On October 30, while the bulk of the 30th Infantry was passing through the Mortagne Forest, Company G, 30th Infantry, passed through Company F to press the battle on Hill 616, north of and part of the Le Haut Jacques position which the 7th Infantry had been attacking from the west. The attack of Company G was made through cross machine-gun fire against enemy established in deep dugouts and bunkers along the forward slope of the hill. The attack progressed to within two hundred yards of the company's objective where it was halted because of the frightful number of casualties exacted by the defending enemy. The company dug in under harassing enemy fire. Private Wilburn K. Ross had placed his light machine gun in a position ten yards in advance of the foremost supporting riflemen. Shortly thereafter the enemy counterattacked. Thirty-three men remained in the company, fifty-five having been lost in the attack. Private Ross, exposed to machinegun and small- arms fire of the attacking force, fired with deadly effect upon the assaulting enemy troops and repelled the counterattack. Despite the hail of automatic-weapons fire and the explosions of rifle grenades within a stone's throw Of his position, he continued to man his machine gun alone, repulsing six more German attacks. The citation of the award of the Medal of Honor to Private Ross is quoted here in part:

"When the eighth assault was launched, most of his, supporting riflemen were out of ammunition. They took position in echelon behind Private Ross and crawled up during the attack, to extract a few rounds of ammunition from his machine-gun ammunition belt. Private Ross fought on virtually without assistance, and, despite the fact that enemy grenadiers crawled to within four yards of his position in an attempt to kill him with hand grenades, he again directed accurate and deadly fire on the hostile force.... After expending his last round, Private Ross was advised to withdraw to the company command post, together with the eight surviving riflemen, but as more ammunition was expected he declined to do so.... As his supporting riflemen fixed bayonets for a last-ditch stand, fresh ammunition arrived.... Having killed and wounded at least fifty-eight Germans in more than five hours of continuous combat and saved the remnant of his company from destruction, Private Ross remained at his post . . ."

Such was the fury of the battles fought at the hellhole, Le Haut Jacques.

The 15th, which had a tough day in attacking Hill 526, occupied its objective the next morning with no resistance as the Germans had evacuated their positions during the night. Les Faignes and Nompatelize, villages in the path of the 15th's advance, were also yielded without a fight but definite resistance was met in the attack on La Salle.

The 2d Battalion, commanded by Maj. Eugene A. Salet, hit La Salle from three directions. Company E, under 1st Lt. Charles E. Adams, closed in from the south, Company F, commanded by Capt. Hugh H. Bruner, advanced from the northwest and Company G, under Capt. Richard B. Dorrough, assaulted the village from the west.

All companies were halted at well dug-in positions which surrounded the village and after these were overrun, a house-to-house fight ensued as the Germans were occupying every building in the settlement. Heavy artillery and mortar fire was laid down on the attackers ,but Company G finally broke through and entered the town at noon on the second day of the battle. By 1200 hours, November 3, the town was cleared.

The Ist Battalion of the 30th Infantry, commanded by Maj. Mackenzie E. Porter, attacked the town of Sauceray. In a perfectly coordinated attack, employing machine guns, mortars, and artillery, the battalion closed in from south and west. There was a sharp 30minute fight, but the prebattle conception had been excellent and the town fell. This attack was the first of a series of battalion attacks in which the regiment had to pull a battalion from a defensive position and extend it over the other two battalion fronts in order to close up a large gap and make an attack.

During the days of the 7th Infantry's fight for Le Haut Jacques the 30th Infantry's 2d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Frederick, R. Armstrong, launched and completed a successful coordinated attack on Hill 616, a key terrain feature for the defense of St. Die. The regiment had been battling for this hill even before the 7th Infantry encountered the defenses of Le Haut Jacques, but previous attacks met with furious fire and fanatical resistance. The final attack the enemy also resisted fiercely, and with reinforcements. Enemy artillery fire caused a number of casualties when the command post of Company C, commanded by 1st Lt. Rex Metcalfe, was struck on the third day of the attack. Much air activity, both friendly and enemy, was present during the days that the Division fought on the hills in front of the Meurthe River and our forces were strafed many times by enemy planes. Hill 616 was occupied by the 2d Battalion on November 5 when elements of the 7th Infantry entered the attack.

The day witnessed also the seizure of Biarville by the 15th Infantry. This attack was short lived but it demonstrated great determination.

Biarville was fairly covered by fire when it was attacked by a force comprising Company A of the 15th, one platoon of light tanks, a platoon of mediums, one platoon of tank destroyers and a platoon of engineers. The withering fire brought quick results and the town fell in a short time.

The Germans by now had started a real flight rearward and although the Division was still subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire during its continued advance, the resistance became more scattered and sporadic as the 3d Battalion neared the Meurthe River. The towns of Brehimont and La Vacherie, overlooking St. Michel, were weakly defended and most of the defenders were taken prisoner when the 3d Division occupied them. The PW total mounted rapidly as scattered pockets of left-behinds were cleared.

One by one, the towns fronting on the hills along the Meurthe were occupied with the chief action in the Division zone being waged in the 15th and 30th Infantry sectors. Enemy troops in a draw and in the woods to the north opposed the 15th's advance toward Le Menil, while at the same time the 30th Infantry was clearing the St. Die' hill mass by battalion attacks around its entire perimeter which, in addition, helped the 15th Infantry by covering its right flank. The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, took Chalet on the morning of November 10, and the 3d Battalion took La Bolle after an afternoon and all-night fight on November 10-11, with Companies I and K in the assault. Fighting ended the morning of November 11 when the bridge across the Taintrux River was taken and the Chalet-Saucerey highway was completely cleared.

On the afternoon of November 8, Companies E and F of the 15th attacked Le Menil, supported by tanks of the 756th Tank Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Glenn F. Rogers. There were four light tanks from Company D under Capt. Robert F. Kremer, and two mediums from Company B, commanded by Capt. David D. Redle with the 2d Battalion, when it launched its drive. As at Biarville, the attack was well-planned and vicious and lasted but a short time since the Germans withdrew in the face of the onslaught.

While the 2d Battalion was entering Le Menil, the 3d attacked Deyfosse, a short distance to the south. A wooded area outside Deyfosse gave the enemy convenient emplacement positions but Company K, commanded by Ist Lt. John J. Tominac, wore down the resistance after Companies I and L had made a houseto- house clearance of the south part of the village. Company K completed clearing the village late that night.

The 15th continued the Division advance while elements of the 7th were being relieved by the 103d Infantry Division. Etival, a small village located on the edge of the Meurthe, was taken by the 15th with little resistance.

At a conference conducted at VI Corps headquarters at Grandvillers on the afternoon of November 10, Corps Commander General Brooks outlined to his division commanders the operations incident to the Corps mission of proceeding east through the Vosges from the St. Die' area, capturing Strasbourg, and destroying the enemy west of the Rhine River in its zone. He presented three plans, all of which involved crossings of the Meurthe River by the 3d Infantry Division.

Plans "A" and "B" called for the 3d to cross the Meurthe in the vicinity of St. Michel, and to establish an initial bridgehead on the east bank. In plan "A" the 3d proceeded due east on the axis Saales-Schirmeck- Strasbourg, with the 100th Infantry Division operating on its left, and the 103d Infantry Division on its right, following an administrative crossing behind the 3d and subsequent passage through its right to the south and southeast. In plan "B". the missions of the 3d and 103d Divisions were interchanged after the establishment of the initial bridgehead by the 3d. Plan "C" called for the 3d Infantry Division and the 103d Infantry Division to. cross the Meurthe River abreast, with the 3d on the left. The action of each division following establishment of the initial bridgehead conformed to the maneuver outlined for plan "A," which was favored.

General Brooks indicated that the probable date for the 3d Division crossing would be November 20. This date was contingent upon the progress of the 100th Infantry Division in its action southeast from Baccarat, and of the progress of the 103d on the right of the 3d in seizing the high ground southwest of St. Die'. Successful consummation of these operations would serve to draw enemy reserves from the front of the 3d, thereby weakening the enemy in the zone of crossing.

At the time of the issuance of the Corps Commander's plans, the 3d was in the process of undergoing relief by the 103d Division of its center and right regiments (30th and 7th Infantry Regiments). At the same time 15th Infantry was carrying out an operation to the northeast to clear the enemy from the west bank of the Meurthe as far north as Clairfontaine. Necessarily, then, the 7th and 30th were earmarked for the assault, whereas 15th Infantry was to hold the west bank of the Meurthe in the Division zone and to cover all preparations incident to the river crossing, then assemble in Division reserve following the crossing.

Men of the Division heard many explosions during the next few days as the Germans methodically began destroying St. Die'. This town, seat of the Congress which named America in honor of the Italian, Amerigo Vespucci, had been shelled to some extent but was not nearly as thoroughly battered as Bruyeres, for example. But now reports were received at the Division headquarters from front-line infantrymen and artillery forward observers that "St. Die' is in flames."

It was revealed later that the enemy, without reasons justifiable even on the grounds of military necessity, had ordered St. Die' destroyed. Giving scant notice to the occupants of the town's houses and business structures, the Germans reduced the greater part of the town to ashes; the wall skeletons which were left standing intact testified that high explosive played little part in the needless destruction of St. Die', but rather that it was gutted by German-started fires. General Haeckel, German 16th Infantry Division CG, was responsible for the destruction of St. Die" and surrounding villages.

"Powerhouse I" was the name given the Meurthe crossing operation. On the face of it, this was an extremely difficult job.

Division engineers had made careful map, photo and ground reconnaissance, but had failed to locate good bridge sites except where hard-surfaced approaches reached the river at points where bridges had been demolished. The Meurthe twisted northwest across a flat bottomland several hundred yards wide which was flooded north of Etival, and boggy everywhere else.

The river itself, swollen by fall rains, was everywhere too deep and swift to be forded by foot troops.

Worst of all, the "winter -line," a solid chain of prepared enemy defenses, ran all the way from Fraize to Raon L'Etape, especially strong in the sector opposite the 3d. These defenses consisted of trenches, barbed wire, weapons pits, AT gun positions, AT ditches, and mines, and had been under construction since early fall. Our machine gunners on the west bank could see many of these defenses clearly.

Rather than make a frontal assault against these defenses behind an artillery heavy barrage, General O'Daniel decided to try to gain surprise by infiltration in force under cover of darkness. Plans were made therefore to throw footbridges across the river at last light, move the foot elements of the 7th and 30th regiments across during the night, and attack from the cast bank at daylight with strong preparatory fires. Caliber .50 machine guns, Flakwagons, tanks, TD's and all available weapons were to provide fire support from the west bank.

The 15th Infantry held the line of departure (the west bank of the river) for several days prior to the attack, and patrolled vigorously to determine the conditions of the river and the nature of enemy opposition on the far bank. The patrols confirmed the fact that fording for any large body of troops was out of the question, and that employment of boats and rafts would be difficult because of the current. It was then that the use of prefabricated footbridges was decided upon.

Enemy reaction to the patrolling, however, was surprisingly weak, and although no prisoners were taken it was fairly clear that (1) the enemy held the east bank very thinly, and (2) enemy troops who were present were neither aggressive nor alert. The enemy was compelled to keep his line thin by continuing attacks on the part of the 103d Infantry Division in the Taintrux area, on the 3d's right, and the 100th Infantry Division's attack southeast through Raon L'Etape, on the 3d's left.

Then, for two or three days prior to the attack, friendly planes strafed and dropped fire bombs all along the enemy's line of prepared positions, to further lower the already low morale of the German soldiers holding those positions.

While plans went forward for the crossing, 7th and 30th Infantry regiments were engaged in training with their respective combat-team engineer companies. Since the crossing plan had been communicated to the appropriate commanders at the outset of the five-day period, it was possible to make all training objective in nature. To this end full emphasis was placed on engineer training in assault-boat operation and in construction of footbridges of the prefabricated type. Infantry received training in assault boats and in crossing over footbridges. This training was conducted on a battalion basis. Half of the training was conducted at night with a view to developing speed, coordination, and control. Directional aids such as luminous markers, telephone wire, engineer tape, ropes, and markings on the rear of helmets were stressed. Finally, special exercises were conducted for the assault platoons earmarked for covering footbridge construction.

In order to deceive the enemy as to the date and time of our crossing, the Commanding General directed the artillery commander, Brig. Gen. William T. Sexton, to increase harassing fires on the Division front during the three days prior to the crossing. In addition, he prescribed for these three days a 15-minute pre-daylight shoot plus a 15-minute after-darkness shoot. It developed later from prisoner accounts that this program served as an effective cover plan for the main preparation which was fired from H-minus-30 to H-hour, since the enemy had become accustomed to heavy firing at this time.

On November 18 notification was received from Corps to the effect that the splendid progress of the 100th Infantry Division southeast of Baccarat warranted cancellation of crossing plans for the 3d Infantry Division in the interest of passing the 3d through. the 100th to exploit its progress. Immediately upon receipt of these instructions, the concentration plan for the crossing which had been underway for two days was cancelled, and the assault regiments were directed to reconnoiter forward assembly areas in the zone of the 100th Division in the vicinity of Raon L'Etape. A movement order was issued covering concentration in forward assembly areas preliminary to passage through the 100th Infantry Division. Movement was to be initiated on Corps order during the night of November 19-20.

At a meeting on the l8th, originally intended to be a final review of crossing plans, General O'Daniel made the announcement of the new plan and initiated discussion on it.

The original plan was destined to carry through, however. For, on the morning of November 19, word was received from General Brooks that the progress of the 100th Division for the preceding twenty-four hours had been considerably retarded, and that instead of passing the 3d through the 100th in the face of increasing resistance, the 3d would effect its crossing of the Meurthe as originally planned.

Fortunately, the thorough preparation pertaining to both the concentration and crossing plans enabled the Division to resume its concentration and complete all preparations without incident. It was impossible, however, due to the loss in time, to emplace all tanks, TD's and smoke generators originally scheduled to move into position during the three nights prior to D-Day. The tanks and TDs were instead tied in with artillery fire-direction centers and used in an indirect fire role to support the crossing.

The Division drew a damp, moonless night for the crossing-the night of November, 19-20. A platoon of Company I, 15th Infantry, had crossed two nights before by boat in the 7th Infantry's zone and occupied a house immediately in front of the enemy's main position without being detected. This platoon had radioed back several reports on the l9th, all of which indicated that the enemy was holding his main position with light forces, who appeared entirely to be occupying buildings along the Raon L'Etape-St. Die' highway.

To observers not actually on the river line, it seemed unbelievable that a large-scale river crossing was in progress. There was hardly as much shooting as on any quiet night of ordinary patrol activity. Division artillery dropped its normal quota of harassing shells along the enemy's supply routes with studied haphazardness; rifles cracked occasionally, but there was nothing approaching a genuine fire fight. Obviously, the enemy was totally unaware that two of United States' finest regiments were moving onto his doorstep on a narrow front.

By 2400 the footbridge assault platoons, which had been ferried across by Company A, 10th Engineers, under the command of Capt. Albert Cook, were in possession of a line of departure approximately 300 yards from the Raon L'Etape-St. Die' highway. Footbridges were installed with exceptional speed, being completed by approximately 2359. Foot troops of the main assault forces proceeded from detrucking areas to the footbridges without incident. Immediately they started over-riflemen, BAR men, machine gunners, mortar squads, communication men, aid men-everybody who walks in the infantry team.

Meanwhile the bridge trains of the 36th Combat Engineer Regiment were moving toward St. Michel and Clairefontaine, to be in position for beginning construction of the Bailey and treadway vehicle bridges as soon as the far bank had been cleared to sufficient depth. Company B of the 10th Engineers, under Capt. Daniel A. Raymond, and Company C, under Capt. Homer M. Lefler, also ferried advance troops and took part in the bridge construction. The treadway and Bailey bridges at St. Michel drew intermittent enemy artillery fire all during the first day, but this did not prevent the construction and continuous use of the bridges until the approaches of the treadway bridge finally became unusable.

At 0600 hours, five battalions of United States doughboys stood on the east bank of the river, having won a solid victory by their quiet crossing before even beginning the attack.

It was now time for Division artillery, with Corps artillery and several other battalions in support, to raise the mask of secrecy and fire an all-out preparation. Tanks, TDs and Flakwagons stationed on the west bank of the river opened direct fire on houses and strong

points known to be in the enemy main line of resistance. Under cover of this fire, infantrymen of the Division struck, and in less than an hour the 7th had seized Le Voivre while the 30th had captured La Hollande and Himbaumont, preparatory to springing a trap on Clairefontaine.

It was one of the smoothest operations ever conducted by the 3d Division. It was easily the quickest and most successful large-scale river crossing we had ever made.

The Winter War of Movement was under way.

The 36th Engineer Combat Regiment, together with certain personnel of the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion, initiated reconnaissance of the four heavy bridge sites at daylight of November 20. Reconnaissance of the two Clairefontaine sites was rendered impossible by small- arms, mortar and self-propelled fire from the town. At the two St. Michel sites, however, reconnaissance proceeded satisfactorily and by midmorning engineer material had been moved to the vicinity of the bridge sites. Work was initially concentrated on construction of a wide-track armored force treadway bridge in the vicinity of St. Michel. After initial progress the work was suspended for several hours due to accurate enemy mortar and self-propelled fire on the bridge site. Although efforts were made to smoke the sites by means of generators, smoke pots, and chemical mortars, shifting winds and the fact that the enemy had registered on the bridge sites minimized the effect of the smoke.

At approximately noon orders were received from Corps that two regimental combat teams of the 103d Infantry Division were to be crossed over 3d Division footbridges at the earliest possible moment and, following assembly on the far bank, were to pass through the right of the 3d and continue the attack to the southeast. Immediate contact was made with the 103d, and it was ascertained that the two regimental combat teams (409 and 410) were in assembly areas on our right rear in the vicinity of the town of La Bourgonce. The 103d was requested to send its reconnaissance forward to the footbridges and to the CPs of the assault regiments of the 3d. Brig. Gen. Robert N. Young, Assistant Division Commander, was designated as coordinator of crossing and was stationed at the footbridge sites.

Quickly exploiting the crossing, 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments moved to the east. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, shoved on toward Hurbache. Second Battalion, 30th Infantry, entered the town at 1635 in conjunction with Company C, 7th Infantry, and the village was shortly cleared. The 2d Battalion 7th, leaving Company G to block on the right flank, continued to advance without opposition. The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, cleared Clairefontaine on the afternoon of the 20th.

The 15th Infantry moved from its defensive positions on the west bank of the Meurthe River to the vicinity of La Hollande commencing with the 3d Battalion at 1530 and followed by Ist Battalion at 1600. Both battalions crossed on the northern footbridges in 30th Infantry sector.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, had seized Denipaire by 2100.

Meanwhile on the "engineer front" the progress of front- line troops was such that by late afternoon the enemy was unable to bring fire to bear upon the bridge sites. At darkness, therefore, work progressed in earnest and continued steadily through the night. The light assault bridge at the footbridge crossing area, which had been completed prior to daylight of the 20th had passed approximately seventy-five 1/4-ton loads prior to 2300, at which time the approaches to the bridge were rendered impassable by rising water and mud. Had it not been for this bridge, the Division resupply and emergency evacuation at the most critical time would have been imperiled.

With daylight on November 21 work on all four heavy bridge sites was intensified. By 0645 the widetrack armored force treadway bridge at the St. Michel site was completed and promptly passed seventeen armored vehicles and about twenty other tactical vehicles. At this time a tank bogged down at the exit of the bridge because of flooding of the approach by rising water, and the bridge was inoperative from this time on.

During the night the two combat teams of the 103d Infantry Division had crossed the Meurthe over 3d Division footbridges, and during the morning of the 21st passed through Company G, 7th Infantry, to the south.

On the morning of the 21st Denipaire became the assembly area for the Ist Battalion, 7th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, which had been pushing steadily, despite Company I's meeting small-arms fire a good part of the way, was still moving. Company I cleared La Paire. Companies I and K followed Company L toward La Chapelle. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, which had captured Denipaire the night before, shoved on toward St. Jean d'Ormont.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, was the last of that regiment to cross the Meurthe, which it did at Etival at 0715, after which it closed in its assembly area at La Hollande before noon.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, seized St. Jean d'Ormont on the afternoon of the 21st.

Task force Whirlwind was activated on that same afternoon. This consisted of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry; Company C (minus one platoon) of the 756th Tank Battalion; a platoon of Company C, 601st TD Battalion; 3d Recon Troop minus one platoon; B Battery of the 93d Armored FA Battalion; a platoon of Company B, 10th Engineers, with an armored bulldozer; and the 2d platoon of Company D, 756th Tank Battalion. Division provided twenty-five 21/2-ton trucks to motorize the battalion of infantry.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, scarcely paused in its rapid move as it seized La Fontanelle, Launois, and Maire. Its fight carried over to November 22, when it encountered strong resistance at Nayemont.

The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, pushing east, sent its Company I into La Chapelle without opposition, at 1230, November 21. At 1300 Companies K and L moved from La Chapelle and headed for Menil which they entered at 1500, meeting no opposition. The 1st Battalion moved by marching from Clairefontaine to LaPaire, with Company C moving on to La Chapelle. The remainder of the battalion closed into La Chapelle during the afternoon, reverting to regimental reserve. The 2d Battalion continued its attack, attaining successive objectives before Laitre, which fell at 1700.

By late afternoon of November 21, the attack of the 103d Division on our right- (south) flank, which had commenced at 0900 that morning and moved out to the southeast through elements of 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, had progressed from two to four kilometers on its entire front. At 1430 the 103d was given traffic priority over the St. Michel bridge. Upon completion of the crossing of the 103d Infantry Division tactical transportation, the 103d's passage phase as applied to the 3d Division was complete.

During the night of November 21-22 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, occupied Baltant de Bourras.

Task Force Whirlwind moved out of its assembly area at 0730 November 22 and passed through 7th Infantry along the route La Hollande-Hurbache-Denipaire, north to a road junction, and then southeast toward Launois. The 3d Battalion of the 15th moved from the vicinity of La Hollande at 0800 and followed the Task Force by shuttling. Task Force Whirlwind had reached Launois (which had fallen to 1st Battalion, 7th) by noon and was prepared to continue the advance.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, during the morning seized Hill 619 and drew. enemy fire from a nearby crossroad.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, had run into a definitely tough battle at Nayemont. Here the enemy "Winter Line" positions were first encountered by 7th Infantry elements. These consisted of elaborately constructed zigzag fire trenches, machine-gun emplacements, and partially finished concrete bunkers. These positions had been under construction for several months preceding, and it was here that the enemy had planned on spending the rest of the winter. The VI Corps attack, spearheaded by 3d Infantry Division in its surprise crossing of the Meurthe and rapid advance eastward, gave the Germans no opportunity to utilize fully the well-built positions. The 103d and 100th Divisions (the latter attacking on our left) had helped draw enemy strength from our zone and stretch his reserves to the breaking point.

The positions were so formidable, however, that 1st Battalion was engaged in a harrowing fight that lasted several hours before the line was cracked and the German remnants forced to withdraw. Nayemont was occupied at 1650.

The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, took Le Roaux in its stride, reaching the town by 0820 November 22 and continuing to Chatas, which was cleared at 0945. By 1010 the battalion had reached a further phase line and was still pushing.

The 3d Battalion's Company I reached Grandrupt and was still clearing the town at noon.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, engaged an enemy roadblock force in the village of Le Fraiteux during the afternoon and, after reducing it, continued east on the Saales road, but was passed through by the 3d Battalion at 1600. The 7th Infantry Battle Patrol advanced east on the Saales road after Nayemont was taken and encountered a mined enemy roadblock.

Task Force Whirlwind had shoved off from Launois at 1200, and made good progress until it encountered enemy resistance in the early morning hours of November 23, when it halted for the night.

The 2d Battalion, 15th, assembled in La Fontanelle and moved to Grandrupt at 1625, establishing roadblocks on main roads leading into town upon arrival.

At 1645 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, continued its advance and seized the high ground overlooking Saales.

The Division advance scarcely paused during the night of November 22-23. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, by- passed the roadblock on the Saales road which the regiment's Battle Patrol had encountered during the afternoon of the 22nd and at 0100 Company I seized the town of La Grande Fosse. While 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, sent patrols into Saales which destroyed an 88mm gun and actually cleared the northwest corner of town, Company K, 7th Infantry, spearheaded its battalion's attack on the town, entering at dawn and promptly becoming engaged in a fire fight. The 3d Battalion was engaged in this mission all the morning of November 23 and into the afternoon. Capture of the town symbolized entrance of the Division into Alsatian territory, but still more important was the fact that one of the two principal hinges of the Winter Line, (the other being Saulxures) had been taken and that now the enemy could not hope to stop us short of the Rhine River.

The 2d Battalion, 7th, eliminated the roadblock in the wake of 3d Battalion. The 1st Battalion entrucked at Nayemont and moved to a point near St. Barbe, north of Saales, where the men detrucked and marched to the heights of St. Barbe, from which point the battalion moved south to assist 3d Battalion in clearing Saales. Upon entry into the town the afternoon of November 23, 1st Battalion found that Saales had been cleared by 3d Battalion at 1535. The 1st Battalion thereupon headed east again, toward Bourg-Bruche.

Task Force Whirlwind had been held up by an enemy roadblock and small-arms fire from the vicinity of Saulxures. At 1400, in conjunction with 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, it attacked Saulxures. Companies I and L, 30th Infantry, attacked the town while Company K went over the high ground east of town and there seized Hill 512. Companies I and L entered town, along with elements of Whirlwind, at 1400, and had cleared the town at approximately 1630 against stubborn enemy resistance. The Winter Line was now completely broken. The condition of prisoners captured both in Saales and Saulxures indicated that they had been expecting a protracted stay behind what their superiors fondly imagined to be a secure line. Many of the rear-echelon personnel had acquired such appurtenances as skis and snowshoes, in anticipation of moments of relaxation. The skis found new owners and the dispossessed would-be skiers found exercise in marching back to the PW cages, hands clasped firmly and resting lightly on top of the head.

Only disconnected battles along the route to Strasbourg now remained. One of the toughest of these was encountered by 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, at Bourg- Bruche. It was here that the Germans had marshalled a striking force and were on the verge of counterattacking the 3d Battalion in an attempt to recapture Saales. At 1730, November 23, 1st Battalion moved out to attack Bourg-Bruche.

Approximately 150 yards beyond Saales elements of Company B encountered heavy machine-gun and rifle fire from both sides of the road. S/Sgt. James P. Wils, a squad leader, immediately rushed an S-shaped communications trench from which a storm of enemy fire was issuing, jumped inside it and fired eight clips of M-1 ammunition, coming out with twenty prisoners. The company's 3d platoon on the other side of the road wounded and killed another sizable number of enemy, putting the rest to flight.

At 1930 the battalion resumed its advance along the highway. A mile along machine-gun and rifle-grenade fire flayed the assault company. Reconnaissance disclosed that a strong German force was defending a railroad overpass which had been partially demolished by explosives.

Riflemen of Company B worked their way forward, firing at enemy muzzle blasts in the gloom. Soldiers of an enemy platoon attempting to strike at the company's left flank silhouetted themselves on the embankment and were decimated by a prompt fusillade of M-1 fire.

After tough fighting the enemy was gradually driven from the embankment. At 2300 the 1st Battalion resumed the advance toward Bourg-Bruche. Spearhead elements of Company B worked their way from building to building upon reaching the town, toward a crossroads in the center of town. A pair of building strongpoints held up the advance. Flakwagon and 88mm-gun fire deluged the intersection.

A tank was brought forward by Ist Lt. Wendell D. Leavitt, who rode it up to direct cannon fire on the enemy 88mm guns and Flakwagons. The assault platoons then charged forward into the building strongpoints destroy or put to flight the German occupants. Company C drove up the right side of the highway and penetrated into the eastern section of Bourg-Bruche. The 3d platoon, with a strength of nine men, held its gains against strong enemy pressure for five hours. A squad of Germans assaulted the house in which the platoon had taken cover and demanded that the platoon surrender, only to be greeted and repulsed by fragmentation hand grenades.

Another group similarly held out in a nearby house throughout the night.

In the morning Company C's Ist and 3d platoons joined forces and proceeded to clean out the houses on the right side of the east-west road through Bourg-Bruche, leaving the 2d platoon in support. This attack took place under strong enemy artillery, emplaced on a ridge running north- south and masking the eastern portion of the town. The ridge contained a long communications trench and heavily fortified emplacements.

The two platoons pressed their attack and reached a tavern near the railroad overpass, where they remained under concentrated fire and from which they directed artillery on the German gun emplacements, destroying an 88mm gun, blowing up an ammunition dump, and destroying a dug-in 20mm Flak gun.

During this time the Battalion CO, Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Wallace, committed Company A in an attack on the eastern section of town. As the company advanced it came under fire from two machine guns and a 20mm gun emplaced on a ridge, but these weapons were silenced by tanks and a tank destroyer after a duel which lasted several minutes.

Rounding a curve in the road, the company resumed the advance. The men drew furious blasts of Flak and machine-gun fire from the right. The enemy opened fire with an intensive mortar concentration. The company halted, having had five casualties. An unsuccessful assault on the enemy positions in which a platoon leader was killed and two men wounded followed; then a bazooka team crept forward and placed three rockets on the position, killing two Germans and crippling the position. The 3d platoon assaulted and destroyed it.

Companies B and C occupied positions in a cluster of buildings and rained fire on the Germans emplaced on the ridge. By midafternoon of the 24th they had killed between forty and fifty of the enemy and silenced two machine guns.

At about 1500 the third platoon of Company C assaulted the communications trench which was dug into the ridge. As the platoon surged up the hill slope the effect of the M-1, machine-gun, and intense artillery fire, added to the assault, convinced the Germans of the uselessness of the struggle. Approximately eightyfive prisoners were taken. Remnants of the battered German garrison fled from Bourg-Bruche only to be captured in large numbers by the 3d Battalion, which had maneuvered into position beyond the town. By 1630 Bourg-Bruche was firmly in our hands, lacking only the clearance of isolated snipers. Approximately 200 prisoners had been taken and seventy-five of the enemy killed.

The 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, had moved from St. Stail to Chateau St. Louis. Company G remained in St. Stail and sent patrols north to Le Vermont, contacting the 398th Infantry of the 100th Division. The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, remained in assembly in the vicinity of La Fontelle, alerted to move.

The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, was in flank-blocking positions along the regiment's route of advance over the 24-hour period from noon to noon of November 23-24. The 2d Battalion's Company E reported Sanatorium clear at 1540 November 23, after a brief fire fight, while Companies G, F, and H were assembled and moved toward the town. At 0700 of the 24th the battalion moved out toward St. Blaise, sweeping the edge of the woods en route.

The 3d Battalion, 7th, passed through 1st Battalion in Bourg-Bruche and encountered enemy north of the town on the afternoon of the 24th. This resistance was taken care of and the battalion had pushed on to an assigned phase line by 1840. The 2d Battalion moved north from Lehan and cut the Bourg-Bruche-La Saales Road, leaving Company F there to block. Remainder of the battalion pushed north and assembled.

Task Force Whirlwind continued to push east until 0550 the next morning when it made contact with an isolated group of enemy. By 0830 this group had been cleared up and the Task Force, its mission accomplished, was dissolved and its elements returned to control of parent units.

The last phase in the Meurthe-Rhine River push was a sweep out onto the Alsatian plain, clearing scores of towns en route. There were only brief fire fights with bewildered, isolated enemy groups. At the town of Mollkirch there were nearly a hundred Germans who wanted neither to fight nor surrender. They finally decided to fight a little, then surrendered almost wholly. Taken prisoner, most of them stated that their only hope had been to make their way back across the Rhine.

The 30th Infantry took Grendelbruch. The 2d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Frederick R. Armstrong, had an all-night house-to-house fight at Grendelbruch. Shortly before midnight Company E, under Capt. Ralph R. Carpenter, moved around to the right of the town, sweeping out the woods as it went. The company then attacked from the east as Company F, commanded by Capt. Marshall T. Hunt, struck simultaneously from the west. By 1000 November 26 the battalion headquarters was doing business at a CP situated in the center of the town.

The 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, had advanced from La Broque to Schirmeck, Wisches, Schwartzbach, Urmatt, and Dinsheim, to west of Mutzig, along the main road to Strasbourg by noon of the 26th. On the afternoon of November 26, 3d Battalion cleared Mutzig.

Combat Command A, 14th Armored Division, passed through the 3d Infantry Division, moving from Schirmeck at 0700, following two routes. One column followed the route Schirmeck-Mutzig south to Obernai east in the direction of Erstein. The second column followed the route Schirmeck-east to Russ-Grendelbruch-Obernai south to Coxwiller.

On the night of November 26-27, 1st and 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, assembled and moved by truck to an assembly area in the vicinity of Strasbourg, to which patrols had gone and met elements of the French 2d Armored Division which reached the town ahead of the 3d Division, having come in from the northwest. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, also moved by motor to take up defensive positions along the Rhine River south of Strasbourg that same night, and, 2d Battalion prepared to join it.

The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry cleared Rosheim, and moved on to establish defensive positions in the vicinity of Dorlisheim by 0330 of November 27. The 2d Battalion established roadblocks during the same period to protect 1st Battalion's flank. Company G patrols cleared Laubenheim and Mollkirch.

The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, captured Boersch, Klingenthal, and Obernai. Roadblocks were established on all roads leading out of Obernai.

On our north flank the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, attached, screened the last move into Strasbourg. Isolated enemy elements occasionally offered resistance, but the squadron, encountered no real fight until it approached the vicinity of Gambsheim, where determined SS troops made a stand. After much tentative probing of the strong positions here, the 117th settled down and awaited stronger forces to attack the town.

Strasbourg is the great communications and market center and capital of the Bas-Rhin Department, located on the Rhine River. The 7th prepared to relieve General Jacques Le Clerc's famed 2d French Armored Division which had taken Strasbourg and held positions in the city in the vicinity of the Kehl Bridge, which crosses the Rhine east of Strasbourg.

The port of Strasbourg, third largest in all France, stretches east to northeast between the Rhine and Kleiner Rhine (small Rhine) opposite the Kehl Bridge and has a peacetime annual capacity of ten million tons.

Strasbourg's peacetime population was nearly 200,000 persons. The III River crosses the city in two branches, one along the northeast edge and the other along the southwest. Upstream, the Ill joins the Rhone-Rhine Canal and the Breusch River whereas downstream, the river receives the waters of the Rhone-Rhine Canal.

The 7th Infantry took up defensive positions on the western outskirts of Strasbourg, the 15th occupied positions south of the city along the Rhine River and the 30th continued to scour the rear sector of the Division for straggler groups that had been by-passed in the rush to the Rhine and that had taken refuge in some old forts near Mutzig.

In one of them some 200 Germans, armed with bazookas, machine guns and small arms, offered stubborn resistance to all efforts to dislodge them. Benko Force of the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, commanded by 1st Lt. John F. Benko, spent several days searching caverns and hammering the strongpoints with fire from our TDs which had little effect on the occupants.

These forts had been a part of the Maginot Line. This one had been built in the late 1800s and later, modernized, completely equipped with generators, water supply, and ample ammunition. In its location and structure the fort posed a perplexing problem in reduction to the 30th Infantry, artillery, and 10th Engineer Battalion. Special interest was manifested in it owing to the fact that the VI Corps command post wished to move into Mutzig, but thought it inadvisable to locate with such proximity to the enemy.

The fort was built below ground level on the crest of the highest terrain in the area and was enclosed by a moat thirty feet wide and thirty feet deep. Any attempt to enter the fort could be frustrated by fire covering all angles of the moat. Direct fire could be brought to bear only on the steel turrets housing 150mm guns and the entrance, which was set at an angle to the fort' proper. Tanks could not approach the edge of the moat to pound the walls because of extremely accurate Panzerfaust fire from slits in the walls.

Lt. Col. John A. Heintges, 30th Infantry executive officer, was in charge of operations, and Company E was charged- with maintaining a cordon around the fort. A 155mm Long Tom was first employed in an attempt to batter down the entrance, only to find that entrance to the fort proper was still blocked by a series of steel doors and compartments, each of which could be sealed off from other sections. The second measure taken was to call on the Air Corps, and two missions with dive bombers, using heavy, delayed-action and fire-bombs, were flown-but with scant success because of the planes' inability to register successive direct hits. Company E maintained its vigil and Company H pounded the fort steadily with mortar fire.

Colonel Heintges finally devised a plan. First, he announced in German- to the garrison over a loudspeaker that the men had one-half hour in which to surrender, or else to be subjected to something new in secret weapons. This failed to budge them. At 'the end of the elapsed time Company H resumed its 88mm mortar fire to cover the work of a tank-dozer which was cutting a driveway to the edge of the moat. When the driveway was completed a captured halftrack personnel carrier loaded with four tons of explosive was started by Company C, 10th Engineer Battalion, and sent driverless toward the driveway. The vehicle toppled over and fell into the moat with its load of explosive resting against the wall.

The electrical detonator was disconnected by the plunge, so mortars fired on the vehicle. There was an explosion which rattled windows in Strasbourg, thirty miles away, and when the dust had settled a fifteen-foot hole marred the side of the fort.

During the night of December 4-5 the garrison endeavored to break out through the fire of Company E. After three unsuccessful attempts the detachment of eight-four men and officers surrendered at 0900, December 5. Only the commander, a major, escaped and he was rounded up at a roadblock a few days later.

Company E guarded the fort until it could be sealed by the 10th Engineers and rendered useless. On December 7 Company E rejoined its battalion at Oberhausbergen.

As November ended, the 79th Infantry Division was on the 3d's left flank and the 103d was on the right.

The 3d Infantry Division of World War II now began its "Watch on the Rhine." The first day of December found the 7th Infantry launching an attack to reduce the German bridgehead at the eastern outskirts of Strasbourg, opposite the town of Kehl, while other elements of the Division began police and guard duty in Strasbourg.

The 7th met stubborn resistance when it attacked on the morning of December 1. Small-arms, automatic weapon, machine-gun and rocket-launcher fire from dug-in positions on the west side of the river and mortar and artillery fire from the east side comprised the enemy defense.

The 2d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Clayton C. Thobro, took up the "Battle of the Apartment Houses" in the eastern section of the city while Company C, commanded by Capt. Beverly G. Hays, continued the street fight which it started shortly after midnight. Members of Company C will long remember the hand-to- hand battles that were staged in the vicinity of the Hippodrome and in the railroad yards on the edge of town. Sniper fire from across the river also added to the misery.

Organized resistance began to dwindle with daylight of December 2 after the 2d Battalion had cleared the peninsula between the Bassin De L'Industrie and the Rhine River. The entire area rocked late that afternoon as demolitions set off by the Germans destroyed all three bridges across the river. The last Germans to leave the bridgehead escaped by boat.

While the 7th was chasing the Germans from the west bank of the Rhine, the 1st Battalion of the 30th, attached to the 2d French Armored Division, veered suddenly south and crossed the southern branch of the III River between Sermersheim and Kogenheim. The mission was to secure a site for the French to build an armor-carrying span.

At about midnight, Colonel Porter's battalion crossed in boats and came under a concentration of heavy mortar and artillery fire. Company B, commanded by Ist Lt. Lysle E. Standish, made the crossing at Kogenheim, and Company C, under Ist Lt. Charles H. Skeahan, Jr., landed at Sermersheim, about a half mile upstream. The two companies came under more artillery fire in the towns, where an estimated 600 rounds of heavy enemy shells fell the next morning. Supported by French artillery and tanks, the attackers pushed the Germans out of the villages and carried the assault into the woods cast while Company A, commanded by 1st Lt. Willard C. Johnson, took over blocking positions to the southeast.

It Action described by a veteran doughboy as the toughest three days I have ever spent" came to a close when a French colonel announced that the battalion attached to him by the 30th Infantry "is the finest outfit of its kind I have ever seen."

So satisfied were the French forces with the job that they awarded twenty-three Croix de Guerre to members of the 30th's Ist battalion from CO Major Mackenzie E. Porter down to the privates of the front ranks, who received most of the decorations.

In the same way the French 2d Armored Division's plaudits were passed out to Company C. At Company C, 1st Lt. Rex Metcalfe accepted the tribute by passing credit on to his doughfeet, who ended their 48-plus hours of fighting by sitting on the division objective for fourteen hours alone.

The 15th Infantry continued to maintain defensive positions, check the numerous pillboxes that the enemy had evacuated, and provide anti-parachute alert units. Our troops occupied many of the pillboxes as outposts.

Marnemen will recall the guard duty in the old Alsatian capital-the Physics Building, Adolf Kosmier, Matford Factory, Hotel De Ville, the Pioneer Gasno, the laboratories at Fort Ney, and the interminable strings of railroad cars that filled the yards.

Many will remember the worship services that were held in the world-famous Strasbourg Cathedral . . . the first since the Germans came in 1940. Others will recall the burial given Pfc. Simon Quiroz of the 15th Infantry, who was the only 3d Division man to die in the liberation of the little village of Mutzig. M. Haller Eugene, mayor of St. Maurice, was given permission to conduct the services, which were attended by a guard of honor from VI Corps artillery. After eulogizing Quiroz and paying high tribute to the 3d Division, the mayor announced that a plaque would be erected in honor of the fallen soldier.

Strasbourg, as the largest and most important city occupied by the 3d Division in France, called for special attention from the occupying forces. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, for instance, guarded intelligence targets prescribed by Sixth Army Group's T- Force, which had the mission of protecting and exploiting anything that might yield information of the enemy's army or war industry. Included in the targets were an amphibious-motor-vehicle plant, an important naval munitions experimental plant, and the notorious laboratory at the University of Strasbourg, whose doctors were accused of performing experiments with poison gas and disease cultures on living humans.

Before reaching Strasbourg, the Division also liberated one of the most brutal of the Nazi concentration camps-that at Natzwiller, northeast of Schirmeck.

The Division established a supervisory city administration (G-5) under the A C of S, G-2, Lt. Col. Grover Wilson. Until the arrival of French 10th Military District headquarters under the French General Schwartz, the Division was responsible for guarding food dumps, utilities and warehouses, arranging for transportation and distribution of food, and other functions performed by military government personnel.

Prize PW of the Strasbourg episode was General Major (equivalent: Brig. Gen.) Vaterrodt, the town commandant, who was described by interrogators as cringing, totally opportunistic, and only too willing to give information if it might improve his position with his captors.

On December 8, the Division started a program of deception, designed to assist the VI Corps in its attack in the north toward Germany.

Artillery registration on points east of the Rhine River, apparently "careless" revealing of rubber assault boats on the banks of the river with an occasional boat being sent downstream on the. loose, and many other measures were perpetrated, designed to make the Germans believe that the 3d was going to cross the Rhine in the Strasbourg sector.

Once the restoration of some degree of order) if not normality, was well under way in Strasbourg, the 3d had some chance to reflect upon its recent accomplishments. The effect of the sullenly-bitter Vosges battle manifested itself in several ways.

LeClerc's 2d Armored Division,, the outfit which had been first to enter Paris the previous autumn, and which had moved on Strasbourg from a general northwest direction in the recent drive with characteristic celerity, had spearheaded that effort to crack German defenses before the Rhine River. Enemy elements west of the river were already partially frustrated in their efforts to hold a sizable salient when elements of the French First Army reached the Rhine just above Basle, Switzerland, and moved up to liberate a section of territory which included Mulhouse. This occurred a short time before our own all-out push from the Meurthe.

The 3d Infantry Division had broken through the enemy's intended winter line, spearheading Seventh Army's push through the central Vosges in the latter stages of the drive, to widen the breach made by the first breakthrough to Strasbourg, and to help reduce German forces west of the Rhine in our sector and split them into two groups: a large pocket which included Colmar on the south and a German foothold on Alsatian soil to the north which was rapidly dwindling under continued Seventh Army pressure.

The recent drive had been record-making in several ways. In a congratulatory message, VI Corps Commander Major General Edward H. Brooks made note of one precedent-shattering fact:

"Since the beginning of the military history of Europe, to force a successful passage of the Vosges Mountains has been considered by military experts as an operation offering such small opportunity for success as to forestall consideration of such effort." [No military force had ever before crossed the Vosges against organized resistance.]

"To march, supply and maintain a large body of troops through these natural obstacles, without hostile opposition, is a major problem in itself."

"To fight cross-country, in the face of unreasoning, stubborn Nazi resistance, at times supplying over snowcovered mountain roads and trails, through this region and at this season of the year, is a military achievement of which all who participated can be justly proud."

"To those men of the 100th and 36th Divisions who battered the flanks, to those of the 3d and 103d Divisions and of the 14th Armored Division who poured onto the Alsatian Plain, to those supporting combat troops of the Corps, and to those indispensable elements of supply, maintenance, and evacuation, I extend my thanks and congratulations. Teamwork, throughout to a superlative degree."

"It is with pride and humility that I realize the pinnacle and the magnitude of this concerted achievement of American soldiery-your achievement. I have every confidence that the future of the VI Corps rests secure and bright in your capable hands."

Bare statistics pointed up another important feat. From the beginning of the attack on the morning of November 21 to the time leading elements of the 7th Infantry entered Strasbourg on the night of the 26th, the distance covered was at least fifty miles, measured by road. The troops who ended the long march in the vicinity of Strasbourg were very near exhaustion.

They were not particularly articulate about their great success. The trail was too rocky. Even at the finish, when the Rhine forced a temporary halt, the job was not done. There had been the grinding, nerve-wracking "Battle of the Apartment Houses" under small-arms, machine-gun, and Panzerfaust fire, and heavy caliber artillery from Germany for the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Infantry. There was the temporary attachment of 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry to LeClerc, and Company E's battle to reduce the Mutzig fort,

There was to be no sustained period of rest in Strasbourg. On the north the bulk of Seventh Army was continuing to force the issue with the enemy remaining in Alsace in that sector. The 36th and 103d (the latter very shortly relieved and sent to rejoin the Seventh) were still in strong contact with the Germans to the south. The French 2d Armored slowed down in its attack toward Colmar as the enemy, anticipating a pincers between I French Corps on the south and II French Corps on the north flank, demolished bridges along every possible route of approach and offered tenacious resistance to the attackers. The 36th Division was attached to II French Corps.

There was much speculation in regard to 3d Division's next assignment. Cross the Rhine? Go north and into Germany through the old Maginot Line? Or south, to join the French . . .?