack in the vicinity of Melay, where the 3d Reconnaissance Troop, commanded by 1st Lt. Allen R. Kenyon, also suffered heavily when it ran into a minefield just as the enemy opened fire on the troop from a hill near Melay. Company I withdrew and our artillery then laid a terrific concentration on the area.

During the period September 20-26, the 30th Infantry engaged in some of the most bitter and exhausting fighting in its entire history and contributed materially to the 3d Division's outstanding role in the Seventh Army's flanking attack on the Belfort gap.

Jumping off in the attack to the northeast at 0630 September 20, the 2d Battalion, in fog and rain, moved forward with Company F in the lead, followed by Company E, with G Company in reserve. Objective was the village of Voleaux, eight miles distant and north of Faucogney. Route of the battalion led through a valley with rugged wooded high ground on either side. At 1145 elements of the enemy defense system outside the village began a harassing action and by 1400 had built up sufficient resistance ' using small arms, machine guns, and mortars, to force the battalion to deploy and bring up artillery and mortars to soften enemy positions preliminary to frontal assault.

As Company E attacked under this fire it almost reached the ridge, only to be forced back by a violent counterattack. Company F launched an attack directly up the south slope of the high ground but was cut in half by a German thrust from the flanks and forced to pull back. At 1600 G Company, in reserve, was sent one mile to the north, across a waist-deep stream, through heavily wooded, mountainous country to a point 500 yards southeast of the objective to prepare for an attack early in the morning.

At 0700, September 21, Company G attacked forward, northeast along the ridge, meeting intense opposition, including much close-range grenade fighting, but the company succeeded in capturing its objective.

Bitterly. counterattacked without rest the company and a reinforcing platoon from Company F beat off no less than nine counterattacks in as many hours in one period. Numerous counterattacks were launched by fanatical Nazis who yelled allegiance to Hitler as they attacked.

Relief reached the company late September 21 when Company E finally broke through the enemy. positions which had been established across the rear of Company G. In the bitter action the Germans lost an estimated 140 men killed or wounded and twelve as prisoners. Company G lost twenty-nine killed, wounded and missing. For this action Company G received the Distinguished Unit Citation.

Throughout the September 20-21 period, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 30th Infantry, were engaged in bitter fighting with the enemy in the vicinity of Melay and La Mer. Mined roads prevented extensive use of armor, and heavy mortar and artillery fire caused numerous casualties. Heavy rains made the poor road net impassable.

The advance of the 7th, which was generally north, met only harassing fire as it moved forward to occupy Hill 753 after silencing several machine guns on the hill, which overlooked the Moselle River.

Turning its attack to the southeast, the Division advanced steadily against decreasing opposition, then turned sharply northeast. This sudden shift took the Germans by surprise and the badly disorganized enemy abandoned trucks, field pieces and other material as they broke and fled by whatever transportation they could jump onto, and by foot, across the bridge at Ruptsur- Moselle.

The bridge had been prepared for demolition with nineteen cases of TNT but the 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Jesse F. Thomas, struck so quickly that the baffled Germans who remained to fight were killed or captured and the others retreated across the river. Company B, under 1st Lt. William K. Dieleman, effected the bridge capture and repulsed numerous attempts of the enemy to infiltrate back to detonate the explosives during the night. The company also beat off several efforts to recapture the bridge and by daylight of September 24, the entire 1st Battalion had crossed the bridge and was engaging the enemy in a fire fight in Rupt-sur-Moselle, which lay just east of the Moselle.

A platoon of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, made another crossing of the river at Maxonchamp, about one mile north of Rupt-sur-Moselle, at noon. The 3d Battalion of the 15th was attached to the 7th to protect its right flank during the river-crossing operation.

Meanwhile the 1st and 3d Battalions, 30th Infantry, following relief by the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron, assembled in Faucogney the morning of September 22 and at 1200 jumped off in a coordinated attack, the 3d on the left and Ist on the right-the 2d holding the line of departure. Objective of the attack, which was straight northeast on the east side of the Faucogney-Remiremont highway, was the high ground cast of Corravillers-le- Plain.

Opposition was immediate. All roads in the rugged regimental sector were mined and blocked by trees. Fog and rain added to the difficulties. Every type of enemy fire was encountered. When the 1st Battalion reached the vicinity of Evouhey and encountered a well-prepared enemy line, the advance was halted for coordination purposes, preparatory to a renewal of the attack. The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, cleared the roads to Esmoulieres.

Throughout September 23 the advance continued, with the two assault battalions jumping off at 0645, the Ist Battalion securing Evouhey at 0717 and the 3d Battalion moving up on the left only to encounter stiff resistance from by-passed enemy positions in the 7th Infantry sector. The 3d Battalion continued its blocking mission to the right flank and cast of the regiment.

At 1400 September 24 a strongly held enemy roadblock on the main road, manned by enemy infantry, with a Flak gun in the woods behind, prevented a further advance by the 3d Battalion. When it appeared that a battalion from the 7th Infantry could not clear this area before dark, the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, bypassed the resistance, leaving K Company as a blocking force, and proceeded to clear out the enemy in its assigned sector. Company F meanwhile was attached to the battalion, abreast of the left flank positions on the Le Chene road.

At 0630, September 25, the 30th Infantry jumped off in an attack to the southeast to secure high ground overlooking Le Thillot, which was to serve as a springboard for French armor to attack that important city and continue on toward Belfort.

The 3d Battalion advanced on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right of the Corravillers-Chateau Lambert road. The 3d Battalion, whose left flank on the Moselle River was exposed to enemy fire, found the going through dense woods and over the rough terrain very slow, enemy small-arms fire being extremely persistent. Company F attacked and found the Le Cherie road almost entirely blocked by fallen trees and heavily mined. By 1620, however, the company had reached the outskirts of Le Cherie.

The Ist Battalion, although making no contact initially, ran into well-defended positions at 1305, with mortar, self- propelled artillery and Flak guns composing the opposition. The assault companies forced their way slowly through pouring rain, dense woods, and numerous roadblocks, with visibility very low, to reach the final objective at 1910. The battalion barely missed capturing an enemy divisional commander, but took a German battalion command post with telephones intact which was in communication with the German division command post. More than 150 prisoners, including three officers, were taken in this outstanding action.

At 1845 Company L was sent to assist Company F in the attack on Le Chene, which had proved in early efforts to be too large a job for one company.

The 3d Battalion, having continued throughout the night of September 25-26, reached its objective at 0930 September 26, after killing, wounding, or capturing fifty- two more enemy soldiers.

On the same day 2d Battalion, less Company G, captured Le Chene after a 40-minute fight, taking twenty more prisoners.

That afternoon the 30th Infantry was relieved by French troops and closed in assembly areas at La Longine and Corravillers. During the afternoon of September 27 the regiment moved by motor to Remiremont and spent the following day in preparation for the attack toward Le Tholy.

Rupt-sur-Moselle was cleared of all resistance by noon September 25 and Hill 867 which rose directly behind the village and served as a vantage point from which the enemy fired on traffic crossing the bridge, was occupied. The high ground east of Maxonchamp likewise served the enemy well until it was cleared by the 7th, which had expanded its area by fanning out north to Dommartin and south to La Roche.

The 15th Infantry, meanwhile, had moved out from positions in the vicinity of Remiremont and attacked northeast from St. Ame'. with the 7th Infantry protecting its right flank south of the Moselette, from a high wooded area containing many enemy gun positions.

With nature as the greatest obstacle to progress, the 15th moved steadily forward after the attack began early September 27 but on the next day the enemy, in well dug- in and previously prepared positions between Le Syndicat and Cremanvillers, put up a terrific fight.

Two night counterattacks, coupled with constant infiltrations after dark, taxed the 15th's strength to the utmost and on September 28 the 30th joined in the attack, going into position between the 15th and the 36th Infantry Division on the 3d's left flank.

The 7th continued to clean out the Germans between the Moselle and Mosellette Rivers and occupied Ferdrupt, east of the Moselle and a little north of Le Thillot, shortly after noon.

It was at Ferdrupt that Company F of the 7th Infantry particularly distinished itself. For six consecutive days it had advanced in chilling rain up the precipitous slopes of a 2,500-foot hill mass against determined opposition to seize its objective. Fighting at hand-to-hand range raged for days in the densely wooded terrain. German infiltration attempts through the wooded area and enemy counterattacks were repulsed time and time again. Having secured the top of the hill mass the weary, thinned-out ranks of the company continued to drive off German attacking forces to hold the terrain feature they had so dearly won in the fog and cold. For this grim battle and victory the Distinguished Unit Citation was later awarded the doughty warriors of Company F.

The 15th Infantry approached one of its greatest battles in the Vosges (and the entire war) as it neared the Cleurie Quarry. During the afternoon of September 26 the 1st Battalion relieved elements of the 36th Infantry Division in the vicinity of St. Ame'. The enemy still held a roadblock on the bridge crossing the stream south of the town, which was covered by fire from positions a mere 300 yards from the bridge. The battalion immediately seized it and the crossroads there in the face of heavy enemy fire, just in time to prevent the enemy from detonating 250 pounds of dynamite laid to demolish the bridge. The 1st Battalion had thus secured the southern extremity of the line of departure for the following day's attack, and seized an important bridge.

The same afternoon, 2d and 3d Battalions moved into positions in preparation for the attack; 2d Battalion to an area just west of St. Ame', and 3d Battalion farther to the north.

At daylight, September 27, the 2d Battalion attacked cast through the densely wooded sector following a 15- minute artillery concentration. The battalion pushed through the gloomy, rain-soaked foothills and almost at once the leading elements drew enemy mortar fire. The first group of enemy was contacted immediately north of St. Amo and was protecting the secondary road leading north from the town, from the woods west of the road. Elements of the 2d Battalion surprised the enemy from the rear and there was a brief skirmish, during which thirty-two prisoners were captured.

The battalion continued to the northeast through small- arms, machine-gun, and mortar fire, and boobytrapped roadblocks. By 1400 it had reached the secondary road running southeast from Bemont. Resistance then slacked off and the 2d Battalion pushed rapidly to its objective on the high ground northeast of St. Ame.

The 3d Battalion, which had held back initially to support the 2d's advance with fire, attacked at midmorning toward Cleurie, from the vicinity of Putieres, and moved along the ridge to the northeast without opposition. In the afternoon the advance was punctuated by bitter hand-to-hand fighting, but the battalion battered its way to positions on the high ground south of Cleurie.

At dusk about 150 Germans launched a counterattack against Company K. This attack was preceded by a short, intense, artillery barrage, but was repulsed within three hours.

The fight for the Cleurie Quarry was in the mold. Company I attacked all night and secured Bemont. Company G continued toward Cremanvillers, held up in the woods, and sent patrols to the town. At 0230 the enemy hit Company G with a heavy counterattack, which was beaten off. Daylight found the company again heavily engaged just northeast of Cremanvillers. Company C was attached to the 2d Battalion to aid G Company, and pushed east from St. Ame', where it was counterattacked by the enemy in the wooded areas.

The enemy was now completely aroused. He struck again at K Company and again was beaten off. The constant, driving rains, the fog and mist, cut visibility almost to the zero point and the Germans used this to advantage to move between our elements in attempts to disorganize our lines and demoralize the men.

Company F, moving south from the 2d Battalion hill position toward G, again was heavily attacked, and fought throughout the day. Other enemy groups pushed through the gaps between the companies of the 2d and 3d Battalions, one group even penetrating almost to the 3d Battalion command post.

By dawn, September 28, the entire effective strength of the 15th Infantry was committed. Elements of the Ist Battalion were pushing toward Cremanvillers and Bemont to assist the other two battalions, moving out to attack north through the woods in the zone east of the road leading north out of St. Ame'. As the 1st moved north into the clearing east of Bemont, it drew heavy fire of all descriptions from the woods to the east, and consequently it attacked northeast through the woods to outflank the enemy positions from which the fire was coming. 1st Battalion remained heavily engaged throughout the day.

Enemy tanks were encountered for the first time in several days. One moved south almost to Bemont, where it was beaten off by artillery. Two others fired on the houses east of Bemont.

Ration details were forced to run a gantlet of roving enemy tanks and snipers while hand-carrying their heavy loads up slippery, wet slopes. Even litter teams were not exempt. Many a wounded doughboy had to be carried through small-arms and mortar fire.

The ferocious fighting continued throughout the day and through the night of September 28-29. In the early morning hours five enemy tanks moved in to shoot up F Company positions in a group of houses, and before the armor could be turned away with artillery the company had become badly scattered, the Commanding Officer and much of company headquarters either killed, wounded, or captured. Only seventy men could be accounted for by the time the attack was beaten off.

Company E was counterattacked and forced to fight for four hours to hold its positions. The attack was finally broken.

Company L, fighting south toward K Company, was hit by 250 enemy and engaged in a furious battle to hold its hill. Two platoons of the company were split and scattered and it was daylight before about seventy or eighty men could be rounded up, organized and moved up to the original hill positions.

The 1st Battalion continued its drive as the remainder of the regiment cleaned out the enemy who had infiltrated everywhere into the regimental sector. Company I was attached to the battalion. From the area east of Bemont the 1st drove up the main road, against small-arms and mortar fire. Our artillery raked enemy strongpoints near Cleurie and in the buildings south of town. The battalion made good progress and turned east along the edge of the woods. Late September 29, the forward elements were hit with fire from about forty enemy who were lodged in the vicinity of Cleurie Quarry. It was then that the great battle began.

Company B held up-then pushed on. A few hours later the enemy launched a light counterattack. At midnight, a full-force counterattack hit the tired company. Capt. Paul Harris and his men groped their way toward the top of "Great Rock," to reach the crest and hole up, but under the thick night fog the enemy once more slammed back. Closing in, feeling their way along like blind men, the enemy approached behind a heavy artillery preparation to within fifty yards. Slinging potato-masher grenades and blasting away with machine pistols, he hit B Company's right flank. Fanatical young Nazis pressed the attack for five hours. The attack mounted in fury. Then, just before the dawn of September 30, the enemy withdrew. Although the right flank platoon of B Company, which had borne the brunt of the savage battle, had been forced to pull back, the bulk of the company was still holding firm.

In the remainder of the 15th Infantry zone, the constant attempts at infiltration had continued. One group of enemy had probed its way between G and C Companies; another counterattacked E Company, and still another struck at G Company twice during the day, and the night of September 29-30. All attempts finally were repulsed with the help of prepared concentrations from mortar batteries and the regimental Cannon Company. But the battle was not yet over.

On September 29 the 30th Infantry assumed offensive action, with the objective of seizing Hill 78t, highground overlooking Le Tholy. The 3d Battalion led the attack, crossing the line of departure at 0700 and continuing without resistance until 0835, when strong resistance in the form of small-arms and artillery fire was met from well-defended all-around positions, which blocked maneuvering elements at every point. The 2d Battalion, following to the right rear, found it could not pass through 3d Battalion without becoming engaged in a fire fight, and 1st Battalion was then committed. The 2d Battalion became the reserve battalion and established roadblocks.

Company A relieved Company K, 15th Infantry. Later A Company was relieved by E Company. It took part in a cross-country march with 1st Battalion which began at 1500 September 29 and continued until 0020 September 30, when the entire battalion relieved 3d Battalion, 141st Infantry (36th Division).

At 0715 that morning, 1st Battalion jumped off in the attack again, and began receiving heavy fire at 0810, initially from machine guns, mortars, and small arms, but which was intensified with the addition of heavy artillery concentrations at 0945. Severe casualties, numbering up to 150, were received. Company B, under 1st Lt. Lysle Standish, attempted to maneuver and flank enemy positions, and was met with heavy automatic-weapons fire, which slowed the advance. The 3d Battalion resumed its attack at 0915, September 30, but strongly- entrenched enemy in commanding positions held up the advance. Another attack at 1815 secured a line and gained strategic ground, while the 2d Battalion remained in regimental reserve.

As the month of September closed, the Division was embroiled in heavy fighting. Enemy counterattacks were characterized by a ferocity hitherto encountered only in Italy the previous winter. Increased artillery fire from 75s, 88s, and 105s was evidence that the German commander had received reinforcements in this all-important branch as October came and actual winter began to set in.

The Division was well into the first phase of October, with the three regiments battling for important ground in its over-all attack northeast toward Le Tholy in conjunction with the move east to overrun Vagney and Sapois. The second phase was to come following the capture of these important centers, and consisted of an attack through elements of the 45th Infantry Division that carried across the Mortagne River and to the high ground overlooking the important enemy communications center of St. Die. The latter attack was to begin at noon, October 20, and result in a breakthrough of the enemy's strong defensive line based on the Mortagne River. But much fighting remained before this could be achieved.

By September 30 the 7th Infantry had taken Ferdrupt and was pushing on toward Vagney to come up on the 15th Infantry's right flank. While the remainder of the 15th was forced to halt and clean out its zone of infiltrating Germans, the 1st Battalion continued to batter away against the quarry positions.

The quarry was a major thorn in our side and had to be cleaned out, although it was proving a tough obstacle. It controlled the main route of advance, the Le TholyGerardmer road which itself had to be cleared before the Division could continue on the over-all mission of penetrating the Vosges proper. The quarry was the anchor-point of the enemy main line defending the important St. Ame' hill mass, and the largest hill in the area which controlled the entire situation all the way back to Remiremont.

There were several reasons for the difficult mission that the quarry proved to be. First, it was situated on the slopes of the large, thickly-wooded hill mass. The only approaches to it were up the steep, almost clifflike sides of this mountain. On the north and south sides of, the quarry were steep cliffs covered by machine guns. In order to gain entrance to the interior, our men had to charge up the sides in the face of furious fire. East and west ends were blocked by huge, stonewall roadblocks constructed by the Germans. The steep cliffs on either side made it impossible to by-pass these, and thus the only way left open was to go over the top of them which again, was covered by terrific concentrations of small- arms fire.

The quarry was honeycombed with passageways, tunnels and walls, rendering the defenders virtually safe from mortar fire. Another difficulty was that it was impossible for us to use artillery after the companies had closed in around the position, since our guns in position in the flat lands near St. Ame' had to fire over the top of the hill mass, and with our troops so close to the enemy, tree bursts often fell within our own lines.

As October came, prisoners reported that there were two companies, approximately 100 men each in strength, with orders to fight to the death for the position. The regimental plan now was to coordinate with the drive of the 30th Infantry in a house-to-house push down the valley toward Gerardmer, the VI Corps objective, where the enemy was known to be entrenched in strength.

All three battalions of the 30th Infantry during the period October 1-8 continued an unrelenting pressure toward the northeast. On October I the 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, resumed its attack at 0700, and the 1st Battalion jumped off at 0800. The 2d Battalion patrolled into the valley, encountering and charting minefields, and taking and occupying fifteen houses. Despite enemy artillery concentrations and counterattacks the Ist and 3d Battalions continued to advance.

On October 2, the 2d Battalion was moved by motor to the extreme left of the regimental sector, behind Hill 769, to outflank enemy positions on the high ground and open the route across the Tendon-Le Tholy highway to the high ground beyond. The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, continued a yard-by-yard advance against well dug-in and held enemy positions, sustaining heavy casualties and overrunning one enemy mortar platoon. The battalion also captured four mortars, two antitank guns, two Flak guns, and fifteen soldiers plus an artillery observer. Throughout the day the 2d Battalion continued the slow advance through heavily mined areas, and was relieved by 15th Infantry and 10th Engineer Battalion elements at 2010, following which the battalion entrucked and moved to an assembly area, prepared to attack on October 3.

In the 15th zone, virtual stalemate had set in by the morning of October 2. In some places the lines were barely seventy-five yards apart. It was jungle warfare, with thick nests of enemy snipers and infiltrating German parties. At the mouth of the quarry the enemy now had constructed a rock wall squarely across both entrances, then covered them with fire from positions in the rock piles. During the night of October 2-3, Companies C and I were returned to their battalions, and took up positions in their respective zones.

The all-out drive got underway October 3. At first light two tank destroyers and two tanks mounting 105mm assault guns were moved into position across the valley from the quarry, from where they pumped 500 rounds of high explosive into the tunnels and main part of the quarry. At the same time, 1st Battalion mortars laid in a terrific concentration. When the fire lifted, patrols from all three rifle companies of the 1st Battalion ranged out to probe the quarry. Opposition still remained, and brisk fighting raged throughout the day. Company B patrols were hit by an enemy machine gun immediately in front of its lines short of the quarry, and captured a sniper. Other prisoners indicated that a complete company of sharpshooters, eighty men strong, had been brought into the area, each man carrying a rifle equipped with telescopic sight. One squad of marksmen was attached to each regular rifle platoon of the 601st Schnelle Battalion, defending the quarry, for employment as snipers.

Contact with the enemy was constant throughout the day. Plans to launch the cleanup attack the following day were made. While on his way to an observation post, Col. Richard G. Thomas, regimental commander, was stricken with a heart attack, and command of the 15th Infantry passed to Regimental Executive Lt. Col. Hallett D. Edson. In the 3d Battalion, Lt. Col. Frederick Boye, commanding, left for the United States on temporary duty and his executive officer, Maj. Russell Comrie, replaced him.

At 0530, October 4, the 3d Battalion launched an outflanking attack. In conjunction with the 30th Infantry, the battalion drove northeast down the valley from positions just northwest of L'Omet, and sent Company I around west of the quarry to cut the road. The other two battalions remained in blocking positions.

Despite the fact that the enemy had poured strong reinforcements into the quarry and prepared for a bitter stand, Company I surprised the first positions short of the quarry and the enemy here withdrew.

Behind the supporting fire of three battalions of artillery, the 3d Battalion drove on. In less than two hours L Company had destroyed two machine guns, captured a crew of six, and driven two other machine-gun crews back. By noon Company I was halfway around the quarry on the west side and was meeting heavy sniper fire, while L Company was overrunning the houses in the valley and bringing up tanks to blast them.

All afternoon and during most of the night the fight went on. By dark I Company had cleared the enemy from the western approaches to the quarry, after bringing up tanks to blast down the stone-wall roadblock at that entrance with their guns.

The 3d Battalion had now established a line from the main road just west of Hazintray, bending around almost to the western edges of the quarry. Before midnight one platoon-sized patrol from I Company pushed into the eastern end of the quarry after men of the 10th Engineer Battalion had been committed to blast the stone wall blocking the road at that end.

The fight was at a climax and the job completed on October 5. Mortars of the 1st Battalion opened up with an 1100-round continuous creeping barrage. Then combat patrols from the battalion, plus the 3d Battalion Battle Patrol, and a platoon of Company I pushed out to destroy the last positions. By midafternoon, the Battle Patrol, under Sgt. John J. Shermetta, came up to the quarry from the west and met S/Sgt. John D. Shirley's I Company platoon coming from the east.

The quarry had now fallen after a gruelling six-day fight.

The Medal of Honor was awarded to Ist Lt. (then 2d Lt.) Victor L. Kandle for his action performed during the last days of the fight for the quarry. While leading a reconnaissance patrol in the vicinity of La Forge in enemy territory, Lieutenant Kandle engaged in a daylight duel at point-blank range with a German field officer and killed him. Having taken five enemy prisoners during the morning, he led his skeleton platoon of sixteen men, reinforced by a light machinegun squad, through fog and over precipitous mountain terrain to fall on the rear of the approach positions of the German quarry stronghold, which had checked the advance of the 1st Battalion. The citation of Lieutenant Kandle reads in part:

" . . . Rushing forward several yards ahead of his assault elements, Lieutenant Kandle forced his way into the heart of the enemy strongpoint and by his bold ness and audacity forced the Germans to surrender. Harassed by machine-gun fire from a position which he had by-passed in the dense fog, he moved to within fifteen yards of the enemy, killed a German machine gunner with accurate rifle fire, and led his men in the destruction of another machine-gun crew and its rifle security elements. Finally he led his small force against a fortified house held by two German * officers and thirty enlisted men. After establishing a base of fire, he rushed forward alone through an open clearing in full view of the enemy, smashed through a barricaded door, and forced all thirty-two Germans to surrender. His intrepidity and bold leadership resulted in the capture or killing of three enemy officers and fifty-four enlisted men, the destruction of three enemy strongpoints and the seizure of…..

.Meanwhile the 30th Infantry had jumped off on October 3, with the 2d Battalion now committed in a new attack on the regiment's extreme left with the final objective of seizing Hill 781, north of Le Tholy. At 0700 the attack was well under way, with the 2d Battalion coordinating with the 1st Battalion on the right. Throughout the bright moonlight night of October 3-4 the regiment continued its determined attack. At 0500 the 1st Battalion was counterattacked on its exposed right flank. Company B beat off the attack and at 1320 the enemy counterattacked this battalion again, but failed to dent it. The 2d Battalion's attack met equally fierce resistance ' but the 3d Battalion reached its objective by 1230, taking eight prisoners and a mortar position, using the mortars to fire back at the enemy. Casualties for the period October 1-3 totaled more than 400.

Throughout October 4, the enemy continued to make limited attacks against the Ist Battalion's right flank. Both the 1st and 2d Battalions continued to press the attack, but enemy resistance was determined and progress was slow. During this period enemy artillery increased considerably with several three-gun batteries firing simultaneously at 30th Infantry troops.

The 1st Battalion maintained its pressure on the enemy, and advanced slowly toward the objective. The 2d Battalion, by late afternoon of the 6th, placed fire on enemy positions astride the main Tendon-Le Tholy highway, driving the Germans out. During the night this position was occupied by 2d Battalion troops.

At 0730, October 7, the 1st Battalion jumped off in an attack which gained the crest of the objective by 0930, while the 3d Battalion moved Company I to reinforce the Ist Battalion's sector.

On the 8th the 1st Battalion launched a concerted cleanup attack at 1515, coordinated with tanks and TDs to drive all the enemy from the ridge by dark, despite heavy enemy 150mm artillery opposition.

Remaining in position on the 9th, and consolidating its positions, the regiment took its final objectives on October 10, with the 2d Battalion pushing Companies E and F across the Tendon-Le Tholy road under cover of darkness and seizing the objectives by 0700. The entire battalion was consolidated on the high ground north of Le Tholy that night and the 3d Battalion moved up to occupy positions left by the 2d Battalion.

The 7th Infantry, in this tedious fight for control of the Vosges, entered Vagney after overcoming stubborn resistance. The 1st Battalion, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, established its CP approximately in the center of town. The regimental command post was set up just north of Vagney, and the 3d Battalion CP was also moved into town. A dense fog covered the area on October 7 and small, by-passed groups of enemy still held out in the hills and pine forests that flanked the narrow valley floor on which Vagney was located.

The decision to displace' 7th Infantry headquarters units forward while Vagney was, still receiving strong shell fire involved a deliberate sacrifice of security, but the necessity of establishing and maintaining control over the combat elements required it. Vagney was still under observation from high ground in the direction Of Sapois.

Terrain, the weather conditions and the progress of the offensive all conspired to create perfect conditions for a hostile counterattack and the Germans took advantage of one of the darkest and foggiest nights of the early winter to conduct a raid on the 3d Battalion CP.

T/Sgt. Gerald T. Hennings, the battalion sergeantmajor, later described the action.

"I heard a terrific roar as a tank came down the road and stopped in front of the house next to the CP," Hennings said. "I knew that some of our tanks were expected to return to the rear areas for a short rest and naturally thought that this was one of them. I heard the sound of a grenade as it exploded in the next house. Then another came through our own window in the CP!"

A supporting tank platoon, under command of 2d Lt. James L. Harris, was in the town square at the time. The noise brought immediate action from the lieutenant's crew.

"There was confusion as to the identity of the tank at first," Hennings continued, "and Lieutenant Harris elected to go forward afoot in an effort to identify it. The first burst of machine-gun fire from the enemy tank caught the Lieutenant squarely, knocking him to the ground. The next burst killed a man beside me. We were really in a bad spot.

"Lieutenant Harris didn't forget his mission and despite his painful wounds, he crawled thirty yards through a hell of machine-gun fire to his tank, where he ordered the tank into a covered archway, but it burst into flames, struck by five direct bits, while still in the center of the street."

Pvt. Burton B. Roberts, a medic attached to the 1st Battalion, said that Lieutenant Harris refused medical aid until the sole survivor of his tank had been cared for.

"After I had evacuated the enlisted men I returned to help Lieutenant Harris," Roberts stated. "He asked me if I had taken care of his men and I told him I had. He seemed relieved. He told me he was done for and I saw that his right leg had been cut off at the crotch, apparently by the flying pieces of armor plate from his tank. He was in bad shape. I don't see how he lived as long as he did."Col. Ben Harrell, commanding officer of the 7th, commented, "The Germans had struck at the heart of a vital command area. As a result of Lieutenant Harris' heroism and single-minded devotion, the force of their blow was warded off; the battalion command post was saved from possible destruction and an interruption of offensive operations in that sector of the Vosges was averted."The posthumous award of the Congressional Medal of Honor that followed Lieutenant Harris' act was the recognition of many similar deeds performed by the 756th Tank Battalion during the battle for the Vosges and Lieutenant Harris' heroism was typical of many other officers and enlisted men during the bitter winter warfare.

The 1st Battalion of the 7th repulsed a strong tanksupported counterattack at Vagney while another that isolated Companies E and I from the rest of the regiment for a short time was beaten off after a bitter fight in the same vicinity.

The 7th Infantry occupied Sapois and completed the occupation of Zainvillers, clearing out many sniper nests in the process. The regiment was taken out of the line October 11 and began a five-day training schedule in the vicinity of Eloyes. On the same day, Peck Force (elements of the 15th Infantry) took LaForge and the rest of the regiment continued its march to the northeast while the 30th remained in the vicinity of Le Tholy where the Germans were firmly dug in.

Regimental raider platoons and reinforced combat patrols raided enemy positions frequently during the next few days and although no major gains were made during the period, the Division maintained a continuous pressure that was slowly pushing the enemy back.

The Porter Force of the 30th, led by 1st Lt. Morris C. Porter, commander of the regimental raider platoon, and including a platoon of the division battle patrol, led by 2d Lt. Walter Gill, who was captured in the action, engaged in a torrid fight in the early morning hours of October 16 when another raid was conducted against Le Tholy. Lieutenant Porter's men suffered heavily when they were caught from the front and flanks upon entering the town. The battle lasted for several hours and the force withdrew at daylight.

The 15th was relieved by French units October 17, leaving only the 30th in the line. The latter regiment maintained contact with the enemy through vigorous patrolling until October 20, when the Division renewed the attack northeast toward Vervezelle and Brouvelieures.

The setting for this action was generally as follows:

VI US Corps was still fighting with the same divisions which had landed on the Riviera two months before-the 3d, 36th, and 45th. All had been continuously engaged. Now, with winter approaching and the rugged terrain adding to the difficulties imposed by the weather, our tired troops were finding it increasingly difficult to keep up their day-to-day advances. Meanwhile the enemy's lines of supply had shortened, his replacements were becoming more numerous and frequent, and above all he now had time to emplace and employ his artillery. Against this, the Allies had in their favor the slow but steady buildup of troops and supplies which everyone knew spelled eventual victory, but which was powerless to offset the temporary enemy advantages. It was part of the Allied build-up that the French were to come into the line opposite Belfort, and relieve United States troops as far north as Le Tholy; the slowness of the Allied build-up was emphasized by the fact that our troops could not be relieved fast enough to build up a really large striking force, strong enough, say, to break through and reach the Rhine.

Thus the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments, relieved by the French in the Vagney and St. Ame' areas were able to effect a breakthrough at Brouvelieures, and the 30th, relieved around Le Tholy, was able to exploit the breakthrough nearly as far as St. Die". But there the advance momentarily stopped, while our forces regrouped and our build-up continued, augmented next by the 100th and 103d Infantry Divisions, recently arrived from the United States.

The shape of the battle was roughly as follows:

The 7th and 15th Infantry regiments attacked abreast at noon October 20, the 7th on the right heading due east for Vervezelle, the 15th on the left swinging, to the northeast toward Brouvelieures. The enemy had previously stabilized his positions on the high ground west of Brouvelieures, where the 45th Infantry Division, strung out as far as Rambervillers on the north, had been unable to concentrate enough force to penetrate the enemy line. (As a matter of fact, a strong enemy counterattack with armored support had hurt the 45th badly in this very area the previous week).

Now, with the 36th Infantry Division engaged in a successful attack on Bruyeres, and the 45th continuing to attack farther north, the added kick provided by the 3d caused the enemy line to give way completely, and by the end of the second day a definite breakthrough had been accomplished.

The 3d Battalion of the 15th Infantry, commanded by Maj. Russell Comrie, helped the campaign tremendously by seizing a bridge over the Mortagne River just north of Brouvelieures before the enemy could demolish it. The regiment crossed as rapidly as possible at this point, and began an attack to the east along the ridge on which the town of Mortagne was situated. The 15th met many strong detachments of enemy trying to escape over the few roads leading away from this ridge-top to the east and northeast, and fought a series of spirited engagements during this advance.

The 7th meanwhile had captured Vervezelle and Doinfaing in two powerful attacks, and had then swung east up the south side of the valley leading to Les Rouges Eaux. In night marches over the heavily forested hills the 7th secured valuable ground, although control was so difficult that the 1st Battalion on one occasion had a hard time locating itself on the map when daylight came. On the high ridge southeast of Etival, and south of Les Rouges Eaux, the regiment first made contact with the 201st Mountain Battalion, a fresh formation of well- equipped Austrian mountaineers, some 600 men strong. Fortunately the 7th hit this unit before it had a chance to get well dug-in, and smashed it so badly the first day of contact that it never gained its full fighting efficiency.

It was in this vicinty north of Les Rouges Eaux, on October 25, that S/Sgt. Clyde L. Choate, Company C, 601st TD Battalion, engaged a German Mark IV tank in a one-man battle, with Choate stalking the tank until he finally destroyed it just as it was about to break through to an infantry battalion CP area.

"The Germans had launched a surprise attack on densely wooded positions on a hilltop occupied by our forces," related Lt. Col. Walter E. Tardy, Commanding Officer of the 601st, "and the enemy struck with force and decision.

"The only tank destroyer available in this sector was knocked out before it could open fire. The German tank proceeded straight down a wagon road, slashing through the infantry positions and shooting the soldiers in their foxholes.

"Sergeant Choate couldn't find all of our crew and he believed the driver was trapped in the burning TD. Choate ran through a rain of enemy fire to the M-10, which was empty. Kraut infantry followed the Mark IV as it headed toward the infantry battalion CP about 400 yards to our rear," added Sgt. Thomas L. Langan, who was a gunner in the ill-fated TD.

"The German tank cruised through the woods, firing down into the foxholes of the doughboys and crushing soldiers to death under its tracks. Grabbing a bazooka from one of the foxholes, Choate immobilized the enemy tank, which the Germans then converted into an armored pillbox.

"Choate ran back to our infantrymen again, got another rocket and closed in on the tank to within ten yards, always under heavy enemy fire. The shot was a bull's eye and Germans began piling out of it, with Choate shooting them with his revolver."

T/4 Jay W. Shively, who also witnessed the event, said that Choate "winged" at least two Krauts and threw a hand grenade into the tank to be certain there were no more live ones in it.

Losing their tank, the German infantry became disorganized and the melee ended with thirty Germans killed, wounded or captured.

How Sergeant Choate "got his man" and stopped enemy armor without a tank destroyer is legend in the 601st TD Battalion.

For this action Sergeant Choate was awarded the Medal of Honor.

The determination displayed by Choate was characteristic of the Battalion's efforts ever since it was first attached to the 3d Infantry Division at Monte Corvino, Italy on September 20, 1943. Lt. Col Tardy was commanding throughout the period of the attachment, except for short periods.

The Commanding General at this time decided to commit the 30th Infantry, with the mission of attacking through the 7th Infantry and driving east. Col. Lionel C. McGarr, regimental commander, directed patrols be sent between the 7th on the south and 15th Infantry on the north, which got through the lines to a depth of 600 yards. Colonel McGarr then recommended that the regiment not batter against the strong resistance which was holding up the other two regiments, but drive through what apparently was a soft spot. The Commanding General approved the suggestion.The 1st Battalion led off, followed by the 2d, which swung from a road "spiderweb" north to a mill near the south side of the Nompatelize Valley. It was there that armor attached to the 2d Battalion encountered enemy armor and shot it up.

,Lt. Col. Eugene Salet's 2d Battalion of the 15th followed the 30th here, swung in behind and took a hill to the northeast of the crossroads at which the 15th Infantry had been held up for several days. This maneuver allowed the 15th to flank and clear a stronglyheld road junction halfway between Les Rouges Eaux and La Bourgonce for which it had been battling fiercely. On the last day of this road-junction battle, Company I of the 15th, attacking from the east destroyed nine enemy machine guns in a few hours, and provided the flanking punch that drove the enemy clear out of the position.Both the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 30th were committed along the ridge-top to support the 3d, the 1st taking over the left half of the zone in the area dominated by Les Jumeaux, or twin peaks, which jutted into the plain south of Nompatelize, and the 2d going into the right half of the zone, holding a long east-west line north of Le Haut Jacques.

The type of battle that was being waged during these days resulted in a situation of October 28 that brought the 3d Infantry Division another Congressional Medal of Honor.

The 30th Infantry was pressing through the Mortagne Forest toward the heights overlooking St. Die' when elements of the German 201st Mountain Infantry Battalion, which had been by-passed, succeeded in cut ting the supply line of the 3d Battalion, disrupting the flow of ammunition and food to the unit.

Company I, commanded by 1st Lt. Maurice Rothseid, was in reserve position when it was called on to drive the enemy out. Going into the attack at 1400 that afternoon, the company was immediately subjected to intense fire from automatic weapons and small arms coming from an enemy that was well concealed in the dense undergrowth and woods.At this point, S/Sgt. Lucian Adams, a squad leader of the 2d platoon, under 2d Lt. Frank H. Harrell, took charge of the situation and began a one-man assault that ended after he had killed nine Germans and captured two singlehanded. The number that he wounded as he dished from tree to tree with his BAR was not determined.

He engaged an enemy machine gun at twenty yards and succeeded in killing the gunner.Lieutenant Harrell described Adams' action, saying, "Sergeant Adams moved so fast and had such a head start on the rest of us that he killed a great number of them before we could maneuver to shoot at the enemy without endangering him by our fire."

Adams' charge disorganized the enemy in their strong defensive positions and was mainly responsible for the quick manner in which Company I cleared the supply line to the assault companies -of the 3d Battalion.

For this action Sergeant Adams was awarded the Medal of Honor.

By this time the exploitation phase had ended, and during the closing days of October the Division fought a bitter, costly action against a constantly-reinforced, infiltrating foe. The 2d platoon of the 3d Reconnaissance Troop, commanded by 2d Lt. John Begovich, holding a hillside position just north of Le Haut Jacques, fought almost nightly actions against enemy who came up draws both from the east and west. All three battalions of the 30th had "hot corners" where two enemy seemed to spring up for every one shot down. This was almost literally true, as the enemy, sensing the threat posed by the 3d Division to St. Die, robbed other sectors of the front to throw in the 291st and 292d Special Employment Battalions, the 737th Infantry Regiment, the 726th Infantry Regiment, and finally introduced another fresh mountain battalion, the 202d. By this time the German 16th Infantry Division, whose 221st, 223d and 225th Infantry Regiments had opposed our initial attack west of Brouvelieures, had virtually disappeared from the picture, although the division's General Haeckel still commanded the sector opposite the 3d.

The fighting in the western Vosges was weirder than any engaged in before or since by the Division. Crushing concentrations of 120mm mortar fire smashed into the wooded ridges without warning, sometimes wiping out half a company in a comparatively few minutes. Casualties mounted rapidly, largely because of these tree-bursts of artillery and mortars. The nights, chilly before, suddenly turned cold, and frost gave way to snow on the ridge-tops. The artillery airstrip had to be corduroyed because of the deep mud. Logging trails which ran the ridges had to be rebuilt by the engineers in order to support the supply traffic which ran nightly to the farthest units. There was only one area practicable for gun positions-the plateau south of Mortagne- and nightly it was constantly lit up by flashes from scores of artillery pieces.With a bit of improvisation, Maj. Norman C. Tanner, Division Artillery Air Officer, provided his spotter planes a landing field during the difficult weather which characterized the Vosges throughout the whole campaign there.It took the form of a 250 by 15-yard wooden runway, and at the time it was built it was 6000 yards from the enemy front lines. To camouflage it, Major Tanner had it painted olive drab.

Capt. Alfred W. Schultz, Assistant Air Officer, commented after his first landing, "I checked my map twice to make sure that I had the correct coordinates, for that little strip looked like a ribbon up there," to which Pilot 1st Lt. Warren T. Ries rejoined, "Yes, a very tiny ribbon."

Meanwhile the Division faced the enemy on three sides -the north, east, and south. Enemy armor showed up in unexpected places-one Mark IV tank was destroyed by one of the enemy's own mines several 'hundred yards north of Le Haut Jacques, on the crest of a wooded ridge. Friendly supply parties were ambushed. Small groups of enemy, cut off by our rapid advance, showed up in our rear and fought with CP groups and wire crews. One whole company of the enemy, cut off by the 7th Infantry, surrendered after negotiations that covered an entire night.October 25 saw the first issue of the Division weekly newspaper, the Front Line.In an opening statement written for the paper, Commanding General O'Daniel declared: "It is fitting that this paper is being published today for the first time. It is the mouthpiece of a fighting Division, and as we are now in the midst of a great attack, we can say that the 3d Division Front Line was born in battle.

"We shall therefore be able to submit very soon additional reports on more deeds of valor as performed by our fighting men. This paper is one way we can let them know what we think of them. Therefore the names of all men who are cited in orders of this division will be published in this paper. We salute them all."

At first crude in form, the paper rapidly acquired polish, and by June 1945, was able to announce proudly that it had been adjudged by Camp Newspaper Service the second best overseas letter-press organizational paper.

November began with fights for Hill 256, near Les Jumeaux, and for the crossroads town of Le Haut Jacques.

Survivors of the battle for the crossroads at Le Haut Jacques were later to refer to it as "The Crossroads of Hell." Anzio veterans said that at times the fighting was worse than any they had seen all during the beachhead siege and the drive to Rome.

To advance a few hundred yards took the 7th Infantry five days. The enemy had-and used-every weapon in the book: 120mm mortars, Flakwagons, mines and booby- traps, machine guns, artillery, and small arms.

The hot spot was first encountered on October 31st. All three battalions were on line: 1st, under Capt. Kenneth W. Wallace, on the north (left) flank; 2d, commanded by Lt. Colonel Clayton C. Thobro, to right (slightly back); and Maj. Glenn E. Rathbun's 3d Battalion on the regimental right and echeloned somewhat to the rear.

On the 31st, 1st Battalion moved slowly along the St. Die' road. Company A moved north behind a mortar preparation, with the intention of flanking the town from that direction, Company B was in reserve, and Company C attacked due east. Companies E and G of the 2d Battalion took Hill 652, which they had fought for the entire previous twenty-four hours, and continued east slowly. The 3d Battalion, which was attacking southeast, had been stopped the day before by heavy fire in the vicinity of an enemy roadblock. The area, in addition, was found to be heavily mined. On the morning of the 31st the attack was resumed, but initially only Company K made any progress, due to slightly lighter resistance than that encountered by L Company. Hill 499 was taken by K-its second objective. In the afternoon, however, some slight progress was made as Company K engaged the enemy in a moving fire fight. Company L found itself, likewise, in a strong exchange of fire.

The 2d Battalion, under extremely heavy mortar and artillery on its company areas and OP, nevertheless shoved forward, but it was slow, painful going.

The following day, November 1, this same inching forward continued. Every bit of firepower available to the 7th was called down on Le Haut Jacques and the vital crossroads, but the enemy more than matched it with the combined fire of every emplaced weapon. That afternoon the enemy fired a heavy artillery concentration at the 2d Battalion at 1500, and followed up with a counterattack at Company G. which was repulsed. Company C was forced to beat off a counterattack at 1615. During this time mines were encountered throughout the zone of both Ist and 2d Battalions.

The 3d Battalion continued the attempt to push to the southwest. Company L destroyed an enemy machine- gun nest during the morning of November 2.

The 2d Battalion was counterattacked about noon of the same day and repulsed it. Company F was relieved by the 7th Infantry Battle Patrol at 1230 and in turn relieved Company C, which moved further north toward the remainder of 1st Battalion. Relief of the 3d Battalion was started during the afternoon by 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry.

Meanwhile, 1st and 2d Battalions had launched an all- out attack at 1415, but failed to make any appreciable gains. The enemy fire was of an intensity rarely encountered before in the entire war by the 7th Infantry. The 3d Battalion joined this attack on November 3, and worked further toward the achievement of getting to the east of the village for the final assault. The 2d Battalion would have to attack directly east as 1st Battalion pushed in from the north.

As the attack went into its fifth day, the bloody battle reached its climax. The entire regiment (less one company) moved out at 0615 determined to smash the enemy at Le Haut Jacques. The enemy, aggressive in the defense, almost immediately made a counterattack at Company A and 1st Battalion was held up. Company I encountered withering fire from four well-emplaced machine guns and also stopped, but K Company continued moving on against strong resistance. To Companies E and F-commanded by 1st Lt. James F. Powell and 2d Lt. Earl E. Swanson, respectively-and especially to E company, fell the task of moving in directly from the west. By 0940 Company F had control of one house in the village and E was taking prisoners.

By 1150, after weathering murderous mortar and artillery, 2d Battalion had cleared the village. Companies I and K still had a fight on their hands, but the back of the enemy resistance was broken. Over a hundred prisoners were taken. The regiment had suffered 125 casualties in the final push. Le Haut Jacques was a costly objective.

"It seemed to me that we were just a handful of men trying desperately to push the whole top away from that mountain," said Pvt. Alfonso Pesko of E Company, later. "It was worse than Anzio, because we were steadily going up hill and were in such a confined area."

Although the entire regiment had experienced grim 'fighting E Company had been especially outstanding and those members who survived were later awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation.

With the village occupied, the 7th moved east and north.

During the attack by the 7th Infantry on Le Haut Jacques, the 30th Infantry helped greatly by flanking the town from the north-with Task Force Kenyon and Task Force Greer, and without this help 7th infantry might never have taken Le Haut Jacques.